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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
Introduction: December 1907 and Beyond 
At 10:30 a.m. on December 6, 1907, there was a massive explosion at the 
interconnected No. 6 and No. 8 mines of the Fairmont Coal Company in Monongah, 
West Virginia. The explosion spread rapidly through the two mines and was heard up to 
eight miles away. Hundreds of men and boys were burned alive, crushed by rubble, or 
asphyxiated by the lethal quantities of methane gas, or “black damp,” released by the 
blast. As the rescue operation started, grief-stricken families and relatives congregated at 
the entrance to the mines. The methane gas hindered rescuers’ efforts to find survivors by 
limiting the time they could stay underground to fifteen-minute intervals. Even working 
in relay teams, many of the rescue workers became ill or died as a result of entering the 
mines. On December 8, the Washington Post reported, “A score of men of the rescuing 
parties are in critical condition tonight from inhaling black damp. Several of them are 
expected to die. One of these men, John Gabber, was carried from the mine tonight 
almost a raving maniac. His lungs were filled with black damp, which produced a 
delirium, and the services of four men were necessary to hold Gabbert while doctors 
attended him.”1 In the days that followed the disaster, the rescue workers recovered sixty-
six burned and mutilated bodies, many in such bad condition that immediate burial was 
                                                 
1 Washington Post, December 8, 1907, 1. 
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necessary. They found only one survivor, a Polish immigrant named Peter Urban, who 
was sitting on top of the body of his twin brother.2  
There has been considerable debate over exactly how many people died in the 
Monongah disaster. The official death toll was 372, but evidence suggests that more than 
500 miners lost their lives. The Fairmont Coal Company, a subsidiary of the 
Consolidation Coal Company, did not keep accurate records of its workforce, particularly 
the ‘unofficial workers,’ such as mule drivers and trapper boys.3 The exact cause of the 
disaster also remains unclear, although investigators concluded that the most likely 
explanation was that a blown fuse caused the “black damp” to ignite the combustible coal 
dust in the mine.  
Five days before the Monongah disaster, thirty-four miners died in an explosion at 
the Naomi mine in Fayette City, Pennsylvania. Later in the month, on December 19, a 
methane explosion killed 239 men and boys at the Darr coal mine in Jacob’s Creek, 
Pennyslvania. The blast was so powerful that many of the bodies recovered from the 
                                                 
2 For extensive coverage of the Monongah mining disaster, see New York Times, 
December 7, 1907, 1; New York Times, December 9, 1907, 3; New York Times, December 
10, 1907, 2; New York Times, December 11, 1907, 7; New York Times, December 12, 
1907, 1; New York Times, December 13, 1907, 18; Washington Post, December 7, 1907, 
1 and 3; Washington Post, December 8, 1907, 1 and 8; Washington Post, December 9, 
1907, 1 and 3; Washington Post, December 10, 1907, 5; Washington Post, December 11, 
1907, 5; Washington Post, December 12, 1907, 5. For an extensive account of 
community, culture, and the mining economy in Monongah see Davitt McAteer, 
Monongah: The Tragic Story of the 1907 Monongah Mining Disaster, the Worst 
Industrial Accident in U.S. History (Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 2007). 
An extensive discussion the Monongah disaster in the larger context of workplace safety 
in the Progressive Era can be found in William Graebner, Coal Mine Health and Safety in 
the Progressive Era: The Political Economy of Reform (Lexington: The University Press 
of Kentucky, 1976). 
 
3 For a complete discussion of the debate surrounding the Monongah death toll, see 
McAteer, Monongah, especially 218-241. 
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mine were headless or burned beyond recognition. In addition, hundreds of other miners 
died in isolated accidents throughout 1907. That year, there were over three thousand 
fatalities in the coal mines of the United States.4 In response to the Monongah disaster, 
the federal government created an agency called the Bureau of Mines to provide safety 
recommendations to the coal industry and carry out research, while many state 
legislatures revised their mining codes with the intention of reducing the hazards that 
miners faced on the job. The United Mine Workers of America, the largest union in the 
coalfields, mostly engaged in retroactive policies, by campaigning for improved workers’ 
compensation and hospital care for miners. 
The events of 1907 emphasized the dangers of coal mine labor. Historian Price 
Fishback notes that coal mining was one of the most dangerous jobs ever devised.5 
Miners faced a wide range of safety hazards in their work. They labored deep 
underground in near total darkness. They were at constant risk of being crushed to death, 
with tons of shifting rock overhead supported only by fragile wooden timbers. 
Throughout the twentieth century, roof collapses were the most common cause of death 
in underground mines. Coal miners also faced the constant threat of being injured or 
killed in an explosion, as they worked with explosives in an atmosphere filled with 
methane and other ignitable gases. Miners were often responsible for making their own 
                                                 
4 For coverage of the Naomi disaster, see New York Times, December 3, 1907, 1; 
Washington Post, December 2, 1907, 1; Washington Post, December 3, 1907, 1. For a 
detailed account of the Darr mine disaster, see New York Times, December 20, 1907, 1 
and 2; New York Times, December 21, 1907, 8; New York Times, December 22, 1907, 4; 
Washington Post, December 20, 1907, 1 and 2; Washington Post, December 21, 1907, 1. 
 
5 Price Fishback, “The Miner’s Work Environment: Safety and Company Towns in the 
Early 1900s,” The United Mine Workers of America: A Model of Industrial Solidarity?, 
edited by John Laslett (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University, 1996), 201. 
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explosive devices, and were frequently involved in accidents as a result of overloading 
the explosives or going back to a device after it had been lit. The cars that hauled coal 
through the mines also posed a significant risk. Miners were often killed by runaway cars 
or as a result of falling off the ‘mantrip’ that transported workers through the mine. With 
the advent of electrification in the mines, the wires that powered cars and lighting were 
often exposed. Miners frequently died of electrocution when they brushed against the 
wires. 6   
As the twentieth century progressed, coal miners faced new hazards in their 
working environment. The mechanized loading machine gradually replaced miners who 
loaded coal onto cars by hand. The loading machine forced miners to work more quickly, 
increasing the chance that they would cause an accident through error or carelessness. 
When production demands were especially high, miners often neglected to carry out roof 
control procedures. Moreover, the loading machines generated more methane gas and 
higher quantities of coal dust. 7 This not only made explosions more likely, but also 
greatly increased miners’ chances of developing pneumoconiosis, or ‘black lung,’ a 
debilitating, work-related respiratory disease. Coal operators increasingly mechanized 
their operations after World War II. Consequently, black lung disease became more 
prevalent among miners, causing long-term chronic suffering and early death for the men 
who labored underground. In the coal industry, there was a distinct connection between 
                                                 
6 Fishback, “The Miner’s Work Environment,” 201-203. For a more thorough account, 
see Price Fishback, Soft Coal, Hard Choices: The Economic Welfare of Bituminous Coal 
Miners, 1890-1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).  
 
7 Keith Dix, “Mechanization, Workplace Control, and the End of the Handloading Era,” 
United Mine Workers of America: A Model of Industrial Solidarity?, edited by John 
Laslett (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University, 1996), 176. 
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the safety hazards that caused immediate injury or death and the health hazards that 
resulted in ‘black lung’ and other long-term occupational diseases. The coal dust that 
permeated the atmosphere in underground mines both caused explosions and led to 
crippling occupational lung disease in miners. 
The federal government’s creation of the Bureau of Mines in the aftermath of the 
Monongah disaster emphasized that legislative change in the coal industry was driven by 
the public outcry resulting from large-scale disasters. The routine hazards that miners 
faced, and the thousands of deaths that occurred from isolated accidents such as roof falls 
and mechanical failures, typically did not influence the federal government and state 
legislatures to improve health and safety regulations. During the twentieth century, each 
major reform of mining legislation in the United States occurred as a result of the 
widespread publicity and research efforts generated by major disasters. In 1941, the 
Franklin Roosevelt administration passed the Federal Coal Mine Inspection and 
Investigation Act, which enacted limited safety measures for the coal industry.8 The 
passage of the 1941 legislation followed two major disasters the previous year. On 
January 10, 1940, ninety-one miners perished in an explosion at the Pond Creek No. 1 
mine in Bartley, West Virginia.9 Two months later, on March 16, seventy-two miners lost 
                                                 
8 For details of the 1940 Inspection and Investigation Act, which was part of a larger 
federal appropriations program for the Department of the Interior, see U.S. Statutes 54 
(1939-41): 441-445. 
 
9 For a full account of the Bartley disaster, see New York Times, January 11, 1940, 1; New 
York Times, January 12, 1940, 11; New York Times, January 13, 1940, 1 and 16; New 
York Times, January 14, 1940; 3; New York Times, January 15, 1940, 3; Washington Post, 
January 11, 1940, 1; Washington Post, January 12, 1940, 1 and 5; Washington Post, 
January 13, 1940, 1. 
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their lives in an explosion in the Willow Grove No. 10 mine at St. Clairsville, Ohio.10 
Similarly, the next major legislative development in mine health and safety occurred as a 
result of a major coal mine disaster. The Harry Truman administration passed the Federal 
Coal Mine Safety Act in 1952 after a massive explosion at the Orient No. 2 mine in 
Frankfort, Illinois, in 1951, killed 112 miners.11 The 1941 and 1952 legislative acts are 
discussed later in this chapter. Most notably, the Richard Nixon administration passed the 
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 following a major coal mine disaster in 
Farmington, West Virginia in 1968, which claimed the lives of seventy-eight miners. The 
1969 Federal Mine Act mandated strong enforcement measures, as well as compensation 
for black lung victims. Nixon strengthened the terms of the 1969 Federal Mine Act by 
signing the Black Lung Benefits Act in 1972. Further emphasizing the link between 
safety and health, the congressional debate that preceded the passage of the Federal Mine 
Act of 1969 incorporated both issues into a single legislative bill. The Farmington 
disaster also led to changes in West Virginia’s worker compensation laws.12 
                                                 
10 For a full account of the St. Clairsville disaster, see New York Times, March 17, 1940, 
3; New York Times, March 18, 1940, 10; New York Times, March 19, 1940, 26; 
Washington Post, March 17, 1940, 1; Washington Post, March 18, 1940, 1; Washington 
Post, March 19, 1940, 3. 
 
11 For the full text of the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act of 1952, see Federal Coal Mine 
Safety Act of 1952. U.S. Statutes At Large 66 (1952): 692-710. For a full account of the 
Frankfort mine disaster, see Chicago Tribune, December 22, 1951, 1; Chicago Tribune, 
December 23, 1951, 3; Chicago Tribune, December 24, 1951, 1; Chicago Tribune, 
December 26, 1951, 20; New York Times, December 22, 1951, 1 and 30; New York 
Times, December 23, 1951, 1 and 16; New York Times, December 24, 1951, 1 and 7; New 
York Times, December 25, 1951, 1 and 24; New York Times, December 26, 1951, 40. 
 
12 The Farmington disaster and its political and legislative implications, particularly the 
emergence of the West Virginia Black Lung Association, are discussed in detail in 
chapter two. The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 is the main focus of 
chapter three, while the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 is covered in chapter six. 
 . 
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It is ironic that the most significant advances in coal mine health and safety 
legislation in the twentieth century occurred during the Richard Nixon administration. 
Nixon was a Republican president whose political philosophy opposed government 
regulation of economic enterprise and favored corporate interests over those of labor and 
the environment. Nixon decided to sign the Federal Mine Act of 1969 and the Black 
Lung Benefits Act of 1972, both passed by a Democratic-controlled Congress, for two 
key reasons. First, he sought to strengthen his blue-collar support for the 1972 
presidential election and, second, he wanted to secure the Democrats’ approval for his 
defense and foreign policy objectives.13 Yet other factors also influenced Nixon’s 
decision to sign the legislation. To a large extent, he was responding to the Farmington 
disaster and the grassroots protest that spread through the coalfields in its aftermath.  
In this dissertation, I show that the Farmington disaster gave rise to a generation 
of coal mine health and safety advocacy and legislation. Coal miners used the Farmington 
disaster to convince distant and hostile elected officials of the need for stronger health 
and safety and compensation laws, at both the state and federal levels. I argue that miners 
and their supporters achieved substantial legislative change through community-driven 
activism. A large number of rank and file miners rejected the national leadership of their 
union, the United Mine Workers of America (UMW), which was corrupt and inattentive 
to their concerns, and instead used local branches of the union and grassroots 
                                                 
13 Nixon’s efforts to win blue-collar support and to court the Democrats for his defense 
and foreign policy aims are discussed in chapter three. Jefferson Cowie has researched 
Nixon’s efforts to win blue-collar support for the 1972 election in great detail. See, for 
example, Jefferson Cowie, “Nixon’s Class Struggle: Romancing the New Right Worker, 
1969-1973,” Labor History 43 (2002); Jefferson Cowie, “Vigorously Left, Right, and 
Center: The Crosscurrents of Working Class America in the 1970s,” America in the 
Seventies, edited by Beth Bailey and David Farber (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2004). 
 . 
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organizations as the foundation for challenging weak coal mine laws. Supported by their 
families, miners’ widows, retired and disabled coal miners, and local volunteers, as well 
as politicians and medical physicians, the miners’ campaign for legislative change was 
rooted in the community of the Appalachian coalfields.  
The support from the wider community was the most important dimension in the 
miners’ campaign. While many elected officials were hostile to reform, a small minority 
provided crucial support for the miners’ cause. In particular, Representative Ken Hechler 
(D-WV) and Representative Phil Burton (D-CA) exerted considerable pressure on the 
U.S. Congress to adopt strong preventative health and safety measures and compensation 
provisions, which were embodied in the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969. Dissenting members of the medical establishment also contributed to the miners’ 
campaign. Dr. Isidore Buff, Dr. Hawey Wells, and Dr. Donald Rasmussen rejected their 
peers’ claim that miners’ lung disease was the result of cigarette smoking. Instead, they 
linked miners’ lung ailments directly to the inhalation of coal dust. They formed the 
Black Lung Association (BLA), which initiated grassroots protest across the West 
Virginia coalfields by organizing miners, their families, and local communities. The 
Black Lung Association’s campaign persuaded the state legislature to provide workers’ 
compensation to the victims of black lung disease in 1969. Furthermore, the physicians’ 
testimony on the impact of coal dust on miners’ lungs influenced the passage of the 
Federal Mine Act that year.  
Miners and their supporters continued to engage in community-driven, grassroots 
protest when they realized that their legislative achievements were being undermined by 
an inefficient and industry-orientated federal bureaucracy, represented by the U.S. 
 . 
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Bureau of Mines and the Social Security Administration (SSA). The Bureau of Mines 
failed to enforce the health and safety legislation in the Federal Mine Act of 1969, while 
the SSA denied compensation to tens of thousands of miners who were suffering from 
black lung disease. Rank and file miners and local and district union leaders protested 
against the Bureau of Mines by sending letters to their Congressman and the UMW 
national leadership. They highlighted the Bureau’s lax enforcement policies and its 
neglect of non-union mines. While the letters did not significantly influence the Bureau’s 
policies, they showed that the miners were conscious, determined protestors who actively 
protested the federal government’s failure to enforce health and safety. The Black Lung 
Association, which expanded beyond its West Virginia origins into several other states, 
launched a sustained campaign of lobbying and protesting against the Social Security 
Administration. The campaign resulted in significant changes to the federal black lung 
compensation program in 1972. 
 Miners also believed that the corrupt national leadership of the United Mine 
Workers, fronted by President Tony Boyle, was an obstacle to safe working conditions in 
the coalfields. When Jock Yablonski, Boyle’s opponent in the 1969 union presidential 
election, was murdered, a small group of rank and file miners formed Miners for 
Democracy. Convinced that the national leadership was behind Yablonski’s death, they 
sought to make the UMW more democratic and attentive to health and safety issues. 
The success of community activism in the coalfields in the early 1970s was 
undermined by the energy crisis, which prompted coal operators to prioritize higher 
production ahead of safe working conditions. While President Jimmy Carter signed 
legislative acts in 1977 to improve mine health and safety and regulate the environmental 
 . 
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abuses of the coal industry, the activists’ achievements were further undermined by the 
deregulatory policies of the Ronald Reagan administration.   
To undertake this study, I conducted research at several archival institutions. The 
Walter P. Reuther Library of Labor and Urban Affairs at Wayne State University, which 
contains many valuable materials on coal mine health and safety, was particularly useful. 
I examined documents in the Richard J. Jensen Collection, John Herling Collection and, 
most significantly, the Miners for Democracy Collection, which contains the papers of 
the grassroots organization of the same name that seized control of the United Mine 
Workers in 1972. I also undertook research in the Special Collections Library at 
Pennsylvania State University, which holds the extensive Safety Division Office Files of 
the United Mine Workers. At the West Virginia State Archives, I researched reports, 
documents, and studies pertaining specifically to coal miners in that state. Elsewhere in 
West Virginia, I consulted materials in the Historical Collection of the Mine Enforcement 
and Safety Administration in Beckley and UMW Welfare and Retirement Fund papers in 
the West Virginia Collection at West Virginia University. As well as carrying out 
research in archival institutions, I conducted several oral history interviews and studied a 
range of periodicals, magazines, and national and regional newspapers. During a trip to 
the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., I conducted research using regional 
newspapers from Kentucky. Finally, I expanded my primary research with government 
reports, the U.S. Congressional Record, and the minutes of legislative hearings before 
Congressional committees and subcommittees.  
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The Historiography of Coal Mine Health and Safety, 1968-1988 
While this study diverges from the existing literature, it is necessary to place it in 
the context of the larger historiography. Several historians and writers have addressed the 
issue of coal mine health and safety in the United States, most notably labor historian 
Alan Derickson, whose book, Black Lung: Anatomy of a Public Health Disaster, is the 
definitive work on the cultural, political and social evolution of black lung disease from 
the late nineteenth century to 1969. In Black Lung, Derickson argues that social 
movements were key to the gradual recognition of miners’ lung disease. He also contends 
that the real tragedy of black lung was the failure of operators, physicians, and legislators 
to address the disease in the late nineteenth century, even though they possessed enough 
knowledge to do so.14 Derickson concludes his study by explaining that the passage of 
the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 represented the culmination of 
activism in the coalfields. Aside from a few brief paragraphs, he does not assess the 
effectiveness of the act in addressing black lung disease among coal miners, nor does he 
carry the story forward to incorporate the burgeoning activism in the coalfields in the 
early 1970s.  
Derickson also addresses ‘black lung,’ or pneumoconiosis, in several articles, 
most notably, “Down Solid: The Origins and Development of the Black Lung 
Insurgency,” in which he argues that West Virginia miners did not abandon their union, 
the United Mine Workers of America (UMW), in pursuit of state black lung 
compensation legislation in early 1969, but rather used local union branches as the 
                                                 
14 Alan Derickson, Black Lung: Anatomy of a Public Health Disaster (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1998), xii-xiii. 
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foundation of their activism.15 In “The United Mine Workers of America and the 
Recognition of Occupational Respiratory Diseases, 1902-1968,” Derickson argues that 
the UMW played a crucial role in advancing recognition of miners’ lung disease, 
particularly through the dissemination of information by its Welfare and Retirement Fund 
in the 1950s and 1960s.16 
In Digging Our Own Graves: Coal Miners and the Struggle Over Black Lung 
Disease, Barbara Smith also focuses on black lung disease. She argues that miners gained 
recognition of occupational lung disease by emphasizing their personal experience of the 
disease and engaging in collective action. Smith’s study is supported by an extensive 
number of oral history interviews with coal miners, activists, and politicians. The book 
ends in 1977, with the passage of amendments to federal black lung legislation during the 
Carter administration. In her coverage of events from 1969 onwards, however, Smith 
neglects to analyze the federal agencies responsible for health and safety enforcement. 
She focuses mostly on black lung activists’ campaign for legislative amendments and the 
change in leadership of the United Mine Workers in 1972.17 
Bennett M. Judkins examines the Black Lung Association, especially its 
organizing activities in its pursuit of amendments to the Federal Coal Mine Health and 
Safety of 1969. In his dissertation, “The Black Lung Association: A Case Study of a 
                                                 
15 Alan Derickson, “Down Solid: The Origins and Development of the Black Lung 
Insurgency,” Journal of Public Health Policy 4 (1983), 25-44. 
 
16 Alan Derickson, “The United Mine Workers of America and the Recognition of 
Occupational Respiratory Diseases, 1902-1968,” American Journal of Public Health 86 
(June 1991), 782-90. 
 
17 Barbara Smith, Digging Our Own Graves: Coal Miners and the Struggle Over Black 
Lung Disease (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988). 
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Modern Social Movement,” Judkins focuses on the internal dynamics of the Black Lung 
Association (BLA), particularly the role of central leaders in guiding BLA policies and 
the relationship between different local chapters.18 Judkins develops his work on the 
black lung movement in his book, We Offer Ourselves As Evidence: Towards Workers’ 
Control of Occupational Health, which focuses on the politics of two specific diseases, 
coal miners’ lung disease and ‘brown lung,’ a lung disorder affecting textile workers.19 
He argues that retired and disabled miners and textile workers played a crucial role in the 
advancement of occupational health laws. By looking beyond the role of active workers 
in the campaign for legislative reform, Judkins makes an important contribution to the 
historiographical debate on coal mine health and safety. Again, however, the focus of his 
research is limited to black lung disease, rather than a broader analysis of safety and 
health. Two additional articles by Judkins provide a detailed examination of black lung 
disease and the black lung movement.20 
Other books discuss coal mine health and safety from the perspective of the 
United Mine Workers of America, the main labor union in America’s coalfields. Brit 
Hume’s Death and the Mines: Rebellion and Murder in the UMW examines the decline 
                                                 
18 Bennett Mallory Judkins, “The Black Lung Association: A Case Study of a Modern 
Social Movement (Ph.D. diss., University of Tennessee, 1975). 
 
19 Bennett M. Judkins, We Offer Ourselves As Evidence: Towards Workers’ Control of 
Occupational Health (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986). 
 
20 Bennett M. Judkins, “Mobilization of Membership: The Black and Brown Lung 
Movements,” Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies, edited by Jo Freeman (New 
York: Longman, 1983), 35-51; Bennett M. Judkins, “”The People’s Respirator: Coalition 
Building and the Black Lung Association,” Fighting Back in Appalachia: Traditions of 
Resistance and Change, edited by Stephen L. Fisher (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1993), 225-241. 
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of the UMW, giving particular focus to the period from 1968 to 1971.21 Much of the book 
covers the union’s neglect of health and safety under W. Anthony “Tony” Boyle, who 
assumed the UMW presidency in 1963. Published in 1971, Hume’s book is a 
contemporary expose of the union, not a historical monograph. Furthermore, Hume’s 
background as a journalist means the book should be treated with caution. It does not list 
citations or a bibliography, and his arguments are largely based on his observations and 
investigations. Yet, even accounting for such limitations, Death in the Mines is rich in 
detail, and its content is verifiable through other primary and secondary sources. In The 
Corrupt Kingdom: The Rise and Fall of the United Mine Workers, labor lawyer Joseph E. 
Finley provides a general history of the union, devoting substantial focus to its health and 
safety policies. Finley traces the history of the UMW until 1972, the year the book was 
published, emphasizing internal corruption and the decline of coal mine health and safety 
under Boyle.22 Both monographs are limited in that they do not provide a long-range 
perspective of the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Act. 
Published in 1973, J. Davitt McAteer’s Coal Mine Health and Safety: The Case of 
West Virginia is perhaps the most comprehensive account of coal mine health and safety 
in a single coal mining state. Based on an earlier study conducted by McAteer and a team 
of graduate students working for consumer advocate Ralph Nader, the book examines 
health and safety from the perspectives of the miners, the UMW, the coal operators, the 
federal government, and the West Virginia state government. McAteer depicts the 
                                                 
21 Brit Hume, Death in the Mines: Murder and Rebellion in the United Mine Workers 
(New York: Grossman, 1971). 
 
22 Joseph E. Finley, The Corrupt Kingdom: The Rise and Fall of the United Mine 
Workers (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972). 
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residents of the coalfields as victims of the mining operators, who exploit West Virginia’s 
mineral resources and evade payment of local taxes. McAteer’s analysis shows that 
institutions such as the U.S. Bureau of Mines and the West Virginia state government 
perpetuated the status of coal miners as victims.23  
 
Defining Miners’ Occupational Lung Disease 
To understand the struggle over coal mine health and safety from 1968 to 1988, it 
is necessary to examine the key participants, as well as the significant issues, from the 
late nineteenth century. One of the central issues has been the conflict over the definition 
of pneumoconiosis, or ‘black lung,’ a debilitating work-related disease afflicting coal 
miners. Despite miners’ insistence that coal dust impaired their breathing, physicians and 
coal operators minimized the severity of the disease by classifying it as miners’ asthma, 
thus preventing the passage of preventative legislation until the late 1960s. 
By the turn of the century, American coal miners suffered from a range of chronic 
occupational illnesses, including miners’ asthma, bronchitis, and emphysema. ‘Miners’ 
asthma,’ now more commonly known as pneumoconiosis or ‘black lung disease,’ was the 
contemporary name given to lung disease caused by the inhalation of coal dust. In his 
post-mortem examinations of coal miners in the late nineteenth century, Dr. John O. 
Malley, of Scranton, Pennsylvania, frequently discovered that their lungs had absorbed 
excessive quantities of fine coal dust particles.”24 Coal operators, nor the United Mine 
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Workers, and certainly not the federal and state governments made significant efforts to 
address miners’ lung disease. Beginning around 1910, operators typically followed 
engineers’ recommendations of using mechanical fans or spraying water, but such 
techniques did not significantly reduce the quantities of airborne coal dust. The limited 
political and economic power of the United Mine Workers restricted its efforts to obtain 
preventative measures for occupational disease, so it focused more on providing 
compensation for the victims. In contract negotiations, however, the union opted to push 
for wages to renumerate miners for the dangers they faced.25 
 In 1902, miners in the Pennsylvania anthracite coalfields went on strike for higher 
wages and a shorter working week.26 The Anthracite Coal Strike Commission, created by 
President Theodore Roosevelt in response to the strike, arbitrated a settlement between 
the United Mine Workers and the coal operators that provided the miners with limited 
concessions, including a ten percent wage increase and reduced working hours.  After the 
strike, physicians, engineers, and industry representatives started to deny that coal dust 
was harmful to miners, in what Alan Derickson refers to as “an amazing reversal.”27 
Many denied that anthracosis, or black lung, was a legitimate disease, while several 
investigators, disregarding miners’ black spit, argued that blackened lung tissue was 
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nothing more than “a harmless discoloration.” In 1924, British physician Thomas Oliver 
maintained that miners’ coughing up of black fluid was beneficial, as it cleaned the lungs 
of coal dust. Most notably, an increasing number of physicians argued that miners could 
protect themselves from tuberculosis by inhaling coal dust. Anthracite coal operators had 
tried to convince the 1902 strike commission of the “antiseptic properties” of carbon dust, 
and they had argued that hard coal dust was “more than ordinarily healthful,” but without 
success.28 In the years following the strike, the argument that coal dust was beneficial to 
miners became increasingly widespread. Physicians’ claims about coal dust contrasted 
with the prevailing medical logic on silica dusts, such as marble, slate, and flint, which 
were found in some coal seams and other hard rock mines, and regarded as a key cause of 
tuberculosis and lung diseases.29   
Edgar Collis, a British scientist, conflated pneumoconiosis with silicosis, a 
disease that afflicted hard rock miners. He argued that if miners had lung disease, then 
they must have inhaled rock dust. He further maintained that coal dust was “not 
injurious” and that miners who breathed it were less susceptible to tuberculosis. For 
Collis, tuberculosis was primarily caused by silica dust.30 In a lecture before the British 
Medical Association, he emphasized, “Some dusts, such as coal… not only appear to 
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have no power of producing pneumonoconioses, but even may possess some inhibitory 
influence on phthisis.”31  
Similarly, medical researchers Eugene Pendergrass and Henry Pancoast used 
radiology to dismiss the threat posed by coal dust. They argued that X-rays clearly 
showed the effects of silica, in the form of nodules on the lungs, but they downplayed the 
shadows that indicated deposits of coal dust. They pointed to the large number of elderly, 
seemingly healthy miners who had such X-rays. In using X-rays to dismiss the severity of 
coal miners’ asthma, they ignored the physical symptoms caused by the inhalation of coal 
dust, including miners’ struggle to breathe and their expectoration of thick, black sputum, 
a process commonly referred to as melanoptysis. Like Collis, Pendergrass and Pancoast 
used the terms ‘silicosis’ and ‘pneumoconiosis’ interchangeably to describe lung disease 
caused by the inhalation of silica dust. Yet, in their study, Pneumoconiosis [Silicosis], 
Pendergrass and Pancoast mentioned, but failed to account for, the high incidence of 
pneumoconiosis among locomotive firemen, who were not exposed to rock dust in their 
work.32 
By 1920, medical professionals and researchers, supported by the coal operators, 
were widely extolling the benefits of coal dust. They dismissed anthracosis as nothing 
more than a slight discoloration of the lungs. A minority of critics continued to argue that 
coal dust was harmful to miners’ long-term health. Miners disputed the claim that they 
were not suffering from a disease specific to the coal industry. For almost half a century, 
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there was little change in this dispute. Great Britain, meanwhile, recognized the health 
implications of coal dust by passing a black lung compensation law in 1943.33 
 
The Federal Response: The U. S. Bureau of Mines and (Ineffective) Safety Laws 
As noted above, the federal government only engaged in legislative change in 
response to large-scale disasters. The Monongah disaster of 1907 prompted the federal 
government to examine the issue of coal mine health and safety more closely. In the first 
three years after the Monongah disaster, Congress provided funds for the Technologic 
Branch of the Geological Survey to carry out scientific research and provide educational 
programs on safe mining practices. Because these functions stretched beyond the 
Geological Survey’s mandate, Congress sought an alternative means of improving health 
and safety. It created a new agency, the Bureau of Mines, located in the Department of 
the Interior, and appointed the head of the Technologic Branch, Joseph A. Holmes, as its 
first director.34 Holmes had been advocating a national mining agency since becoming 
head of the Technologic Branch in 1905. Formerly a professor of geology and natural 
history at the University of North Carolina, and the head of the department of mining and 
metallurgy at the 1903 Louisiana Purchase Exposition, Holmes had long sought to 
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improve the efficiency of mineral production and the conditions of the men who labored 
underground.35 
 The Bureau’s key functions were conducting scientific research and making 
recommendations on mine safety. In its early years, it did not have the authority to 
inspect mines or to formally enact the recommendations it made, nor could it investigate 
the social and legal aspects of mining companies’ operations. For instance, the Bureau 
proposed reducing coal dust in underground mines through the use of rock dusting, a 
practice that involved spraying the walls and roof with a substance containing limestone 
and silica, but most companies resisted this measure. It did not become mandatory. The 
Bureau also had little success in encouraging coal operators to avoid using types of 
equipment it identified as liable to cause explosions. The Bureau did, however, 
successfully facilitate the creation of mine safety stations, but only because the federal 
government assumed the cost. The United Mine Workers attacked the Bureau because it 
focused principally on responding to disasters and not preventing them.36 The UMW also 
condemned Joseph A. Holmes, because he gave the impression of being more concerned 
with production than safety.37 
 The Bureau’s role remained unchanged for thirty years until Congress passed the 
Coal Mine Inspection and Investigation Act in 1941. The act gave the Bureau the 
authority to inspect mines and write reports concerning safety recommendations. The 
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Bureau, however, still had no powers of enforcement, and operators were not legally 
bound to follow its recommendations. The 1941 act stipulated that only state 
governments had the authority to enforce safety measures in the coal industry. Without 
the ability to enforce its recommendations, the Bureau was powerless to stop operators 
from using equipment that was liable to cause explosions. In the following nine years, 
835 miners died in coal explosions across the United States, and half of those explosions 
resulted from faults in electrical devices that the Bureau had identified as dangerous or, in 
its own language, “non-permissible.”38 
 The Federal Coal Mine Safety of Act of 1952, signed into law by President Harry 
Truman, extended the Bureau’s role beyond an advisory capacity by giving Bureau 
inspectors the power to issue violation citations to operators who committed safety 
violations or, where conditions posed an immediate risk to miners, to close down mines.39 
However, the act did little to regulate operators’ use of hazardous equipment. It contained 
a clause that permitted mining operators to use non-permissible equipment for an 
indefinite period if they had owned it before the legislation came into force. Several years 
later, in 1967, the Bureau carried out an investigation and found that 150 mines still 
owned non-permissible equipment.40 The 1952 Federal Mine Safety Act also perpetuated 
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the states’ responsibility for the actual enforcement of safety in underground coal 
mines.41 
 
State Legislation and Workers’ Compensation 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, state legislatures generally did 
not adopt specific health and safety laws for the coal industry. Pennsylvania did, 
however, enact minor provisions for coal miners. In 1893, it passed a law stipulating that 
“gassy” mines should provide 100 feet of cubic air per employee per minute, although its 
main objective was to reduce the threat of methane explosions.42 In 1903, working with 
the United Mine Workers, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a law that provided 
Miners’ Homes for old, sick, and injured former mine workers over the age of 60, 
including those suffering from ‘miners’ asthma.’ The institutions were financed by 
deductions from miners’ wages and tonnage royalty payments from the coal operators. 
Some UMW representatives hoped to extend Miners’ Homes to all states. At the union’s 
1905 convention, however, delegates voted against this plan, because they felt that the 
state governments should provide miners with pensions instead.43 
 The states’ lack of regulation for coal mines reflected the absence of health and 
safety laws for other sectors of industry. Before 1900, Massachusetts and Illinois were 
the only two states that passed factory inspection acts. The acts were unenforceable, 
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because regulators did not have the power to impose sanctions on employers who 
violated them.44 From 1906, the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL), in 
an effort to address the lack of regulation by the states, campaigned on a state-by-state 
basis for uniform workplace laws. Focusing on issues such as industrial disease, accident 
prevention, and workers’ compensation, its main goal was to prevent companies from 
moving to states with less restrictive labor laws.45 
 Before 1910, coal miners, like workers in most other sectors of industry, found it 
difficult to obtain compensation for work-related injuries and impossible to attain 
remuneration for occupational disease. Workers could only obtain compensation through 
the employer liability scheme. Employers were responsible for making compensation 
payments for injured employees, and common law doctrines stated that workers had to 
prove the employer was at fault. This was a particularly hard task for seriously injured 
workers and the families of people killed on the job, as they had to depend on the 
testimony of co-workers and supervisors who were susceptible to manipulation or 
intimidation by the employer. Moreover, the companies could take three separate lines of 
defense: They could argue the worker had caused the accident through his or her own 
careless, that the worker had assumed the risk of injury by accepting the job, or that a co-
worker had been responsible. Most employers were able to evade a lawsuit by arguing 
one of those defenses. 46  
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From 1910, workmen’s compensation gradually replaced the employer liability 
scheme. Employers were supportive of the shift, even though evidence showed that 
workmen’s compensation would actually increase their costs. Over the next fifteen years, 
the majority of state legislatures passed workmen’s compensation acts. In most cases, 
employers were liable for funding workers’ compensation payments through private 
insurance contributions.47 In the coal industry, serious injuries or death caused by 
accidents in the mines were eligible for compensation. Black lung disease, however, was 
not recognized as a legitimate occupational disease, and so victims were unable to claim 
compensation. In 1966, Pennsylvania became the first state to make black lung a 
compensable disease. 
 
The United Mine Workers of America (UMW) and Health and Safety in the Mines 
As the largest miners’ union in the coalfields of Appalachia and the West, the 
United Mine Workers of America (UMW), founded in 1890, was at the forefront of the 
struggle over health and safety.48 In its founding statement, the UMW promised to fight 
for better working conditions and stronger mine legislation. In its early years, however, 
the UMW had little substantive power to improve health and safety in the coal mines. By 
the mid-1920s, operators almost succeeded in driving the union entirely from the West 
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Virginia coalfields. The passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933 
provided a foundation for UMW organizers to become more active, and membership of 
the union rapidly expanded from 100,000 to 400,000.  
 Endorsing the principles of state workmen’s compensation laws, the UMW 
argued that the victims of work-induced respiratory disease should receive compensation 
funded by higher insurance premiums on employers. The union hoped that higher 
premiums would act as a preventative measure, by forcing employers to improve working 
conditions. Union representatives were aware that compensation for miners would do 
little to prevent black lung disease; some even feared that it could lead to mass firings by 
the coal operators. Such fears limited the enthusiasm of the union’s national leaders for 
‘black lung’ compensation. But district leaders quickly became firm advocates of 
compensation. Their anger at the omission of lung disease from state compensation laws 
superseded their fears about mass dismissal.49 
 In 1916, Districts 7 and 9 in the Pennsylvania anthracite region passed resolutions 
to fight for state compensation for miners’ disabled by ‘black lung disease.’ For Thomas 
Kennedy, the head of District 7, the compensation resolution was part of a broader 
agenda that included mothers’ pensions, old age pensions, and unemployment insurance. 
Because they focused solely on compensation for occupational disease in their own 
industry, the anthracite districts’ campaign to win compensation was unsuccessful. In the 
late 1920s, John Walker, the president of the Illinois State Labor Federation, was unable 
to persuade the state legislature to adopt an occupational disease amendment sponsored 
by District 12 of the UMW. From 1924, the UMW International also began to campaign 
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for social insurance coverage for miners’ asthma. Its focus on occupational disease 
afflicting miners contradicted the universalistic approach promoted by the American 
Association for Labor Law. On the eve of World War II, none of the state governments in 
the United States had added black lung disease to their workers’ compensation 
programs.50  
 In March 1946, UMW President John L. Lewis was negotiating a new contract 
with the coal operators. At the opening of the wage conference on March 12, Lewis gave 
a speech in which he emphasized the record numbers of men killed and injured in the 
mines. As a solution to this crisis, he presented the operators with a list of “negotiable 
suggestions,” rather than firm demands, which included a welfare fund, an unspecified 
wage increase, recognition for the foreman’s union, and improvements to miners’ 
working and living conditions. To support his demands, Lewis presented details from a 
recent UMW investigation into mining accidents, living and working conditions, 
sanitation, and health care in the coalfields. He informed the operators that he would not 
negotiate wages and hours until they had agreed to support a welfare fund.51 Because his 
history of manipulation and secret dealings gave the impression of man with few 
principles, the national media doubted the sincerity of Lewis’s commitment to improved 
health and safety. At the same time, Lewis had been a staunch health and safety advocate 
since the late 1930s. He had used the poor conditions in the mines to turn public opinion 
against the mine health and safety policies of President Franklin Roosevelt and the coal 
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operators, and he devoted considerable time to the improvement of the union’s health and 
pension coverage. His attention to health and safety also evolved out of necessity. By 
1944, the average age of the union’s members was 45, and only sixteen percent were 
under the age of 30.52   
 In response to the operators’ refusal to support a welfare fund, miners across the 
bituminous coalfields went on strike on April 1. When additional negotiations failed, and, 
the decline of the country’s coal supplies threatened to impede its post-war economic 
recovery, the Truman administration intervened by overseeing a conference between 
Lewis and the operators at the White House. On May 10, the White House announced 
that the mine owners agreed in principle to a welfare fund. The operators, however, still 
refused to endorse the fund in the miners’ contract, even after a further conference at the 
White House. The Truman administration responded by establishing government control 
of the mines. 53  
Secretary of the Interior A. J. Krug negotiated a contract with Lewis that included 
a Welfare and Retirement fund for the bituminous miners, to be jointly supervised by the 
UMW and the federal government. It was to be funded by a five-cent royalty on every 
ton of coal mined. The contract also mandated a separate hospital and medical fund, 
which operated by transferring miners’ dues to a union-controlled hospital, rather than 
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company doctors.54 In addition to the two welfare funds, the contract included a wage 
increase for miners of 18.5 cents per hour, recognition of the foreman’s union, and an 
increase in vacation pay.55  
Having achieved a favorable agreement for bituminous miners, the UMW struck 
the anthracite coalfields in June. The outcome of that strike was a unified benefit 
program, the Anthracite Health and Welfare Fund, which was funded solely by a tonnage 
royalty. Under the new anthracite fund, several black lung victims received treatment at 
Jefferson Memorial College Hospital in Pennsylvania.56 The following year, the union 
negotiated the unification of the two funds in the bituminous industry.57   
 The coal operators expected Lewis to reciprocate the gains the UMW had made, 
by supporting its program of mechanization in the mines. He also assured the operators 
he would allocate union resources to improving the coal industry’s productivity and 
eliminating non-unionized operations. Paradoxically, the mechanization program created 
additional health risks for underground bituminous miners. Lewis commented, “We’ve 
encouraged the leading companies in the coal industry to resort to modernization in order 
to increase the living standard of the miner and improve his working conditions.”58 Lewis 
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was convinced that opposing the mechanization of the industry would lead to a reduction 
in miners’ wages. In reality, it led to mass unemployment, as the ‘continuous miner’ and 
other machines replaced thousands of miners. More significantly, mechanization vastly 
increased the quantities of respirable coal dust in the mines, which subsequently led to a 
sharp rise in cases of black lung disease. Because mechanization facilitated higher 
production and, consequently, increased operators’ payments to the Welfare and 
Retirement Fund, Lewis and the UMW leadership did not question the health risks it 
created. In fact, Lewis believed that a more hazardous work environment was an 
inevitable cost of the fund.59 There was, therefore, a significant hidden cost to the 
Welfare and Retirement Fund. It provided miners’ with hospital treatment and health 
care, but it ultimately contributed to a greater prevalence of occupational disease.60 
Lewis’s policies showed that the union’s commitment to improve health and safety was 
limited by the economics of coal production.  
 Health and safety in the Appalachian coalfields declined further after Lewis 
retired as UMW president in 1960. Thomas Kennedy, the union vice-president and 
former secretary treasurer, succeeded to the union presidency. He had a long history of 
union activism, having led the campaign for miners’ compensation in District 7 in 1916. 
Soon afterward, the executive board accepted Kennedy’s appointment of Tony Boyle as 
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union vice-president. Over the next three years, Kennedy, who was old and in declining 
health, trusted Boyle with much of the daily management of the union.61 
In 1947, Tony Boyle had become a member of the union headquarters staff as 
Lewis’s administrative assistant. He was born in a Montana mining camp in 1906, the son 
of an Irish immigrant miner. His father had worked as a child in the coal mines in 
Scotland, and both his grandfathers and great-grandfathers had labored in British mines. 
After working for several years as a rank-and-file miner, Boyle became president of 
District 27 in Montana in 1940. On being summoned to Washington by Lewis in 1947, he 
appointed his brother Dick to replace him as district leader. The union constitution 
stipulated that at least five years of mining experience were necessary to assume a 
leadership position, but Richard Boyle had never worked in a coal mine.62 
 Even during his time as Lewis’s assistant, Boyle seemed more concerned with 
profits than safety. In 1957, he went to Montana to attend a legislative hearing on 
modernizing the state’s mining laws. In his testimony, he vigorously contested the 
proposed mine safety bill, particularly its requirement of roof bolts for all mines. Roof 
bolts were the most effective device for preventing roof falls, by far the most common 
cause of death in the coal industry. However, because Boyle feared that coal operators 
would incur substantial financial costs by installing roof bolts, he distorted the logic 
behind the bill. He argued that it “would legalize the killing of men in coal mines.” He 
threatened that his brother Richard would shut down all his mining operations in the state 
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if the legislature enacted the bill. Less than one year later, four men died in a roof fall at 
Richard Boyle’s “Montana Queen” mine. The state mine investigator later announced 
that the roof had not been properly supported.63 
  When Thomas Kennedy died in 1963, Boyle succeeded him as UMW President. 
By the time Boyle came to power, the union was plagued by corruption and 
mismanagement. Most of the staff representatives were not democratically elected, 
having been directly appointed by Lewis. The union’s constitutional rules were unused 
and meaningless.64 Boyle exploited the corruption and mismanagement in the union to 
his own personal benefit. From 1963 to 1969, he spent vast quantities of members’ dues, 
totaling almost $200,000, on portraits of himself and other union officers, which he sent 
to local headquarters around the country. He used the United Mine Workers Journal as 
his personal campaign organ during presidential elections. At the 1964 UMW Convention 
provided delegates with expensive gifts, such as electric alarm clocks with his name and 
picture engraved on them, to increase his support. In addition, he exploited the union’s 
financial reserves for himself and his family. He made his daughter Antoinette a staff 
attorney, while still allowing her to keep her private law practice in Montana. She 
received an annual salary of $40,000, the same as UMW General Counsel Edward Carey 
in Washington D.C. He also provided his brother Richard with an annual salary of 
$25,000 for his continuing role as District 27 president. Most notably, however, he and 
vice-president John Owens diverted $650,000 of members’ dues into their own private 
pension fund. Boyle’s behavior reflected his disdain for the union’s rank and file 
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members, and their key concerns such as wages, pensions, and health and safety in the 
mines. His disregard for miners’ welfare became a major obstacle in the campaign to 
reform coal mine health and safety legislation.65 Chapter two will show that Boyle 
vehemently opposed the inclusion of black lung disease in West Virginia’s workmen’s 
compensation program. As highlighted in subsequent chapters, he also sought to limit 
improvements to federal coal mine legislation. 
 
Defining Appalachia: The Geography, Economy, and Culture of the Coalfields 
While this dissertation analyzes coal mine health and safety in the United States, 
and devotes substantial attention to the creation and enforcement of federal legislation, 
much of its discussion of coal mine disasters, miners’ activism, and community protest 
focuses on the Appalachian region. The geography, economy, and culture of Appalachia 
played a central role in the development of the coal industry, and in the miners’ fight for 
stronger health and safety legislation and workers’ compensation. In order to determine 
exactly how the region shaped the coal mine health and safety movement, it is necessary 
to address one of the fundamental questions of the dissertation: What is Appalachia?  
 First, it is necessary to consider the region in purely geographical terms. The 
Appalachian Mountains extend for over 2,000 miles, from Newfoundland in eastern 
Canada to northern Alabama in the southeastern United States. 66  However, they are not 
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a unified mountain system, but rather divided into two segments, the glaciated northern 
segment and the unglaciated southern segment, which meet at the Hudson and Mohawk 
Valleys in New York State. Within the southern unglaciated segment, there are four 
separate provinces, each of which run parallel to the whole chain: the Appalachian 
Plateau, the Valley and Ridge Province, the Blue Ridge Province, and the Piedmont Ford 
and Thrust Belt.67   For the purposes of this dissertation, I will consider southern 
Appalachia.68 I further narrow the geographical focus by examining only the major coal-
producing regions within southern Appalachia: eastern Pennsylvania, southern Illinois, 
western Virginia, eastern Kentucky, the entire state of West Virginia, and northern 
Tennessee. Coal mining takes place in 165 of Appalachia’s 445 counties.69  
Within the southern Appalachian mining regions, there are distinct geological 
differences that affect the physical properties of the coal. With the exception of 
northeastern Pennsylvania, all the coal mining regions contain a soft-rock coal called 
bituminous coal. Miners first excavated bituminous coal in West Virginia in 1750, 
although initially it did not gain widespread popularity. There was no industry to 
facilitate demand for it and the unpleasant smell it generated when burned made it 
unsuitable for domestic use. From the late nineteenth century, however, the commercial 
market for bituminous coal rapidly expanded. It played a key role in the industrial 
development of the United States and, from the mid-twentieth century, in the provision of 
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electrical power. The mining districts of northeastern Pennsylvania contain a hard-rock 
coal called anthracite. The exact date of anthracite coal’s discovery is unclear, although 
the Nantichoke Indians settled along the Susquehanna River started burning a form of 
hard rock coal in the 1760s. Anthracite coal is cleaner. It burns more slowly and at a 
higher temperature than bituminous coal, and until the 1920s it was widely used to heat 
homes.70 
As the coal industry developed, the differences between the bituminous region 
and the anthracite region expanded beyond mere physical characteristics. In each region, 
the geological composition of the coal determined mining practices, working conditions, 
employers’ attitudes to health and safety, and the economic welfare of the miners. The 
anthracite operators actively tried to prevent employees from organizing. They frequently 
evicted union sympathizers from company homes. The absence of a strong union 
presence meant that the miners worked longer hours and were paid less than their 
bituminous counterparts. The anthracite coal mines also were more dangerous, with a 
higher incidence of roof-falls, floods, toxic gases, and explosions. In the early twentieth 
century, weak and ineffectual coal mine legislation prompted miners to improvise safety 
measures, such as observing the behavior of the rats. Miners believed that rats were 
susceptible to changes in the atmosphere, and they followed them if they suddenly darted 
away.71  
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Appalachia has long exported its natural resources of coal and timber, yet the 
profits from these resources have not provided the native people with a standard of living 
equivalent to most other people in the nation.72 According to Raitz and Ulack, the 
widespread poverty in the region constitutes ‘the paradox of Appalachia.’ There is an 
“imbalance in fiscal well-being across a region of immense resource wealth.”73 Large 
corporations from outside the region have exploited natural resources for short-term 
profit, and their irresponsible use of these resources has contributed to many of the 
region’s social and economic problems.74  
Similarly, Barbara Smith argues that the poverty of the region did not, as the 
Appalachian Regional Commission stated, stem from its geographical isolation, but 
rather its exploitation by outside investors. She writes that the investors’ exploitation of 
natural resources led to “the systematic development of underdevelopment: corporations 
headquartered elsewhere drained off the region’s natural wealth, returning almost nothing 
in tax revenues and exploiting the people as coal miners.”75 Smith interprets this 
exploitation as part of a long historical process. Even in the nineteenth century, before the 
onset of industrialization, she argues, most natives labored on farms owned by absentee 
landowners. Yet, as a native Appalachian, Smith also cautions against creating a 
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dichotomy of ‘us and them.’ There were and are prominent economic and social divisions 
within the region.76 
Finally, it is also necessary to examine the culture of Appalachia, particularly 
religious faith, which played a significant role in the lives of coal miners and their 
families. When disasters, such as explosions and roof falls, occurred, trapped miners 
coped with the imminent threat of death by turning to religion. Similarly, religion was a 
source of comfort for the families who congregated around mine entrances after a 
disaster. According to Bill J. Leonard, “Religious life was, and to some extent remains, a 
primary source of identity for many southern Appalachian people. It provided a place, a 
source, of security in the face of poverty, disease, and the many unpredictable elements 
of life.”77 Coal mine disasters were one such ‘unpredictable element of life,’ occurring on 
a regular basis and profoundly shaping the religious faith of mining communities. In 
Work and Faith in the Kentucky Coalfields: Subject to Dust, Richard Callahan explores 
the relationship between coal miners and religious faith, arguing that miners’ labor 
concerns “intertwined at a basic level with religious expression, sentiment, and 
imagination in the coalfields of central Appalachia.”78 Callahan further maintains that the 
broader labor movement in the United States could be defined as “a form of religious 
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expression that has emerged from the struggle to express and meet particular concerns in 
the context of industrial capitalism.”79  
In Kentucky, religious meaning was embedded in the daily lives of coal miners 
and their families. Preachers in mining communities often permitted the use of their 
churches for union meetings, and regarded labor unions as the “worldly” counterpart to 
the church. Callahan writes, “Work remained a fundamental human experience that 
linked self, society, and the world, and extended into spiritual issues… Indeed, religion 
itself is a form of work, involving constant production and reproduction with old and new 
resources.”80 Religious belief helped miners to make sense of the realities they faced, 
particularly the continuous threat of injury and death, the exploitation of their labor by 
the coal operators, and the anxieties of their families. To adapt to their uncertain 
circumstances and the obstacles of life in the coalfields, the Kentuckian coal miners 
adopted their own religious idioms.81 Such idioms provided a ‘bodily experience’ to 
tolerate the hard and dangerous physical labor of coal mining, while also connecting the 
limitations of the body to “a more enduring and eternal dimension of life.”82 
Miners’ adherence to religious ritual was by no means unique.  In many industries 
across Appalachia, religion was a fundamental part of workers’ daily lives. As Ken 
Fones-Wolf explains in Glass Towns: Industry, Labor and Political Economy in 
Appalachia, 1890-1930s, the church enabled glassworker families to integrate with the 
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local community. Fones-Wolf presents the example of Joseph Martin, a flint who died at 
the age of twenty-seven and was memorialized by several local organizations, including 
the Cavalry Methodist Church.83 He also notes that churches were important for 
establishing cohesion between immigrant glass workers and their communities.84  
 
Chapter Outline 
This study is organized thematically rather than chronologically. Chapter two 
examines the origins and development of the West Virginia black lung movement. It 
shows how three radical doctors, known as the Committee of Physicians on Miners’ 
Health and Safety, not only legitimized ‘black lung’ as a serious medical disease, but also 
significantly increased public awareness of it. Their efforts, combined with the 
catastrophic disaster at the Farmington mine in November 1968, led to the formation of 
the West Virginia Black Lung Association (BLA). Through sustained grassroots protest, 
which included a massive wildcat strike in the West Virginia coalfields in early 1969, the 
organization convinced the state legislature to make black lung a compensable disease. 
The chapter provides a case study of how community-driven protest in a single state 
resulted in significant legislative change.  
Chapter three widens the scope of the study, focusing on how the Farmington 
disaster and the emergence of the black lung movement in West Virginia prompted the 
federal government to reshape coal mine health and safety legislation. It explains how 
President Richard Nixon’s political ideology and policymaking decisions hindered his 
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administration’s efforts to reform working conditions in the coal industry. The chapter 
also scrutinizes the legislative hearings in the United States Congress in the early months 
of 1969. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate deliberated a number of draft 
bills on coal mine health and safety, in a series of hearings that were beset by conflict and 
tension. The hearings, as well as legislative debates in Congress in the summer and 
autumn of that year, had a significant impact on the passage of the Federal Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act of 1969. Chapter three also presents a separate narrative strand that 
focuses on the conflict within the United Mine Workers of America. In May 1969, Joseph 
Yablonski, a high-ranking union official, announced his intention to challenge W. A. 
Boyle for the union presidency. His decision to contest President Boyle’s leadership had 
significant implications for the union’s approach to health and safety issues. Boyle had 
long neglected the interests of the rank and file, particularly with regard to working 
conditions, while Yablonski made health and safety a key issue of his election campaign.  
Chapter four considers the escalation of grassroots protest in the coalfields in 
1970. On one level, this protest was directly connected to the United Mine Workers of 
America. In April of that year, a group of dissident miners and organizers, responding to 
the murder of UMW presidential candidate Joseph Yablonski, broke away from the union 
to form an organization called Miners for Democracy (MFD). The new organization 
sought to win the UMW presidency at the next election, with the goal of democratizing 
the union and reforming its health and safety policies. On a wider level, rank and file 
miners, along with their families and communities, protested the federal government’s 
poor enforcement of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. The U.S. Bureau of 
Mines, the Department of the Interior agency responsible for enforcing the act, was 
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largely ineffective, while the Social Security Administration, which processed miners’ 
claims for federal black lung compensation, was encumbered by bureaucratic red tape. 
Several key organizations facilitated the protest in the coalfields, including the 
Association of Disabled Miners and Widows (DMWA), the Disabled Miners and 
Widows of South West Virginia (DMW/SWV) and the revived Black Lung Association 
(BLA), which began to operate as a national organization.  
Chapter four will also discuss the mine health and safety hearings in the U.S. 
Senate in August 1970, which were a direct response to the short-term failure of the 1969 
Federal Mine Act. While the hearings concluded that the act’s failure was largely 
attributable to the Bureau of Mines, they did not establish legislative solutions. Nixon’s 
conservative approach to staffing the Bureau of Mines and the Department of the Interior 
exacerbated the weaknesses of the Federal Mine Act. After dismissing Bureau director 
John F. O’Leary, who miners and liberal politicians regarded as a strong proponent of 
mine health and safety, Nixon waited several months before appointing a new director. 
O’Leary’s successor, Elburt F. Osborn, outwardly supported strong enforcement 
measures, but did not support his rhetoric with his actions. Ultimately, Nixon’s staff 
policies were detrimental to coal miners’ welfare. 
Chapter five will focus in depth on the U.S. Bureau of Mines from late 1970 to 
the end of 1971, focusing in particular on coal miners’ perception of the agency. From 
November 1970, local and district union leaders began to protest the Bureau’s health and 
safety enforcement procedures at non-unionized mines. Many of the coal miners who 
transferred from non-union mines to unionized operations informed their union leaders of 
the Bureau’s lax inspection policies at their former places of employment. In response, 
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the local and district representatives wrote letters to their Congressmen and high-level 
UMW officials. They feared that if such accusations were true, then union employers 
would be encouraged to ban the UMW from their mines. As the chapter shows, to a large 
extent, miners’ allegations about the Bureau’s neglect of non-union mines were valid. In 
December 1970, an explosion at the non-union Hyden mine in Kentucky killed 38 men. 
A subsequent Congressional investigation attributed the disaster to the Bureau’s failure to 
inspect the mine properly. With their suspicions seemingly confirmed, miners continued 
to write letters of protest. 
Chapter five also shows that the Bureau’s defects went beyond its neglect of non-
union mines. Bureau managers often overturned citations issued by inspectors for health 
and safety violations, while many inspectors lacked the necessary training to carry out 
their duties. The Department of the Interior’s extensive reorganization of the Bureau in 
the spring of 1971 further undermined its ability to provide effective health and safety 
enforcement. Miners conveyed their disdain towards the Bureau by writing letters of 
protest to the agency’s director, Elburt F. Osborn. The Bureau’s performance finally 
showed signs of improvement in late 1971. Because historians have yet to devote 
attention to the Bureau of Mines in the early 1970s, chapter five is constructed almost 
entirely from primary sources, notably letters from the United Mine Workers Safety 
Division Office Files, oral interviews, archival documents, and newspapers. 
Chapter six examines the resurgence of the national Black Lung Association 
(BLA), particularly its efforts to amend the federal black lung benefits program. 
Developing the analysis of the BLA in chapter four, the chapter discusses the 
organizational tactics used by the organization, including its demonstrations against the 
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Social Security Administration. The chapter also examines the factors that limited the 
BLA’s organizational activities, including a lack of funding and dissension within and 
between different local chapters. Most significantly, it shows how the Black Lung 
Association’s lobbying campaign in Washington D.C., combined with extensive 
Congressional hearings on the federal black lung program, led to the Black Lung 
Amendments Act of 1972.   
Furthermore, chapter six explains how the continuing deterioration of the United 
Mine Workers’ health and safety policies, combined with the lack of democracy within 
the union, resulted in two important changes. First, a legal ruling by the U.S. District 
Court made it easier for miners to claim benefits to which they were entitled from the 
union’s Welfare and Retirement Fund.  Secondly, the Miners for Democracy won control 
of the union in the 1972 election, displacing the Boyle regime and, over time, making the 
union more attentive to the concerns of the rank and file. Finally, the chapter discusses 
the major changes in the federal government’s health and safety enforcement policies in 
1973. The Nixon administration, conscious of the Bureau of Mines’ poor record, created 
a new agency, the Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA), which was 
responsible for enforcing health and safety. The Bureau was still responsible for research 
into coal production and technology, a function it had maintained since its inception in 
1910. 
Chapter seven focuses on the impact of the energy crisis on miners, local 
communities, and the environment. It takes as its starting point the Buffalo Creek disaster 
of 1972, in which the collapse of a coal slag dam killed 125 people, injured hundreds 
more, caused widespread homelessness, and contaminated the landscape with toxic 
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chemicals. As the chapter shows, the Buffalo Creek disaster was indicative of the broader 
environmental devastation caused by the coal industry in the early 1970s. During this 
time, surface coal mining was becoming more widespread across Appalachia and the 
western states, resulting in the erosion of mountains, the destruction of homes and 
properties, and the pollution of valleys and streams, which conversely also caused serious 
health problems among local communities. With oil becoming more costly and more 
difficult to import, and domestic oil reserves declining, the United States increasingly 
relied on coal for generating electrical power.  
Chapter seven also considers how the energy crisis impacted miners laboring in 
underground marginal mines. The renewed emphasis on coal as a source of energy meant 
that operators were less attentive to health and safety. The hazards of such mines were 
clearly emphasized by the Scotia disaster in Kentucky in 1976, which resulted in several 
fatalities. In addition, the chapter will provide an overview of coal mine health and safety 
under the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan administrations. While the Carter 
administration made important legislative changes that improved miners’ conditions, 
most notably the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, the Reagan administration 
engaged in a program of deregulation that undermined many of the gains miners had 
made over the past decade. Ronald Reagan actively supported private business at the 
expense of workers’ health and safety, and was responsible for a growing number of 
injuries in the coal mining industry.  
 . 
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Chapter 2 
The Origins of Reform: 
The Farmington Disaster and the West Virginia Black Lung Movement, 1968-1969 
 
Introduction 
On the morning of May 6, 1968, twenty-six miners entered the Gauley Coal and 
Coke Company No. 8 mine at Hominy Falls, West Virginia. They divided into separate 
groups and began working in different sections of the mine. The smaller group, 
consisting of ten miners, unintentionally cut through a wall into an abandoned, water-
filled tunnel. They were quickly trapped in the path of the oncoming water. As millions 
of gallons of water surged towards the other group, one miner was able to escape, while 
fifteen managed to climb to safety in the higher reaches of the shaft.. Several hours later, 
a miner in the group of fifteen contacted rescuers on the surface by telephone, informing 
them that the air was safe to breathe. The rescuers became increasingly concerned, 
though, for the remaining ten miners, who were still trapped in the deepest part of the 
mine. Although two of those miners had telephoned the surface at 5.00 p.m., the rescuers 
lost contact soon afterwards. The miner who escaped, 39-year old buggy operator Ernest 
Fitzwater, told reporters that he suddenly was engulfed in water. He said, “It was about a 
foot from the roof and rising fast. I grabbed this piece of yellow burlap and put it over my 
face.” He continued, “By now, the buggy had jack-knifed… so it was all I could do to get 
ahead of the water.”1  
 The Hominy Falls mine was located beneath a steep mountain around sixty miles 
from Charleston, the state capital. The following day, the rescue team drilled an air vent 
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into the mountain and sent food, oxygen, and blankets to the fifteen men on higher 
ground using the mine’s conveyor belt. Company officials said it was unlikely that the 
other ten miners had survived, as several sections of the mine floor were completely 
filled with water. For the rescuers, bringing the trapped miners to the surface was a long, 
arduous task. Engineers installed several water pumps at the mine site a few hours after 
the disaster, but they were slow and ineffective. The company decided to install a larger, 
high-capacity pump, but the engineers faced considerable problems drilling a 15-inch 
hole in the mountain to accommodate it. It took more than twelve hours to install the 
pump. By the third day of the rescue operation, the pumps had drained enough water 
from the mine to allow rescuers to enter the shaft. Their initial efforts to reach the miners 
were hampered by water seeping into the mine from another abandoned tunnel. 
Eventually, on May 11, more than five days after the disaster, the rescue team made 
contact with the 15 miners and led them back through the mine to safety.2  
 Relieved families greeted the miners at the entrance. Father-of-five Ottie Junior 
Walton declared, “I knew we were going to get out. We prayed and sang and talked about 
living a better life when we got out. We had a real religious bunch down there.” Another 
man in the group told reporters that the miners had survived because of their refusal to 
panic and shared sense of humor. Physicians who examined the men said that they were 
in good physical condition, despite being confined to damp, airless conditions for several 
days. Despite the recovery of the fifteen miners, many of the families at the mine 
entrance were despondent, as the remaining ten miners had still not been found. They 
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were presumed dead. Company president C. E. Richardson vowed to keep pumping water 
from the mine until search teams located them.3 
 Several days later, on May 16, rescuers found six of the men alive deep inside the 
mine. They had protected themselves from the rising water by constructing an emergency 
barricade with roof timbers and canvas, and had survived for ten days by rationing the 
contents of two lunch buckets and drinking scum-covered water. The other four men had 
been swept to their deaths by the force of the water. Doctors at a local hospital were 
surprised to find the miners in good physical shape and discharged all of them within 48 
hours. The miners emphasized how discipline and teamwork had kept them alive. Eugene 
Martin said, “At no time did any man try to leave and make it on his own.” Several of the 
miners emphasized how religion had got them through their ordeal. From his hospital 
bed, Joseph Fitzwater said, “I was a sinner when I went into that mine, but I came out a 
Christian… Each day we grew weaker, but we kept our heads. We survived through the 
grace of God. It was a miracle of God’s.”4  
 The deaths of four men at the Hominy Falls mine showed that coal mining in the 
post-war United States remained a dangerous and hazardous occupation. The disaster also 
highlighted a number of other characteristics of the United States coal industry in the late 
1960s. First, it was indicative of coal miners’ resilience and ability to survive under harsh 
conditions. Second, it showed that miners’ identities were deeply rooted in their local 
communities.  The men who were trapped in the Hominy Falls mine for ten days 
ultimately survived because they supported each other and envisioned life beyond the 
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mine. The miners’ connection to their community was reflected by the disaster’s 
emotional impact on their families and relatives. Those waiting on the surface at Hominy 
Falls experienced an agonizing wait before they learned the fate of their loved ones. 
Third, the story of coal mine health and safety up to the late 1960s had been one of 
repeated failure. The Hominy Falls disaster emphasized that state mining codes and the 
federal mine acts of 1941 and 1952 had done little to protect coal miners. It was precisely 
this failure that set the stage for the Hominy Falls disaster and countless other small, yet 
fatal, mine accidents across the country.  
As bleak as circumstances seemed for Appalachian coal miners, the events at 
Hominy Falls occurred at a turning point for health and safety regulation. In the late 
1960s, the Lyndon B. Johnson administration was investigating ways to make coal 
miners safer, while the media, including the burgeoning television networks, were giving 
more coverage to mine health and safety. Moreover, coal miners were beginning to reject 
W. Anthony (Tony) Boyle’s national leadership of the United Mine Workers in favor of 
organizing at the local level. From 1968, such opposition was especially prominent in 
West Virginia, where young workers with Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) 
and welfare rights activists advocated justice and equality for powerless members of 
society, including the state’s coal miners. The activists were particularly concerned with 
obtaining more stringent legislation and compensation for miners suffering from 
pneumoconiosis, a debilitating, work-related lung disease otherwise known as ‘black 
lung.’  
The issue of black lung disease prompted a determined band of radical physicians, 
liberal politicians, activists, local union leaders, and rank-and-file miners to create a 
 . 
48
separate organization called the West Virginia Black Lung Association (BLA) at the 
beginning of 1969. Engaging in local, community-based organization, the BLA led a 
massive strike across the coalfields in February and March 1969, which ultimately 
persuaded the state legislature to introduce a compensation program for black lung 
victims. As this chapter will highlight, the BLA’s achievements marked a crucial turning 
point in the improvement of coal mine health and safety, not just at the state level, but 
across the nation. 
 
The “Discovery” of Black Lung Disease: Fiery Rhetoric and Union Apathy  
The emerging mine activism in West Virginia started with a small band of 
pioneering doctors and medical specialists. In the late 1960s, those physicians, working 
largely outside the institutional settings of the U.S. Public Health Service and the coal 
companies, brought visibility to one particular aspect of mine health and safety, a disease 
called pneumoconiosis, otherwise known as ‘black lung.’ By far the most prominent was 
60-year old Dr. Isidore E. Buff, a heart specialist from Charleston, West Virginia.  
Buff had started to take an interest in coal miners’ lung disease when the 
continuous mining machine came into widespread use in the Appalachian coalfields in 
the early 1950s. Company doctors were increasingly sending him miners who had 
collapsed as a result of the excessive dust generated by the new machinery. While the 
company doctors typically diagnosed heart failure, Buff soon discovered that most were 
victims of miners’ lung disease. Although Buff felt it was imperative that he learned 
more about the connection between environmental conditions and lung disorders, he was 
unable to obtain funding from either the U.S. Public Health Service or the Bureau of 
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Mines to conduct a study.5 His inability to obtain support for the study reflected the 
power of the coal operators, who had strong economic and political influence in 
Washington, D.C. Buff also tried to create an educational program about the dangers of 
coal mining for West Virginia high schools, but he was unsuccessful in this effort. He 
had intended the program to function as a counterweight to an extensive, federally 
supported recruitment campaign by the coal operators, but industry pressure ultimately 
forced him to back down. Even as head of the West Virginia Air Pollution Control 
Commission, a position he took in 1967, Buff struggled to convince the general public 
about the environmental hazards of underground coal mining.6 
By mid-1968, Buff had become the self-appointed leader of the emerging welfare-
rights movement in West Virginia.  He became actively involved in the Poor People’s 
Campaign. More significantly, he pressed for workers’ compensation for miners’ lung 
disease. In defining miners’ lung disease, he abandoned the term ‘silicosis’ in favor of 
‘black lung.’ Silicosis was a lung disease common among miners who worked in western 
hard rock mines. He played to miners’ belief that the coal operators were destroying their 
health.7 Buff argued that coal miners did not suffer from silicosis, a disease typically 
caused by the inhalation of silica dust, but from a unique disease caused by coal dust. He 
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quickly gained a reputation for his fiery rhetoric. The miners felt that they had found 
someone who understood them and could communicate with them.  
Just days after the Hominy Falls disaster, Buff spoke to around 100 miners at a 
small local union hall in Clifftop, West Virginia. He showed them a picture of a normal 
lung, then one of a lung afflicted by black lung disease, before breaking into an 
impassioned speech: 
Black lung is what’s killing all of you. But the company says you’re sick in the 
head, shiftless, or stupid. They ask, ‘Don’t you care about your family?’ And 
those cute little girls in miniskirts over at the welfare department feel your head 
and say, ‘You’re not sick. Don’t you want to work?’ You believe them! But don’t 
you know that they just don’t want to pay you compensation? You have a mind 
like anyone else. You’re sick and the company knows it. But they won’t pay a 
dime… The miners of this state ought to demand compensation and safer working 
conditions. And if you don’t get them – use whatever means are necessary!” 8 
 
 
As Buff worked to focus public attention on pneumoconiosis, two other 
physicians were making important advances in the battle against black lung disease. 
Pulmonologist Dr. Donald Rasmussen was carrying out research on miners’ lung disease 
at the Miners’ Memorial Hospital in Beckley. Rasmussen had arrived in West Virginia in 
1962 with no knowledge of black lung. Some internists drew his attention to the disease 
when they asked him to perform medical evaluations on a group of miners. At an early 
stage of his evaluations, Rasmussen realized that the miners exhibited breathing 
difficulties, but X-rays, physical examinations, and even pulmonary function tests failed 
to provide concrete evidence of lung disease. Electing to adopt a different approach, 
Rasmussen carried out exercise studies and analyzed the miners’ arterial blood. He 
obtained conclusive proof of lung disease from the first miner he examined, which 
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prompted him to start investigating the disease in much greater depth. In order to obtain 
the funding that was necessary to conduct further studies, Rasmussen transferred to the 
local branch of the U.S. Public Health Service. He spent just over two years touring local 
coal mines and conducting evaluations when the PHS cut off his funds and transferred his 
research program to Morgantown University. Despite losing the federal government’s 
support, Rasmussen and one of his colleagues, Earl Stafford, testified before 
Congressional mine safety hearings on a regular basis.9 
 The other physician at work on miners’ lung disease was pathologist Dr. Hawey 
Wells, director of a chest laboratory in a Pennsylvania hospital. He also taught medicine 
at the University of West Virginia, Morgantown, and had worked with Rasmussen during 
the early 1960s. Wells gained a thorough knowledge of the effects of coal dust on miners’ 
lungs by conducting autopsies. He was a strong advocate of black lung preventative 
legislation and compensation and, like Isidore Buff, flamboyant and outspoken. He 
frequently stood before audiences of miners and crumbled blackened lung tissue into 
small pieces with his fingers, informing them that the same would happen to their lungs if 
they were continuously exposed to high quantities of dust.10 In the summer of 1968, Buff, 
Rasmussen, and Wells formed an alliance. They began collectively touring the coalfields 
of West Virginia to emphasize the impact of pneumoconiosis on coal miners and their 
families. 
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Despite the physicians’ efforts, there was little progress in defining, treating, or 
compensating miners’ occupational illnesses. In general, advancements in coal mine 
health and safety faced significant obstacles, not least a union leadership that was bound 
to the coal operators. In September 1968, UMW President W. Anthony (Tony) Boyle 
used the union’s convention as an opportunity to consolidate his position as national 
leader of the union. Despite recent mine accidents, and new medical findings, Boyle had 
little interest in reform. In keeping with the 1964 convention in Florida, Boyle held the 
1968 meeting far from the bituminous coalfields, in Denver, Colorado.  He purposely 
selected a distant location to restrict the attendance of rank-and-file miners who might 
criticize his leadership. He also plundered union funds to provide financial incentives for 
his supporters to attend the convention and circumvented the union’s constitution by 
allowing the participation of “bogus” local unions. Under constitutional rules, local 
unions had to have at least ten members to maintain active status within the national 
organization. Despite the fact that at least 566 locals did not have enough members, 
Boyle and his colleagues still permitted them to send delegates. The national leadership 
supplied delegates for locals that were not able to provide them. It typically placed the 
delegate on a committee and instructed him how to vote, with the promise of financial 
reward.11  
At the 1968 convention, delegates from across Appalachia passed several 
resolutions concerning pneumoconiosis. Twelve of the resolutions called for 
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compensation for miners disabled by lung impairments and advocated measures to 
achieve it, such as overhauling workers’ compensation laws, increasing operators’ 
contributions to the union’s Welfare and Retirement Fund, and making operators 
responsible for paying compensation directly to miners. The other six resolutions 
advocated preventative measures, including dust suppression in mines and mandatory 
dust limits. In an impassioned speech, Dr. Lorin Kerr of the UMW Welfare and 
Retirement Fund urged the national leadership to become more actively involved in 
health and safety issues. Boyle retorted that changes in mining laws could happen only at 
the state level. He made Kerr read a resolution that called on all union districts to press 
for legislation that would make pneumoconiosis eligible under workers’ compensation 
laws. In the aftermath of the convention, however, Boyle and his colleagues abandoned 
most of the health and safety resolutions that delegates had passed.12 
The convention took place just before the union started contract negotiations with 
the coal operators. The union’s 1966 contract with the Bituminous Coal Operators’ 
Association was scheduled to expire in early October 1968. On October 1, believing that 
the contract had ended, over 10,000 bituminous coal miners in Appalachia engaged in a 
wildcat strike. They were protesting what they perceived as the inadequacies of the 1966 
contract, particularly the failure of Boyle and the coal operators to negotiate an increase 
in the tonnage royalties that funded the UMW Welfare and Retirement Fund. For the 
majority of miners, the WRF was the only available source of subsidized health care. 
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Boyle, who was already negotiating the new contract with the BCOA, declared that the 
strike was illegal, as the existing contract included a one-week grace period and thus did 
not end until October 8. District union officers urged the men to return to work, but their 
pleas went largely unheeded, as only a fraction of the miners resumed their jobs.  The 
strikers were joined on October 9 by thousands more coal miners who walked off the 
job.13  
By the time the union signed a new contract on October 14, 130,000 miners were 
on strike. Boyle boasted that a wage increase of three dollars per day meant that the 
contract was “the best ever negotiated by any union in history,” but the new contract did 
not include higher royalty payments for the Welfare and Retirement Fund. Throughout 
the negotiations, the coal operators had firmly refused to agree to such a provision. The 
miners returned to work, as the national leadership of the United Mine Workers 
continued to demonstrate its lack of commitment to better health care for coal miners.14  
 
The Farmington Disaster: The Catalyst for Change 
 
In mid-November, a horrific disaster intensified the nation’s focus on coal mine 
health and safety. Shortly after 5:00 a.m., on November 20, 1968, an explosion ripped 
through the Consolidation Company’s No. 9 mine in Farmington, West Virginia. It 
destroyed the main entrance to the mine, trapping inside the majority of the 99 miners 
who were on the nightshift at the time. Only 21 of those miners, working far from the 
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source of the blast, managed to escape through portals and airshafts. A second explosion 
followed just a few hours later, by which time anxious families and relatives had 
descended on the site of the mine. In the days that followed, they kept a constant vigil at a 
local church, as several more explosions hindered the efforts of rescue crews to locate the 
trapped miners. On November 29, Consolidation President John Corcoran ordered rescue 
crews to seal the mine to prevent further explosions. While few people on the mine site 
believed the miners had survived the explosions, not least because surface tests showed 
that lethal amounts of methane in the mine could not support human life, Corcoran’s 
decision brought a sense of finality to their deaths. It also provoked mixed reactions 
among the families and relatives of the miners. Some vehemently opposed the action 
while others passively accepted it. “We knew it was coming, we knew there was nothing 
else to do,” commented the wife of one of the trapped miners.15 
 The exact cause of the disaster was unclear. Investigators cited high levels of 
methane, poor ventilation, and the accumulation of large quantities of combustible coal 
dust as possible causes. During its inspections at the Farmington mine over the previous 
six years, the Bureau of Mines had consistently discovered inadequate rock dusting. The 
practice of rock dusting, a requirement of the 1952 Federal Mine Act, involved covering 
the walls of underground mines with limestone to prevent the spread of combustible coal 
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dust, thereby reducing the risk of explosions. Furthermore, the bureau had recorded an 
additional 25 safety violations in the Farmington mine since 1966.16 
Lewis E. Evans, Safety Director for the United Mine Workers of America 
(UMWA), asserted that Consolidation had prioritized large profits over preventing 
accidents. However, his view was not typical of the UMWA leadership. On the first day 
of the catastrophe, Tony Boyle made a speech that, remarkably, defended Consolidation. 
At the scene of the disaster he proclaimed, “I share the grief. I’ve lost relatives in a mine 
explosion. But as long as we mine coal, there is always this inherent danger of 
explosions. This happens to be, in my judgment as President of the United Mine Workers 
of America, one of the better companies to work with as far as cooperation and safety is 
concerned.” William Poundstone, Consolidation’s executive vice-president, echoed 
Boyle’s claims by arguing that his company followed lawful practices and was not 
therefore responsible for the disaster.  
Assistant Secretary of the Interior J. Cordell Moore, one of Washington’s most 
influential mine legislators, provided further support for the company during a brief trip 
to Farmington. “We have tried our very best to make mines safe and I think the company 
has done all in its power to make the mine safe,” he declared. “Unfortunately, these 
things happen – we don’t understand why they happen, but they do happen.” The 
comments of the men who vindicated Consolidation Coal provoked outrage among the 
relatives of the victims. Judy Henderson, widowed at the age of just 21 as a result of the 
disaster, had particular contempt for Boyle. “I hated him right then,” she later 
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remembered.” I couldn’t believe someone could say that right in front of the mine where 
all our husbands were buried alive.”17 
The Farmington disaster exacted a heavy toll on the local community. Of the 78 
miners who died, 73 were married and 55 had dependent children.18 One of the deceased 
miners, Hartsel L. Mayle, left behind a wife and 13 dependent children.19  While the 
widows were distraught at the loss of their husbands, they also were determined to fight 
for changes to federal mine legislation. Representative Ken Hechler (D-WV) agreed to 
meet with the widows shortly after the disaster occurred, assuming he would be giving 
them consolation and emotional support. The widows, however, displayed a resilient 
attitude. They demanded that he take immediate action to prevent future disasters and the 
conditions that resulted in black lung disease. They implored him, “You’re a 
Congressman, why don’t you do something about this?” 20  
First elected to Congress in 1958, Hechler had long been an advocate of safer coal 
mines. During his inaugural term in office, shortly after the completion of the 1960 
census, the West Virginia legislature redrew the state’s Congressional districts. Under the 
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United States Constitution, state legislatures were required to engage in redistricting after 
every ten-year census, in order to democratize the election process for the U.S. House of 
Representatives. As part of the West Virginia redistricting, the state legislature removed 
Tyler County from Hechler’s control and gave him authority over Logan County instead. 
The redrawing of county boundaries actually facilitated Hechler’s re-election in 
November 1960, as Tyler County was traditionally a Republican County, whereas Logan 
County leaned more towards the Democratic Party. Moreover, it prompted Hechler’s 
involvement in coal mine health and safety. While there were no coal mines in Tyler, 
there were several in Logan County, which meant that many of his new constituents were 
coal miners and their families. As a Congressman, Hechler became aware of the 
problems and injustices that workers in the coal industry faced.21 
The re-election of Lyndon B. Johnson to the U.S. Presidency in 1964 further 
advanced Hechler’s interest in coal miners’ welfare. President Johnson sought to tackle 
mine health and safety head on with preventative legislation, in contrast to his 
predecessor, John F. Kennedy, who had adopted a relatively passive approach. President 
Kennedy’s administration had only provided relief for mine disaster victims after the fact, 
instead of advocating preventative measures. In Hechler’s own words, Kennedy, “instead 
of putting a fence around the cliff, put an ambulance in the valley.” Hechler cited 
President Johnson’s introduction of a draft bill on mine health and safety to Congress in 
September 1968 as a signal event, despite the fact that only he and two other 
Congressmen supported it.22   
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By the time he met the Farmington widows, Hechler was knowledgeable about 
the issues affecting miners. The meeting prompted him to become more active in coal 
mine policy and legislative issues.23 In a written statement, dated November 25, 1968, 
Hechler proclaimed, “Coal miners don’t have to die. In a civilized society, it is nothing 
short of criminal to allow the present conditions to continue in the coal mines.”24 He 
contended that federal and state mine safety laws were weak and hindered by 
bureaucratic obstacles, that most companies had advance warnings of inspections, and 
that dust levels in mines were unacceptably high. He further argued that miners accepted 
the constant risk of death and injury, while Congress and the general public were 
apathetic to the dangers of coal mining. Hechler was particularly scathing toward mine 
company officials and union leaders who claimed they were doing all in their power to 
protect miners. The nation had a duty, asserted Hechler, to push Congress for more 
effective mine safety legislation.25 
 The Department of the Interior, meanwhile, was hastily planning a conference on 
mine health and safety in response to the Farmington disaster. Two weeks after the mine 
first exploded, Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall announced that the conference 
would take place on December 12, with the participation of members of Congress, 
industry representatives, and union leaders. Udall stated, “We are looking into ways in 
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which we can better discharge our current responsibilities under existing law, and are 
considering what additional legislation is needed to provide practical remedies for the 
hazards to which our miners are exposed.”26 Udall’s announcement prompted an outbreak 
of activity at the offices of the United Mine Workers. President Boyle instructed several 
delegates, including Safety Director Lewis Evans, to collate evidence that would enable 
the union to retract Udall’s charges that it “had not done enough in the field of safety,” 
and to show conference attendees that it had “been the crusading force in improved safety 
in the coal mines of [the United States].”27 Boyle was reacting to the increased national 
focus on the UMW in the aftermath of the Farmington disaster. The union was now under 
pressure to justify its contributions to coal mine health and safety. 
The substantial media coverage of the Farmington disaster also heightened public 
awareness of West Virginia miners and the black lung movement. After the initial 
explosions, reporters from national newspapers and television networks descended on the 
local community. For almost a week, renowned anchorman Walter Cronkite presented a 
nightly segment on the events at Farmington, as the nation waited in suspense for news 
about the entombed miners. Given that nearly all the trapped men in the Hominy Falls 
disaster had escaped the mine alive, there was initially hope that the Farmington miners 
might also survive. For long periods of time, however, there was nothing for the media to 
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report. While awaiting news of the trapped miners’ fates, journalists started to investigate 
other aspects of miners’ lives. Isidore Buff capitalized on the media’s presence by 
informing them about black lung and its harmful effects on miners. He had no 
compunction about criticizing the coal operators, the UMW, and the Bureau of Mines.28  
In his book Forcing the Spring, Robert Gottlieb argues that the Farmington 
disaster only “tangentially affected the black lung movement,” but he fails to take into 
consideration the highly visible campaign orchestrated by Buff and others in the 
aftermath of the disaster. 29 Moreover, Gottlieb ignores the fact that in underground coal 
mines immediate safety risks and long-term health hazards were interconnected. The 
deaths and injuries caused by explosions and the lung disease caused by coal dust were 
both reflections of weak legislation and the disregard of coal operators and federal and 
state governments to miners’ welfare. Furthermore, coal dust was both a cause of 
explosions and serious lung disease in the miners who toiled in underground mines.  
In the aftermath of the disaster, Buff, Wells, and Rasmussen intensified their 
efforts to increase awareness of black lung disease. They brought a more formal nature to 
their partnership by establishing the Committee of Physicians on Mine Health and Safety. 
The committee toured the West Virginia coalfields extensively, talking to miners about 
the effects of the disease and the need for preventative legislation and compensation. Buff 
typically spoke first, much to the chagrin of Rasmussen, who frequently disapproved of 
his frenzied, inaccurate speeches. In a booming voice, Buff told the miners, “You’ve all 
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got black lung! You’re all gonna die!”30 Rather than accept such rhetoric with silent 
fatalism, most miners broke into loud shouts and applause. Buff sometimes exaggerated 
the proportion of miners who had the disease, claiming on some occasions that four fifths 
of West Virginia miners were afflicted by it.31 Like Buff, Hawey Wells relied on theatrics 
to highlight the threat posed by the disease. He continued to stand before miners and 
crumble lung tissue from deceased black lung victims between his fingers. Rasmussen’s 
research had demonstrated that not every miner was susceptible to black lung. After Buff 
and Wells had finished playing to the emotions of the audience, Rasmussen was left to 
discuss the disease in more scientific, grounded terms. This was often a difficult task, as 
the miners were often still clapping and cheering for Buff.32  
Craig Robinson, a law graduate working in West Virginia with the Volunteers in 
Service to America (VISTA), collaborated with local unions to organize the physicians’ 
appearances.33 With the help of his colleague Rick Bank, he used the dialogue that 
emerged from the meetings to draft changes to the West Virginia compensation law. 
Robinson and Bank formulated the new changes on the presumption that miners who had 
worked underground for a significant length of time should automatically receive 
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compensation from the state. The miners embraced this idea, for they had long 
recognized that working underground diminished their labor capacity.34 
The West Virginia state legislature responded to the Farmington disaster by 
holding a hearing from December 5 to 7, 1968. Representatives from the U. S. Bureau of 
Mines, the West Virginia Department of Mines, the United Mine Workers of America, 
and the Mountaineer Coal Company, the subsidiary of Consolidation responsible for 
operating the Farmington mine, gathered in the Federal Building in Fairmont to 
deliberate the cause of the disaster. Several of the miners who survived the disaster, or 
who had not been on shift when it happened, testified at the hearing, giving their 
perspective on the working conditions in the mine. Although preliminary evidence 
showed that a dangerous accumulation of methane gas had caused the disaster, the 
miners’ conflicting testimonies only served to complicate the investigation into what 
happened at Farmington.  
Lawrence Riggs, the General Superintendent of the No. 9, asserted early in his 
testimony that rock dusting procedures in the mine were adequate. As questioning 
progressed, however, he implied that the procedures for monitoring methane levels in the 
mine were flawed. When Frank C. Memmott, the Associate Director of Health and Safety 
in the Bureau of Mines asked Riggs to describe his experience with methane monitors, he 
responded, “We had a methane monitor in 6 right, 7 south, and in main west, and I 
believe they were both operating. I wouldn’t make that for a face, but I believe they 
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were.”35 Quickly trying to cover up any sense of hesitation or doubt, Riggs stated that 
neither the mine’s own inspection staff nor the inspectors from the Bureau of Mines had 
found problems with the monitors. He further claimed, “… I’ve watched them operate 
lots of times, and I never did see an operator continue to run when those meters showed 
that there was methane in there.”36 
Walter Slovekosky, a main-line motorman, cited his belief that section managers 
had too many responsibilities to carry out their duties effectively. He said, “Well, one of 
our problems that I have thought for a long time, especially in our mines, has been the 
fact that a section boss isn’t really a section boss. He has a belt system to look after and 
he has everything else to look after and he doesn’t really have the time to spend on the 
section to be sure that the section is safe. I know that to be a very real fact.”37 Asked by 
Memmot if the section managers gave utmost priority to safety, Slovekosky responded, “I 
would say that although that boss may have safety at heart and maybe that was what he 
was wanting and worrying about, it’s not something that he can look after continually 
like he should and spend time right there on his own section with his own men at the 
working face…”38 Ralph Starkey, who was responsible for running the loading machine, 
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further cast doubt on operating procedures in the mine. He said that there could have been 
better dust control on the continuous mining machine. In contrast to the testimony given 
by Riggs, he also emphasized his belief that there could have been more rock dusting in 
the mine.39 
A common theme emerged from the testimonies given at the hearing. All of the 
witnesses questioned indicated there were irregularities or flaws with safety procedures in 
the No. 9 mine, but they appeared reluctant to discuss them in great detail. Their 
hesitation reflected that the balance of power in the coalfields still favored the coal 
operators and their supporters in the United Mine Workers. The presence of a legal 
assistant from the Mountaineer Coal Company on the interrogation panel was hardly 
conducive to establishing an accurate testimony from the miners. Moreover, the 
witnesses were reluctant to acknowledge that the disaster could have been prevented. The 
delegates concluded the hearing without establishing a definitive cause for the disaster.  
The federal government was concerned not only with determining the cause of the 
disaster, but also its wider implications for coal mine health and safety. To that end, the 
Interior Department’s conference on mine safety opened in Washington D.C. on 
December 12. In his opening speech, Stewart Udall placed much of the onus for 
improving underground working conditions on management and labor. He told attendees, 
“The Federal Government can establish the standards and assist in the process through 
inspections and training, but, in the last analysis, management and labor must see to it 
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that good safety practices are observed.”40 Udall clearly envisioned a limited role for the 
federal government in the enforcement of mine regulations. He also realized, however, 
that it was necessary to modify the operating practices of the Bureau of Mines, as it did 
not do enough to enforce safe working conditions. He recommended giving the Bureau 
more power to carry out surprise inspections and the authority to shut down mines that 
were particularly unsafe. A further, crucial measure for Udall was the passage of 
President Johnson’s 1968 mine health and safety bill, albeit with a few modifications, 
including the addition of minimum dust standards for coal mines. Secretary Udall also 
highlighted the need for non-legislative measures, such as better training for mine 
inspectors.41 
 In his statement to the conference, Consolidation Coal President John Corcoran 
cautiously admitted that the Farmington disaster reflected the inadequacy of the 
company’s safety enforcement practices, despite its commitment to reducing 
underground fatalities. He assured the delegates that ‘Consol’ was re-evaluating its 
operating procedures and that its first priority was the welfare of its employees: “There 
can be no question that the health and safety of employees in the coal mining industry 
must be given first priority… Our trained and experienced employees constitute our most 
valuable resource and the protection of their health and safety is an absolute prerequisite 
                                                 
40 “Statement by Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall Before the Mine Safety 
Conference, Department of the Interior, Washington D.C., December 12, 1968,” U.S. 
Department of the Interior, p. 2, Folder 10, Box 3, UMW Safety Division Files, PSU 
Special Collections. 
 
41 Ibid., 1-21. 
 
 . 
67
to the successful and continued operation of our business.”42 Corcoran indicated that he 
would support changes to health and safety laws, so long as the federal government 
actively reinforced them. In doing so, he indirectly challenged Udall’s assertion that the 
federal government should have only a limited role in safety enforcement.43  
 UMW President Tony Boyle brought a large entourage of fellow union officers to 
the mining safety conference, to ensure an appreciative audience for his speech.44 From 
the outset, Boyle sought to exaggerate the union’s contribution to coal mine health and 
safety legislation. In a protracted discussion of the history of mine legislation during the 
twentieth century, he exaggerated and misrepresented the union’s role. For instance, he 
credited the union as a major influence in the creation of the Bureau of Mines in 1910, 
while underplaying the role of the federal government. He completely ignored the impact 
of public and media pressure in the wake of the 1907 Monongah mining disaster.45 In 
fact, Boyle credited the UMW with the passage of all previous mine health and safety 
laws, including the 1952 Federal Mine Safety Act and the 1966 law that extended the 
terms of the 1952 legislation to small mines.46 
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The Department of the Interior conference was more than a forum for the 
discussion of coal mine health and safety; it was nothing less than a contest over who was 
responsible for protecting the nation’s miners. Moreover, Boyle’s manipulation of his 
leadership position, and his contempt for the rank-and-file, meant that the average coal 
miner was not represented at the conference. The Department of the Interior, therefore, 
was unable to assess the impact of federal legislation on miners’ working conditions, or 
miners’ interpretation of the legislation. 
 From mid-December, Bureau of Mines director John F. O’Leary, conscious of the 
measures advocated by Udall at the conference, adopted a stronger approach to enforcing 
mine safety. He instructed Bureau inspectors to make unannounced spot-checks on mines 
and to close any that posed an immediate risk to miners’ health and safety. Stewart Udall 
had appointed O’Leary in late October, just prior to the Farmington disaster, as part of his 
drive to reform conditions in the mines. Although the Bureau had gained the authority to 
shut down mines after the passage of the Federal Mine Act in 1952, it rarely used this 
power. O’Leary’s new policy, therefore, marked an important shift in the Bureau’s role in 
regulating the coal industry.47 The Bureau’s more active role in mine policy did not have 
an immediate effect. Throughout 1968, a total of 98 miners in the bituminous coal 
industry died from roof falls or collapses of the mine face or ribs, four more than the 
previous year. The 1968 fatality rate represented 0.67 casualties per million man-hours 
worked, and 36.7 percent of the total underground bituminous fatalities. The 1967 fatality 
rate for roof falls and face and rib collapses represented 0.63 casualties per million man-
hours worked, although a larger proportion of the total bituminous fatality rate, at 56.6 
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percent. Thus, even discounting the Farmington disaster, safety in bituminous coal mines 
was worse in 1968 than it had been the previous year.48   
 The Farmington disaster not only resulted in stronger enforcement policies by the 
federal government and increased activism by the black lung movement. It also prompted 
consumer advocate Ralph Nader to campaign for tougher legislation. A graduate of 
Harvard Law School, Nader had established a visible public profile through his recent 
investigation of automobile safety. In his 1965 book Unsafe At Any Speed, he criticized 
the safety of many American cars, particularly General Motors’ Chevrolet Corvair.49  
Nader described the Corvair as “one of the greatest acts of industrial irresponsibility in 
the present century.”50 Most notably, the Corvair’s swing-axle rear suspension 
occasionally caused the car to spin out of control or roll over. General Motors responded 
to Nader’s claims by conducting extensive investigations of his private life and hiring 
undercover detectives to follow him.51 Nader sued the company for $26 million for 
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invasion of privacy, and eventually won a settlement of $425,000.52 His investigation led 
to the passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 1966.53 
Nader became involved in coal mine health and safety after learning of Dr. Buff’s 
travels through Appalachia.54 He had already demonstrated his commitment to the issue 
by pressing the Johnson administration to overhaul federal mining legislation. He also 
published an article on black lung, entitled “They’re Still Breathing,” in The New 
Republic. In the article, Nader criticized the U.S. Public Health Service’s lack of attention 
to black lung disease, as well as the federal government’s failure to enforce coal mine 
health and safety laws.55 Moreover, Nader argued, “both the operators and officials of the 
United Mine Workers are more concerned about the problems of competing energy 
sources and anti-air pollution drives than the slow death in the mines. UMW hospitals are 
available for the sick worker but the UMW seems far less interested in the toxic 
environment of the mines.”56 In essence, Nader argued, the coal operators and the United 
Mine Workers were more concerned with maintaining the financial profits of the coal 
industry than miners’ welfare.  
As 1968 drew to a close, Nader escalated his campaign for better coal mining 
conditions. In a letter to Wilbur Cohen, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
Nader argued that pneumoconiosis was the “major public health problem in several states 
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-- especially West Virginia and Kentucky.” He attributed a large degree of responsibility 
for this problem to the coal operators, the Bureau of Mines, and the United Mine 
Workers, but he was particularly critical of the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare. He argued that the department’s Division of Occupational Health had failed to 
capitalize on a study of black lung it had conducted more than a decade earlier. Nader 
wrote, “The $5 million in appropriations that the Department has received since 1953 for 
research on the causes and prevention of soft coal workers’ pneumoconiosis has little to 
show for itself, apart from the afore-mentioned prevalence study and the aborted research 
effort at Beckley, West Virginia.” The Department, therefore, had failed to devise 
effective preventative measures for black lung disease, even though it had received 
substantial funding to do so. As Nader pointed out, it had abandoned its research on the 
disease at its health field station for miners in Beckley. He asserted the department’s 
failings were the result of “poor management, petty bureaucratic in-fighting, and a well-
known belief by the physician in charge of the research program that a safe dust level for 
coal mines could not be set because of political and economic factors.” According to 
Nader, the physician in question, Dr. Murray Brown, placed the coal industry’s financial 
interests ahead of his scientific obligations to miners.57 
 Nader proposed that a group of impartial observers should carry out an 
investigation of the Department’s mismanagement of the program. He argued that the 
investigation should address several specific issues, including the closure of the miners’ 
health field station in Beckley and the department’s failure to use its only qualified 
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mining engineer in the investigation of underground dust levels.58 Nader also used the 
letter as an opportunity to criticize the medical profession’s role in the black lung crisis. 
He reiterated a comment made to him by Dr. Lorin Kerr, that physicians’ general 
indifference was “one of the greatest disgraces in modern medicine.”59 Nader’s 
intervention gave the miners a powerful new ally, and increased national attention on 
black lung disease.  
Even so, beyond the United Mine Workers’ mismanaged and under-funded 
Welfare and Retirement Fund, there was little financial relief available for miners. Only 
Pennsylvania, Alabama, and Virginia provided state compensation for coal miners 
suffering from black lung. Outside those states, sick miners could claim social insurance 
benefits, but they were administered through a set of tough and often unrealistic criteria. 
In order to receive benefits, miners typically had to demonstrate the quantity and 
chemical composition of the dust they had inhaled throughout their working life. Coal 
miners in West Virginia fared particularly badly, as only silicosis, and not 
pneumoconiosis, was classified as a compensable miners’ disease. Local branches of the 
UMW had pushed to expand workers’ compensation laws in 1964 and again in early 
1968, but without success. 60  
  
 
 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 2. 
 
59 Ibid. 
 
60 Derickson, Black Lung, 144. 
 
 . 
73
The West Virginia Black Lung Association (BLA) and Community Activism 
In early January 1969, a handful of rank-and-file miners in West Virginia formed 
the Black Lung Association (BLA).61 Lacking the support of the UMWA national 
leadership and the mine owners, they believed that any movement for change had to stem 
from the miners themselves. The Committee of Physicians played an instrumental part in 
the creation of the organization, which intended to press the West Virginia legislature for 
the addition of pneumoconiosis to the state workers’ compensation law. Charles Brooks, 
president of the Winifrede local branch of the UMW in West Virginia, became the 
association’s first president. Brooks mortgaged his home to help raise the $10,000 needed 
to hire a lawyer for the new organization, while other local union branches across the 
state engaged in fund-raising efforts. The BLA appointed attorney Paul Kaufman, a 
former state senator, to draft legislation and provide legal support. He immediately 
drafted new black lung compensation bill with the assistance of Craig Robinson and Rick 
Bank. The draft contained the radical clause that any miner with a breathing impairment 
was presumed to have work-related pneumoconiosis. It also proposed that doctors should 
be able to use evidence other than X-rays to prove the existence of the disease and that 
those afflicted with the disease should be allowed to sue their employers for damages.62 
           The Black Lung Association met for the first time on Saturday, January 4, 1969, at 
the community center in Vivian, West Virginia. Dr. Isidore Buff told an audience of 450 
miners, “You get a black lung from working in the mines, not from cigarettes, not from 
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tobacco.”63 Buff was arguing against propaganda issued by coal companies, conservative 
politicians, and several physicians, that black lung was not a legitimate disease and 
miners’ lung ailments were the result of cigarette smoking. The association concluded its 
first meeting by scheduling a statewide demonstration for January 26 in Charleston. In 
the aftermath of that first meeting, the BLA spread throughout the West Virginia 
coalfields. The Committee of Physicians continued to play an important role in 
mobilizing support. Speaking to miners at Park Junior High School on January 18, Buff 
drew cheers of applause as he denounced the influence of major railroad and mining 
companies on the coal industry and promised changes to the existing compensation laws. 
He urged audience members to attend the meeting scheduled to take place in Charleston 
at the end of the month. Robinson and local union leaders also organized Black Lung 
Association meetings throughout South West Virginia, to inform miners’ about the 
campaign for compensation and the forthcoming meeting in Charleston.64 
On January 26, over 3,000 miners attended the BLA’s first statewide meeting at 
the Charleston Civic Center. They were joined by a number of significant people, 
including Ken Hechler, Paul Kaufman, and the three doctors from the Committee of 
Physicians. Sixty year-old James Wyatt, a pneumoconiosis victim, opened the meeting by 
performing his own song, “Black Lungs.” Accompanied by a guitarist, and struggling to 
breathe throughout, Wyatt encapsulated the decline in health that countless miners 
experienced during their working lives: 
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A young miner’s lungs may be hearty and hale 
When he enters the mine with his dinner pail 
But coal dust and grime 
In a few years time 
Fills up his lungs and they begin to fail 
Black lungs, full of coal dust 
Coal miners must breathe it or bust 
Black lungs, gasping for breath 
With black lungs we are choking to death.65 
 
The song, which truly captured the impact of pneumoconiosis on coal miners, set the tone 
for the speeches that followed.  
Ken Hechler read a message to the coal miners from consumer advocate Ralph 
Nader, who was unable to attend the rally. Hechler had agreed to read the message after 
meeting Nader in the office of Congressman James O’Hara of Michigan a few days 
earlier. Nader’s message accused Tony Boyle and his colleagues of abandoning the 
miners at their time of need: 
The record is overwhelming that Mr. Tony Boyle has neglected his responsibility 
to protect coal miners… You may conclude that he is no longer worthy of being 
your leader, that you need new leadership that will fight for your rights and not  
snuggle up close to the coal operators and forget about the men who are paying  
the dues and paying the price.66 
 
This bold assertion crystallized what had long been apparent, that there was a massive 
gulf between the national union leadership and the rank-and-file on the issues of black 
lung and mine safety. In the hope of addressing the union’s failure, those present 
unanimously passed a resolution calling on Boyle to assist the West Virginia miners in 
their fight for improved legislation. In addition to reading out Nader’s message, Hechler 
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gave his own speech, in which he publicly condemned the West Virginia Medical 
Association for giving him a document with the slogan, “Black Lung is Good for You.” 
In response, the Congressman produced a 12-pound slab of baloney from his bag and 
shouted, “That is baloney,” to the cheers of the miners. Hechler also criticized those who 
argued that prolonged studies of black lung were necessary before the introduction of a 
new compensation program.67  
 Donald Rasmussen spoke of the need to disseminate knowledge among the state’s 
physicians. He argued that doctors in Kanawha and Cabell counties had passed 
resolutions condemning the Committee of Physicians on Mine Health and Safety only 
because they did not fully understand the nature of black lung disease: “Part of our 
problem is the lack of education of physicians in West Virginia in modern techniques. If 
it takes too long to educate the doctors, we will educate the miners and the legislators.” 
Rasmussen did not trust the medical profession to identify black lung in miners. He 
envisioned miners and legislators playing an important role in the diagnosis of the 
disease.68  
Isidore Buff was less critical of the medical profession. To loud applause, he 
thundered, “There is no person more dedicated in the country than the country doctor or 
the general practitioner… The country doctor likes people, but some specialists don’t like 
people. Specialists work for the coal companies.” Buff, therefore, believed that 
independent doctors, who were not under the influence of the coal companies, had an 
important role to play in diagnosing black lung disease.  Showing the audience slides of 
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blackened lungs, Buff reiterated what he had long been saying: “There are many coal 
miners who think they have heart disease, but they have lung disease.”69 As he continued 
his speech, Buff also repeated his assertion that the coal workers had to empower 
themselves to achieve legislative change.70  Paul Kaufman also spoke at the event. He 
explained to the miners the features of the bill he had drawn up with Robinson and Bank. 
Although not present at the meeting, UMW President Boyle denounced the 
miners as “black-tongue loudmouths.” He claimed that the Black Lung Association was a 
“dual organization.” This was a serious charge, as it jeopardized the activists’ 
membership in the United Mine Workers. Under the union’s constitution, members could 
be expelled for participating in other unions or external organizations.71 Boyle’s 
criticisms, however, did little to detract from the success of the meeting. The gathering at 
Charleston reflected the Black Lung Association’s ability to mobilize West Virginia’s 
miners. It was also indicative of the discontent and anger that had long been simmering 
beneath the surface in the state’s coalfields. The BLA gave the miners a focal point for 
their anger, and it demonstrated its potential to invoke real legislative change. In his 
pivotal study, Black Lung Disease: Anatomy of a Public Health Disaster, Alan Derickson 
argues that the Charleston rally enabled the BLA’s members and supporters to realize the 
strength of the movement they were building, and showed that high-profile political and 
medical figures were willing to support the miners’ cause. Moreover, he contends, the 
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rally increased the miners’ trust of the Committee of Physicians on Mine Health and 
Safety.72  
The Charleston demonstration reflected the groundswell of support for black lung 
compensation in West Virginia. In addition to pneumoconiosis, however, coal miners still 
faced the kind of safety hazards that had resulted in the Farmington disaster and countless 
other mine catastrophes. The lack of progress in addressing such hazards became 
apparent just two days after the Charleston demonstration, when, on January 28, rescue 
workers pulled twelve men from the burning Humphrey No. 7 mine in Mount Morris, 
Pennsylvania. The mine, owned by Consolidation Coal, had caught fire after a roof 
collapse triggered an electrical fault. On this occasion, there were no fatalities, although 
one man was treated at hospital for smoke inhalation and exhaustion. In addition to the 
twelve men who were rescued, another 126 miners escaped the shaft using elevators and 
safety bucket hoists. During its last three inspections of the mine, the Bureau of Mines 
had uncovered more than 100 safety violations. It dismissed the violations as common 
occurrences for an underground mine, and did not compel the owner to address them. The 
fire’s occurrence in the face of those violations demonstrated that the bureau lacked any 
real regulatory will.73 
Despite the high fatality rate emanating from disasters and safety failures, the 
Black Lung Association’s sole priority was tougher preventative legislation and 
compensation for black lung disease. Its focus on a single issue was its greatest strength, 
contributing to its ability to mobilize a broad coalition of support. Even so, the 
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association still faced an uphill climb to achieve its goals. Events in early February 1969 
reiterated the challenge that the association and its supporters faced. First, Stephen G. 
Young, Vice President of the West Virginia Coal Association, accused the organization 
and its supporters of “clowning around.” In a thinly veiled attack against Buff, 
Rasmussen, and Wells, Young said the vast majority of physicians were more concerned 
with establishing scientific, medical facts about pneumoconiosis than spreading 
mistruths. Second, a joint hearing between the West Virginia Senate Judiciary Committee 
and its counterpart in the House of Delegates on February 11, while giving a public 
forum to the reformers, did not result in immediate change to the legislation, despite the 
strength of their evidence.74 
Dr. Murray Hunter, director of the UMW Welfare and Retirement Fund clinic in 
Fairmont, attended the February 11 hearing with a panel of  “expert” witnesses, while the 
Committee of Physicians and UMW leaders put aside their differences to present a united 
front. Thousands of miners also missed work to attend the hearing in Charleston.  
Hunter’s panel opened the hearing by stressing their desire to make compensation more 
widely available. In Hunter’s view, Buff’s term “black lung” was medically inaccurate, 
but useful because of the attention it had generated for pneumoconiosis.  Welsh 
pathologist Jethro Gough bolstered the panel’s claim by testifying that lung diseases other 
than silicosis affected miners, and that ‘simple’ coal workers’ pneumoconiosis – that is, 
pneumoconiosis that had not reached an advanced stage – could be disabling. Radiologist 
Eugene Pendergrass, meanwhile, reiterated the assertion that Rasmussen had long been 
making, that X-rays were an inadequate method of detecting black lung. The advocates of 
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reform were so forceful in their arguments that their opponents had a hard time 
presenting their own case, particularly when it emerged that one of them, Rowland Burns, 
was being paid by the coal operators to testify.75  
Although the West Virginia state legislature was deliberating several legislative 
bills that provided workers compensation for the victims of pneumoconiosis, it was slow 
to enact legislative change. Growing resentment in the coalfields, however, quickly led to 
industrial action. On Tuesday, February 18, 1969, at the East Gulf mine in Raleigh 
County, 282 miners walked off the job after a dispute with the management. As the strike 
quickly spread across West Virginia, the miners demanded the state legislature’s swift 
passage of the new black lung legislation. One man threatened, “If necessary, we will 
stop every lump of coal in the state until we get this legislation through… We support the 
state and the federal government with our taxes. It’s time we did something for our 
benefits.” Two days after the walkout began, the strike had already escalated to 5,000 
miners. Its rapid growth was largely attributable to the roving pickets that traveled around 
the state’s coalfields. Although the BLA had not started the strike, it supported the 
miners. Ken Hechler and Paul Kaufman, in contrast, opposed the walkout, believing the 
action was premature. By the weekend, 30,000 miners across the state were staying away 
from work in protest over the state legislature’s failure to respond to their concerns. Coal 
production had stopped in the southern part of the state, while many of the northern 
mines had temporarily shut down.76 
                                                 
75 Ibid. 
 
76 Charleston Gazette, February 20, 1969, 1; Judkins, We Offer Ourselves As Evidence, 
70; Smith, Digging Our Own Graves, 115. 
 
 . 
81
On Sunday, February 23, a large crowd of miners gathered for a meeting at the 
local union hall in Affinity, Raleigh County. Five hundred crammed into the hall, while 
another 700 waited outside in the snow. The large attendance meant that the speakers, 
which included the Committee of Physicians, state delegates Warren McGraw and Ted 
Stacy, and BLA representatives, had to climb in and out of a window in the hall to 
address both groups. At the meeting, Buff roused the miners with another fiery speech, 
extolling them to fight for the compensation they deserved. Ernest Riddle, the BLA 
treasurer, then spoke of black lung as a disease that affected entire families, not just 
individual miners: 
We appreciate every bit of support, we appreciate everything we see here today.  
And we know that everybody that’s got a father – each and every one of you –  
 when Dad comes home in the evening and he can’t breathe, you know what’s  
a-hurtin’ him [“Yes, sir,” “That’s right”]. And a woman that’s living with a man  
and seeing him slowly die, nobody has to tell her. Nobody has to explain to them   
babies what was wrong with Daddy that he couldn’t get his breath at night…”77 
 
Riddle recognized that many families were familiar with the physical symptoms of black 
lung disease, and thus had an important role to play in the black lung movement.  In 
Digging Our Own Graves, Barbara Smith argues that while the meeting at Raleigh 
County was disorganized and unfocused, it enabled the black lung leaders to lay the 
foundations for a march on the state Capitol on February 26, the purpose of which was to 
pressure state legislators into signing their black lung bill. Later that evening, a roving 
picket stopped the midnight shift at several mines across West Virginia.78  
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As a result of the growing agitation among the miners, there was a tense 
atmosphere in the state Capitol. A number of legislators were hostile to the Black Lung 
Association leaders and their demands for legislative change. Harry Pauley, a member of 
the House of Delegates, was especially critical of Ken Hechler:  
Hechler is a celibatic, misogynic, extrovert putting himself before the public at 
every opportunity. He is a political acrobat who would swing by his tail, if he had 
one, on the flagpole in front of a polling place to get attention. He is like a jackass 
who becomes lonely at night for attention and keeps the neighbors awake by 
making braying noises at one end and unrestrained noises from the other and 
thinks he is pleasing his audience with his melodious voice.”79  
 
Pauley implied that Hechler was more concerned with gaining public approval and 
furthering his own political career than supporting the coal miners. His speech was a 
direct personal attack on Hechler, rather than a criticism of his legislative policies. He 
clearly intended to undermine the power of the black lung movement by condemning one 
of its key leaders. Moreover, his speech illustrated the significant fractures in the West 
Virginia political establishment over the issue of black lung compensation. In the House 
and the Senate, there was enough opposition to black lung compensation to prevent the 
passage of the Black Lung Association’s legislative bill.80 
 Despite the obstacles it faced, the black lung movement continued to gain 
momentum. On Wednesday, February 26, three thousand miners and their supporters 
from across the state gathered for a rally in Charleston’s Municipal Auditorium. A 
number of speakers, including Ken Hechler, Paul Kaufman, Isidore Buff, Hawey Wells, 
and Donald Rasmussen, discussed the state government’s ongoing legislative debates 
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over black lung compensation. The miners responded cautiously to Hechler at first, 
because of his initial opposition to the strike. Hechler regained their trust with a rousing 
speech, in which he admitted had made a mistake. He proclaimed, “The greatest heroes 
are you coal miners who have taken your future in your hands and said, ‘No longer are 
we going to live and die like animals.’” He went on, “The national searchlight is on West 
Virginia. I can report to you that the hope and prayers of many people throughout this 
land are with you.” Hechler also indicated that he had made a $1,000 donation to the 
Black Lung Association as part of his support for tougher legislation. His contribution, 
notes historian Alan Derickson, far outweighed the five dollars given to the association 
by West Virginia Secretary of State John D. Rockefeller IV. Reiterating the tension 
between the BLA and the leadership of the United Mine Workers, Hechler reminded the 
miners that the union leadership had labeled him a “fink,” because of his assertion that it 
was not doing enough to help them.81   
At the rally, BLA attorney Paul Kaufman discussed the association’s stance 
regarding the legislative bills under debate in the Capitol. He explained to the miners that 
the association supported Senate Bill 216 and House Bill 814, which contained 
presumption clauses. Under those clauses, black lung victims who had worked a certain 
number of years in the mines could receive compensation, without having to provide X-
ray evidence. Rasmussen, meanwhile, contested legislators’ claims that VISTA workers 
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were responsible for the statewide strike, asserting that the miners were intelligent 
enough to undertake the strike of their own volition. 82   
After the rally, the miners marched to the state Capitol, many of them bearing 
placards with slogans such as “No Law, No Work” and “78 / 4,” a reference to the miners 
killed in the Farmington and Hominy Falls disasters. One legislator recalled watching the 
procession approach the Capitol. “We were in a committee meeting,” he remembered. 
“Our room was on the third floor facing Kanawha Boulevard. You could look out and 
watch them come – watch them march up the steps and into the building… Well, none of 
us had ever seen anything like that!”83  
Historian Alan Derickson argues that the February 26 demonstration symbolized 
the miners’ revolt against UMW President Boyle’s leadership. It did not mean that they 
had rejected the union itself. Miners who booed at the speakers’ mention of national 
union officials and jeered while marching past the District 17 headquarters carried 
placards displaying the name of their local union. Moreover, local union leaders played a 
significant role in organizing the demonstration, while many local union presidents, such 
as Arnold Miller, Charles Brooks, and Elmer Brown, were leaders in the Black Lung 
Association.84 
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Governor Arch A. Moore Jr. addressed the assembled group from the steps of the 
Capitol. When he announced that the state government’s efforts to establish a new bill 
might be delayed until the July legislature was in session, however, the miners 
interrupted him, chanting, “No! We want it now. If we don’t get it now, we won’t work.” 
Moore explained that he was already committed to a new black lung law, but he could 
only extend the current legislative session for budgetary matters. In an attempt to 
persuade the miners to end the strike, the governor said they would only be hurting their 
families by continuing. Wives, children and widows, however, were present at the 
demonstration to show their support for the miners. Mrs. Hall, from nearby Gallagher, 
complained to the Charleston Gazette that physicians were dismissive of her husband’s 
claims that he was disabled by black lung disease. Eight-year old Mark Legg, whose 
father Charles worked in a coal mine in Raleigh County, bore a placard that said, “My 
daddy is a coal miner. He need’s [sic] protection.” 85  
Hundreds of the miners made their way into the public galleries in the Capitol 
building. In response to their presence, the House Judiciary Committee reported a draft 
bill to the floor of the House. Although the bill incorporated many of the miners’ 
demands, it was still weaker than they had been anticipating. Delegate Robert Nelson 
said the bill accomplished 60 percent of the miners’ proposals. Similarly, delegate 
Warren McGraw, who had consistently supported the miners’ cause, commented, “The 
bill doesn’t go as far as I hoped it would but it goes much further than the coal industry 
thought it would.”  Most significantly, the bill contained a ‘presumptive’ clause, which 
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stipulated that miners suffering from pneumoconiosis would be presumed to have 
contracted the disease as a result of their work if they had spent ten of the past fifteen 
years in underground mines. Under the presumptive clause, victims would be entitled to 
collect compensation from their employer.  
The bill also stipulated that X-rays were insufficient for diagnosing 
pneumoconiosis, as they were unable to detect the disease in its early stages. Under the 
existing law, if X-rays detected nodules on miners’ lungs (that is, signs of advanced 
pneumoconiosis) then they were deemed to be suffering from silicosis, not 
pneumoconiosis. The bill advocated the replacement of the silicosis medical board with 
an occupational disease medical board and setting disability benefits as a percentage of 
miners’ weekly wages, as opposed to a set dollar amount.86 For the most part, the bill 
would not be retroactive, except where a miner met the criteria for the presumptive clause 
and could prove he contracted the disease in the three years before the passage of the bill. 
Stephen Young, of the West Virginia Coal Operators Association, attacked the bill as 
“social legislation,” and a “signed blank check” for all kinds of illness not related to 
work. Coal operators and the UMW leadership falsely claimed that pneumoconiosis was 
“already compensable under the existing laws.” 87 
Several of the black lung leaders were pessimistic about the Judiciary 
Committee’s bill. Paul Kaufman rejected the bill, because it covered only 
pneumoconiosis and not other dust-related occupational diseases. Appearing before the 
House Rules Committee to request the complete rewriting of the bill, Kaufman argued 
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that the passage of the bill in its existing form would be more detrimental than beneficial 
to the miners. He was particularly opposed to the bill’s stipulation that the diagnosis of 
pneumoconiosis was dependent on the assessment of individual physicians. Dr. Hawey 
Wells, meanwhile, accused the Judiciary Committee of colluding with the mine 
operators. Responding to his claims, J. E. Watson, the head of the committee, said a few 
doctors and “a baloney waving Congressman” were unfairly creating hysteria among the 
miners. In a speech on the House floor, Watson said that the behavior of some miners had 
gone “beyond the conduct which can be tolerated.” Watson, a native of West Virginia, 
was the great-grandson of the founder of the Consolidation Coal Company.88  
The continuing pressure from the black lung movement pushed the full House of 
Delegates to make several amendments to the bill. In a prolonged session on Friday, 
February 28, during which the doors to House chamber were locked and guarded by state 
policemen, the legislators modified the bill by incorporating several of the activists’ 
demands. The new version of the bill placed less emphasis on medical opinion in the 
diagnosis of pneumoconiosis, stressing instead the importance of pulmonary function 
tests. It also placed the onus on employers to prove that miners had not contracted lung 
disease as a result of their work. In a significant victory for the Black Lung Association 
and the striking miners, the House voted 95-0 to pass the amended bill. 89 
Warren McGraw commented that the bill “[was] the most important piece of labor 
legislation in this state in this century.” But not everyone was satisfied with the bill. Paul 
Kaufman feared that doctors would still play a significant role in diagnosing miners’ lung 
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disease. For Kaufman, the only way to diagnose pneumoconiosis was by mechanical tests 
of lung efficiency. In contrast, several House delegates contended that the modified bill 
did not allow for a broad enough spectrum of medical opinion.90 A spokesman for the 
coal industry claimed the bill could cost operators up to $16 million per year. Paul 
Morton, the President of the West Virginia Coal Association, referred to the bill as “not 
just social legislation, but galloping socialism in one of its purest forms.”91 Having given 
unanimous approval to the bill, the House passed it on to the Senate for consideration. 
While the miners were jubilant about the House bill, they resolved not to go back 
to work until the Senate and Governor Moore had endorsed it. A number of coal 
operators, including the U.S. Steel Corporation and the Eastern Associated Coal 
Corporation, sought an injunction against the strikers. They charged that the strike 
violated their contract with the UMWA and resulted in the loss of $4,488,000 in revenue 
and 748,000 tons of coal production. The operators’ court suit targeted in particular the 
UMW International and Districts 17 and 29; it sought S1.1 million for each day the strike 
had been in progress. A hearing before Federal Judge John A. Field on March 1 did not 
result in a court injunction. By March 1, the strike had escalated to over 40,000 miners, 
and coal production in West Virginia had come to a halt. 
Thousands of impatient miners marched to the State Capitol on March 2 to 
pressure the Senate and Governor into endorsing the House bill. The Senate Judiciary 
Committee responded by releasing a draft bill the next day. To the miners’ dismay, the 
bill significantly weakened the House legislation. It stipulated that pneumoconiosis could 
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only be diagnosed with an X-ray, or other “objective medical evidence,” and included a 
more stringent presumptive clause. The Senate’s presumptive clause rested on the word 
“continuous,” stipulating that miners’ exposure to occupational dust had to amount to at 
least two “continuous” years during the ten years before their last exposure.92  
The West Virginia Black Lung Association immediately released a statement 
condemning the bill. The statement quoted Donald Rasmussen, to the effect that “there is 
no relationship between what an X-ray shows and the degree of symptoms the patient 
complains about.” The statement also quoted Dr. Eugene Pendergrass, treasurer of the 
BLA and former president of the Radiological Society of North America. According to 
Pendergrass, “Black lung cannot be seen on conventional X-rays. An X-ray does not 
provide any reliable evidence for evaluation of pulmonary function or disturbed 
pulmonary function in early pneumoconiosis.” Jeanne Rasmussen, wife of Donald 
Rasmussen and spokesperson for the BLA, said the miners opposed the bill’s rule on 
“continuous” exposure to coal dust.93 
 The Senate had the option of either passing its amended bill or the House bill in 
its original form. On Wednesday, March 5, it rejected the House version of the bill and 
voted by a clear majority of 34-0 for its own amended version. A crowd of over 400 
miners watched silently from the galleries as the bill was passed. The Senate’s 
endorsement of the bill was a major setback for the Black Lung Association. After close 
scrutiny of the bill, the House rejected the amendments, which meant the bill became the 
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subject of negotiation in a conference committee. By March 7, the 59th day of the 60-day 
legislative session, the committee had neared a compromise. Its failure to agree on a final 
version of the bill prompted Governor Moore to allow deliberation for three more days. 
Across West Virginia, 42,000 miners were still on strike, awaiting the results of the 
committee’s negotiations. It was the largest strike in response to a health and safety issue 
in American history, and the largest political strike in the country’s history.94   
On March 8, at 11:45 p.m., just fifteen minutes before the scheduled legislative 
session ended, both branches of the legislature passed a rewritten version of the black 
lung act. The House voted 93-0 in favor, while the Senate endorsed the bill by 32-2. The 
revised bill closely resembled the original House version, restoring the more liberal 
clause on presumption and authorizing an occupational disease medical board. It also 
gave a broad definition of pneumoconiosis, using the term to describe a range of 
occupational-related lung ailments. While the legislation still emphasized the importance 
of X-rays and expert medical opinion as evidence of pneumoconiosis, it stated that X-
rays were not sole proof of the disease. Nevertheless, the bill rejected the utility of 
pulmonary function tests, and it mandated a fixed weekly sum of $55 for compensation, 
rather than establishing rates connected to miners’ wages. Furthermore, the presumption 
clause only applied to miners who were actively working as of July 1, 1969. Although an 
improvement on the conservative black lung legislation passed by the Senate, the final 
version of the bill fell short of the original bill drafted by the BLA. Paul Kaufman stated 
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that he wished to study the bill in detail before commenting. Donald Rasmussen, 
meanwhile, praised the bill’s rejection of X-rays as definitive evidence of black lung. 95 
 Only a few hours after the state legislature’s endorsement of the bill, two 
thousand miners gathered for the Black Lung Association’s final rally in West Virginia, 
at Park Junior High School in Beckley. One miner later recalled that miners spilled out of 
the crowded auditorium into adjacent hallways and even onto the streets. “I remember 
there was one guy that got up and asked for a vote to go back to work,” he said. “And I 
can’t describe it… but there was a great big roar – “No!” – that they wouldn’t go back to 
work. They were going to wait until the governor signed the bill.”96 Another miner at the 
rally perceived a lack of consensus over what the next course of action should be. The 
miners ultimately decided to continue the strike until Moore signed the bill. As the rally 
was taking place in Beckley, a group of around fifteen black lung activists stopped a coal 
train in Kanawha County, delaying it by several hours. The activists only dispersed with 
the arrival of the local sheriff. 97 
  Governor Arch Moore signed the black lung bill in a ceremony on March 11. By 
this time, 15,000 coal miners had already returned to work, confident of his endorsement 
of the bill. After signing the bill, Moore commented, “As I noted in my message to the 
legislature only three days after taking office, coal mining is an essential part of the 
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economy of this state, therefore it is incumbent upon us to provide for the health of those 
engaged in that vital industry.”98 His approval of the legislation marked the end of the 
West Virginia miners’ strike. Shortly afterwards, the remaining 30,000 miners ended 
their walkout. 
 
Conclusion 
Governor Moore’s signing of the black lung bill represented a significant advance 
in coal mine health and safety in West Virginia. Although the legislation did not fulfill all 
the demands of the black lung activists, it was far more progressive than the existing state 
law. That the activists were able to achieve their demands so quickly reflects a number of 
significant points. First, the rank-and-file miners’ decision to align themselves with the 
Black Lung Association, rather than the union leadership, shows just how fragmented and 
aloof the United Mine Workers had become. The miners were no longer able to rely on 
organized labor to better their working conditions, to the point were they sought an 
alternative medium to achieve their demands. Furthermore, the events of late 1968 and 
early 1969 revealed the corrupt practices of Tony Boyle and the UMW national 
leadership. Regardless of his public statements to the contrary, Boyle viewed his position 
as UMW President as a way to advance his own personal interests. The union, miners 
believed, no longer fought for its own members, but rather supported the interests of the 
coal industry.  
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Second, the passage of the new West Virginia black lung legislation demonstrated 
the effectiveness of grassroots protest. The pressure exerted by the Black Lung 
Association leaders and thousands of rank and file miners was instrumental in persuading 
the state legislature to endorse comprehensive legislation. By engaging in a lengthy strike 
and halting coal production, the miners were able to demonstrate both the significant role 
they played in the state’s economy and that they were entitled to more comprehensive 
black lung legislation. The association’s leaders not only framed the miners’ demands in 
politically comprehensible terms, but provided the motivation and determination the 
miners required to maintain their protest. Furthermore, miners organized through local 
unions to achieve improved compensation measures. 
Third, the black lung movement in West Virginia showed that coal miners’ 
identities were deeply rooted in their local communities. After major disasters such as the 
ones at Hominy Falls and Farmington, families and relatives kept vigil at the mine sites 
as they waited for news.  Similarly, they marched with the miners through downtown 
Charleston and attended rallies and demonstrations. The black lung movement 
transcended the individual injuries and diseases of coal miners. More importantly, it was 
about miners achieving justice for the small communities in Appalachia that were often 
overlooked and exploited by corporate interests.  
The success of the black lung movement in West Virginia had much broader 
ramifications. It led to the growth of similar movements in Ohio and Kentucky, and while 
these movements, which will be discussed later, were not as large and successful, they 
still led to notable improvements in black lung compensation at the state level. It also had 
a significant influence on coal mine health and safety legislation at the federal level -- the 
 . 
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events in West Virginia prompted Congress to look for ways of improving the existing 
laws, and of making the mines safer places to work. 
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Chapter Three 
A Conflict of Interests:  
Political Dissent, Union Rivalry, and the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 
of 1969 
 
Introduction 
In early 1969, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives both opened 
legislative hearings on coal mine health and safety. They sought to strengthen federal 
mining laws and ultimately prevent catastrophes such as the Farmington disaster from 
happening in the future. At both sets of hearings, several legislative bills were the focus 
of debate. The Senate passed a bill with strong health and safety measures on October 1, 
1969. Later that month, as the House of Representatives was debating the final terms of 
its own bill, a group of fifty miners stormed unannounced into Congressman Ken 
Hechler’s office in Washington D.C. The miners challenged Hechler for not endorsing 
the two draft safety bills the United Mine Workers had submitted to the House and for 
presenting his own, more stringent legislative bill. The leader of the group, a man named 
Eli Zitkovich, started shaking his fist at Hechler, demanding to know why he had rejected 
the UMW bill. Zitkovich was an aide to Tony Boyle, the president of the UMW. The 
confrontation was interrupted when the bell started ringing to signal that Congress was in 
session. Hechler tried to leave his office, as he was scheduled to deliver a speech, but the 
miners jostled him, shouting “Damn traitor!” Outside in the corridor, Hechler noticed 
UMW leader Tony Boyle standing in a corner. Assuming that Boyle had orchestrated the 
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confrontation, Hechler went over to shake his hand. Boyle promptly turned his back on 
Hechler, refusing to have any contact with the congressman.1 
 As this chapter will show, the encounter between Hechler and the miners 
symbolized a number of larger issues. First, the UMW leadership clearly opposed the 
radical overhaul of the nation’s mining laws. Boyle’s use of a small, aggressive group of 
his own supporters to intimidate Hechler suggested that Boyle was out of touch with the 
majority of rank-and-file miners. He was still hostile to broad reform and unwilling to 
jeopardize his financially lucrative position as UMW leader. Boyle more closely 
represented the standpoint of the coal operators, who claimed that more stringent health 
and safety standards would lead to economic catastrophe and declining production in the 
coal industry. Thus, an important priority for Boyle was stamping his influence on the 
legislative debates on mine health and safety in Congress. 
 The confrontation also highlighted Ken Hechler’s political representation of the 
rank and file at the national level. His submission of a tough legislative bill to the 
Congressional hearings reiterated the support he had shown to West Virginia coal miners 
in their campaign for black lung compensation. On a broader level, the confrontation 
between Hechler and the miners emphasized the political divisions and internal labor 
conflict that jeopardized the overhaul of the United States’ inadequate mine laws. Many 
conservative politicians were, like Tony Boyle, opposed to strong federal legislation. In 
contrast, Hechler and other liberal Congressman such as Phillip Burton sought tough 
legislative measures such as limits on underground dust levels and federal compensation 
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for the victims of black lung disease. Political rivalries characterized the Congressional 
hearings throughout the spring of 1969. This chapter further shows that President Nixon’s 
political ideology complicated the legislative debate. While Nixon supported the 
improvement of federal mine health and safety legislation, he did so largely to attract 
more blue-collar votes in the 1972 presidential election and to obtain support from 
Congress for his defense and foreign policies. Furthermore, he was fundamentally 
opposed to a federal compensation program for the victims of black lung disease.   
The same conflict and dissension that characterized the legislative debates in 
Congress was evident within the institutional framework of the United Mine Workers of 
America. In May 1969, Joseph A. “Jock” Yablonski challenged the national leadership of 
Tony Boyle by announcing he intended to run for the union presidency. Yablonski sought 
to reinstate democratic practices to the union, such as the election of district leaders, and 
address the health and safety concerns of the union’s members. His candidacy prompted 
the most bitterly contested election campaign in the union’s history.  
During 1969, there was an intensive struggle over the redrawing of America’s 
federal mine laws. Rank-and-file miners, union leaders, federal government officials, and 
medical researchers clashed over the most effective ways to improve working conditions 
and to compensate victims of work-related injury and disease. This chapter will show that 
pressure from liberal politicians and high-profile activists, combined with the influence of 
mining communities, led to significant improvements in federal mine laws.  
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The Limits of Reform: The Nixon Administration and Coal Mine Health and Safety 
The public outcry resulting from the Farmington disaster, combined with the 
rising militancy of the Appalachian coal miners, expressed most visibly in the West 
Virginia black lung movement, prompted the Nixon Administration to address the issue 
of coal mine health and safety. On March 3, 1969, after less than two months in office, 
President Richard Nixon sent a special message to the United States Congress, 
accompanied by new draft legislation. The Senate had already opened its own hearings 
on coal mine health and safety on February 27. Nixon’s message vividly described the 
risks that characterized underground coal mining and stressed the importance of 
eradicating them: 
The workers in the coal mining industry and their families have too long endured 
the constant threat and often sudden reality of disaster, disease, and death… Death 
in the mines can be as sudden as an explosion or a collapse of a roof and ribs, or it 
comes insidiously from pneumoconiosis or black lung disease… The time has 
come to replace this fatalism with hope by substituting action for words.  
Catastrophes in the coal mines are not inevitable.  They can be prevented, and 
they must be prevented.2 
 
 
Nixon stated that he had authorized several measures to create a safer and more healthful 
working environment for coal miners, including the expansion of government-funded 
research into pneumoconiosis, the creation of a program to foster greater cooperation 
between management and labor in mine safety, and an increase in the federal mine 
inspection force. He outlined the key proposals in the draft legislation, known as the 
Javits bill, after its main author Senator Jacob K. Javits (R-NY). The Javits bill proposed 
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the improvement of state workmen’s compensation programs, the modernization of 
underground equipment, and the expansion of the Secretary of the Interior’s power to 
modify coal mining regulations when required. Moreover, it sought to “provide strict 
deterrents and enforcement measures and, at the same time, establish equitable appeal 
procedures to remedy any arbitrary and unlawful actions.” The bill also advocated a 
mandatory dust limit of 4.5 milligrams per cubic meter of air in underground coal mines 
and the elimination of the distinction between ‘gassy’ and ‘non-gassy’ mines. Nixon 
urged Congress to adopt the new legislation immediately.3  
The Javits bill was, in many respects, stronger than the bill introduced by the 
Johnson administration the previous September, but the West Virginia Black Lung 
Association argued it did not go far enough and immediately rejected it.4 Despite the 
positive measures embodied in the Javits bill, there were clear limits to Nixon’s plans to 
reform the coal industry. First, by advocating the improvement of state workmen’s 
compensation programs, Nixon was stopping short of recommending a federal 
compensation program for the victims of black lung disease. In fact, Nixon was wholly 
opposed to such a program because of its substantial financial cost.5 Second, the 
conservative 4.5-milligram dust standard would only partially reduce miners’ risk of 
developing pneumoconiosis, and it would still present a significant explosion hazard in 
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underground mines. Third, Nixon’s call for “strict deterrents and enforcement measures” 
against operators did not include concrete or tangible sanctions for those who violated the 
law. In a broad sense, then, President Nixon’s proposals to reform coal mine health and 
safety were limited in scope. 
The weaknesses in the bill stemmed from Nixon’s inherent political beliefs, many 
of which were not conducive to significant reform. Nixon believed that the federal 
government had become too unwieldy in the realm of domestic politics, a problem he 
intended to rectify by giving more power to state and local governments. Furthermore, 
Nixon viewed Lyndon B. Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ reforms as too expansive. Instead, 
Nixon favored a welfare program reminiscent of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal.’ 
His criticism of the ‘Great Society’ program had enabled him to win votes of 
disillusioned Democratic voters who felt that the Johnson administration had become too 
intrusive with its broad, far-reaching social policies. The same voters, however, did not 
completely embrace Nixon’s conservative beliefs. They were still attached to the liberal 
consensus that had dominated American politics in the immediate post-World War II 
years. The liberal consensus was essentially a centrist approach that believed in the 
importance of a strong economy, the New Deal political order, and aggressive foreign 
policy.6  
Nixon’s political ideology meant that he had to work within narrow parameters in 
his quest establish a new Republican majority and win reelection to a second term. In 
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Beyond the Liberal Consensus, Iwan W. Morgan argues that the approach Nixon adopted 
was a combination of neo-conservatism and populist conservatism. Neo-conservatives 
were typically intellectual elites who favored government policy that mirrored the old 
liberalism, while ‘populist conservatives’ were the suburban and Sun-Belt masses who 
rejected the extensive liberalism of the North East and wanted to protect their new-found 
economic status. Both camps opposed extensive bureaucracy, taxes, and federal 
regulations.7 They were, therefore, hardly conducive to reform of federal mining laws or 
extensive government regulation of the mines. 
Nixon’s commitment to strong federal regulation of the coal industry was 
hindered by the fact that he had come to office with a slender domestic policy agenda. He 
based his election campaign largely on his promises to end the war in Vietnam and to 
reform Cold War diplomacy. Moreover, he had little interest in courting the support of 
Congress. He relied instead on senior White House staff to set policy. During his first 
term in office, Nixon, however, faced a Congress with Democratic majorities in both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, so he understood that compromise was 
necessary in the realm of domestic policy.8 
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 His political ideology aside, Nixon was uninterested in, if not woefully ignorant 
of, coal mining policy. While meeting with congressional representatives shortly after his 
election, he was accosted by Ken Hechler, who informed Nixon that federal mine health 
and safety laws were ineffective and in dire need of reform. Nixon merely responded, “I 
have a wonderful Secretary of Labor, I’ll tell him to look into it.” He was unaware that it 
was the Department of the Interior, not the Department of Labor, that was responsible for 
coal mine health and safety.9 
 Many of Nixon’s staff appointments did not bode well for the improvement of 
coal mine health and safety laws. His appointment of Alaska Governor Walter J. Hickel 
to the position of Secretary of the Interior particularly concerned advocates of reform. 
Hechler argued that Hickel’s previous ties to the oil industry jeopardized the 
implementation of effective mine legislation and might erode miners’ rights. Shortly after 
entering office, Hickel met with seven widows from the Farmington disaster. He later 
claimed in his memoir, Who Owns America, that the meeting convinced him of the need 
to improve miners’ working conditions. He wrote, “This meeting, unscheduled and 
unannounced, illuminated for me one of the most pressing and oppressing problems on 
the agenda of the American people. When I talked to these women of West Virginia, I 
was deeply moved. I decided that if it was humanly possible, I would change the 
situation.” The widows, however, were unimpressed with Hickel’s attitude. Similarly, 
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Ken Hechler felt that Hickel had been unresponsive to the widow’s concerns. Hechler 
had arranged the meeting and personally financed the widows’ visit to Washington D.C.10  
In Who Owns America?, Hickel identified the U.S. Bureau of Mines as the main 
source of the coal industry’s poor safety record. He criticized the Bureau’s failure to shut 
down coal mines that posed an imminent danger to miners, as well as its policy of 
educating operators rather than imposing sanctions against them. According to Hickel, 
the Bureau’s failings could be resolved by giving it the power to impose civil and 
criminal penalties on operators who committed safety violations.11  In early 1969, 
however, Hickel did not take any substantive action to implement such measures. 
Moreover, the problems with the Bureau went far beyond those highlighted by Hickel in 
his memoir. In the past two decades, it had typically failed to follow up on its preliminary 
inspections, a fact that the Farmington disaster made all too clear. The Bureau was caught 
between two competing functions: upholding health and safety standards on the one hand 
and promoting the interests of the coal industry on the other. During its sixty-year 
existence, it had always leaned more towards the production aspects of the coal industry.  
Despite the Bureau’s failures, its director John F. O’Leary had made significant 
efforts to improve its health and safety enforcement policies after the Farmington 
disaster. Consequently, there was an outcry when President Nixon announced in February 
1969 that he planned to replace O’Leary. Outraged by Nixon’s decision, Ken Hechler 
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urged miners across West Virginia to send letters of support for O’Leary to the White 
House. At a press conference, Hechler voiced his concern that O’Leary’s departure would 
be a setback to the thousands of coal miners who were continually at risk from injury and 
death and “a victory for the special interests who opposed vigorous enforcement of the 
law.” Hechler found support from Speaker of the House John W. McCormack (D-MA), 
who argued that the Nixon Administration should reappoint O’Leary because of his 
efforts to reduce the mine fatality rate. UMW President Boyle also declared his 
endorsement of O’Leary. This was surprising given his opposition to strong health and 
safety enforcement. Nixon defended his plan to remove the bureau director. In a public 
statement, he said he was under pressure from coal operators who disliked O’Leary’s 
tough policies.12  
 Walter Hickel later claimed he felt uncomfortable about removing O’Leary from 
office. He commented, “It bothered me, because I had not yet had the time to evaluate the 
quality of his work. However, my instructions were clear. Remove O’Leary. Following 
my orders from the White House, I took steps to let O’Leary go.”13 One of those steps 
was to interview Dr. Beecher H. Charmbury, Secretary of Mines and Mineral Industries, 
as a potential replacement for O’Leary. According to reports in the national media, 
Hickel offered Charmbury $36,000 per year for the position. Charmbury, whose 
experience centered more on the production aspects of the industry than health and 
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safety, rejected the position, leaving the immediate future of the U.S. Bureau of Mines 
uncertain.14  
Although Hickel was ready by late February to dismiss O’Leary, the 
administration’s plan for a new defense program prevented him from doing so. Nixon 
was anxious to gain Congressional approval for his Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
program. The previous year, before he began his presidency, his initial proposal to 
provide extensive ABM protection for major cities and missile silos across the country 
had not been received favorably by Congress. He therefore pursued a scaled-down 
version of the plan, which centered on ABM coverage for America’s offensive missile 
silos. To gain support for the program, the Nixon administration aggressively lobbied 
Congress.15  
Nixon feared that dismissing O’Leary, a tough bureaucrat who was highly 
regarded by the Democrats, would alienate potential supporters for the ABM program, 
and he decided to postpone firing O’Leary. Nixon told his Congressional liaison Bryce 
Harlow, who had been at the forefront of the White House’s lobbying efforts for the 
ABM plan, to prevent Hickel from making a formal announcement about O’Leary. 
Hickel later recalled: “Before I could make the official announcement, I received a call 
from Bryce Harlow telling me to hold off for a while… he said this would mean two 
more votes on the Administration side of the ABM question. I thought to myself, ‘Okay, 
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so I’ll be a team player.’” As directed by the administration, Hickel refrained from firing 
O’Leary, who remained in his position. Despite Nixon’s political maneuvering, and the 
addition of a weakening amendment to the ABM bill by Republican Margaret Chase 
Smith, the outcome of the final vote was a 50-50 tie. The vote was enough to allow the 
ABM program to proceed, but on another level it represented a defeat for Nixon in 
Congress. Hickel wondered, “What about the miners? How in the hell do all these 
political games help solve their problems?”16 
In early 1969, President Nixon was ambivalent about coal mine health and safety. 
While he outwardly criticized the injustices coal miners faced, there were limits to his 
plans for legislative reform. The Javits bill was a calculated response to the Farmington 
disaster and the black lung movement in West Virginia. Nixon felt he had to act, but he 
sought to do so within the parameters of his own political ideology. Similarly, Nixon’s 
decision to halt the termination of John F. O’Leary did not reflect commitment to strong 
enforcement measures, but rather his prioritization of defense strategy and foreign policy 
over domestic affairs. In the months that followed, as Congress held coal mine health and 
safety hearings, the support of the Nixon administration for a radical and far-reaching 
overhaul of the nation’s mining laws was by no means certain.  
 
Congressional Hearings and the Search for a Legislative Solution 
 
The Farmington disaster and the West Virginia black lung movement spurred 
Congress to take decisive action to combat the work-related hazards faced by the nation’s 
coal miners. In the early months of 1969, the House of Representatives and the Senate 
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both scheduled hearings on coal mine health and safety. The purpose of the hearings was 
to debate several draft legislative bills, including the Javits bill submitted by the Nixon 
administration. Historian Alan Derickson argues that federal preventative legislation for 
coal mines was long overdue by 1969. The technology to reduce the risks of coal dust 
had existed since the early twentieth century, and for several decades coal companies had 
understood the need to suppress coal dust.17 Yet the lobbying power of the coal industry, 
combined with political divisions on mine health and safety, kept the legislation weak. In 
both the House and the Senate, the search for a legislative solution was a bitterly 
contested process. Federal politicians, coal miners, officials from the United Mine 
Workers, coal companies, physicians, and state legislators clashed over how best to 
afford coal miners greater protection from the hazards of their work.  
In the House of Representatives, mine health and safety fell under the mandate of 
the Education and Labor Committee, chaired by Congressman Carl Perkins of Kentucky, 
while the specific task of drafting and presenting new bills was the responsibility of the 
Labor Subcommittee, chaired by John Dent of Pennsylvania. Before the hearings, the 
House afforded all its members the opportunity to submit draft bills on coal mine health 
and safety. Ken Hechler introduced a bill on February 6 that recommended harsher 
penalties for safety violations than those set by local and state governments, the transferal 
of safety enforcement from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Labor, 
and a minimum dust standard of 3.0 milligrams per cubic meter of air. His bill also 
included a provision for a national insurance scheme, whereby the federal government 
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would make up any shortfall in state compensation payments to miners.18 Hechler said 
his bill was necessary “to break the dismal chain of disasters in the coalfields and to 
check the slow death caused by the ravages of black lung.” 19  
The House Subcommittee on Labor opened its hearings on March 4, with several 
bills under consideration. In addition to the Hechler bill (H.R. 6504) and the Javits bill 
(H.R. 7976), the subcommittee introduced bills by John Dent (H.R. 1047), Carl Perkins 
(H.R. 4047), and the United Mine Workers (H.R. 4295 and H.R. 7747). Dent’s bill H.R. 
1047 was a duplicate of the bill presented by President Johnson in September 1968, while 
H.R. 4047 by Perkins embodied the most recent legislative proposals of the Johnson 
administration made in early 1969. The UMW introduced two bills, because its national 
leaders felt that health and safety were two distinct, separate issues. As such, H.R. 4295 
dealt with health concerns, while H.R. 7747 focused on safety matters.20 
In an opening statement during the House hearings, Secretary of the Interior 
Walter Hickel endorsed the Nixon administration’s bill, but he also argued that safer 
mines were the responsibility of mine owners and miners, not just federal government 
inspectors.21 Framing the legislative debate in moral terms, Hickel stated, “There is more 
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at stake here than the lives and health of 144,000 coal miners, though they surely merit 
out most strenuous efforts on their behalf. The problems we are wrestling with have an 
impact that extends beyond any coal mine. If we fail, those problems can weaken the 
physical and moral fiber of our whole society.”22 Hickel stressed the importance of 
finding a balance between improving health and safety while maintaining coal production 
at level that would sustain the nation’s energy requirements. “Coal is our most abundant 
fuel resource,” he cautioned. “Right now, it supplies nearly a fourth of our total energy 
demand and every forecast, whether by the Government or the private sector, indicates 
that coal must continue to play a significant role if this country’s future energy 
requirements are to be satisfied.”23  
 Bureau of Mines director John F. O’Leary also emphasized his support for the 
Nixon administration bill in his appearance. In his statement before the subcommittee, he 
explained that Bureau’s existing powers of enforcement, as dictated by the 1952 Federal 
Mine Act and its 1966 amendments, were too limited:   
The Bureau needs broader authority, and it needs it now, in order to bring coal 
mine injury and fatality rates into line with those of other major industries, and to 
assure that our coal miners do not escape accidental injuries onl to fall victim to 
an insidious industrial disease. The administration’s bill would, in our opinion, 
provide the kind of authority that is urgently required.24 
 
 
O’Leary emphasized the importance of research, which he argued was the key to 
providing long-term solutions to hazardous conditions in coal mines. He also argued that 
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the dust standard in the administration’s bill was not too restrictive, but rather provided 
the foundation for a lower standard in the future once the necessary technology had been 
developed. Both he and Hickel claimed that the technology to create a 3.0-milligram dust 
limit did not yet exist, but they neglected to mention that such technology had been in use 
in Britain and most parts of Europe for the past three decades.25  
The House hearings continued on March 19, with Ken Hechler and coal miners 
Elmer Yocum and Elijah Wolford as the opening witnesses. The appearance of Yocum 
and Wolford showed that rank and file miners were aware of the contemporary legislative 
debate on coal mine health and safety. Prior to that day’s hearing, Yocum and Wolford 
had visited Hechler in his Charleston office without invitation and asked to speak before 
the Subcommittee. Hechler, reluctant to dismiss their request, agreed to bring them to the 
hearing.26 In a lengthy testimony, Wolford emphasized that miners were partly 
responsible for safe working conditions. He proposed that miners should be penalized a 
full day’s wages for any health and safety violations they committed. Wolford also 
stressed the importance of clearer escape routes in underground mines and better roof 
maintenance.  
In his prepared statement, Hechler charged that the government and coal industry 
had invested millions of dollars in coal production, but had spent only “pennies” on 
research and development in health and safety. Such neglect, he argued, underscored the 
necessity of devising and implementing protective measures for the nation’s 144,000 
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miners.27 Hechler devoted much of his statement to reiterating the key measures in his 
own bill (H.R. 6504), including the introduction of minimum qualifications for 
inspectors, harsh financial penalties against operators, and the transferal of safety 
enforcement from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Labor. He 
proposed the Bureau of Mines should not be responsible for enforcing mine health and 
safety because it “[had] been subservient to every special interest, to every interest except 
the man who mines the coal,” although he acknowledged there had been some 
improvement under O’Leary. He reiterated the importance of a dust standard of 3.0-
miligrams and the assignment of miners who already displayed signs of pneumoconiosis 
to a work environment containing not more than one milligram of dust per cubic meter of 
air. And, in agreement with Walter Hickel, Hechler stressed the importance of including 
both health reforms and safety measures in one bill.28 
During the Labor Subcommittee hearings, Hechler added lawyer David Finnegan 
to his staff. Recently, while working for the Department of the Interior, Finnegan had 
assisted Senator Jacob K. Javits in drafting an early version of the Nixon administration’s 
coal mine bill. When, on the insistence of Javits, Finnegan included a dust standard of 
three milligrams, in contradiction to the administration’s goal of 4.5 milligrams, Walter 
Hickel fired him for insubordination. On learning of Finnegan’s dismissal, Hechler, who 
had already consulted Finnegan in drafting his own bill, offered him a staff position.29  
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Finnegan aided Hechler’s quest for strong legislation in two ways. First, he was in 
contact with several inspectors at the Bureau of Mines, who were able to identify 
loopholes in the different bills passing through Congress. The inspectors advised Hechler 
not to weaken his own bill (H.R. 6504) with vague clauses such as “where economically 
possible,” or “where technologically feasible,” and to use strong, assertive language. 
Secondly, Finnegan’s close ties with the House Subcommittee on Labor enabled him to 
observe committee meetings and to participate in technical debates. His connections 
proved invaluable to Hechler, who was not a member of either the subcommittee or the 
Committee on Education and Welfare. He was able to gain an insight to the workings of 
the subcommittee, and he relayed his views to the subcommittee through Finnegan.30 
   As the hearings continued, UWM President Tony Boyle informed the 
subcommittee that he opposed a single health and safety bill. Unlike Walter Hickel and 
Ken Hechler, he advocated two separate bills, one for health issues and another for 
safety. He argued that health and safety were distinct subjects that required separate 
treatment and that the union’s introduction of two bills was the most effective way to 
secure the passage of new legislation.31 Boyle failed to recognize the strong connection 
between health and safety in the underground working environment. For instance, the 
issue of dust control was pertinent to safety, as limiting the quantities of airborne dust 
prevented explosions. It was also pertinent to health, as dust control was a key factor in 
preventing miners’ occupational lung disease.  
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 The House subcommittee hearings marked the emergence of an unlikely advocate 
for the coal miners’ cause. Democratic Representative Phillip Burton from San Francisco 
was the first Congressman to propose a federal compensation scheme for black lung 
victims. Burton argued that new health and safety legislation should include a federal 
compensation program that covered all black lung victims, including those who 
developed pneumoconiosis prior to the legislation’s enactment, and widows. Burton had 
been searching for a cause to promote since failing to gain enough support to run for the 
Senate the previous autumn. His past accomplishments marked him as one of the most 
liberal representatives in the House. In 1966, Burton, working with John Dent, had 
orchestrated the largest extension of the U.S. minimum wage program since the early 
1930s.32  
 Alan Derickson argues that Burton’s commitment to federal compensation was 
not as unlikely as it first appeared. Although there were no coal mines in San Francisco, 
there was an extensive network of docks. Burton’s knowledge about the federal 
compensation program for the city’s injured longshoremen and harbor workers provided 
a foundation for drafting similar legislation for miners. Moreover, Burton was a member 
of both the Committee on Education and Labor and its Labor Subcommittee. According 
to Derickson, Burton’s position on the full committee provided him with the ideal 
position to criticize both the Nixon administration and the coal operators. His position on 
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the Labor Subcommittee afforded him an intimate role in the creation of the coal mine 
legislation.33 
At the hearing on March 26, Burton vehemently challenged Undersecretary of 
Labor James D. Hodgson for his recommendation that state governments should assume 
responsibility for sick miners’ compensation payments. Ken Hechler later recalled, 
“Burton came into the hearing late. He looked as if he’d just gotten out of bed. He was 
unshaven and you could smell his bad breath, as he was drinking black coffee to try to 
stay awake.”34 The dialogue that ensued between Burton and Hodgson exemplified 
Burton’s brusque and often aggressive manner. Burton emphasized that workers injured 
or disabled prior to the bill’s enactment would be ineligible for compensation unless they 
lived in a state that provided workers’ compensation to black lung victims. Ignoring 
Hodgson’s efforts to provide an explanation, Burton argued: 
All the previously injured people, through all the history of the failure of the 
States and the Federal Government to act, are going to get no relief or assistance 
at all under this bill. And when you use a State scheme of compensation there is 
no way that I am aware of that you can impose liability on private insurance 
companies to pay for injuries that took place prior to the time they received 
premiums. 35 
 
Hodgson admitted, “There is no ex post facto aspect to this bill.” In response, Burton 
commented, That is a very fine set of three Latin words to say that this proposal isn’t 
going to provide any help to 95 percent of the workers affected.36 
                                                 
33 Derickson, Black Lung, 176-177. 
 
34 Ken Hechler, interview by author, June 15, 2009. 
 
35 House, Coal Mine Health and Safety Hearings, 262. 
 
36 Ibid. 
 
  
115
Representatives Marvin Esch (R-MI) and John Dent tried to convince Burton that 
state compensation would allow for retroactive payments to miners who were already 
sick. Dent highlighted the “grandfather’s clause” in the Pennsylvania compensation law, 
which enabled miners to collect benefits if they had developed pneumoconiosis before 
the state government made it a compensable disease in 1966.  They also contended that 
federal investment in the state compensation programs would ensure they were 
adequately funded. Burton, however, was convinced that only a broad federal program 
would provide adequate compensation.37 
 Burton’s unwavering avocation of federal black lung benefits broadened the scope 
of the Congressional hearings. Prior to his outburst on March 26, delegates had not 
considered a federal plan that provided retroactive coverage to miners and widows. 
Furthermore, Burton cast further doubt on the legitimacy of the Nixon administration’s 
bill, and marked himself, along with Hechler, Nader, and the Committee of Physicians, as 
a firm supporter of the rank and file in the coalfields.  
The conflict that characterized the hearings before the House Subcommittee on 
Labor also was evident in the Senate hearings on coal mine health and safety. In the 
Senate, mine safety issues fell under the mandate of the Labor and Public Welfare 
Committee, chaired by Ralph Yarborough (D-TX), while the General Labor 
Subcommittee, chaired by Harrison Williams (D-NJ), held the specific role of drafting 
new legislative bills. Jennings Randolph, the Democratic Senator from West Virginia, 
played a significant role in both committees. He was the most senior Democrat after 
Yarborough on the Labor Public Welfare Committee and held second place on the 
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General Labor Subcommittee. As a senator from a coal mine state, Randolph was in a 
difficult position, as he had to placate the coal operators who dominated the state’s 
economy and the miners who represented the majority of West Virginia’s voting bloc. In 
trying to appeal to a broad constituency, he adopted a moderate attitude to coal mine 
health and safety.38  
In contrast, Harrison Williams was a strong advocate of coal mine reform, having 
encouraged the black lung activists in West Virginia to expand their movement into 
Kentucky. However, Williams’ hopes for extensive legislative changes faced two 
significant obstacles. First, Jennings Randolph, who did not want to burden mining 
operators with unnecessary regulations, outranked Williams on the full committee. 
Second, Williams’ political reputation had been sullied by a long battle with alcoholism. 
Although undergoing treatment for the disease, his capabilities as a Senator were still in 
question.39 
When the Labor Subcommittee’s hearings opened on February 27, Randolph and 
Williams each introduced two new legislative bills on mine health and safety. Randolph 
introduced S. 355, which represented the original view of the Johnson administration. It 
was the equivalent of bill H.R. 1047 in the House, along with S. 467, which embodied the 
safety demands of the United Mine Workers and acted as a companion bill to H.R. 7747. 
Senator Harrison Williams, meanwhile, presented S. 1094, which mirrored Ken Hechler’s 
                                                 
38 Donald Rasmussen, interview with author, tape recording, August 21, 2008, West 
Virginia Department of Labor; Hume, Death and the Mines, 153-155 
 
39 Ibid. 
 
  
117
bill H.R. 6504, as well as his own draft bill S. 1178.40 The subcommittee considered 
several other bills later in the hearings, including the United Mine Workers’ separate 
health bill. 
During the first day of the hearings, the representatives lamented that it had taken 
a tragedy of the magnitude of the Farmington disaster to force them into action. John 
Dent argued that the decline in health and safety standards was attributable to members of 
Congress and state legislators, because they had failed to pass strong protective laws. 
While there had clearly been inaction on the part of the federal and state governments, 
much of the responsibility for death and injury in the mines rested on the coal operators. 
Despite the coal industry’s culpability in the nation’s shocking mine fatality rate, the 
National Coal Association (NCA), the organization that protected the coal industry’s 
interests, openly approved of the Senate’s hearings. By publicly supporting the hearings, 
the NCA gave the impression that it was concerned about miners’ welfare. Behind closed 
doors, however, it planned to take measures to dilute the legislation.41 
UMW President Tony Boyle’s testimony on the first day of the hearing was far 
more aggressive than the statement he later made in the House. Boyle informed the 
committee that he had more knowledge of black lung disease than most people, having 
watched his father and two of his uncles die from the disease. He condemned the “instant 
experts” who spoke out in support of sick and injured miners, arguing they had not 
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supported the union’s previous struggles for better legislation. Casting doubt on the 
credibility of these ‘experts,’ Boyle said, “Such false prophets lead people astray by 
distorting the truth, indulging in falsification and distort every facet of the truth in order 
to create evidence of self importance.” He claimed that both the UMW leadership and the 
coal industry agreed that coal operators should be penalized for unsafe mines, and that 
miners should not lose their jobs if they refused to work in a dangerous mine. He further 
claimed that he “[had] no other ambition in life but to protect the underdog coal miners of 
this country.”42  
Several times during his speech, Boyle singled out Ken Hechler for criticism, 
although he mostly refrained from referring to the congressman by name. At one point, 
referring to Hechler’s appearance at the black lung rally in Charleston on January 26, he 
ranted: 
How many dollars have we [the union] spent? Over $2 billion to rehabilitate these 
people. I didn’t say millions, I said billions of dollars to rehabilitate these people. 
Then we are characterized as doing nothing. We didn’t get any donations, we 
didn’t get any help, we didn’t get any assistance from these bologna experts. I 
didn’t know he was a bologna expert until the other day, didn’t know he existed.43 
 
 
In a fierce attack on consumer advocate Ralph Nader, Boyle stormed, “He has never been 
in a coal mine. He has never come to see me. He has not asked me anything about coal 
mines. He is not an expert.” Boyle threatened, “I will tell him, too, when I see him, 
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physically, mentally, in the alley or anywhere he wants to see me.”44 Boyle was 
especially critical of Nader’s letter to the West Virginia coal miners, which had been read 
at the January 26 black lung rally. In that letter, Nader had disputed Boyle’s capabilities 
as union president and called on the miners to displace him. Responding to the letter, 
Boyle boasted that several delegates at the 1968 UMW Convention had submitted 
resolutions calling for his election as union president for life. He claimed that the 2,000 
delegates at the convention represented local unions, which showed there was strong 
support for him among the rank and file. Moreover, he argued that because delegates 
discussed every resolution on the convention floor, the convention “was more democratic 
than the Congress of the United States.” 45 Boyle was asserting that he, not the Black 
Lung Association or political figures such as Hechler or Nader, was the true voice of the 
miners on health and safety issues. 
Boyle distorted the truth, as he had on other occasions. He had filled the 1968 
convention with his own supporters and used intimidation to prevent anyone from voting 
against him, especially on mine safety and health issues. Furthermore, his staging of the 
event in Denver, Colorado, far from the Appalachian mining communities, meant that 
most genuine rank-and-file miners were unable to attend. With his aggressive and self-
serving rhetoric, Boyle was trying to deflect criticism of the ineptitude and lethargy that 
characterized his UMW leadership. His personal attacks on Ken Hechler and Ralph 
Nader aside, not everyone was persuaded by Boyle’s representation of the union’s health 
and safety record. In an interview for NBC television news, Hechler responded: 
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[Since] the last coal mine safety legislation was passed [in 1952], only one 
significant amendment was achieved as a result of the UMW’s efforts, and that 
was to extend the provisions to those mines employing less than fifteen. All these 
years, that’s the only little mouse that has been produced with all this laboring at 
the mountain. The UMW should have been leading the parade for effective safety 
legislation, when, as a matter of fact, all they’ve done is watch to see where the 
parade was going and then try to run around in front of it.46  
 
Several witnesses at the Senate hearings clashed over the incidence of 
pneumoconiosis among coal miners. Most of the people who testified about the disease 
used recent United States Public Health Service statistical data as their starting point. The 
PHS figures showed that 1 in 10 active miners and 1 in 5 inactive miners suffered from 
pneumoconiosis. U.S. Surgeon General Dr. William H. Stewart established a firm 
connection between coal dust and Coal Workers’ Pneumoconiosis (CWP), which he 
referred to as “an occupational disease of previously unrecognized magnitude.” He 
claimed that the disease afflicted as many as 100,000 coal miners. Dr. Lorin E. Kerr, the 
head of the UMW Welfare and Retirement Fund, lambasted the medical profession for its 
failure to recognize the disease and take preventative measures against it. He estimated 
that 125,000 of the country’s 144,000 coal miners were suffering from it. Consumer 
advocate Ralph Nader further insisted that 150,000 active and retired miners had 
advanced black lung disease and that tens of thousands more had it to a lesser degree.47   
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Other witnesses who appeared before the General Labor Subcommittee 
downplayed the prevalence of black lung disease, and even argued that it was not a 
legitimate occupational disease. Dr. Paul Goss argued that coal dust was not harmful to 
the lungs. Miners’ breathing problems, he argued, were more likely bronchitis or 
emphysema induced by cigarette smoking, while Dr. Charles E. Andrews, a lung 
specialist at West Virginia University, argued that pneumoconiosis affected only a small 
minority of miners. The National Coal Association (NCA), assuming that the ratio of 
active to inactive miners was four to one, calculated that 15,000 miners had the disease. 
In a cautious statement that reflected the Nixon administration’s stance, Walter Hickel 
stated that the PHS data on black lung disease was inadequate. In fact, Hickel maintained, 
the extent of the disease could not be adequately measured.48   
As the hearings progressed, additional legislative bills appeared before the 
Subcommittee, including S. 1300 and S. 2917. The former, reflecting the official line of 
the Nixon Administration, was conservative in its standards. It advocated an underground 
dust limit of 4.5 milligrams per cubic meter of air, in contrast to the limit of 3.0 
milligrams proposed by the Hechler bill. In keeping with Nixon’s opposition to federal 
compensation, it did not contain any provisions for black lung compensation, and placed 
few obligations on coal mine operators. Bill S. 2917, endorsed by Ken Hechler, was more 
liberal than most of the other bills under deliberation. It proposed an intermediate dust 
standard of three milligrams, with a further reduction to two milligrams within six years. 
It also placed much of the responsibility for safety enforcement on the coal operators.  
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Immediately after the hearings ended, on May 12, Jennings Randolph added 
another bill to those already under consideration. It was far more conservative than any of 
the bills submitted up to that point. Randolph’s bill abolished all monetary penalties for 
safety violations. It also did not provide for basic underground amenities such as toilets 
and had a weak dust standard. It further perpetuated the existence of the Federal Coal 
Mine Health and Safety Board of Review, an outdated agency set up to enforce the 1952 
Mine Act.49 Although his action went largely unnoticed, the bill quickly drew the 
attention of consumer advocate Ralph Nader. Outraged by the terms of the bill, and by 
Randolph’s surreptitious introduction of it after the hearings had ended, Nader wrote an 
open letter to Randolph, which he also distributed to several newspapers and media 
organizations. In the letter, Nader complained that Randolph’s bill prioritized the coal 
operators’ interests at the expense of the welfare of miners and their families. He accused 
Randolph of being insensitive to the risks that coal miners faced, particularly the dust that 
caused black lung disease. In a scathing attack on the Senator, Nader stated: 
Coal mining is the most dangerous occupation in the country in the category of 
trauma and far and away the most hazardous in the country in the category of 
disease. Black lung strikes at about fifty percent of the working miners to a 
significant degree, often ending in death. The misery and pain were brought to the 
Senate hearings. You saw miners in such pain, you saw an actual black lung [from 
an autopsy], you heard the testimony of experts abstracting the anguish and bodily 
destruction of these cruelly depleted human beings who rely on you to represent 
them. Why have you forsaken them? 50 
 
 
Nader identified what he described as  “forty separate weakening provisions” in 
Randolph’s legislation that nullified the terms of the Javits bill. For example, Randolph’s 
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bill did not grant the Secretary of the Interior authority to change mining laws without the 
consent of Congress, and it maintained the distinction between “gassy” and “non-gassy” 
mines, a provision that would exempt so-called non-gassy mines from installing safety 
equipment.51   
Nader surmised that Stephen Dunn of the National Coal Association had inspired 
Randolph’s bill. His guess was partly true, as the NCA had participated in the drafting of 
the bill. To Nader, Randolph’s actions reflected the prevalence of coal industry lobbying 
in congressional politics.52 When questioned by the media, Randolph claimed that he had 
not read Nader’s letter. He also stressed that he was not “inflexible” to supporting a 
different bill, as he had introduced two other legislative bills earlier in the year. He flatly 
denied representing either the coal industry or the United Mine Workers. Two days after 
the story first came to light, John Corcoran of the National Coal Association publicly 
rejected Nader’s claim that his organization had played a significant role in authoring the 
Randolph bill. While Corcoran admitted that he had met with Jennings Randolph on 
several occasions, he said that the bill was largely the Senator’s own work.53   
 In his analysis of the Congressional hearings, Nader relied heavily on the 
expertise of his general counsel, 32-year old Gary Sellers. Nader had originally hired 
Sellers, a graduate of the University of Michigan Law School, to help him run the Center 
for the Study of Responsive Law. The center was the base for Nader’s consumer 
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investigations, which were executed by Ivy League college students known as “Nader’s 
Raiders.” Prior to working for Nader, Sellers had been employed in the Natural 
Resources Division of the Bureau of the Budget under the Johnson Administration. 
During his time in the Bureau, Sellers had devoted much of his time to learning about 
coal mine legislation. By the spring of 1969, he had compiled extensive data on coal 
mine health and safety.54  
 The intense debate during the House and Senate hearings, which concluded in 
mid-May, emphasized the political divisions that impeded the passage of new legislation. 
The hearings solidified the lines of opposition between the competing interests in the 
struggle for a new health and safety bill. On the one hand, there was a notable movement 
for legislative reform. For example, Ken Hechler recommended stringent measures for 
health and safety enforcement, including the dust standard of three milligrams, while Phil 
Burton proposed a federal compensation program for black lung disease. On the other 
hand, there was strong opposition to tougher coal mine laws. Senator Jennings Randolph 
and UMW President Tony Boyle both actively tried to limit the scope of legislative 
reform. Congress therefore faced a complicated task in its quest of strengthening coal 
mine health and safety laws. 
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Jock Yablonski: A Major Challenge to the Boyle Regime 
On May 29, a small group of reporters gathered in the Pan-American room of the 
Mayflower hotel in Washington D.C. The previous evening, Ralph Nader had telephoned 
each of them to request their presence at a secret press conference by a key United Mine 
Workers representative. The conference began with the arrival of Joseph “Jock” 
Yablonski, a 33-year veteran of the union, and labor attorney Joseph Rauh. With Nader 
sitting in the audience, and three men guarding the doors to the room, Yablonski 
announced that he intended to challenge Tony Boyle for the presidency of the union in 
the forthcoming election. By doing so, the relatively unknown Yablonski thrust himself 
into the national spotlight and made the first significant challenge to the Boyle regime. 
 Born in Pittsburgh in 1910, Yablonski started working in the mines as a young 
boy. He became actively involved in the United Mine Workers after his father died in a 
mine explosion. He was first elected as a local union leader in 1934. Although Yablonski 
had been a member of the union’s executive board since 1942, he was not the most likely 
candidate to challenge Boyle’s leadership. Before he announced his candidacy, Yablonski 
had always publicly supported Tony Boyle. In 1964, he campaigned for Yablonski’s re-
election as president over rival candidate Steve Kochis. And, in his delivery of the 
keynote speech at the 1968 UMW Convention, Yablonski praised Boyle’s 
accomplishments as union leader. Boyle had recently appointed Yablonski the head of 
the Labor Non-Partisan League, the political arm of the United Mine Workers, as a 
reward for his loyalty.55   
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  Privately, however, Yablonski detested Boyle. In 1966, Boyle had forced him to 
resign as leader of District 5 in retaliation for his unauthorized bid for the UMW national 
presidency in the 1964 election.56 Yablonski reluctantly stepped down when Boyle 
threatened to place District 5 into trusteeship. The district was one of only four that still 
held democratic elections; in most districts, leaders were appointed directly by the union 
president. Furthermore, Yablonski was convinced that Boyle was uninformed about 
modern labor practices in the coal industry. In December 1962, an explosion at U.S. 
Steel’s Robena mine in Pennsylvania had killed 37 men. At the scene of the disaster, a 
reporter overheard Boyle, who was union vice-president at the time, dismissively asking, 
“Did a trapper boy leave the door open?”57 The industry had not used trapper boys, who 
controlled the streams of ventilation traveling through mines, for several decades. 
Yablonski also knew that Boyle was using miners’ union dues to provide himself and 
several of his family members with large salaries and lucrative pensions. Finally, he 
disapproved of Boyle’s refusal to renegotiate the miners’ contract on their own terms and 
his apparent disregard for health and safety.  
Yablonski’s speech at the press conference reflected his private contempt for 
Boyle. He launched into a blistering attack on Boyle’s record as UMW leader: 
… In recent years, the present leadership has not responded to its men, has not 
fought for their health and safety, has not improved grievance procedures, has not 
rooted itself in the felt needs of the membership and has rejected democratic 
procedures, freedom to dissent and the right of rank and file participation in the 
small and large issues that affect the union.  
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Contrary to Boyle’s claims at the recent Congressional hearings, Yablonski believed that 
the UMW President had been inactive on the issue of health and safety. He attacked 
Boyle for denying the rank and file the opportunity to vote on union policies, as they 
were entitled by the UMW constitution. Yablonski was particularly critical of Boyle’s 
failure to address black lung disease. He stated, “In recent months, the shocking 
ineptitude and passivity of the union’s leadership on black lung disease – not to mention 
its ignoring this massive disability of its men for years – became apparent to the nation, 
not just those inside the union.”58 Yablonski believed that Boyle had conveyed his 
disregard for black lung to the nation when he condemned the West Virginia Black Lung 
Association earlier in the year. 
 Yablonski argued his decades of union experience made him a strong candidate 
with the rank-and-file. As part of an eleven-point program, he proposed increasing the 40 
cents per ton royalty for the union’s Welfare and Retirement Fund, adopting a more 
assertive stance in contract bargaining, pushing industry to adopt the latest safety 
equipment, and levying local and state extraction taxes to fund education programs in 
Appalachia. He also advocated an increase in workers’ compensation and the expansion 
of the union’s Safety Department.59 
 Yablonski knew that capturing the union presidency would be a difficult task. He 
commented, “I am not naïve enough to think that there is not going to be much difficulty 
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put in my way.” To run for the presidency, he first had to secure the nominations of fifty 
union locals. Boyle had increased the number of required nominations from five to fifty 
after his election in 1964. In acquiring the requisite number of local nominations, 
Yablonski faced a significant challenge. Every local union was affiliated with a larger 
district branch, and Boyle essentially controlled all the districts. Even in the districts 
where there were still elections and Yablonski had firm support, Boyle had enough 
financial and institutional power to manipulate the nominations in his favor. Although the 
United States had filed suit five years previously to return full autonomy to the local 
unions, the outcome of the case was still pending. The union had planned the nomination 
period for one month beginning on July 9. 60 
 Joseph L. Rauh from the Department of Labor was Yablonski’s attorney for the 
campaign. Nader for his part provided Yablonski with a full time legal researcher, 
Beverley Moore, Jr., from Harvard Law School.61 Yablonski encountered obstacles from 
the outset of his campaign. On June 2, he wrote to Boyle to ask the union to mail out his 
campaign literature at his own expense, under the terms of the Landrum Griffin Act, 
Section 401(c). Attorney Edward Carey, representing the union leadership, denied 
Yablonski’s request. He argued that since Yablonski was not yet a ‘bona fide’ candidate, 
the terms of the law did not apply to him. Joesph Rauh filed a motion with the federal 
district court in Columbia, which later ruled that the union had to send out Yablonski’s 
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campaign materials.62 The union leadership also ignored Yablonski’s request for 
publication space in the United Mine Workers Journal.63 
Although Boyle did not comment directly on Yablonski’s decision to run for 
office, his actions showed he was unwilling to accept the challenge to his leadership. In 
early June, he dismissed Yablonski as the head of the Labor Non-Partisan League, 
claiming he had been neglecting his duties, and ordered him to report to District 5 for 
reassignment. Joseph Rauh filed suit, arguing that Boyle’s actions were political in nature 
and a violation of labor law.64 He challenged Boyle for dismissing Yablonski without 
prior notice. Boyle responded that Yablonski had given his own notice the moment he 
decided to challenge the union hierarchy by deciding to run for president. The coal 
operators’ reaction to Yablonski’s announcement was mixed. Some welcomed the news, 
while others feared that a union led by Yablonski would be harmful to their interests.65 
  Opposition against Yablonski intensified throughout the month of June. At a 
meeting in Springfield, Illinois, on June 28, someone gave him a karate-chop to the back 
of his neck and rendered him unconscious. His family doctor informed him the next day 
that he had narrowly escaped paralysis or death.66 The identity of the perpetrator was 
never discovered. On June 29, John Karlavage, a prominent Boyle staff campaigner, led 
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the disruption of a Yablonski campaign meeting in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania. Still 
recovering from the assault the previous day, Yablonski had appointed his vice-president 
nominee Elmer Brown to head the meeting. Karlavage and his cronies burst into the hall 
where the meeting was taking place and paraded around with banners and placards in 
support of Boyle. One week later, at a meeting of local union 7113, John Aiello, a staff 
member for district 17 and the financial secretary for local 7113, nominated Boyle for the 
presidency, even though the nomination period had not started. He rejected another 
miner’s nomination of Yablonski and declared that the nominations were closed.67  
 The attitude of the Boyle regime to Yablonski’s challenge reiterated its stance on 
union democracy and key issues such as health and safety. It was unresponsive to the 
concerns of the rank and file, and sought to maintain control of the coalfields. As the 
nomination period began, Yablonski offered the miners the chance of safer and more 
equitable working conditions, but he faced an enormous challenge to gain the required 
amount of nominations, far less win the UMW presidency. 
 
The Summer of Discontent 
 Throughout the summer of 1969, as the debate over coal mine legislation 
continued, the divisions between competing interests became more even pronounced. 
Representatives from the coal industry and the federal government assembled in New 
York in June for the annual convention of the National Coal Association (NCA). The 
convention emphasized that the majority of coal industry leaders were opposed to 
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legislative reform. As the convention unfolded, the mine operators’ prioritization of coal 
production ahead of miners’ welfare became clear.  
 At a convention panel discussion on June 16, John Corcoran, the head of the NCA 
and President of Consolidation Coal, announced that Consolidation had decided to reopen 
the Mannington (Farmington) mine. Although the company had not established a fixed 
date, it planned to make the mine operational as soon as it had approval from the 
Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Mines, the West Virginia Department of Mines, 
and the United Mine Workers. Corcoran assured the audience that the bereaved families 
would learn of the opening date before the general public, and that the company would 
undertake the reopening as safely as it could. Consolidation’s decision to reopen the site 
of the worst mining disaster in the post-World War II era suggested the coal industry was 
obsessed with increased production.68 
 At the same time, Corcoran insisted that the Farmington disaster had persuaded 
Consolidation of the need for tough federal health and safety legislation. He urged his 
fellow operators to accept new mining laws, if not for humanitarian reasons, then out of 
economic necessity. The industry would not be able to attract the required workforce 
unless it offered a safe and healthful working environment. However, his company’s 
decision to reopen the Farmington mine undermined the sincerity of his remarks. He cast 
further doubt on his professed commitment to reform by objecting to the closure of 
unsafe mines, as advocated by several recent legislative bills. Emphasizing the coal 
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industry’s production-orientated focus, Corcoran justified his objection to mine closures 
by arguing that coal was vitally important to the national economy and that production 
could not be disrupted. He stated that Congress should create legislation based on factual 
evidence, not emotions.69  
 George Judy, the president of the Bituminous Coal Operators Association 
(BCOA), was more conservative than Corcoran in his assessment of mine health and 
safety. In his view, safety could not be regulated because “Mother Nature reacts violently 
and unexpectedly in countless ways to civilized man’s intrusion in her private domain to 
steal her private treasures.” 70 Furthermore, Judy argued, coal miners were prone to 
human error, and such error could not be controlled by legislation. He conceded that 
certain minimum legislative standards were necessary, but only to the degree that 
operators could strive for better working conditions. To Judy, the Federal Code, a set of 
rules applying to companies that had signed a labor agreement with the United Mine 
Workers, contained acceptable standards. With only vague health and safety provisions, 
the code was limited in scope. It certainly did not address many of the industry’s biggest 
risks, such as excessive underground dust levels.  
 Judy also condemned the United Mine Workers’ recent campaign to phase out the 
flame safety lamp. He argued that the lamp, used to detect dangerous accumulations of 
methane gas, operated on scientific principles. There was nothing better, he insisted, to 
replace it. His most extreme proposal, however, was to prevent the Secretary of the 
Interior from enforcing health and safety regulations. The Secretary’s role, maintained 
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Judy, should be limited to ensuring conformity to standards in the context of daily 
operations, not regulating health and safety from a distance.71 The position of the BCOA, 
then, was that mine owners should be able to run their operations with minimal regulation 
and government intervention. The BCOA had always strongly opposed federal 
regulation, particularly preventative measures and compensation programs.72  
 James R. Garvey, the president of Bituminous Coal Research and vice-president of 
engineering in the National Coal Association, denied that the industry opposed coal mine 
dust standards. He complained that the bills before the House and the Senate were open 
to conflicting interpretations and that the extraction of coal was just as important as 
miners’ health. He argued that the dust standard of three-milligrams per cubic meter of 
air, as proposed in the Hechler and UMW bills, would not guarantee better health 
standards. Coal dust affected individual miners differently, contended Garvey, and a 
better understanding of dust levels was required for a workable law to take effect.73  
 Bureau of Mines director John F. O’Leary also addressed the NCA convention. 
While he admitted that the Bureau had “been remiss in [its] attention to health,” he felt 
that the interim dust standard of 4.5 milligrams in the Nixon administration bill was 
adequate. He believed it was unrealistic to expect operators to establish minimum dust 
levels of three milligrams in less than three years. 74  O’Leary’s speech reflected the 
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official line of the Nixon administration, but it was also marked by an underlying tension. 
O’Leary, who had adopted a stricter approach to enforcement after the Farmington 
disaster, was trying to avoid conflict with the administration, following the dispute over 
his resignation earlier in the year. His speech also indicated that he was conscious of the 
need to bring a more humanitarian perspective to the Bureau’s research activities. He 
remarked, “Our mining research to date has been preoccupied with one element of cost: 
those that we can list as economic. I think more and more, not because we want to but 
because we must, we are going to be forced to look upon human cost and environmental 
cost as well.” 75  
 The NCA conference did not bode well for the prospects of a broad, liberal health 
and safety law, particularly given the coal industry’s lobbying power in Washington D.C. 
More so than the Congressional hearings, the conference revealed the industry’s 
opposition to tough legislative standards. By way of confirmation, in the weeks that 
followed, the coal operators stepped up their efforts to shape the terms of new coal mine 
legislation.   
  In early July, Phillip Burton and Gary Sellers began collaborating on their own 
health and safety bill. Burton was still convinced that new legislation should include 
federal compensation for black lung victims. Sellers had approached him on the 
recommendation of Representative Morris Udall (D-AZ), who served with Burton the 
House Labor Subcommittee. Udall informed Sellers, “He’s got the personality of a brillo 
pad, but he gets a lot done.”76 Sellers and his employer Ralph Nader also realized that 
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Burton, as a representative from San Francisco, was not beholden to the coal industry’s 
money or influence. Moreover, because he was not the head of a major Congressional 
committee, they perceived him as “a tremendous strategist and tactician in the House.”77 
The bill that Sellers and Burton began drafting proposed strict limits on coal dust, 
improved standards for the quality of air and ventilation in underground mines, and, 
crucially, federal payments to miners and miners’ widows affected by pneumoconiosis. 
The bill was loosely based on the Johnson administration bill from the previous 
September, which Sellers had helped to draft. Burton and Sellers focused in particular on 
that bill’s “presumptive clause,” which stipulated that miners with lung ailments were 
presumed to have an occupational illness and were thus automatically eligible for 
compensation.78  The Johnson administration bill had been presented in modified form as 
H.R. 1047 at the House Labor subcommittee hearings earlier in the year.  
 Burton hoped successful passage of the bill would allow him to establish new 
connections, particularly with influential politicians in coal mining states, and enhance 
his reputation among national labor unions. His determination to see strong federal 
mining legislation passed, however, was not just rooted in his own political ambitions. 
His intense engagement in the issue also emanated from genuine concern for miners and 
their families. He was distressed by accounts of the hardships they suffered and 
committed to using his expertise to solve their problems. 79 In his single-minded approach 
to creating new legislation, Burton refused to abandon his own political values. He 
                                                 
77 Ralph Nader, telephone interview with author, May 1, 2009. 
 
78 Jacobs, A Rage for Justice, 185. 
 
79 Ibid., 187. 
 
  
136
shunned the so-called “philosophical liberals” in Congress, who he perceived as weak 
and unable to implement legislative proposals, and refused to compromise or negotiate 
with Republicans, much to the despair of House Committee leader John Dent. In fact, he 
openly advocated a coal mine dust limit of zero, rather than trying to reach a middle 
ground with the Republicans.80  
  The Committee of Physicians, meanwhile, continued to rail against the coal 
operators. On July 4, Dr. Isidore Buff led a miners’ rally at the Jefferson Memorial in 
Washington, D.C. Brandishing a plastic bag containing what he claimed was blackened 
tissue from a deceased miners’ lungs, he delivered an impassioned 40-minute speech, in 
which he attacked “the enslavers and killers of coal miners.” He promised that the miners 
would strike if operators did not take the health and safety issue more seriously. “This is 
a warning, not a threat,” he stated, “but if the miners do not dig coal the economy of this 
country will stop for 90 days. You would have no electricity. Factories would close. And 
the country would be almost gone.” Ken Hechler, also attending the rally, stated, “Let the 
word go forth to every coal miner throughout the nation, we will no longer tolerate the 
conditions in the coal mines which produce disasters like Farmington. Let the word go 
forth, the coal miner refuses to work in conditions of coal dust so high that it produces the 
deadly black lung.”81  
 Buff’s threat of a strike was rendered less potent by the small attendance of less 
than fifty miners. He alleged that United Mine Workers and the coal operators had falsely 
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broadcast messages on West Virginia radio that the event was cancelled, a charge the 
accused parties strongly denied. In reality, Buff was being over-ambitious in expecting a 
large attendance of miners at the Washington, D.C. rally. Most Appalachian miners lived 
far from the nation’s capital, and many did not have access to their own transportation. 
The black lung movement in West Virginia had been successful because it was a local 
movement, grounded not just in miners’ grievances about their working conditions, but 
also in community and family. Nevertheless, the demonstration reaffirmed the black lung 
leaders’ determination to use radical measures to make operators’ more sensitive to the 
miners’ plight. 
At a press conference on July 31, Buff’s two colleagues on the Physicians’ 
Committee, Dr. Hawey Wells and Dr. Donald Rasmussen, publicly announced their 
endorsement of Jock Yablonski and Elmer Brown for the UMW leadership. Rasmussen 
argued that the UMW leadership had completely failed to protect miners from the health 
and safety hazards in the coal industry, and had offered them nothing but “ a stale diet of 
alibi and artifice.” He continued, “Because I believe the rebirth of the UMW into a 
vigorous and progressive labor organization is vital to the future well-being of the miner, 
I am compelled to express publicly my endorsement of the candidacy of Joseph 
Yablonski and Elmer Brown.” 82 Dr. Isidore Buff, also present at the conference, 
emphasized that, while he did not support his colleagues’ endorsement of Yablonski, this 
did not mean he supported Tony Boyle. Buff demanded the resignation of Charleston 
physicians Dr. William C. Stewart, Dr. James H. Walker, and Dr. W. Paul Elkins, 
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members of the state silicosis medical board, who, he claimed, had neglected miners’ 
interests.83 
 Yablonski, who had recently won his fight to remain head of the Labor Non-
Partisan League, did not attend the press conference. His continuing efforts to gain the 
support of fifty local unions for his nomination meant he was working in his office in the 
capital.84 Elmer Brown made an appearance, though, informing reporters that UMW staff 
members were trying to stop the Yablonski-Brown ticket from gaining enough local 
union support. He stated that he had been the recipient of several threatening phone calls. 
His testimony was indicative of the ongoing difficulties that he and Yablonski faced in 
challenging the Boyle regime.  
 Two weeks later, the UMW headquarters announced the results of the election 
nominations. Yablonski had secured 96 nominations, enough to run for the presidency, 
while his running mate, Elmer Brown, also was eligible with 86 nominations. Tony Boyle 
had obtained 1,056 nominations.85 In a public statement, Yablonski commented, “Boyle 
assumed that, with all the power at his command, no man could ever win the support of 
fifty local unions, but he was wrong.”86 Despite securing his place as an election 
candidate, Yablonski still faced a significant challenge. Boyle had secured over ten times 
more nominations, which hindered Yablonski’s chances of winning the December 
election. 
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 Throughout the summer, the Senate Labor Subcommittee deliberated the various 
bills presented during the hearings, in the face of considerable outside pressure. The 
Nixon Administration continued to push for a dust standard of 4.5 milligrams, while Ken 
Hechler urged the subcommittee to endorse a bill with a standard of three milligrams per 
cubic meter of air. The coal companies favored a weak bill with minimal dust regulations 
and worked through Senator Jennings Randolph to achieve it.87  When the Senate 
subcommittee started leaning towards S. 2917, a tough, progressive bill introduced in the 
later stages of the Senate hearings, operators pressured Randolph to weaken a number of 
its more stringent provisions. Still reeling from Nader’s accusation that he had abandoned 
the nation’s miners, Randolph was maintaining a low profile, and he did not accede to 
their demands. Bill S. 2917, endorsed by Harrison Williams, eliminated the distinction 
between “gassy” and “non-gassy” mines, set the underground dust limit at three 
milligrams, with a further reduction to two milligrams after six years, and mandated the 
introduction of new equipment to reduce the risk of explosions. The subcommittee 
ultimately passed bill S. 2917 to the full Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. On 
July 31, the last day of Congressional proceedings before summer recess, the Committee 
voted 17-0 to send bill S. 2917 to the Senate floor. 88   
 Jennings Randolph concluded that the bill was an important step forward in the 
improvement of health and safety standards, but he was still torn between his conflicting 
support for both the miners and the operators. He acknowledged that the bill would exact 
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“heavy costs” on the coal industry.89 Jacob K. Javits, the ranking Republican member of 
the Labor Subcommittee, praised the bill’s stringent dust standard. “By setting maximum 
standards for coal dust, we have taken the major step necessary to seek to end the scourge 
of black lung, which, up to now, has afflicted thousands of coal miners,” he said. 90 Javits 
had supported the three milligrams limit from the outset, having tried to include that 
provision in the Nixon administration’s original bill. However, the administration 
instructed him to include the less stringent limit of 4.5 milligrams.   
 In the House of Representatives, the Labor Subcommittee’s deliberations extended 
into the summer recess period. As the basis for its legislative bill, the subcommittee used 
H.R. 1047, originally introduced by Representative John Dent. By late summer, the bill 
was radically different from Dent’s original version. It included Burton and Sellers’ 
federal black lung compensation program, as well as several health and safety measures 
devised by Ken Hechler, including an immediate dust standard of three-milligrams per 
cubic meter of air, the prohibition of smoking in underground mines, and regular 
inspections by the Bureau of Mines. Phil Burton, David Finnegan, and Gary Sellers 
played an instrumental role in convincing the subcommittee to adopt Hechler’s 
amendments.91 On August 6, the subcommittee made minor changes to the language of 
bill H.R. 1047, before sending it to the full labor committee. The committee voted in 
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favor of H.R. 1047 by 29 votes to 3 on September 18, and passed the bill to the House 
floor.92 
 
The Troubled Road to Change 
 The first day of full Senate deliberations on bill S. 2917 began on September 25, 
1969. A key theme that emerged was the obligation of the federal government and the 
coal operators to improve coal miners’ working conditions. In his opening address, 
Harrison Williams, the chairman of the Senate Labor Subcommittee, predicted, “The bill, 
however effective it may be, will never achieve adequate health and safety for the miner 
unless the Department of the Interior acquires new perspective and focus concerning the 
importance of the miner and unless there is strong and vigorous administration by the 
Department.” Williams noted that the bill incorporated measures to address the failing 
health and safety research program of the Bureau of Mines, the stagnant enforcement 
agency in the Interior Department.93  
 For Williams, the success of the bill S. 2917 depended on the commitment of the 
federal government: “The officials and employees of the Interior Department and the 
Bureau of Mines must reorient their attitudes towards the miner. Business as usual is no 
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longer acceptable. They must develop the role of the “advocate” for the miner. They must 
vigorously seek sufficient manpower and funds to do the job.”94 Williams’ assessment of 
the federal government’s role emphasized the distance between the Subcommittee and 
the Nixon Administration, which still favored a restrained and limited role for the 
Department of the Interior in mine health and safety. More importantly, Williams framed 
the obligations of the Department of the Interior not just in legal and political terms, but 
also in moral terms. He stressed the need for the department to protect miners’ welfare, 
and to direct considerable effort and finance into protecting miners from the hazards of 
their work. Williams highlighted some of the other key components of the bill, including 
its elimination of the distinction between ‘gassy’ and ‘non-gassy’ mines. The bill 
stipulated that all mines, regardless of their classification, were required to install 
machinery to reduce methane gas. Although gassy mines were more prone to explosions 
because they contained higher levels of methane, Williams argued that applying the same 
standards to both categories of mine was the only way to afford equal protection to all 
coal miners.  
 Not everyone shared Williams’ perspective. Senator Jacob K. Javits, the author of 
the Nixon administration’s health and safety bill, opposed eradicating the scientific 
distinction between the two types of mine. He claimed that non-gassy mines had a much 
better safety record than gassy mines.95 To support his argument, Javits presented 
statistics from Bureau of Mines director John F. O’Leary, which showed that 374 
workers had died and 427 had been seriously injured in methane explosions in the 
                                                 
94 Ibid., 247. 
 
95 Ibid., 353-354. 
 
  
143
country’s 392 gassy mines over the past sixteen years. In contrast, there had only been 27 
deaths and 54 injuries in non-gassy mines during the same period.96 Javits argued that 
non-gassy operations posed far less risk of pneumoconiosis because, unlike gassy mines 
owned by large corporations, they typically did not deploy the continuous mining 
machine, and as a result were far less dusty.97 He neglected to mention that coal miners 
had been suffering black lung disease since the late nineteenth century, long before the 
continuous miner came into widespread use in the 1950s. The Senate rejected his 
proposal to maintain the distinction between gassy and non-gassy mines. 
 Before voting on bill S. 2917, the Senate adopted an amendment that provided 
federal compensation for black lung victims not covered by state workers’ compensation. 
Under the terms of the amendment, single miners would receive $1,635 per year, while 
miners with three dependents would receive up to $3,264 annually. The compensation 
measure was originally part of a separate bill presented to the Senate by Robert C. Byrd 
and a number of co-sponsors on behalf of the United Mine Workers. Following the black 
lung movement’s success in West Virginia, the UMW devised the bill to provide benefits 
for black lung victims in other states who were unable to apply for workers’ 
compensation. Senator Jennings Randolph played a crucial role in convincing the Senate 
to approve the compensation measure. On October 2, the Senate unanimously passed bill 
S. 2917 by 73-0, demonstrating that the improvement of miners’ working conditions 
outweighed issues such as the financial cost of the bill’s implementation.98  
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 In early October, the House was still engaged in debate over H.R. 1047. As 
representatives began to negotiate the final terms of the bill, Phillip Burton embarked on 
an intensive lobbying campaign to gain support for the bill’s black lung compensation 
provision. Both he and Gary Sellers exerted considerable pressure on Labor 
Subcommittee Chairman John Dent. For two weeks, they spent their evenings in Dent’s 
apartment in the Congressional Hotel, playing poker and eating Italian food, to ensure 
that he did not attempt to dilute the bill. Burton told Sellers, “This is when the lobbyists 
come out of the woodwork, and Dent will want to make concessions.”99 When the 
lobbyists visited the apartment, Burton merely informed them that he and Dent would 
discuss their proposals.100 Sellers, worried that Dent was going to submit to the pressure 
of the lobbyists, proposed enlisting the help of Ken Hechler. He suggested that Hechler 
should call a press conference and accuse Dent and the Labor Subcommittee of 
supporting the coal industry. Burton agreed that the conference would erode the 
lobbyists’ influence over Dent, but he cautioned Sellers, “Please don’t leave any 
fingerprints.”101 Unaware he was being manipulated, Hechler appeared at the press 
conference, where he attacked the committee for ‘selling out’ the coal miners. The 
conference, which made national news headlines, worked. Dent was infuriated, as he 
could no longer accede to the demands of the coal companies.102 
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 To ensure support for the bill, Burton set the compensation rate for black lung 
victims at fifty percent of the benefits rate paid to GS-2 government employees. 
Explaining the rationale of this move to Labor Subcommittee Staff Director Bob Vagley, 
he predicted that no one would vote against compensation for a black lung victim who 
received only half the benefits of the lowest-paid government worker. He also knew that 
they would never have to increase the benefits again, as government raises were 
automatic. Under Burton’s compensation scheme, individuals would receive $136 per 
month, and miners with wives and three dependent children would receive $272.103  
 Burton obtained additional support for the bill by courting southern Congressmen. 
On October 9, the House was scheduled to vote on a bill to limit agricultural subsidies to 
$20,000 for a single farming business. Large farming corporations were opposed to the 
bill, as it would cost them millions of dollars. Because many southern Congressional 
representatives were dependent on the same corporations to stay in the office, they 
wanted to see the bill overturned. Burton persuaded several liberal northern Congressmen 
to vote against the bill, which was defeated by just four votes, 181-177. In the weeks that 
followed, Burton used the defeat of the agricultural bill to pressure the southern 
representatives into voting for the coal mine bill. He continually reminded them that he 
was responsible for overturning the subsidies bill, and now they were obligated to repay 
him.104 Burton’s political maneuvering was highly effective. On October 29, the House 
passed the coal mine bill H.R. 1047 with the federal compensation provision intact, by a 
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majority of 389 to 4. Federal benefits for coal miners were by no means assured, as the 
provision still had to pass through the joint House-Senate conference committee. The 
compensation measures in the House bill were stronger than those in the Senate version. 
In the weeks that followed, the committee deliberated the final terms of the coal mine 
health and safety legislation.  
 On December 9, the UMW held its presidential election with Tony Boyle and Jock 
Yablonski as the candidates. While Yablonski had been successful in gaining the enough 
local union nominations, he had encountered several other problems in recent months. 
Despite frequent requests by his attorney Joseph Rauh, the Department of Labor had 
refused to investigate the UMW for evidence of corruption and illegal practices against 
Yablonski and Brown. The Department also refused to monitor the polling stations on the 
day of the election. It stated it would not consider investigating the UMW leadership until 
after the election.105 Yablonski had further damaged his own credibility by failing to 
campaign in the first three weeks of August.106  
 When voting commenced, Boyle’s staff used violence or intimidation to prevent 
Yablonski’s supporters from entering the polling station at a number of locations. In other 
places, the UMW leadership changed the location of the polling station at the last minute. 
Ralph Nader employed a number of his “raiders” to ensure the UMW followed fair 
voting practices, but they had little overall impact. They were too small in number to 
monitor all the polling stations and mostly were unable to stop the intimidation or 
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manipulation of Yablonski’s supporters. Boyle won the election by a margin of almost 
two to one, gaining 74,335 votes to Yablonski’s 40,847. Following his victory, Boyle 
stated, “We regard this victory as the miners answer to those outside forces seeking to 
substitute their judgment and values for those of the men who have risked life and limb to 
dig the nation’s coal.”107 Yablonski accused Boyle of stealing votes by violating the 
Landrum Griffin Act, otherwise known as the Labor Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act, a 1959 law designed to prevent internal corruption in labor unions.108 The 
Department of Labor still refused to carry out an investigation. The significant margin of 
Boyle’s victory, combined with the union’s illegal practices on election day, emphasized 
the corruption within the UMW. The re-election of Boyle to the national leadership 
prevented the union from adopting democratic practices, such as the election of district 
leaders, and stifled the reform of its health and safety policies. 
 
The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 
 By late November, the conference committee had consolidated the House and 
Senate bills into a single coal mine health and safety act.109 The final legislation retained 
the strong health and safety measures from the individual bills in the House and Senate. It 
prohibited underground smoking, mandated strict guidelines on roof supports, and 
instructed operators to install ‘permissible’ equipment and machinery. Small operators 
were given a deadline of five years to install the equipment, in contrast to the four years 
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accorded to large corporations. The bill also set an immediate mandatory dust standard of 
three milligrams per cubic meter of air, with a further reduction of one milligram within 
three years. The Bureau of Mines, the mine safety agency in the Department of the 
Interior, was responsible for enforcing the legislation by conducting inspections of all 
underground coal mines and imposing financial penalties on operators who violated the 
law. Where conditions posed an immediate threat to miners’ safety, the Bureau was 
required to shut down the mine. The law, however, did not incorporate Ken Hechler’s 
recommendation of assigning safety enforcement to the Department of Labor.  
 The final bill retained the federal compensation program for miners totally 
disabled by pneumoconiosis and widows of miners who had died from the disease. The 
Social Security Administration (SSA), a branch of the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare, was to process all benefit claims filed before December 31, 1972. It was 
responsible for conducting medical examinations to determine which miners qualified for 
benefits, and for administering benefits of $272 per month to those who were eligible.110 
The Federal Mine Act defined pneumoconiosis as “a chronic dust disease of the lung 
arising out of employment in an underground coal mine.”111 The key diagnostic test for 
detecting total pneumoconiosis was the X-ray exam. If a miner’s X-ray was positive, 
additional medical testing was required. The Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare was responsible for conducting research into dust abatement and other measures 
to prevent black lung disease. Furthermore, it was required to conduct studies into the 
                                                 
110 Ibid., 792-793. 
 
111 Ibid., 793. 
 
  
149
prevalence of black lung disease in the coal industry by subjecting miners to regular 
compulsory X-ray exams.112  
 On December 17, the House of Representatives assembled to vote on the bill. A 
small faction of Republicans who were opposed to the bill’s liberal terms tried to redirect 
it back to the conference committee. Representative John Erlenborn (R-IL) claimed the 
bill would provide compensation to miners with diseases other than pneumoconiosis. He 
argued that the conference committee version made ‘simple’ pneumoconiosis a 
compensable disease, while the individual bills passed by the House and the Senate only 
provided compensation to the victims of complicated pneumoconiosis. His assessment 
was completely inaccurate and designed solely to diminish congressional support for the 
bill. The language of the bill stated clearly that only miners who were completely 
disabled by pneumoconiosis should receive compensation.113 A number of Democratic 
Representatives strongly contested Erlenborn’s claims. Carl D. Perkins argued that the 
conference report was far more precise in its instructions and guidelines than the original 
Senate version. Similarly, Representative James O’Hara (D-MI) asserted that the 
conference committee report had not gone beyond the Senate bill in its health and safety 
measures.114 John Dent emphasized that the federal compensation program provided an 
income for black lung victims who were unable to work.115  
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The bill was opposed not only by a minority within the Republican Party, but also 
by the Nixon administration. The same day, the administration stated it would veto the 
legislation if it passed through the House and Senate. The president publicly claimed he 
objected to the bill in both “substantive and fiscal” terms, but he mainly opposed it 
because he was unwilling to finance the cost of the pneumoconiosis compensation 
program, which his aides estimated would cost $385 million per year. The administration 
had delayed making its opposition known, despite having had access to a copy of the 
legislative bill for almost a month. 116 
In contrast, Ken Hechler, who was responsible for most of the bill’s key 
preventative health and safety measures, highlighted his satisfaction with the new bill. He 
commented, “Mr. Speaker, this is a magnificent piece of legislation. It is strong and 
effective in its terms. It is a tribute to the initiative and hard work of Congress.” Referring 
to the conservative mine health and safety bill drafted by the Nixon administration, 
Hechler said, “Had the Congress followed the advice of the executive branch, this would 
have been a milk and water piece of legislation instead of a brick and mortar piece of 
legislation. Had the Congress followed the advice of the executive branch, there would 
have been little protection for the health and safety of the coal mines of this Nation.”117  
Hechler warned the Nixon administration not to veto the legislative bill. He 
commented, “Every action taken by the White House during the consideration of this 
legislation was in the form of trying to weaken, delay or eliminate provision for the 
protection of coal miners. Now it ill behooves the President and a member of the 
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President’s Cabinet to send a message here at the last minute in an effort to stall or kill 
this legislation.”118 Hechler acknowledged the impact of the Farmington disaster in the 
creation of the new legislation. “The major drive for this legislation began immediately 
after the tragic fire and explosions at Consol No, 9 Mine in Farmington, W. Va. resulting 
in the deaths of 78 miners on November 20, 1968. Passage of this legislation is a fitting 
monument to the memory of the 78 miners who lost their lives at Farmington. Their 
widows have waited 12 months since Farmington for the passage of this legislation.”119  
The House voted by a clear majority of 258 to 83 to pass the bill. The following 
day, December 18, the Senate approved the bill by majority voice vote. President Nixon’s 
opposition to the federal black lung program, however, meant the enactment of the 
legislation was still in doubt. On December 29, 1,2000 miners went on strike in West 
Virginia in response to Nixon’s plan to veto the bill. Nixon, worried that the strike would 
spread through the coalfields and jeopardize coal-fuelled energy for New Year week, 
decided to sign the bill. His announcement that he would sign the bill coincided with the 
arrival of seven Farmington widows in Washington D.C. The widows had been flown 
there at the personal expense of Ken Hechler to press Nixon to enact the legislation.120 
Speaking before television cameras, one of the widows, Mrs. Kaznoski, said, “This is a 
wonderful day for all miners.” The widows were taken on a tour of the White House, 
although they did not meet the president.121 
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On December 30, Nixon signed the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969 into law, describing it as “an historic advance in industrial practices.” Reiterating 
his opposition to the compensation provision, Nixon stressed that the bill was not a 
precedent for federal compensation programs in other industries. He also emphasized that 
the federal compensation program for miners was only a temporary measure, until the 
states assumed control of the program in 1973.122 The passage of the Federal Coal Mine 
Act followed almost a year of heated legislative debate. It introduced long overdue health 
and safety reforms for the coal industry, designed to improve the working conditions of 
the nation’s miners and provide compensation to those suffering from pneumoconiosis. 
The Act was set to become effective on March 30, 1969, giving the U.S. Bureau of Mines 
just three months to draft the technical standards required for operators to implement the 
act. 
 
Conclusion 
The passage of the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act emphasized 
the importance of coal mining to the American economy at the end of the 1960s. 
President Nixon signed the legislative bill to avoid a potential nationwide strike and, 
consequently, the disruption of the nation’s coal production. Although Nixon was not 
unfavorable to coal mine health and safety reform, having introduced the Javits bill in 
March of that year, he was strongly opposed to a federal compensation program for 
miners, which he felt was both too costly and an infringement of states’ rights. His 
passage of the bill therefore reflects the substantial political and economic power the 
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nation’s coal miners had gained during 1969. 
 In a broader sense, though, the bill emphasized that the United States federal 
government had finally recognized the occupational hazards faced by the nation’s coal 
miners. The Federal Coal Mine Act symbolized greater awareness of the human costs of 
industrial production. This awareness was driven in large part by the efforts of dedicated 
Congressional representatives such as Ken Hechler and Phil Burton, and was also 
sustained by activists such as Ralph Nader, UMW insurgent Jock Yablonski, and the 
three renegade doctors in the Committee of Physicians. Despite heated conflict in both 
the House and Senate over the new coal mine legislation, their efforts were critical in the 
passage of the final bill. 
Yet, the re-election of Tony Boyle to the presidency of the United Mine Workers 
suggested there were clear limits to the reform of miners’ conditions. As Joseph 
Yablonski and Elmer Brown continued to press the Department of Labor for an 
investigation of the election, Boyle’s record on health and safety cast doubt on the 
union’s commitment to the new legislation. At the end of 1969, there was, therefore, a 
clear split in the UMW. Despite this tension, coal miners still faced a brighter future and 
the prospect of a safer, more healthful working environment.  
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Chapter Four  
A Turbulent Year: 
Grassroots Protest and the Failure of Federal Health and Safety Enforcement in 
 1970 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On January 5, 1970, Kenneth Yablonski, the son of United Mine Workers 
presidential candidate Joseph A. Yablonski, went to his parents’ home in Clarksville, 
Pennsylvania, after being unable to contact them by telephone. On entering the house, he 
found his father, his mother Rita Wasicek, and his sister Charlotte shot dead. The state 
police quickly determined that they had been murdered. They concluded that more than 
one perpetrator was involved. Charlotte and Margaret had been killed as they slept, while 
Joseph Yablonski’s body was sprawled on the floor of the spare bedroom. He had been 
sleeping there to avoid disturbing his wife with his loud snoring. Detective Munz 
speculated that he had awoken and made “an instinctive grab” for a rifle in the far corner 
of the room. Based on the contents of the mailbox outside, the police determined that the 
family was killed on New Year’s Eve. The phone wires to the house had been cut, while 
the tires of the cars in the driveway had been slashed.  
Joseph “Chip” Yablonski, the other surviving son, immediately charged the 
United Mine Workers with his father’s death. He told reporters. “You guys just didn’t 
believe how rotten this union was.” Tony Boyle denied that the union was involved in the 
murders. In a public statement, he said, “I do not know at this time what caused the 
deaths of Brother Yablonski, his wife, and his daughter, but whatever the cause, the 
violent deaths of three members of the Yablonski family can only be called a tragedy.” 
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Boyle offered to give his full cooperation to the authorities’ investigation of the murders. 
At the request of the surviving Yablonski family members, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) became involved in the investigation.1 
On hearing the news of his death, West Virginia politicians paid tribute to 
Yablonski. Secretary of State John D. Rockefeller IV said, “I was very strongly moved 
by his intensity and commitment to making the life of the coal miner better. And if the 
life of the coal miner does get better – and I think it will – Jock Yablonski deserves a lot 
of the credit.” Ken Hechler commented, “He was not afraid of threats or beatings. Coal 
miners throughout the nation owe Joseph Yablonski a lasting debt for speaking out for 
the rights of the rank and file coal miner.”2 Ralph Nader, although shocked by the news, 
felt the murders typified the violence and harsh realities of Appalachian coal country.3  
While the national media was reluctant to make direct accusations about who was 
responsible for Yablonski’s death, it hinted strongly at union involvement. The editorial 
staff at the New York Times had its suspicions that the United Mine Workers was 
involved in the murders. Without substantial evidence, the newspaper refrained from 
saying as much explicitly. It stated, “Violence is part of the tradition of mine unionism, 
and it was no secret to Joseph Yablonski, a man as rugged as coal, that death might be the 
price of his challenge to the leadership of the United Mine Workers.” The New York 
Times was referring indirectly to another incident that almost cost Yablonski his life. As 
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illustrated in chapter two, he narrowly avoided death in June 1969 when someone gave 
him a karate chop to the back of his neck during a campaign meeting. The editorial 
further stated:  
There is, of course, no evidence to support the assertion of Pennsylvania state 
police that his murder and that of his wife and daughter represented “an act of 
vengeance.” Much less can anyone know whether Yablonski’s distraught sons are 
right in charging that the deaths were the work of “professional assassins.” The 
union has condemned the killings and plans to post a large reward to help bring 
the murderers to justice.4 
 
The newspaper refused to support claims by the Pennsylvania state police that UMW 
representatives had murdered Yablonski for contesting Tony Boyle’s leadership in the 
recent presidential election. It also refused to endorse accusations made by Kenneth and 
Joseph “Chip” Yablonski that the UMW had hired professional assassins to kill their 
father, their mother, and their sister. Furthermore, it evaded making direct accusations by 
highlighting the union’s condemnation of the murders and its promise of a reward for the 
arrest of the killers. Yet the New York Times hinted shrewdly at union involvement in the 
murders by commenting, “But the public will be glad that Attorney General Mitchell has 
assigned the F.B.I. to the probe. Even the shadow of terror must be removed from union 
affairs, and that cannot be done until every fact in this monstrous tragedy has been 
brought to light…”5 
The January 7 editorial in the Washington Post adopted a similar approach. It 
stated, “Seeking the presidency of the union, [Yablonski] spoke out, as Rep. Ken Hechler 
put it, for the rights of the rank-and-file coal miner. Apparently that challenge cost him, 
as he feared it might, his life – and the lives of his wife and daughter.” Like the New York 
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Times, the Washington Post noted that Yablonski had perceived death as a possible cost 
of his election campaign. The Post also did not blame the UMW explicitly for the 
murders, stating, “To say this is by no means to say, or even to suggest, that the union 
leadership he attacked had anything to do with the assassination of the Yablonski family. 
The killings may have been the work of chance, sadistic intruders.” It went further than 
the New York Times, however, by implying that miners opposed to Jock Yablonski’s 
election campaign may have carried out the killings. It also acknowledged claims by 
Kenneth and Chip Yablonski that vengeance was a motivating factor in the murders: 
More probably, however, they were in some way, direct or indirect, a 
consequence of the bitterness of the union election campaign and of Mr. 
Yablonski’s exposed position on the front lines, and may well have been 
perpetrated by fanatical individual partisans. Robbery seems not to have been a 
motive. Revenge might have been…6 
 
The editorials in the New York Times and the Washington Post implied that the union was 
characterized by intimidation and violence and unwilling to engage in open dialogue or 
follow democratic principles. As the New York Times noted, this was not a new 
development, but rather part of a long history of violence and corruption within the 
UMW. The editorials also encapsulated the hostility and resentment that defined the 
union’s presidential election in 1969. While the New York Times and Washington Post 
refrained from naming a suspect to avoid libel charges, their editorials also reflected an 
element of fear, that if the union was responsible for Yablonski’s death, then no one was 
safe.  The murders made Yablonski’s close associates particularly apprehensive. In a 
handwritten letter to Ken Hechler on the day the murders were reported, Jesse Stuart, an 
author from Kentucky, warned: 
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Whatever you do be careful with your own life. I think you are in danger. Once I 
was warned – didn’t heed the warning and almost got killed. You were with 
Yablonski – and I think both of you honest men are definitely right – now he, his 
wife, and daughter are dead. I’ll say you are a marked man in this situation 
because you stand for law, order, and right. You cannot stand any other way. Do 
be careful. I think you should have protection when you return to West Virginia.7 
 
 
Stuart believed that opponents of political and legislative reform had killed Jock 
Yablonski. He was concerned that the killers would target Hechler because of his support 
for Yablonski and his pivotal role in the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. 
The union was not the only source of danger in the coalfields. The coal operators had 
long engaged in violence and intimidation to control their workforce and prevent dissent 
from company policy.  
The death of Joseph Yablonski, the only person who had been able to mount 
substantial opposition to Boyle’s leadership, effectively meant that the majority of rank 
and file miners were without a representative voice in the union. With the 1969 Federal 
Mine Act, the Nixon Administration had shown its commitment to afford coal miners 
greater protection, but the one institution that was supposed to fight for safe working 
conditions, the United Mine Workers, was still more concerned about the coal operators 
than its members. Angered by Yablonski’s murder and the lack of democracy within the 
union, thousands of miners across Appalachia took matters into their own hands by 
declaring a wildcat strike. On January 6, around 7,000 miners in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and 
northern West Virginia walked off the job. By the following day, the strike had escalated 
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to 20,000 miners. The strike paralyzed production at a number of mines, threatening to 
jeopardize coal supplies to electrical power plants.8   
At a rally in Monongah, West Virginia, 150 striking miners vowed not to return to 
work until Boyle and other UMW leaders had taken lie detector tests about the murders. 
Captain Joseph C. Snyder of the Pennsylvania state police said such tests would only be 
effective if the evidence pointed towards a particular suspect. He revealed that the police 
had not yet uncovered any clues about the perpetrators. Ken Hechler added weight to 
Snyder’s comments, stating that “[he was] convinced that the top leaders of the U.M.W 
did not direct the brutal murders.” Hechler contended that a low-ranking union official 
might have carried out the murders to cover up illegal activities during the union election 
campaign. Despite the assurances of Hechler and Snyder, by January 10, the day of the 
Yablonski family funeral in Pennsylvania, thousands of miners remained on strike. 9  
Two weeks later, police arrested three men on suspicion of the murders. Two of 
them, Paul Gilly and Aubran Martin, were later convicted and sentenced to death, while 
the third, Claude Vealey, received a life sentence after agreeing to testify against his 
fellow accomplices. Gilly’s wife also received a life sentence for her role in the murders. 
Police continued to investigate, and by 1973, they had uncovered evidence directly 
implicating Tony Boyle in the murders. The UMW president had provided union funds to 
Albert Pass, a member of the executive council, to hire assassins to kill Yablonski. Both 
Boyle and Pass, along with a third union representative, Silous Huddleston, received life 
sentences for their role in the murders. Boyle had ordered the murder of Yablonski 
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because of his campaign pledge to remove voting rights from retired miners, which were 
the main source of Boyle’s power. 10 
Although the Yablonski murders created an atmosphere of fear and apprehension 
in the Appalachian coalfields, the subsequent wildcat strike foreshadowed the grassroots 
protest that spread across the coalfields in 1970. The most visible manifestation of this 
protest was the small group of miners and labor activists who formed the Miners for 
Democracy (MFD), an organization that sought to bring democracy to the UMW and to 
reform its approach to health and safety issues. The rank and file, along with disabled and 
retired miners and the widows of black lung victims, also engaged in protest. Most 
notably, they challenged the failure of the new Federal Coal Mine Act. They were 
particularly aggrieved at its black lung compensation program, which was denying 
benefits to many pneumoconiosis victims. They also criticized its preventative health and 
safety measures. Throughout 1970, the federal government’s enforcement of the 1969 
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act was woefully inadequate. The Bureau of 
Mines, the agency in the Department of the Interior charged with enforcing the 
legislation, was under-staffed, under-funded, and encumbered by bureaucratic red-tape. 
As a result, it was unable to fulfill its role as an enforcement agency. It continued to lean 
more towards production and the interests of the coal operators than safety enforcement. 
President Nixon also showed a lack of sincere commitment to health and safety, 
particularly in his policy decisions regarding the Bureau of Mines. 
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Crucially, miners built on the experience of the activists in West Virginia in early 
1969, empowering themselves to press for more equitable distribution of black lung 
benefits and better enforcement of the 1969 Mine Act. Throughout 1970, a conscious and 
determined activism swept the Appalachian coalfields, as miners and their communities 
campaigned for improved working conditions.  
 
The Bureau of Mines and the Problems of Enforcement 
 
In the early months of 1970, the Nixon Administration had already cast doubt on 
its commitment to reform coal mine working conditions. Before the Federal Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act went into force on March 30, 1970, the Bureau of Mines had to 
clarify a number of issues, including the standards for coal mine dust levels and the 
specifications for underground roof support systems. The Bureau’s work on the new 
standards, however, was hindered by President Nixon’s decision in January to fire 
director John F. O’Leary. Nixon had attempted to dismiss O’Leary the previous year, but 
reversed his decision to gain support for his domestic defense program. When Nixon 
dismissed O’Leary in 1970, he used a letter of resignation O’Leary had submitted in early 
1969 as the basis of his dismissal. The letter did not reflect O’Leary’s desire to leave his 
position. O’Leary, a Democrat, had become head of the Bureau in September 1968 while 
the Johnson Administration was still in power. When Nixon became president, every 
member of the outgoing Johnson administration was required to submit a resignation 
letter as a matter of course. Nixon retained O’Leary because of the intense public focus 
on mine health and safety generated by the Farmington disaster.11 
The rationale behind Nixon’s decision to fire O’Leary went beyond a simple letter 
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of resignation. The president was reacting to pressure from the coal operators, who 
disliked O’Leary’s strong measures to enforce health and safety in the coal industry. 
O’Leary later claimed he was dismissed because he was pushing for a tough 
interpretation of the new legislation. Referring to the coal operators, he said, “I think they 
felt it was not in their best interest to have me administering the Act once it went into 
effect. You know, the mining industry doesn’t like to be regulated.”12 He also sensed that 
“the Nixon Administration would rather have someone administering a program who was 
accepted by the people against whom that program was directed.”13 Several Democratic 
representatives argued that Nixon was acquiescing to pressure from the coal industry by 
removing O’Leary from the Bureau. Ken Hechler contended that the industry was 
determined to dilute the 1969 Federal Mine Act. The president gave credence to such 
arguments by neglecting to appoint another director after O’Leary had served out his 
notice in March. In fact, the debate over who should succeed him dragged on for almost 
six months. In the interim period, Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel managed the 
Bureau.14 
Other problems in the Bureau of Mines did not bode well for its role as a safety 
enforcement agency. On passing the Federal Mine Act, Congress advised the Bureau to 
publish the specific coal mine safety regulations by February 28, 1970. The Bureau had 
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not published the regulations by that date. Officials attributed the missed deadline to the 
complexity of the legislation and the narrow deadline set by Congress to prepare it. 
Frustrated by the Bureau’s inaction, one coal miner and three Democratic Representatives 
filed a lawsuit to compel the Nixon administration to publish the legislation immediately, 
but without success. The Bureau eventually published the regulations on March 28, just 
two days before the new legislation was scheduled to go into effect.15  
 The law went into effect at the end of March as scheduled. In the first ten days, 
Bureau inspectors issued 1,830 penalty notices and shut down ten mines. Mine operators 
did not hesitate to raise their grievances against the Bureau’s zealous approach. Many 
argued that the severe terms of the act might jeopardize the provision of coal-fuelled 
electrical services. The owners of small mining operations complained to federal officials 
that the substantial financial costs of adhering to the new legislation would drive them out 
of business, a claim that was not unfounded. In the same ten-day period, 272 mines 
voluntarily closed because they could not adhere to the new law. According to some 
industry representatives, however, the operators deliberately shut down their operations 
to protest the Federal Mine Act. Across the Appalachian coalfields, operators pressured 
the Bureau of Mines to modify the regulations. At the American Mining Congress 
convention in Ohio in May, Jesse F. Core, the vice-president of the U.S. Steel 
Corporation, said the federal law “was conceived in an emotionally charged atmosphere 
and must be sent back to Congress for reconsideration.” In Virginia, a group of small 
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operators obtained an injunction against the Bureau, which prevented it from issuing 
harsh penalties or sanctions.16 
Yet, the Bureau was not as tough and unrelenting as the mine operators and their 
supporters in Congress made out. Hollis M. Dole, Assistant Interior Secretary for Mineral 
Resources, argued that coal industry was exaggerating the impact of the new law. The 
enormous scope of the Bureau’s task meant that it struggled to enforce the law. On April 
4, Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel announced that the Bureau would be unable to 
enforce the Federal Mine Act to its full extent for several months, as it did not have 
enough inspectors. He admitted that the Bureau had just 220 inspectors for 2,832 coal 
mines. Until the Bureau had acquired enough staff, it would inspect coal mines “on a 
partial but representative basis.” During its inspections between April 19 and 25, the 
Bureau found more than 1,000 violations of the law across 108 mines, but the shortage of 
inspectors meant it was unable to impose sanctions on those mines or set deadlines for 
modification of the violations. Because the inspectors were stretched so thinly across a 
large area, they would not be able to follow up on the violation notices.17 
Even in light of the Bureau’s ineffectiveness, the mine owners found support for 
their grievances in Congress. On April 22 1970, Democrat John H. Dent condemned the 
Bureau of Mines for not allowing flexibility in its enforcement of the new law. Other 
representatives in the House echoed Dent’s comments, accusing Interior Secretary Walter 
Hickel of not exercising enough discretion in his enforcement policies. Their objection 
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was not that the law was too harsh on mine owners, but rather that federal mine officials’ 
stringent enforcement policies had given mine owners the incentive to fight it. Moreover, 
they held the view that there was not enough distinction between different violations of 
the legislation. Operators who did not maintain a bulletin board faced fines as severe as 
those who were found responsible for endangering human life.18 
In its first month, the Federal Coal Mine Act had little impact on injuries and 
fatalities in the coal industry. The Bureau of Mines came under further scrutiny in early 
May, when the Nixon Administration officially nominated 41-year old J. Richard Lucas 
to be its new director. Lucas was head of the mining engineering department at Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute, where he had headed a number of studies for the coal industry and 
the Bureau. As an undergraduate, he had spent time working in an underground coal mine 
in Pennsylvania. His nomination resulted in large part from the influence of Virginia 
Governor Linwood Holton, who was acting on behalf of a coalition of operators who 
opposed the 1969 mining law. The operators hoped that Lucas’s background in the coal 
industry meant he would protect their interests.19 
Representative Ken Hechler and Senator Harrison William led the attack against 
Lucas, arguing that he did not have the correct qualifications for the position. 
Representative John P. Saylor (R-PA) also criticized the administration’s choice. In a 
letter to Nixon, Saylor charged that Lucas was “totally unqualified” for the position and 
that his lack of experience was “a roadblock” to the effective functioning of the Bureau. 
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The biggest threat to Lucas’s candidacy, however, was not political rhetoric, but a series 
of damaging articles in the national press. According to reports, the Johnson 
Administration had rejected Lucas for the same position in 1965, in response to a Federal 
Bureau of Investigation report that alleged he plagiarized his doctoral thesis. During its 
routine screening of Lucas, the F.B.I. had interviewed several professors at Columbia, 
some of whom charged that he had copied sections of his thesis.  Lucas’s doctoral 
research challenged the popular conception that nuclear power was set to become the 
main source of energy in the United States to the detriment of coal. Although a more 
extensive F.B.I investigation showed the allegations were unfounded, Lucas was still 
forced to deny them at a hearing before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs on May 27. The allegations tainted Lucas’s public profile and jeopardized his 
appointment as Bureau director.20   
The pressure on Lucas continued to escalate. Writing to Senator Henry M. 
Jackson, chairman of the Senate Committee, Ken Hechler stated that the new Bureau 
director “must be a man with a thorough knowledge of the law, a capacity for leadership, 
a man who places the highest priority on the health and safety of the miners. Dr. Lucas 
has failed to demonstrate that he possesses the qualities enumerated.”21 Pressure from 
Hechler and other members of Congress caused Jackson’s committee to twice delay its 
vote on Lucas’s appointment. By July 7, Hechler was predicting that Lucas would either 
reject the position or be turned down by the Senate Committee. Four days later, on July 
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11, Lucas asked President Nixon to withdraw his nomination as Bureau director. In his 
letter to Nixon, Lucas attributed his decision to personal reasons, including “financial 
hardship.” Thus, four months after O’Leary’s departure, the Bureau was still without a 
director.22   
The controversy over Lucas’s appointment emphasized the Nixon 
administration’s attitude to coal mine health and safety. Clearly, Nixon did not see 
rigorous enforcement of the Federal Mine Act as a priority. Many of his administration’s 
decisions in the past six months had been indicative of a desire to weaken the 
effectiveness of the act. The influence of Governor Holton and the Virginia operators’ 
coalition in the nomination of Lucas demonstrated that Nixon placed the interests of coal 
companies ahead of the miners who extracted the coal from the ground. In a broader 
sense, though, Nixon’s actions reflected the larger political climate of the early 1970s. 
The liberalism that had prevailed just a few years earlier had collapsed, and the United 
States was leaning towards a more conservative order. 
  
The Fight Continues: The Revival of Coalfield Activism 
The ineptitude of the Bureau of Mines and Nixon’s questionable attitude to 
reform were not the only problems hindering health and safety enforcement in the early 
months of 1970. Joseph Yablonski’s supporters also were faced with the problem of how 
to deal with a corrupt and potentially dangerous union leadership. The funeral of the late 
union activist and his wife and daughter in early January provided the vehicle for 
continued rank and file activism against the Boyle regime. At a meeting in a local church 
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hall after the funeral, a small group of activists decided to continue their fight against the 
union leadership. Elmer Brown, the vice-presidential candidate on the Yablonski ticket, 
reluctantly agreed to participate. After the murders had been perpetrated, but before they 
had been discovered, he had received a death threat by telephone. Married with eleven 
children, Brown feared for the safety of himself and his family. J. Davitt McAteer, a 
young law student who was studying coal mine health and safety in West Virginia for 
Ralph Nader, was also present. So too were Chip and Kenneth Yablonski and Harry 
Patrick, a union activist who had supported Yablonski’s campaign.23  
At first, they struggled to attract supporters. The majority of coal miners lived in 
fear that they and their families would be the next targets of the same people who had 
killed the Yablonski family. One black lung activist later commented, “Everything kind 
of went underground. Everybody started carrying guns, getting floodlights for their yards, 
running around with big dogs, that kind of thing. It was a very scary time.”24  
Those willing to protest openly renewed their appeal to the Department of Labor 
to investigate the irregularities in the union election. In a letter to Secretary of Labor 
George Shultz, written on behalf of the Yablonski family, lawyer Joseph Rauh argued the 
Department of Labor had contributed to Joseph Yablonski’s murder by failing to 
investigate the election. Rauh demanded an immediate probe of the union leadership, 
particularly its tactics during the election campaign. Elmer Brown took a more direct 
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approach, writing to Shultz and John Mitchell of the Justice Department to request his 
immediate appointment as union president. Brown believed that an investigation of the 
election and Yablonski’s murder would show “that a new election is not necessary, but 
rather that I should be appointed President.”25 Brown reaffirmed this belief in a letter to 
the UMW International Tellers, the officials appointed to count the election votes. He 
argued that the substantial evidence of irregularities on election day should bar Boyle 
from continuing as president. Brown charged that Boyle had misused union funds to buy 
votes, used violence and intimidation against Yablonski’s supporters, and unlawfully 
instructed retired miners to vote.26  
While Rauh and Brown’s letters touched on internal union politics, they also 
indicated the activists’ growing hostility towards Tony Boyle. The activists aimed not 
just to challenge Boyle’s leadership, but also to reform the United Mine Workers of 
America. Their campaign ultimately sought to reshape the union so it was more 
responsive to rank and file concerns. Rauh and Brown attacked seven years of corruption 
under Boyle and declining safety standards in the mines. They still believed, however, 
that the union was an effective vehicle for reform; it was the leadership itself they were 
attacking.  
The activists soon abandoned their initially cautious approach. In April 1970, they 
formed a new organization, Miners for Democracy (MFD). During the meeting, Mike 
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Trbovich was elected as leader of the organization. MFD saw itself as a viable alternative 
to the UMW leadership. It pursued a number of tactics, such as putting forward 
candidates for district elections, assessing occupational health legislation before 
Congress, and actively seeking to overturn the 1969 election result. In early summer, the 
activism in the coalfields started to escalate. The Miners for Democracy was by no means 
the only organization involved. Several groups pushed for different, although not 
incompatible, objectives. The Association of Disabled Miners and Widows played an 
instrumental role in campaigning for black lung benefits for widows and retired miners. 
A group called Designs for Rural Action also played a prominent role, by narrowing its 
original focus on poverty and community work to black lung activism. Robert Payne, a 
militant black miner, formed the Disabled Miners and Widows of South West Virginia 
(DMW/SWV), a more radical organization than the Association of Disabled Miners. The 
DMW/SWV was at the forefront of the protest movement that swept Appalachia in late 
June and July.27  
On June 9, Payne wrote to Boyle to request a meeting about the union’s Welfare 
and Retirement Fund. The DMW/SWV opposed the union’s practice of seizing disabled 
miners’ hospital cards after one year of care and not returning them until the miners had 
reached the age of sixty-five. The union also refused to provide hospital cards to miners’ 
widows. The DMW/SWV also sought to improve the pension coverage provided by the 
Welfare and Retirement Fund, especially given the lucrative pension plan Boyle had 
established for himself, his family, and his colleagues. Boyle was set to retire with his full 
annual salary of $60,000, while most retired miners were scheduled to receive only $125 
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per month from the Welfare and Retirement Fund. Payne warned Boyle that, if he did not 
respond to his letter by June 20, miners in the Appalachian coalfields would go on 
strike.28  
When Boyle did not reply, miners in southern West Virginia walked off the job at 
midnight on Sunday, June 21. Led by Payne and the DMW/SWV, picket lines were 
established by men, women, and children, including several disabled miners in 
wheelchairs. The picketers bore placards with slogans such as, “We Want Justice” and 
“Return Welfare Cards and Pensions.” Children, widows and disabled miners played a 
pivotal role in the strike. In one county in West Virginia, a group of ten widows 
successfully shut down an entire mine. The strike quickly spread across the state and into 
eastern Ohio and western Pennsylvania. By the following day, Monday June 22, 18,000 
miners had walked off the job. The activists threatened to “put out the nation’s lights” if 
the union did not address their demands. This was not an idle threat, as national coal 
supplies were already running low. Further shortages had the potential to jeopardize the 
provision of coal-fuelled electricity.29  
Miners for Democracy, the dissident union reform group, supported the strike, 
although denied any involvement in its organization. Payne indicated that the major goal 
of the strike was to improve hospital coverage for disabled miners and widows. MFD 
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leader Trbovich said that many of the miners, in addition to demanding improved hospital 
care, were striking because their employers were not taking adequate safety precautions. 
A meeting on June 23 between coal industry representatives and Department of the 
Interior officials fuelled miners’ suspicions that the federal government was 
compromising safety for corporate demands. Walter Hickel had called the meeting in 
response to numerous pleas from mining companies and operator associations to modify 
the Bureau of Mines’ enforcement procedures. Since March of that year, operators had 
filed over 2,000 appeals against safety enforcement actions. The purpose of the meeting 
was to allow operators to suggest how the legislation could be changed. Before the 
meeting, MFD representative Joseph “Chip” Yablonski commented, “I don’t claim to be 
the greatest expert on mine safety… but I have the strong feeling that, at a closed meeting 
of that kind, no-one will be in there fighting for the miners’ welfare.”30  
Not all district and local union leaders supported the strike. James Leeber, the 
head of UMWA District 29, urged the miners in his district to return to work 
immediately. In an official statement, he commented that the strike action violated the 
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement and the union constitution. Miners 
participating in the strike action were not only jeopardizing their union membership, he 
argued, but also stopping the flow of royalties to the Welfare and Retirement Fund. He 
concluded, “This office is insisting that all officers and members of local unions involved 
ignore the activity of such pickets since it is a subterfuge to undermine the United Mine 
Workers of America.” Meanwhile, Carson Hibbits, president of UMW Districts 28 and 
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30, claimed that none of his members were participating in the strike. Miners in Kanawha 
and Logan counties in West Virginia ignored the pickets and continued to work.31  
On Tuesday, June 23, some of the striking miners in Wyoming, Boone, and 
Raleigh counties in West Virginia decided to go back to work, but this did not lessen the 
impact of the strike, as several other mines closed down.32  Elsewhere in the state, 1,000 
miners disobeyed an injunction issued by Judge Everett Cox of the Marshall County 
Circuit. Ultimately, the strike petered out as quickly as it had started. On June 24, at a 
meeting in Wyoming County, Josephine Roche, the head of the union’s Welfare and 
Retirement Fund, agreed to explore the possibility of implementing the miners’ demands 
on the condition they ended the walkout. Moreover, at a hearing in Wheeling, West 
Virginia, Judge Ralph Pryor reiterated the ruling made by Judge Cox that the strike was 
illegal under state law. In Pittsburgh, Federal Judge Wallace S. Gourley responded to a 
petition for an injunction from four major steel companies by ruling that in the absence of 
immediate danger underground, the miners’ dissatisfaction with their employers’ 
enforcement of the 1969 mine act was not sufficient reason to strike. Gourley emphasized 
that the miners’ obligations under their contract with the steel companies had precedence. 
The judge, however, also criticized Tony Boyle for not doing enough to promote unity 
among the rank and file, and condemned the coal companies for not doing enough to 
enforce safe working conditions.33  
                                                 
31 Beckley Post-Herald, June 22, 1970, 1; Charleston Daily Mail, June 22, 1970,  2; 
Raleigh Register (Beckley, WV), June 22, 1970, 1. 
 
32 Beckley Post-Herald, June 25, 1970, 1 and 10; Charleston Daily Mail, June 24, 1970, 
8; Charleston Gazette, June 24, 1970, 1. 
 
33 Wall Street Journal, Thursday June 24, 1970, 9. 
  
174
By June 25, the miners had gone back to work; but the DMW/SWV vowed to 
resume the strike in two weeks if Boyle did not meet its demands. The end of the strike 
came one day before the start of the annual vacation period. Most of the miners were 
scheduled to take a week’s paid leave starting on June 26, while others were set to begin 
their holiday on July 11. The operators planned to use the vacation period to carry out 
maintenance and repair work on the mines.34 
Boyle failed to respond to the Disabled Miners and Widows of South West 
Virginia before the two-week deadline, so the group resumed the strike as promised. Pro-
Boyle union members and representatives of the coal companies used shotguns to 
intimidate the strikers and protect mine property. The coal companies’ use of physical 
violence against the strikers, combined with District 29 officials’ claims that they were 
“welfare bums,” drew more support for the group’s actions. The strike, which at its peak 
involved 25,000 miners, had become more than a protest over hospital care or unsafe 
working conditions; it had evolved into a heated conflict between reform elements in the 
union and the entrenched UMWA leadership.35 
The U.S. District Court issued a temporary restraining order against the miners, 
many of whom had started carrying guns to protect themselves. The order did little to 
quell the strike. The federal government’s imprisonment of Robert Payne and several 
others for contempt of court, combined with Boyle’s continuing refusal to meet the 
protestors’ demands, however, brought an end to the industrial action. The activists had 
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not obtained recognition from the legal system or the UMW. In addition, many of the 
miners were compelled to go back to work because of financial difficulties. Barbara 
Smith argues that the strike was symbolically important because it renewed the spirit of 
activism and determination among miners who sought to overthrow Boyle’s leadership. 
While Smith also acknowledges the community dimension to the strike, she under-
emphasizes its importance. The role of miners’ families and disabled miners was 
instrumental in driving the momentum of the strike.36 
According to George Hopkins, during the protests of 1970, the activists in the 
United Mine Workers split into two disparate groups, one located in southern Appalachia 
and the other in the north. The southern miners, represented most visibly by the Disabled 
Miners and Widows of South West Virginia, sought tangible gains such as black lung 
compensation and pensions for disabled and retired miners. Miners in the north, 
epitomized by the Miners for Democracy, were more concerned with the reform of the 
union itself. According to Hopkins, the northern faction did not disregard the issue of 
health, but it was more concerned with working miners than those who were disabled or 
retired.37 Hopkins’ analysis, however, oversimplifies the objectives of the activists 
working for reform. The Miners for Democracy supported the strike action by the 
Disabled Miners and Widows of South West Virginia; equally, the DMW/SWV, like the 
MFD, supported the reform of the United Mine Workers.  
In late July 1970, the release of a major report, sponsored by Ralph Nader, further 
contributed to the criticism of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. The report was based 
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on extensive research by a group of graduate students over a two-year period. J. Davitt 
McAteer, a young law student from West Virginia who had contacted Nader after the 
Farmington disaster, was head of the group.38  
In setting up the study, McAteer knew that Nader’s typical method of carrying out 
investigations, where “Nader’s Raiders” gathered in Washington D.C. for research, was 
not conducive to a study of the coal industry. McAteer feared that mine operators would 
accuse researchers from beyond the state of being “outsiders,” who did not have the 
requisite knowledge about the industry to make sound judgments. To avoid this problem, 
McAteer convinced Nader to employ students from West Virginia in the study. Once 
Nader had given his support, McAteer formed a taskforce with colleagues from West 
Virginia University Law School, which started raising funds for the study. The taskforce 
had considerable financial backing from sources as diverse as the UMWA, political state 
and federal political representatives, academic research foundations, the Bureau of 
Mines, and even the Carbon Fuel Coal Company of West Virginia. McAteer was 
convinced that the contribution of the latter was not an anomaly, but rather a conscious 
effort to influence the outcome of the study. 39 
The report condemned the administration’s “calculated indifference to the 
unnecessary and avoidable hazards of life in the nation’s coal mines.” It also criticized 
the Nixon administration’s failure to appoint a new director to the Bureau of Mines. The 
report stated, “ To fail to appoint a Bureau director for the six most critical months in its 
history is atrocious, but further to appoint a man [Lucas] who sadly lacked a history of 
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strong safety and health activities is despicable.” McAteer commented that he did not 
think the new legislation had significantly improved miners’ chances of survival. He 
empasized that 100 men had already died in the coal mines in the first half of 1970. A 
federal official retaliated that the report had little merit. McAteer continued the study, 
however, and eventually published a book entitled Coal Mine Safety: The Case of West 
Virginia. 40 As McAteer and his research team conducted their study of the West Virginia 
coal industry in 1970, the black lung movement protested the Nixon administration’s 
mismanagement of the federal black lung benefits program. 
 
Reigniting the Fuse: The Resurgence of the Black Lung Movement 
The collapse of the miners’ strike in 1970 was not, by any means, a sign that 
activism in the coalfields was in decline. In fact, the five-week long strike was only one 
component of a burgeoning network of protest that summer. The black lung movement 
also reemerged, now headed by an independent group called Designs for Rural Action 
(DRA). Founded in West Virginia in 1968 by Gibbs Kinderman, DRA initially adhered 
to the broad goal of tackling poverty and social inequality through community action. 
Designs for Rural Action was one of several organizations fighting for social justice in 
Appalachia in the 1960s and early 1970s, including the Appalachian Volunteers and the 
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Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA). The latter played a crucial role in the original 
West Virginia Black Lung Association.41  
The focus of Designs for Rural Action on black lung compensation resulted in 
large part from the political and social circumstances of the summer of 1970. By this 
time, the Appalachian Volunteers and other groups in the region were coming under 
increasing attack from conservative forces. In 1968, for example, the Kentucky Un-
American Activities Committee had brought several AV activists before public hearings 
in the state legislature, under the premise that they were planning to overthrow the state 
government and redistribute public wealth. The committee labeled the Appalachian 
Volunteers as communists and outside agitators, concluding that the AV program “has 
served as a tremendous detriment to the deserving people of this region.” In West 
Virginia, AV members faced similar charges. As a result, the Appalachian Volunteers 
lost much of their funding from state governments.42 Internal dissent also hindered the 
work of the group. 
By 1970, the radical social activism of the previous decade was in sharp decline, 
and reformers began to focus more on legal and administrative issues. With few other 
avenues of social action open, Designs for Rural Action made fair and equitable 
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distribution of black lung benefits one of its primary goals. During a meeting with 
representatives from the West Virginia Black Lung Association in summer 1969, DRA 
leaders became aware of the impact of pneumoconiosis on miners and their families. 
They also learned that a substantial number of black lung victims had been denied 
benefits by the Social Security Administration. The DRA quickly began to allocate most 
of the organization’s resources to the reform of the black lung program.43  
While the Federal Coal Mine Act defined pneumoconiosis as a “chronic dust 
disease of the lungs arising out of employment in an underground coal mine,” the Social 
Security Administration used a much narrower definition of the disease to judge 
claimants’ eligibility for benefits. To qualify for compensation, miners had to pass a 
series of rigorous medical tests.  They first had to pass an X-ray examination by 
displaying evidence of nodules on their lungs. If the X-rays did not show damage to the 
lungs, the SSA terminated their application. The administration contended that miners 
with severe breathing problems who did not match the X-ray criteria had contracted lung 
disease through cigarette smoking or a non-occupational hazard.44  
Miners who passed the X-ray requirement were required to undergo a pulmonary 
function test to prove that they were “totally disabled” by black lung disease. A large 
proportion of disabled miners discovered their applications did not advance beyond this 
stage. Physicians generally interpreted their test results as evidence of only partial 
disability. The small number of miners who passed the first two stages faced a long wait 
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as a secondary physician scrutinized and analyzed the results. Employed by the SSA, the 
physicians who reassessed the results rarely confirmed diagnoses. Many applicants who 
assumed they would receive compensation had their applications turned down. Widows 
in particular struggled to prove their husbands’ deaths were caused by black lung. They 
had to prove that their husband had worked underground for at least three consecutive 
years and had either died conclusively from black lung or had been receiving benefits at 
the time of death.45  
Aside from the rigorous medical criteria, the under-staffing and under-funding of 
the SSA local offices prevented disabled miners from collecting benefits. The offices 
were not prepared to deal with the huge volume of claims, over 100,000 in the first month 
of the program.46 Because they were under immense pressure, staff members often did 
not collect comprehensive medical evidence for each applicant, and they frequently 
neglected to tell miners that the SSA was financially responsible for obtaining 
background evidence beyond X-ray results. Frustrated miners took out their anger on the 
local staff with verbal abuse and occasional physical violence, even though staffers were 
only the ‘human face’ of a much larger bureaucracy.47 
DRA activists planned to use miners’ frustration over the black lung 
compensation program to create a new network of activism. They also supported Miners 
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for Democracy’s campaign to overthrow Tony Boyle, because they believed that the 
union was the only viable institutional mechanism for challenging the power of the coal 
operators. One activist commented that the UMW had to be reformed before any pressure 
could be placed on the coal operators to improve health and safety. Designs for Rural 
Action made black lung disease its lead issue, however, because it was uncontroversial 
and would easily draw support from the miners. In mid-1970, many people still felt too 
intimidated by the established Boyle regime to risk openly opposing it.48 
Establishing its headquarters in Charleston, Designs for Rural Action mainly 
communicated with the public through the Black Lung Bulletin, which provided extensive 
coverage of the campaign for more equitable federal compensation and the union 
insurgents’ campaign to overthrow the Boyle regime. The DRA distributed newsletters to 
publicize its cause and frequently held press conferences and media events. The 
Charleston office hired Arnold Miller, who had been a key leader in the West Virginia 
strike the previous year, to lead the new black lung movement.  
Miller acted as a link between the BLA and the DRA.49 Born in 1923, Miller 
started working as a coal loader when he was fourteen. After a period of service in World 
War II, during which he lost part of an ear, he started participating in local union politics, 
and eventually became the head of Local 2093. He used his experience at the local level 
to involve himself in the national union leadership. He soon distanced himself from it in 
opposition to Tony Boyle’s policies. Miller was diagnosed with pneumoconiosis in 1965 
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and began devoting his energy to helping other miners afflicted by the disease. In early 
1969, he was a key activist in the West Virginia black lung movement, notably in the 
February 26 march on the Capitol Building in Charleston. The same year, he retired as a 
coal miner; he was unable to continue working as a result of black lung disease, arthritis, 
and high blood pressure.50 Dr. Donald Rasmussen, another notable black lung activist, 
was also part of the ‘Charleston Office Crew.’51  
In its previous incarnation in West Virginia in 1969, the Black Lung Association 
had been spontaneous and unplanned, but the leaders of the revived movement 
emphasized the importance of efficient organization and clear goals. Most notably, with 
the assistance of VISTA workers and rank and file miners, they set up several county 
chapters of the Black Lung Association across southern West Virginia and the wider 
Appalachian region. Unlike the West Virginia Black Lung Association, the new 
movement was focused at the national level, with the intent of challenging the federal 
bureaucracy responsible for the compensation program. The individual chapters provided 
disabled miners and widows with assistance in their benefits claims, worked to overhaul 
the existing compensation system, and helped to organize dissident UMW members.52  
Because the central office staff did not trust the large, bureaucratic structure of the 
Social Security Administration, they tried to prevent the Black Lung Association from 
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evolving into a centralized organization. As one office member commented, their main 
goal was for the local chapters to guide national BLA policy: 
It seems that it is done better when we work under the direction of the BLA 
chapter offices… That way, our work can be guided better by BLA policies. 
While this may make more work for you all, it will help insure that what is done 
in the name of the BLA is actually always in accordance with policies set by the 
members.53 
  
 
 When it was necessary to make decisions on regional and national policy issues, 
the central office sought to involve representatives from each local branch. However, it 
sometimes caused uncertainty among branches by failing to keep them informed of its 
actions at the regional and national level.54 Furthermore, most chapters did not contribute 
directly to the larger organization, with the result that it often lacked a clear sense of 
purpose, and many of them were divided by internal conflict and differences of opinion.55 
The local branches frequently disregarded the BLA charter, which stipulated that the 
central office had to approve all expenses, that officials should be elected in a timely 
manner, and that chapters should hold meetings at least twice per month. Most local BLA 
meetings did not have a set agenda, but often focused on the organization’s struggle with 
the Social Security Administration. Many people who attended the meetings wanted help 
to obtain benefits. Applicants who were waiting on news of their claims often interrupted 
the proceedings of local meetings to complain about their specific case.56 According to 
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Bennett M. Judkins, the chaotic nature of the meetings fulfilled a key organizational 
function, by providing members with a forum to raise their grievances and showing them 
that others were having similar problems. Moreover, the meetings enabled BLA leaders 
to help their constituents.57 
 The BLA was limited in its work by a lack of funding. The organization did not 
have a constant source of finance, and relied mostly on donations from members. The 
central office’s plan for a large central fund did not come to fruition, as local members 
spent most of their time challenging the Social Security Administration for black lung 
benefits. While the BLA received a limited amount of funding from the Appalachian 
Regional Commission (ARC), it was not enough to fund organizing efforts across the 
coalfields. Some members believed that the BLA destroyed its chances of becoming a 
prominent nationwide organization by not devoting more time and effort to fundraising. 
 The centralized, bureaucratic nature of the Social Security Administration also 
hindered the Black Lung Association’s efforts to obtain compensation for its members. In 
contrast to the BLA, which stressed the importance of local autonomy, the SSA made its 
decision regarding compensation at the central level. The director of the SSA office in 
Beckley, West Virginia, commented, “It must be remembered that all decisions come 
from the Baltimore office and that the local offices only get the claims filed and request 
the necessary medical information and then send it to Baltimore – that is where the hang 
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up is.”58 Am article in The Black Lung Bulletin stated, “Decisions are made on 
bureaucratic convenience rather than on serving human needs. For efficiency’s sake 
workers in the SSA operate almost like machines. A decision is made, a button is pushed, 
and the workers do what they are told – losing the ability to understand the people with 
whom they are talking.”59 
 Applicants for benefits did not always understand the enormous task faced by the 
SSA. In a 1973 study on the dangers of coal mine work, the BLA asserted, “There 
appears to be a need not only for a better understanding of the miners by the agencies, but 
also a better understanding of the agencies by the miners.”60 Certainly, the SSA 
encountered problems with black lung compensation it did not experience in the 
administration of its other benefit programs. A large number of applicants filed for 
compensation at the same time, overwhelming local branch offices and causing delays in 
the processing of claims. Furthermore, because many of the applicants were from similar 
economic, cultural, and geographical backgrounds, the SSA organizational and 
bureaucratic network was too inefficient to manage the new black lung compensation 
program, and there were not enough clinics throughout Appalachia to gather medical 
evidence from applicants.61 
Lay advocates, who came into direct contact with the miners and their families, 
were the most important representatives of the new BLA. They advised claimants about 
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their applications, accompanied them to SSA medical centers for testing, and, when 
necessary, represented them in court. Lay advocates were mostly disabled miners, 
widows, or people from coal mining families. Many of them had not completed high 
school but became legal experts, as a result of extensive training provided by the 
Appalachian Defense Fund. Their knowledge and skills provided applicants with vital 
support in their quest for compensation. One advocate, a miner disabled by 
pneumoconiosis, recalled: 
I liked the work, I enjoyed it. It gave me something to put my mind to. When I’m 
retired, I can’t do no physical work. Being a lay advocate was a lot of work, but it 
seems like it takes your mind off your sickness. Now I just lie here. I have to take 
three to six Davron a day, been taking them since 1957. When I’m here, I don’t 
eat nothing til supper, but when I was on the road, I ate three meals a day. We 
might – maybe I’ll talk to some of the others and just get this Black Lung 
Association started all over again.62 
 
His work as a lay advocate gave him a sense of purpose after he became too ill to 
continue working in the mines. Eventually, his black lung disease became severe enough 
that he was unable to work even as a lay advocate. Many of the disabled miners working 
as lay advocates faced the same problem. 
Helen Powell from West Virginia was one of the most prominent activists in the 
revived black lung movement. Powell’s father had spent his life working in underground 
mines until black lung disease made him too sick to work and he was laid off. 
Subsequently, Powell gathered evidence for a compensation suit, which she passed to a 
qualified lawyer. Her father successfully won compensation in court, which led many 
                                                 
62 Quoted in Smith, Digging Our Own Graves, 164. 
 
  
187
other people in Powell’s community to ask her for assistance. As a result of her work, she 
was drawn into the black lung movement.63  
Even in the male-orientated world of the Appalachian coalfields, Powell’s 
experience was by no means unique for the early 1970s. As Kathleen M. Blee highlights 
in No Middle Ground, women across the United States became actively involved in 
radical protest movements in the decades after World War II. In employing the term 
‘radicalism,’ Blee uses a broad definition, describing radical protestors as “those who 
[sought] social, political, or economic changes meant to produce great equality within 
society, or those who [sought] changes meant to restructure society in a less egalitarian 
fashion.” While some of this protest occurred within formal organizations, much of it was 
shaped by the informal environments of family, kinship, and neighborhood. Furthermore, 
the protest was linked to women’s concerns about economic inequality.64  
Powell, then, shared a common experience with many other women. In her role as 
an activist, her family environment and the context of the black lung movement 
intersected. Using her personal experience of witnessing close family members suffer 
from black lung, she played a key role in one of the most visible social movements in 
Appalachia in the early 1970s, helping a substantial number of miners to obtain black 
lung benefits. In doing so, Powell helped to reduce the economic inequality on which the 
black lung compensation system rested.  
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Despite the commitment of its participants, the revived Black Lung Association 
faced a number of obstacles. Individual leaders of county chapters, fiercely protective of 
their territory, often refused to collaborate with other chapters. Moreover, as Helen 
Powell recalls, it was difficult to maintain a sense of unity within each individual chapter: 
We just kind of fell apart. And a lot of people left who were working with us and 
supporting us. After they got their benefits… they went home and sat down. “I 
have my part of the loaf and now you get yours the best way you can,” you know, 
that kind of thing. So then our numbers fell off and we didn’t have as much 
support as what we used to.65 
 
Few members of the Black Lung Association were involved in the organization on a 
long-term basis. Between meetings, each chapter typically experienced a membership 
turnover rate of between 40 and 60 percent. In large part, this was because the majority of 
attendees at meetings required help with their benefits claims. Once miners had started 
receiving benefits, there was no incentive to keep attending the meetings.66  
Furthermore, like its previous West Virginia counterpart, the new national BLA 
struggled with the medical establishment over the definition of black lung disease and 
who was eligible for disability compensation. Conservative physicians and SSA 
representatives continued to argue that the term “black lung” should only cover advanced 
pneumoconiosis, not other lung diseases developed as a result of underground mine work. 
By adhering to such a restrictive definition of the disease, they precluded the majority of 
miners from receiving compensation, as recent studies showed that only three percent of 
miners suffered from advanced pneumoconiosis. Progressive physicians and activists 
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challenged this line of thinking by arguing that miners were susceptible to developing a 
range of diseases underground, many of which did not show up on X-rays. They also 
emphasized that the majority of miners with simple pneumoconiosis had severe breathing 
problems.67  
 The SSA did not respond to pressure from the black lung movement, as the 
compensation program was a significant drain on its finances and resources. The 
administration advocated what it described as “objective scientific evidence,” such as X-
Rays, and not clinical examinations grounded in medical opinion, as the best mechanism 
for proving black lung disease. As a result, observes Barbara Smith, coal miners’ 
pneumoconiosis came to exist independently of the miners’ symptoms. To the miners 
who were so crippled by black lung disease that they became breathless from walking up 
the stairs or moving from the bedroom to the kitchen, the Social Security 
Administration’s position undermined their suffering. They attributed the disease not just 
to many years spent underground in dusty conditions, but also to the coal companies who 
had exploited them, and felt they deserved compensation.68  
 
Reassessing the Federal Coal Mine Act: Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee 
on Labor 
 
In early August, the Senate Subcommittee on Labor resumed in Washington D.C. 
the hearing it had opened in Centerville, Pennsylvania earlier in the summer. The 
subcommittee’s main goals were to assess the effectiveness of the Federal Coal Mine Act 
over the previous four months and to determine how its enforcement could be improved. 
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As the hearing progressed, a consensus emerged that the legislation, despite its stringent 
terms, had failed to improve health and safety in the coal mines. Although there was 
some disagreement over who was responsible for this failure and the best way to address 
it, several witnesses at the hearing singled out the Bureau of Mines for condemnation.  
 In his opening statement on August 6, subcommittee chairman Harrison Williams 
lambasted the recent performance of the Bureau: 
The record of the Bureau of Mines is outrageous. During 1968, the Bureau of 
Mines conducted 9,000 regular inspections. Since the new law went into effect, 
the Bureau has been conducting substantially fewer safety inspections than in 
1968. In the past 4 months, the Bureau has conducted only 153 regular 
inspections, an annual rate of less than 450 regular inspections per year. In my 
judgment, this is just plain unbelievable… This decrease in the number of 
inspections is all the more shocking in light of the fact that the Congress backed 
up its far reaching health and safety law by almost quadrupling funds for 
inspections from $9 million for the year beginning on July 1, 1968, to $33 million 
for the year which began last month.69 
 
 
The Bureau’s ineptitude, Williams went on to argue, had perpetuated the unsafe 
conditions that caused injury and death to the nation’s miners. Therefore, one of the key 
tasks of the hearing was establishing how the Bureau could improve its performance. 
Williams also stressed the importance of passing a health and safety bill that would cover 
the country’s entire workforce.70  
 Leading off the witness testimony, UMW President Tony Boyle strongly 
criticized both the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Mines. He claimed that, 
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over the past five months, the union had begged President Nixon to appoint a new 
director to the Bureau, but without success. “This period,” he stated, “has been marked by 
jealousy and bickering within the Bureau while the coal miners continue to suffer and 
die.” For Boyle, the Interior Department’s reduction of the fine schedule for first-time 
violations was also an obstruction to health and safety enforcement, as was the temporary 
restraining order issued by a federal judge on behalf of small operators in Virginia. Later 
that day, Boyle gave testimony with two UMW attorneys, Edward Carey and Charles 
Widman. While they acknowledged they had not supported the rank-and-file strike in 
Pennsylvania in June, they denied that the union had played an instrumental role in 
obtaining the injunction against the strikers.71 
UMW Safety Director Lewis Evans argued that the Bureau of Mines had hindered 
its ability to enforce the law by delaying the appointment of new inspectors. According to 
Evans, the Bureau should have started hiring and training new inspectors the previous 
summer, rather than waiting until two months after Nixon signed the mine act into law. 
The success of the Federal Mine Act, he asserted, was dependent on the Bureau swiftly 
appointing a new director and expanding its inspection force. In response to Evans’ 
comments, Senator Jennings Randolph urged the subcommittee to send Nixon a telegram 
requesting the immediate nomination of a new bureau chief. Evans closed his testimony 
by highlighting problems in the federal black lung compensation program. He believed 
that the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare had not established adequate 
measures to protect miners’ privacy, which put them at risk from employers’ reprisals, 
and that the Bureau of Disability Insurance needed to adopt more liberal criteria for 
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miners’ X-ray examinations. Evans also disapproved of the Social Security 
Administration’s decision to subtract the Pennsylvania workmen’s compensation 
payment of $100 per month from the federal black lung awards.72  
 Consumer advocate Ralph Nader also attributed responsibility for the health and 
safety crisis to the Department of the Interior and Bureau of Mines. He stated, “The 
strategy of evasion, misfeasance, and malfeasance practiced by the Department of the 
Interior, its Bureau of Mines, and other Federal officials reflects an institutional mutiny 
against a law they have sworn under oath to uphold.” Like Boyle before him, Nader 
argued that the Bureau had used the federal restraining order issued in Virginia as an 
excuse to abandon its original penalty schedule and exempt operators from tough 
sanctions. He also criticized the Bureau’s for neglecting to carry out regular spot 
inspections, even in light of a massive budget increase, and its delay in publishing the 
underground dust control standards. Nader condemned the United Mine Workers, the 
White House, and Congress for not doing enough to address the Bureau’s dismal 
performance. The UMW, he argued, had failed to file legal proceedings against the 
Bureau in Washington, and to participate in the recent meetings between the Department 
of the Interior and coal industry officials.  The White House, meanwhile, “[had] done 
nothing except to try and appoint a Director for the Bureau of Mines whose qualifications 
and allegiances were such that they led to the withdrawal of the candidacy.” There had 
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been little action on the part of Congress, too, with the exception of the lawsuit filed by 
Representatives Hechler, Dent, and Burton.73  
Summing up the poor record of the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of 
Mines, Nader commented: 
There is a total anarchy, institutionalized in the administrative branch of 
Government and I think it requires something more than a telegram of concern by 
any committee of Congress. I think it requires a demand for resignation, a demand 
for repudiation of these officials who have violated their oath of office and 
demand for disciplinary proceedings where such proceedings can be brought 
under the civil service law and other precedents.74 
 
 As a long-term solution to the Bureau’s problems, Nader proposed the separation of its 
two competing functions, the promotion of the coal industry and the enforcement of 
health and safety. Senator Williams, responding to several additional short-term measures 
advocated by Nader, agreed to authorize a General Accounting Office investigation of 
how the Bureau had spent its funding increases, and indicated he would ask the Justice 
Department to rule if the federal government’s poor enforcement the mining legislation 
constituted a violation of the Federal Tort Claims Act. This was a legislative act dating to 
1946, which allowed citizens to sue the United States for injuries resulting from the 
actions or neglect of federal representatives.75 
 Nader’s suggestion that the UMW had not done enough to address the Bureau’s 
inefficiency echoed his earlier criticisms of Tony Boyle. During the West Virginia black 
lung movement in early 1969, Nader had condemned Boyle’s leadership on health and 
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safety in a telegram to miners at a demonstration in Charleston, read by Ken Hechler. 
Boyle had responded by labeling Nader a “fink.” Therefore, the fact that the two men 
were united in their criticism of the Bureau showed just how ineffectual the beleaguered 
agency had become.76  
 In the afternoon testimony on August 6, the strong criticism of the Bureau of 
Mines continued. Industry representative John L. Kilcullen attacked the Bureau for 
discriminating against the small mine owners he represented as counsel for the National 
Independent Coal Operators Association. He complained that the Bureau had started to 
issue violation and penalty notices when the legislation went into force on March 30, 
only two days after the safety guidelines were published in the Federal Register. 
Kilcullen explained: 
Many small operators found themselves being cited for violations over which they 
had no control such as failure to have automatic coupling devices on shuttle cars 
and automatic brakes on coal hauling equipment. The fact that this equipment was 
not available for purchase, and that no manufacturer actually manufactured such 
equipment was not accepted as an excuse by the Bureau of Mines inspectors in 
issuing penalty notices.77    
 
Several small operators, reported Kilcullen, had shut down their operations rather than 
accept financial penalties for violations beyond their control. However, in contrast to the 
speakers before him, Kilcullen did not believe that the Virginia restraining order had 
affected the Bureau’s performance. He argued that the restraining order merely prevented 
it from issuing violation notices when operators were not at fault. Kilcullen actually felt 
that the Bureau had been too severe about enforcement. Emphasizing that it was not his 
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intention to defend it, he highlighted small operators’ disdain for the Bureau’s new 
inspection procedures: “They feel that the Bureau has been extremely zealous, and has 
greatly increased the stringency of its inspection methods and procedures. We know of no 
instances where a Bureau of Mines inspector has condoned or deliberately overlooked 
violations of the new standards.”78 
Few others shared the coal industry’s views about the Bureau. When the hearing 
resumed before the Subcommittee the next day, a delegation from the Miners for 
Democracy (MFD) resumed the criticism of the Bureau’s poor record in health and safety 
enforcement. All the members of the delegation held key leadership roles in the MFD, 
and had attended the organization’s founding meeting in April 1970. In a series of 
scathing testimonies, they argued the Bureau had been detrimental to the improvement of 
coal mine working conditions. However, they also contended that much of the blame for 
death and injury in the mines lay with the United Mine Workers. Joseph “Chip” 
Yablonski said, “Coldly and calculatingly, this administration and the Bureau of Mines 
have emasculated the toughest occupational health and safety bill ever enacted… The 
men who work in the mines are being denied their right to earn their daily bread under 
safe working conditions by a callously indifferent bureaucracy which is floundering in its 
own fat.” Yablonski cited the lack of experienced staff in the bureau, including a 
qualified director, as the main impediment to safe working conditions. Later, in response 
to questions from the subcommittee, he argued that coal miners were highly qualified to 
become mine inspectors, but that many refrained from taking the qualifying exam 
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because of their fear that the Bureau might place them in a distant region of the country, 
far from their families and community.79  
Mike Trbovich, the MFD vice-presidential nominee, focused his statement on the 
ineptitude of the United Mine Workers: 
The leadership of the United Mine Workers is not interested in safety. Their 
concern is to keep production going without consideration for the people who pay 
their salaries and mine the nation’s coal… A law passed by the Congress of the 
United States, signed by the President, is meaningless because the relationship 
between the operators and the United Mine Workers is something like a cancer 
that eats out the foundation of a structure that stands for decency in our 
democracy.80  
 
He also urged the federal government to appoint a Bureau director with no ties to either 
the coal industry or the UMW. Leader Arnold Miller, meanwhile, commented that he had 
not witnessed any improvement to working conditions since the passage of the act. He 
alleged that the UMW leadership was refusing to support local safety committeemen who 
insisted on enforcement of the law. In one instance, claimed Miller, a safety 
committeeman had lost his job for trying to enforce safety himself without union backing. 
He warned the subcommittee: “If we don’t solve the problems of mining today, we are 
not going to have a coal shortage; we are not going to have any coal miners to mine 
coal.”81  
Harry Patrick, another founding member of the MFD, stated bluntly, “On the 
question of the new mine health and safety bill and what it has done for the miners, I 
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would say absolutely nothing. If anything, it has lulled many into a false sense of security 
which simply is not there. In talking to the miners over my district, I hear the same story. 
Conditions are as bad if not worse than before.” In Patrick’s view, spot-inspections were 
ineffective: “On the question of spot inspections which is required by the new mine 
safety law, it is a favorite joke among miners that the company knows exactly what spot 
the inspectors are coming to.” He argued that one of the main causes of accidents was the 
coal industry’s prioritization of production over health and safety. However, he also 
cautioned against labeling all coal companies in the same way. Some employers, he 
argued, were more attentive to safety than others -- for example, Bethlehem Steel his 
present employer, was more conscientious about holding monthly safety meetings than 
his previous employer Consolidation Coal.82  
Following additional testimony from the Miners For Democracy representatives, 
several witnesses from the Department of the Interior made statements. They vigorously 
defended both the Interior Department and the Bureau of Mines from the charges against 
them. Hollis M. Dole, the Assistant Secretary of Mineral Resources, criticized Congress 
and the miners for having unrealistic expectations about the time required for the Bureau 
to draw up new regulations: 
Unfortunately, the publicity concerning the development – and eventually, the 
enactment – of the new law centered almost entirely upon the improvements it 
would bring about, and very little was said about the time that would be required 
to achieve them. Consequently, the mineworkers and the public generally were 
encouraged to expect the improvements in mine health and safety immediately, 
and because they have not been achieved so quickly, they are dismayed. They 
should not be dismayed, because the health and safety revolution in the mines is 
                                                 
82 Ibid., 342-343. 
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underway; their expectations will be fulfilled; but it will take longer than 90 or 
180 days.83 
 
Dole was convinced the Bureau had done everything possible to improve health and 
safety with the limited time and manpower available. “It is not true we are dragging our 
feet,” he said. “We believe that we have made as much progress as possible under the 
circumstances and, more importantly, that our efforts are paying off in the form of 
improvements that are already underway in the mines which makes the mines healthier 
and safer now than they ever have been before.” To support this assertion, he showed that 
the coal mine fatality rate had declined in the first six months of 1970 in comparison to 
the same period the previous year.84  
In his lengthy statement, Dole also claimed that the Virginia restraining order had 
not significantly affected the Bureau’s ability to enforce the law, that ‘Partial But 
Representative’ inspections, despite their flaws, were more effective than spot 
inspections, and that the Bureau was entirely capable of handling its dual function. 
Moreover, he revealed that the Interior Department was expanding the mine inspection 
force by appointing new inspectors from civil service registers and by reducing the 
training period for both safety and dust inspectors. He assured the subcommittee that the 
Bureau would have a full complement of inspectors by July 1, 1972.85  
 James Westfield, Assistant Director for Coal Mine Health and Safety, explained 
how recent advances in the methane monitor had given miners greater protection from 
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84 Senate, Health and Safety in the Coal Mines, 368; New York Times, August 8, 1970, 
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dangerous accumulations of methane gas. In response to additional questions from 
Senators Randolph and Schweiker, he also emphasized that the Bureau was moving from 
PBR inspections to full examinations of underground mines as quickly as possible.86 
 The witness testimony on August 7 also included statements by Mazie B. 
Gutshall, the Executive Deputy Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Mines and 
Mineral Industries, and Paul C. Riley, Deputy Director of the West Virginia Department 
of Mines. Both argued that better health and safety enforcement could be achieved 
through greater cooperation between state and federal governments.87  
 
Maintaining a Conservative Approach 
On October 7, 1970, President Nixon appointed Elburt Franklin Osborn, a 
geologist and vice-president of research at Pennsylvania State University, as the new 
director of the Bureau of Mines. Osborn had been offered the position by the Lyndon B. 
Johnson administration twice before, in 1966 and 1968, but had turned it down because 
he felt the coal industry had too much influence over the Bureau’s affairs. After the 
Senate confirmed Osborn later that month, he announced that his immediate priority was 
protecting miners’ welfare. To that end, he went on a two-week long inspection tour of 
the nation’s coal mining states. He also visited the National Mine Training Academy in 
Beckley, West Virginia, the bureau’s college for training new inspectors. There he 
announced the introduction of an intensive new course, which he predicted would 
alleviate the bureau’s shortfall of inspectors by early the following year.  
                                                 
86 Ibid., 578-580, 589-590. 
 
87 Ibid., 660-665. 
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Coal industry officials opposed the appointment of Osborn, especially in light of 
his statement that the bureau needed to be more demanding of mine operators. Yet, 
despite the industry’s concerns, Osborn’s scientific background made him more suited to 
handling the bureau’s research programs than its role as an enforcement agency. As with 
Lucas before him, Osborn’s credentials for the job were questionable. His assertive 
stance did not necessarily mean that operators would experience tougher sanctions, or 
that miners’ working conditions would significantly improve.88  
 The previous year, Nixon had halted proceedings to fire O’Leary to garner more 
support for his new Anti-Ballistic Missile Program.89 The influence of defense strategy 
and foreign policy on coal mine safety again became apparent when Nixon fired 
Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel and six of his officials on November 25, 1970, the 
day before Thanksgiving. The key reason for Hickel’s dismissal was his condemnation of 
the U.S. invasion of Cambodia earlier in the year. In a letter to the president, Hickel had 
said he was “terribly disturbed” by the administration’s decision to send American troops 
from South Vietnam across the Cambodian border. He criticized Nixon for failing to 
engage in a dialogue with America’s youth, who largely opposed the invasion. An 
Interior Department staff member leaked the letter to the Washington Evening Star, 
which printed it in full. H. R. Haldeman, Nixon’s Chief of Staff, witnessed Nixon’s 
reaction to the leak: “He was pretty calm about it last night, pretty cold-blooded today,” 
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he wrote in his diary. “[Nixon] feels Hickel’s got to go as soon as we’re past this crisis 
[the controversy over Nixon’s decision to invade Cambodia.]” 90  
The president’s response to the letter reflected not only his emphasis on 
aggressive foreign policy, but also his unwillingness to accept criticism that might 
diminish his public profile. More importantly, it showed that Nixon could not 
comprehend domestic issues independently, but rather viewed them as being inextricably 
linked to his larger foreign policy goals. Hickel’s outspoken criticism of the American oil 
industry’s disregard for environmental protection also played a role his dismissal. While 
his less than convincing record in coal mine health and safety was not a contributing 
factor, his departure had significant implications for the federal government’s 
enforcement of the 1969 mine legislation. The Bureau of Mines had been paralyzed for 
ten months by the absence of a director, and without direction from the Interior 
Department, it potentially faced another period of inaction and uncertainty. After losing 
his job, Hickel retreated to his home state of Alaska. On arriving at Anchorage airport, he 
insisted before waiting reporters and supporters that his primary concern had always been 
the welfare of his fellow countrymen. “I made my decisions keeping in mind the next 
generation,” he said, “not the next election.”91   
On December 30, 1970, Nixon extended protective legislation for the workplace 
by signing the Occupational Safety and Health Act into law. With the exception of the 
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coal industry, which was still covered by the 1969 Mine Act, the OSH Act applied to all 
workplaces in the private sector. The idea of comprehensive legislation for the workplace 
was by no means new; Lyndon B. Johnson had mooted a similar plan in his January 1969 
“Manpower Message,” before abandoning it when he decided not to run for office again. 
The act created two new agencies, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). 
NIOSH was located in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and 
responsible for conducting research on accident and injury prevention. Over time, it 
expanded its scope to include research on underground and surface coal mines. OSHA, a 
separate agency, was responsible for setting health and safety standards and, in 
conjunction with the Secretary of Labor, enforcing the law. Employers who violated the 
legislation were subject to sanctions and financial penalties. The OSH Act also gave 
workers the right to access information regarding conditions at their place of 
employment, and to demand protective clothing and equipment where necessary.92 
Rather than marking an important advance in workers’ rights, the terms of the 
OSH Act affirmed Nixon’s conservative attitude to workplace reform. Ralph Nader 
condemned the legislation because it did not include a compensation system or place 
                                                 
92 For a detailed account of the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, see 
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employers under obligation to create health and safety committees. Yet Nixon’s omission 
of a compensation system was not surprising, given his vigorous opposition to black lung 
benefits. In Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall of OSHA, Charles Noble argues that 
the OSH Act merely expanded Nixon’s existing legislative approach rather than altering 
it. In doing so, Noble touches on one of the key characteristics of the Nixon 
administration’s policies. Clearly, President Nixon had little interest in supporting broad, 
substantial workplace regulation, in the coal industry or otherwise.  
 
Conclusion 
Exactly one year after President Nixon signed the Federal Coal Mine Health and 
Safety Act into law, there had been little improvement to coal miners’ working 
conditions. The death of 38 miners in a series of explosions at the Finley Brothers’ mine 
in Hyden, Kentucky, on December 30 1970, which will be discussed in the following 
chapter, only confirmed that the legislation had not provided miners with greater 
protection. In fact, the coal mine fatality rate for the whole of 1970 was significantly 
higher than in 1969. Over the course of the year, 260 miners died, at a rate of 1.02 per 
million man-hours of work time. In comparison, 203 miners died in 1969, at a rate of 
0.85 per million man-hours of work time. The increase in the fatality rate was attributable 
partly to the Hyden disaster, and partly to the persistence of isolated accidents such as 
roof-falls and electrical shocks.93  The fatality rate, however, did not tell the whole story 
about death among coal miners. Many of the victims of black lung disease were dying in 
                                                 
93 Statistics on the coal mine fatality rate are taken from U.S. Department of the Interior, 
Bureau of Mines, “Mineral Industry Surveys, U.S. Coal Mine Injuries and Worktime, 
December and Annual Summary, 1970,” Folder 3, Box 45, Miners for Democracy 
Collection, Reuther Archives.  
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severe discomfort and abject poverty, having failed to obtain compensation from the 
Social Security Administration. Why should legislation that looked so promising on 
paper have failed so completely? Just how committed was the Nixon Administration to 
enforcing and upholding the Federal Mine Act? What role did the United Mine Workers 
leadership play in perpetuating the cycle of death and injury in the mines? And why, 
despite their determination, did social movements in the coalfields have only limited 
success, particularly in light of the success of the coalfield activism in 1969?  
First, the Federal Coal Mine Act failed because of the ineptitude and 
mismanagement of the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Mines. To enforce 
the act, the Bureau was required to undertake frequent and rigorous inspections of all 
underground mines. However, it was unable to fulfill this task because it did not have 
enough inspectors. Moreover, the Bureau clearly sought to avoid disrupting the coal 
industry in its enforcement of the act. When a federal judge in Virginia issued a 
restraining order, which prevented the Bureau from levying penalties against small 
operators, the Bureau used the order to limit the penalties it imposed on larger companies. 
As a result, by the end of 1970, it had issued few violation notices, and had not collected 
any monetary penalties from operators. The absence of a director throughout most of 
1970 further hindered the Bureau’s effectiveness. The Bureau’s abysmal record was, in 
many ways, a reflection of the Nixon Administration’s lack of commitment to health and 
safety enforcement. President Nixon did not fill mine-related staff positions in the 
Interior Department or the Bureau swiftly or with the most qualified, appropriate 
candidates.  
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 The United Mine Workers played a significant role in allowing the death and 
injury of coal miners to continue. Despite his sharp criticism of the Bureau of Mines at 
the Senate hearings in August 1970, UMW President Tony Boyle gave little indication 
that he was truly committed to health and safety enforcement. To an extent, his disregard 
for reform was reflected in his opposition to the Miners for Democracy, which made 
improved working conditions one of its main priorities. More significantly, though, it was 
borne out by his refusal to negotiate with the Disabled Mines and Widows of South West 
Virginia, who charged that the union’s Welfare and Retirement Fund did not provide 
adequate coverage for sick miners or coal mine widows. Boyle’s rhetoric may have 
displayed a commitment to the miners, but in practice, he followed the same course of 
inaction that had characterized his presidency to date. 
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Chapter Five 
The Limits of Regulation: 
Coal Miners and the U.S. Bureau of Mines   
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the year after Nixon signed the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act into 
law, there was an unexpected increase in the mine fatality rate. Rank and file miners and 
liberal politicians attributed the continuing crisis in mine safety to the Bureau of Mines. 
The lack of inspectors in the Bureau limited its ability to enforce the Federal Mine Act, 
and often failed to issue citations and enforce penalties. In particular, coal miners were 
convinced that the Bureau was neglecting to carry out full inspections of non-unionized 
mines. Miners who transferred from non-unionized operations to union mines frequently 
informed their co-workers and local and district leaders of the Bureau’s neglect of their 
former workplaces.  
District and local union leaders highlighted their concerns about the Bureau in 
letters to their Congressmen and, to a lesser extent, the national leadership of the United 
Mine Workers. Their correspondence revealed several important aspects of the miners’ 
fight for improved health and safety. First, district and local unions continued to act 
independently of the national leadership. As in the 1969 black lung movement in West 
Virginia, the rank and file regarded local unions and community organizations as more 
effective vehicles for protest and achieving their objectives. Moreover, the letters show 
that coal miners were not passive actors, but conscious protestors who actively 
challenged the failures of the new federal coal mine legislation. Perhaps more 
importantly, however, the correspondence highlighted the Nixon administration’s failure 
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to enforce the legislation. Miners’ charges against the Bureau, particularly that it was 
neglecting non-union coal companies, were justified, especially given the major disaster 
at the non-union Hurricane Creek mine in Kentucky on December 30, 1970. While the 
Bureau attributed responsibility for the disaster to the carelessness of the miners and the 
lax policies of the mine’s owners, a congressional investigation found that the Bureau’s 
neglect was a significant contributing factor to the explosion.  
Miners also were concerned by Elburt F. Osborn’s reorganization of the Bureau in 
mid-1971. Osborn’s stated goal was to improve the Bureau’s efficiency and provide 
closer supervision of mines at the local level. However, miners viewed the reorganization 
as further evidence that the Bureau was neglecting their concerns. They did not regard the 
reorganization as a measure to improve the working environment in the coalfields, but 
rather a political move to create more high-level administrative positions.  
This chapter focuses specifically on the Bureau of Mines from December 1970 to 
late 1971. The chapter presents original research of neglected primary sources to tell the 
story of the Bureau’s relationship with the nation’s coal miners during this period.1 It 
focuses in particular on letters from local and district branches of the United Mine 
Workers, which are located in the United Mine Workers Safety Division Files in the 
Special Collections library at Pennsylvania State University, local and national 
newspapers, and government reports. It also incorporates material from the Historical 
Collection at the National Mine Safety Academy in Beckley, West Virginia, and oral 
interviews. The chapter shows that the Bureau actively discriminated against non-union 
coal mines in its inspection procedures. Coal miners were aware of this discrimination, 
                                                 
1 Historians have largely neglected the role of the Bureau of Mines in coal miners’ health 
and safety after 1969. As a result, secondary literature on the subject is sparse. 
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and protested by corresponding with labor and political representatives. Yet miners did 
not envision an alternative method of health and safety enforcement to the Bureau. Their 
letters emphasize that they still viewed the Bureau as a legitimate vehicle for the 
enforcement of the Federal Mine Act. Rather, the miners wanted the Bureau to improve 
its performance and to become more attentive to their health and safety concerns. The 
chapter further shows that the reorganization of the Bureau in the spring of 1971 was 
detrimental to its ability to enforce health and safety, a fact that the miners recognized 
and again protested by corresponding with politicians and labor representatives. 
 
Evading Responsibility: The Bureau of Mines and the Hurricane Creek Disaster 
By mid-December 1970, miners were highly critical of the Bureau’s health and 
safety enforcement record. In fact, a number of local and district unions were convinced 
that the Bureau was actively evading the inspection of non-union mines. In a letter to 
Representative Carl D. Perkins, Squire Feltner, the UMW Safety Coordinator for District 
30, wrote: 
… I am deeply concerned over the conditions that exist in the non-union coal 
mines in this district. We have coal miners every day that are coming from non-
union mines and obtaining employment in our union operations who tell us of the 
deplorable conditions that the non-union coal miners are working under. As I am 
sure you are aware, the non-union coal miners do not have safety committees to 
represent them or speak in their behalf for safety and the Federal Bureau of Mines 
are certainly not making the inspections required by the new law in the non-union 
operations.2 
 
                                                 
2 Letter from Squire Feltner, District 30 Safety Coordinator, to Congressman Carl D. 
Perkins, December 14, 1970, Folder 33, Box 2, United Mine Workers Safety Division 
Office Files, Special Collections Library, Pennsylvania State University, State College. 
Hereafter, this collection will be referred to as UMW Safety Division Files, PSU Special 
Collections. 
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His letter not only emphasized the Bureau’s neglect of non-union mines; it also showed 
that local and district branches of the UMW were aware of the health and safety concerns 
of their members. Feltner included with his letter a list of 140 non-union mines that he 
alleged had not submitted new roof support plans by the December 8 deadline, as 
required by guidelines in the Federal Register. In addition, he commented that the 
Bureau’s lax enforcement procedures might “drive our union operations into the non-
union camp.” In doing so, he conveyed just as much concern for the union’s survival as 
miners’ safety.3  
 Feltner also conveyed his fears about the Bureau’s enforcement policies to Bureau 
of Mines District C Manager Joe Malesky in Norton, Virginia. He advised Malesky that 
“we are having a large number of the non-union miners today coming into our local 
unions and they are advising us that there is no effort whatsoever of the Federal Bureau 
of Mines to enforce the Federal Mine Safety Law in the non-union operations, which if 
true is not right.”4 He concluded that the Bureau should not distinguish between union 
and non-union mines and should enforce the law evenly across all mining operations. 
While this conclusion partly rested on Feltner’s desire to protect miners, it was also 
grounded in his determination to ensure the continued existence of the UMW. As he 
stated in his letter to Perkins, the Bureau’s neglect of non-union mines might encourage 
union operators to relinquish their UMW contract and enter the non-unionized sector.  
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
 
4 Letter from Squire Feltner, District 30 Safety Coordinator, to Joe Malesky, District C 
Manager of the Bureau of Mines, December 14, 1970, Folder 33, Box 2. UMW Safety 
Division Files, PSU Special Collections.  
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Although based solely on the testimony of fellow district union members, 
Feltner’s charges against the Bureau were by no means unusual. The leaders of UMW 
local 1405, based at the Westmoreland Coal Company in Big Stone Gap, Virginia, shared 
Feltner’s concerns. In a letter to Tony Boyle, President Haskell Swiney and Recording 
Secretary J. D. Wheatley highlighted claims by some of their members, formerly 
employed at non-union operations, that the Bureau was permitting non-union mines to 
evade the law. They cited the Scotia Coal Mine in Kentucky, run by the Blue Diamond 
Coal Company, as one of the worst violators of the law.5 (By way of confirmation, five 
years later this non-unionized mine was the site of a major disaster that killed 26 
miners.)6  
Swiney and Wheatley predicted that if the lack of enforcement in non-union 
mines continued, the Westmoreland Coal Company would ban the union so it could 
evade the terms of the Federal Mine Act. They urged Boyle to make sure the federal 
government was enforcing the law evenly across all mines. They emphasized that 
immediate action was in the national union’s best interests: “We certainly do not want to 
sit idly by and see our Union destroyed because the Federal inspectors are inspecting the 
Union mines regularly and are not enforcing the law in non-union mines.” 7  Boyle did 
not perceive an immediate threat to the United Mine Workers. In a measured reply, the 
                                                 
5 Letter from President Haskell Swiney and Recording Secretary J. D. Wheatley, Local 
Union 1405, to W. A. Boyle, UMW International President, December 18, 1970, Folder 
22, box 3, UMW Safety Division Files, PSU Special Collections.  
 
6 The Scotia Mine Disaster will be discussed further in chapter seven. 
 
7 Ibid. 
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UMW President merely thanked Swiney and Wheatley for writing and informed them he 
had passed on their letter to UMW Safety Director Lewis Evans for further investigation.8   
Local and district unions’ charges against the Bureau of Mines were valid. As 
Squire Feltner rightly suggested, Bureau inspectors were more likely to spend time 
inspecting unionized mines because of the presence of safety committees. J. Davitt 
McAteer and UMW Safety Director Lorin Kerr trained and educated safety committee 
members across Appalachia about the Federal Mine Act, with the result that the 
committees were equipped with the knowledge to point out health and safety hazards to 
inspectors.9 In non-union operations, where miners lacked such training, Bureau 
inspectors often failed to recognize, and even ignored, such hazards. Yet, the union 
leaders who protested the Bureau’s failure to inspect non-union mines were not seeking 
to replace the Bureau, but rather wanted it to enforce the law consistently across all 
mines, whether they were unionized or not. They still regarded the Bureau as a viable 
enforcement mechanism. They petitioned high-profile figures such as Perkins and Boyle 
in the hope they would address the Bureau’s inconsistent performance. The local and 
district unions’ correspondence emphasizes that the miners were not passive actors who 
always followed the lead of the national leadership, but rather conscious protestors who 
realized they had a vested role in maintaining safe working conditions.  
Miners’ suspicions about the Bureau’s inattention to non-union mines were 
seemingly confirmed on December 30, 1970, when a major explosion occurred at the 
                                                 
8 Letter from W.A. Boyle to J. D. Wheatley, December 21, 1970, Folder 33, Box 3, 
UMW Safety Division Files, PSU Special Collections. 
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non-union Finley Brothers mine in Hurricane Creek, Kentucky. The explosion, which 
occurred just after midday, instantly killed eighteen miners and trapped an additional 
twenty deep within the mine. One miner, A. T. Collins, was thrown out the mineshaft by 
the force of the blast. Collins referred to the dust that came spewing from the mine as “a 
wheeze of wind” that carried rock dust for over 200 feet. “When I tried to get up, I 
couldn’t stand. I kept falling down,” he commented.10  
Hurricane Creek, located five miles east of the town of Hyden, was not a single 
mining operation but two separate mines that were interconnected. For the purposes of its 
investigation, the Bureau of Mines stipulated that both mines were involved in the 
disaster. Investigators could not immediately determine where the explosion originated, 
as the dead miners were spread across both mines. At 7.30pm, with grief-stricken 
families waiting nearby, rescuers began removing the bodies of the eighteen dead miners. 
The bodies were taken to a nearby school gymnasium for identification. Many had been 
so badly disfigured by the blast that relatives had to identify them by the social security 
numbers on their belts. Miners wore the numbers on their belts as a form of identification 
if they were involved in an accident. Everett Bartlett, supervisor for the Hazard district of 
the Kentucky Department of Mines and Minerals, believed the other trapped miners had 
not survived. He told assembled reporters, “We’ve found 18 men, some in each of the 
two shafts of the mine, all of them are dead. As to the chances of the others, we’ll say 
this: Their chances are zero.”11 
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The families of the trapped miners maintained a vigil near the mine entrance. 
Laura Morgan, whose 33-year old son was among those missing, lamented, “Oh Lord, I 
hope my baby’s alive. I only had two left, Lord, and I started with five. I had to give up 
my youngest one two years ago. Oh Jesus, Jesus-children! He had a good education, 
Lord, but he had to go into them mines. He just went up on his brothers’ graves on 
Christmas day. I had a vision the other night… I told them boys I saw a new-dug grave.” 
Similarly, the mother of 23-year old Elmer White said, “I never wanted him to work in 
the mines. His grandfather and his uncle were both killed – his daddy and brothers have 
all been mashed up. I never wanted him to work in the mines.” White’s 18-year-old wife, 
struggling not to cry, added, “Seems like I don’t really believe he’s dead or anything. It 
just doesn’t seem real to me. That’s why I’m so calm.” On December 31, rescuers 
confirmed that the other twenty men had perished in the blast. By the end of that day, 
they had recovered all the bodies. 12 
The responses of the victims’ families emphasized that there was a clear 
relationship between mine disasters and religion in the Appalachian coalfields. In Work 
and Faith in the Kentucky Coalfields, Richard Callahan explains that work, religion, and 
death were inextricably linked in Kentucky mining communities. For example, miners 
and their families attached religious significance to dreams about coal mine disasters, and 
interpreted them as a vision of future events. The folksong, “The Dream of the Miner’s 
Child,” by the Reverend Andrew Jenkins, expressed fears that such dreams were an 
indicator of reality: 
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A miner was leaving his home for work 
He heard his little child scream 
He went to the side of the little girl’s bed— 
“Oh! Daddy, I’ve had such a dream 
 
Chorus: 
Oh! Daddy, don’t work in the mines today 
For dreams have so often come true, 
Oh! Daddy, my Daddy, please don’t go away 
I never could live without you.”13 
 
 
The verses that follow contain images of the mines aflame and “sweethearts and wives” 
crowded around the mine entrances. According to Callahan, folksongs like “Dream of the 
Miner’s Child” gave miners a sense of control over the unpredictable conditions in their 
work environment, by emphasizing that disasters were not just contingent and accidental, 
but events they could avoid if they knew how to recognize the signs.14 The last verse of 
Jenkins’ song emphasizes this point: 
 Go down to the village and tell your dear friends 
 That as sure as the bright stars do shine, 
 There is something that’s going to happen today; 
 Please, daddy, don’t go to the mines.15 
  
 
Some relatives of the Hurricane Creek victims believed that they had known about the 
disaster before it happened. Culture such as “The Dream of the Miner’s Child” reinforced 
miners’ belief that they faced the constant risk of injury or death on the job. In the early 
1970s, they viewed the Bureau of Mines as a tangible source of this risk. For non-union 
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miners and their families, the Bureau’s lax inspection procedures increased the likelihood 
that a disaster would occur. As the miners went to work each day, they anticipated 
disasters such as the explosion at the Hyden mine.  
Federal and state officials promised an extensive investigation of the Hyden 
disaster, while President Nixon assured victims’ families they would receive substantial 
federal aid. In a public statement that resembled his March 1969 special message on coal 
mine safety, Nixon said, “Every appropriate step must and will be taken to identify the 
causes of his tragedy and to prevent future mining accidents.” He continued, “I extend 
our deepest sympathies to the families and friends of those who lost their lives in this 
tragic accident.” Nixon announced he planned to visit the mine to consol the bereaved 
families. When he cancelled the trip, his staff claimed that inclement weather prevented 
him from traveling to Kentucky. Nixon did, however, send a task force to Hurricane 
Creek to provide assistance to the families.16 
Representative Carl D. Perkins announced that his Committee on Education and 
Labor intended to carry out a separate investigation, pending the outcome of the Bureau’s 
investigation. He also asked the Bureau to investigate the mine’s health and safety record 
and to determine if its previous inspections had met federal requirements. Senator Henry 
M. Jackson (D-WA), the Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, and 
Senator Harrison Williams (D-NJ), the Chairman of the Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare, charged that the Bureau had not satisfactorily enforced the 1969 mining 
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legislation. They urged the Department of the Interior to organize a hearing that would 
include testimony from miners, widows, and federal mine officials.17 
After twenty-four hours, the exact cause of the Hurricane Creek disaster was still 
unclear.  Everett Bartlett speculated that the most likely explanation was a blown 
electrical cable or the shooting of dynamite by the miners. It was clear, however, that the 
Bureau of Mines had uncovered a series of health and safety violations in the mine over 
the past seven months. In June, Bureau inspector Gordon Couch had discovered 
“imminent danger” posed by loose coal, excessive accumulations of coal dust, faulty 
electrical equipment, and illegal underground smoking. He ordered the closure of the 
mine until the owners, Charles and Stanley Finley, rectified the violations, a process that 
lasted three days. Couch inspected the mine again on August 14, when a non-fatal 
accident injured two miners, but ultimately decided not to impose sanctions. On 
November 9, the Bureau conducted another investigation of the mine after a worker was 
crushed to death by operating machinery. As on its previous visit, the Bureau did not 
issue a penalty notice. It justified its decision by arguing that its shortage of inspectors 
prevented it from continuously monitoring every mine for violations.18  
Couch visited the No. 15 mine again on November 19 to carry out a routine spot 
inspection and found several violations, including excessive quantities of harmful coal 
dust and an absence of qualified personnel for maintaining electrical equipment. He 
ordered the Finley Brothers to correct the violations by 8:00 am on December 22, when 
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an inspector would return to re-evaluate the mine. No one from the Bureau, however, 
visited the mine on the specified date. The six men employed in the Bureau’s nearby 
Barbourville office were either on holiday leave or engaged in more urgent duties 
elsewhere, such as inspecting roof supports or ventilation systems in other mines. On 
December 24, only one inspector was on duty, and on December 30, the day of the 
explosion, four inspectors were still on leave. When this information came to light after 
the disaster, the Bureau explained that the inspectors had faced losing accumulated 
holiday time after December 31. Ralph Nader demanded a congressional investigation of 
the Bureau to determine who was directly responsible for the missed inspection on 
December 22.19 
Representatives from the Bureau of Mines and the Kentucky Department of 
Mines and Minerals began a full investigation of the disaster on January 1. Although they 
had already conducted a preliminary inspection, their efforts to enter the deepest parts of 
the No. 15 and No. 16 mines had been hampered by lethal quantities of methane gas. 
Before the investigation, Everett Bartlett was convinced that explosives had played the 
biggest role in the explosion. He commented, “Explosives were involved in it, probably 
more than coal dust. The mine had been pretty heavily rock-dusted from what we could 
see.” He acknowledged that coal dust also had been a factor, adding, “We feel like it was 
too much of an explosion for it to have been the explosives alone.” Similarly, James 
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Westfield, the assistant director of the Bureau of Mines, theorized that explosives had 
ignited the coal dust inside the mine.20  
Over the next three days, investigators uncovered evidence of blasting in the No. 
16 shaft and discovered illegal primer cord in both sections of the mine.21 While they 
provisionally concluded that a blasting operation had ignited the coal dust, they refused to 
comment if the illegal device had contributed to the explosion. Referring to the primer 
cord, Westfield said, “It is not practice in the coalfields. It is not permissible.”22 It was 
typically used for blasting during strip mining and the construction of roads. According to 
one expert, primer cord greatly increased the risk of explosions underground because it 
flashed and flamed during operation. Westfield said the Bureau had sent the cord to its 
Pittsburgh laboratory for analysis, but he did not say what role, if any, it had played in the 
explosion.23  
In an effort to determine the cause of the disaster, the Bureau of Mines and the 
Kentucky Department of Mines and Minerals held a public hearing in Hyden on January 
6. Bureau director Elburt Osborn presided over the one-day hearing, with the assistance 
of James Westfield and Henry P. Wheeler, the Bureau’s deputy director of health and 
safety. Harreld N. Kirkpatrick, the commissioner of the state agency, and his assistant J. 
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H. Musgrove, also participated in the questioning of witnesses.24 Osborn cast doubt on 
his ability to lead the hearing objectively by commenting, “This disaster wasn’t 
unexpected. We’ve had two good years since the last disaster… and I think we can expect 
almost one of these a year.”25 Osborn’s callous attitude mirrored the comments made by 
Tony Boyle after the Farmington explosion, that disasters were an inherent risk of coal 
mining and could not be prevented. Furthermore, it implied that he wanted to protect the 
reputation of the coal industry, not the health and safety of miners. 
At the hearing, the state and federal officials questioned Finley employees if they 
had witnessed explosives shooter Walter Bentley, who died in the blast, using illegal 
primer cord or detonating explosives without the necessary safety precautions. Most 
denied having seen illegal or unsafe working practices, but three, including A. T. Collins, 
the sole survivor of the explosion, reported having noticed primer cord inside the mine. 
On the morning of the disaster, alleged Collins, a fellow employee had warned him to 
expect “a small explosion,” then “punched [him] with his elbow like it might be a lie.”26 
Carl D. Perkins and Ken Hechler attended the hearing, although Perkins departed at 
lunchtime to inspect the Hyden mine with his own technical advisers. While Hechler was 
convinced that the mine’s long history of safety violations had contributed to the blast, 
officials focused mostly on the events immediately beforehand.27  
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On January 21, the Kentucky Department of Mines and Minerals published its 
report, in which it concluded that two of the miners, Walter Bentley and day-shift 
foreman Walter Hibbard, were partially responsible for the explosion. The report stated 
that Bentley had used explosives in a “non-permissible” manner, used illegal primer cord, 
and failed to evacuate the mine before detonating the explosion. Bentley was criticized 
for failing to compact the dynamite properly and for setting off 100 sticks with a single 
detonation, ten times the lawful amount. Commenting on the report, Harreld Kirkpatrick 
said, “He [Bentley] could have gotten all of these men out and had them eating their 
lunch, and the man who set off the shot, who was supposed to be the expert, would have 
killed himself and all this wouldn’t have happened.”28 The report also claimed that 
Charles and Stanley Finley were unaware of Bentley’s working methods that day and 
therefore should not have to face penalties.29 However, it based this claim on testimony 
directly from the Finley Brothers, which raised doubts about its accuracy.  
The Bureau of Mines published its own report on the explosion the following 
week. The report concluded that the improper use of explosives, combined with excessive 
quantities of dust, had primarily caused the disaster. “The explosion occurred,” stated the 
Bureau, “when coal dust was thrown into suspension and ignited by Primacord or by 
permissible explosives used in a non-permissible manner or by use of non-permissible 
explosives during the blasting of roof rock for a loading point (boom hole).”30 According 
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to the Bureau, the accumulation of coal dust in the mine, combined with inadequate rock 
dusting, facilitated the rapid spread of the explosion. The Bureau also cited electrical 
faults in the mine as a possible cause of the explosion.31  
The Bureau did not reveal who was responsible for the violations. In previous 
disaster reports, it had always cited the guilty parties or assessed who was responsible. 
Bureau officials announced, however, that they were intending to ask the Justice 
Department to bring charges against the guilty parties.32 One representative stated, 
“There are one or more criminal violations involved in connection with the disaster 
which warrant a recommendation for prosecution.”33  
The Department of the Interior imposed a fine of $53,000 on the Finley Company 
that covered both the disaster and the violations preceding it, a considerable reduction in 
the fine of $77,000 it had originally intended to levy against the company.34 Prior to the 
report’s publication, Undersecretary of the Interior Fred J. Russell had deleted all 
references to the fine from the report, enabling the Department to change the amount of 
the fine.35 Michael Sabaugh, an assessment officer for the Bureau, claimed that Russell 
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removed the information about the fine because the Finely Brothers were in the process 
of appealing it. However, Ken Hechler wrote to Elburt Osborn, informing him that such 
action violated federal mine law, resulting in the Bureau’s announcement of the fine 
shortly after it published the report.36 
In both its report and its announcement that it intended to press charges, the 
Bureau absolved itself of any responsibility for the events at Hurricane Creek. Despite 
absolving itself, coal miners firmly believed that the Bureau was to blame. In the 
aftermath of the explosion, several local and district unions renewed the charge that the 
Bureau was overlooking non-unionized mines. In a strongly-worded letter to 
Congressman Carl D. Perkins, members of UMW local 5741, based at Kentucky’s 
Bethlehem mine, argued the Hyden disaster was proof that small and non-union mines 
were able to “get by with murder.” The local 5741 members alleged that the bureau shut 
down major mines for safety violations, while only giving warnings to non-union mines. 
Most significantly, they charged that if the bureau had shut down the Hyden mine after it 
had discovered the violations on November 19, it would have prevented significant loss 
of life. For the miners of local 5741, the solution was clear: 
It is time that someone with the authority tell the Federal and State Inspectors to 
treat ALL MINES ALIKE AND SHOW FAVORE TO NONE and it will help 
prevent things like this from happening again. 
They holler that they don’t have enough Inspectors, FOOEY [sic], They 
inspected this mine [Hyden] and found severe violations, didn’t they? Why wasn’t 
it corrected before he was allowed to operate again. If they had a MILLION 
INSPECTORS it wouldn’t help any, if, after an inspection and severe violations 
were found and nothing was done to correct them. This also goes to prove that 
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ALL MINES SHOULD BE CLASSED AS GASSY AS RULED 
ACCORDINGLY. [Emphasis in original letter] 37 
 
The members of local 5741 attributed the disaster to the federal government’s 
failure to apply the Federal Coal Mine Act equally to ‘gassy’ and ‘non-gassy mines.’ 
Under the terms of the act, all coal mines were classified as ‘gassy,’ regardless of their 
size and the quantity of methane they produced. The miners believed that the Bureau of 
Mines had failed to classify the Hyden mine as a ‘gassy’ mine during its inspections. 
Furthermore, the members of local 5741 reiterated that the Bureau was remiss in its 
inspections of non-union mines. Moreover, they obviously did not accept the Bureau’s 
claim that a shortage of inspectors prevented it from fulfilling its duties. They argued that 
the Bureau had an obligation to shut down unsafe mines regardless of how many 
inspectors it employed. The letter by the local 5741 emphasized that miners were actively 
engaged in the issue of coal mine health and safety. They had a clear understanding of the 
federal legislation, and they were knowledgeable enough to critically analyze the 
Bureau’s lax inspection policies.  
In a letter to Joe Malesky, Carson Hibbitts, the president of District 30, also 
challenged the Bureau’s record in enforcing the law at non-union mines. Its continuing 
focus on union mines, he argued, would push those mines “to go non-union,” so they 
could evade federal inspections. According to Hibbits, Squire Feltner, the District 30 
Safety Coordinator, had visited the Hyden mine before the disaster and witnessed several 
                                                 
37 Letter from Local Union 5741 (President Robert Carter) to Congressman Carl D. 
Perkins, January 4, 1970, Folder 33, Box 2, UMW Safety Division Files, PSU Special 
Collections. 
  
224
violations even outside the mine.38 Hibbits also wrote to Lewis Evans, director of the 
UMW Safety Department, inviting him to a meeting of District 30 Safety Committeemen 
on January 9.39 
It was not just coal miners who felt the Bureau of Mines had contributed to the 
Hyen disaster. The Labor Subcommittee in the House of Representatives was dissatisfied 
with the Bureau’s report, and on March 9 opened its own hearing in Washington, D.C. 
The committee members focused largely on the Bureau’s inspection practices at the 
Finley mine in the months prior to the disaster. On March 10, Carl D. Perkins, addressing 
Bureau inspector C. E. Hyde, said the Bureau could have saved lives by carrying out 
more extensive investigations of the mine. He criticized Hyde for not inspecting the mine 
when he visited on December 21 to deliver ventilation instructions. Perkins stated, “You 
knew something was wrong with that mine but you did not inspect it. Do you need a 
directive to inspect a mine?” Hyde replied that the Bureau “only [investigated] accidents 
after they [happened].”40 
 Representative John H. Dent, meanwhile, alleged that inspector Gordon Couch 
had not followed up on his November 19 inspection because of a “special arrangement” 
with one of the mine owners, Charles Finley. The previous day of the hearing had 
revealed that Couch and Finley both lived in Manchester, Kentucky, a small town of 
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4,000 residents, and they had once worked together at the same mine. Couch explained 
that he did not return to the No. 16 mine on December 22 because Finley reported that he 
had closed it down because of roof problems.41 He further testified that the Washington 
headquarters of the Bureau had established more urgent priorities elsewhere.42 In 
response, Dent noted that Bureau investigators had uncovered evidence of illegal blasting 
on December 22. He commented, “Somebody knew you wouldn’t be there. Didn’t that 
call make you suspicious? It sounds to me like some kind of working arrangement.”43 In 
his 1973 publication, Coal Mine Health and Safety, J. Davitt McAteer criticized the 
subcommittee for not posing additional questions about the priorities that had prevented 
the Bureau from returning to the Hyden mine in December. He wrote, “This failure of the 
subcommittee to examine the overall attitude of the bureau’s administrators in 
Washington is inexplicable in view of the obvious permissiveness of the bureau since 
O’Leary’s removal.”44 For McAteer, the evidence of the Bureau’s failure to enforce 
health and safety warranted further investigation by the subcommittee. He felt the 
subcommittee had a responsibility to examine how the incompetence of the Bureau’s 
administrators in Washington D.C. had contributed to the disaster.  
On March 11, Charles Finley failed to attend the hearing as scheduled. The 
subcommittee issued a subpoena for him to testify at the hearing when it resumed at 
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Hazard, Kentucky.45 Appearing before the subcommittee in the Hazard district court on 
March 12, several Hyden widows said their husbands had spoken of dangerous working 
conditions and unlawful inspection practices at the Finley mine. Emily Gibson, who lost 
her husband in the explosion, said, “We was laying there before going to sleep, and my 
husband said, ‘If they don’t straighten up over there we’ll all get killed.’”46 Gibson said 
her husband also had noticed explosives in the mine “that wasn’t supposed to be in there 
– that wasn’t safe.”47 Another witness, Nancy Gray, said that her husband Lawrence had 
talked about “inspectors standing outside in their suits but they wouldn’t go inside the 
mines.” According to Gray, her husband had witnessed this five or six times. She also 
claimed that Charles Finley had purchased a cart to “haul the dynamite into the mine.”48 
Daisy Young said the Finley brothers were aware of inspection dates in advance. “They’d 
tell my husband to chew instead of smoke tobacco that day,” she said. “That was the only 
time he’d ever buy chewing tobacco.”49 
On the final day of the hearing, Charles Finley denied that he had been aware of 
miners using primer cord, or that survivor A. T. Collins had warned him about its 
dangers. He insisted that he kept the primer cord, which he used for road work and 
surface mining, concealed in a trailer, to prevent miners from using it deliberately or by 
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accident.50 Finley said that while he could personally supervise every shift, he had 
knowledgeable, well-paid foremen to oversee his 100 employees. “I thought this was the 
safest mine I ever ran,” he commented.51 The Hyden owner rejected the subcommittee’s 
claims that he was acquainted with inspector Gordon Couch. During his testimony, 
Finley complained that small mines could not adhere to the Federal Mine Act without 
jeopardizing their profits.52 His testimony provided direct evidence that mine operators 
prioritized profit margins ahead of the welfare of their workforce. It also revealed, 
however, that smaller mines had greater difficulty in enforcing the Federal Mine Act.  
The subcommittee published its final report on the hearing on June 19, 1971. It 
attributed much of the responsibility for the Hyden explosion to the Bureau of Mines, 
because it had ignored the dangerous working conditions in the mine. The subcommittee 
concluded that the Bureau “should have been on notice as to the dangerous atypical 
conditions in the mine, should have inspected it with greater frequency, carried out more 
complete inspections and perhaps most importantly, been present to insure that cited 
violations were actually abated when required.”53 Furthermore, the subcommittee 
accused the Bureau of betraying the miners who depended on it for the enforcement of 
safe conditions. It asserted that “[it] would be derelict if it did not acknowledge the 
glaring fact that the Bureau of Mines must bear a heavy burden of responsibility for the 
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Hyden tragedy.”54 However, the subcommittee attributed no specific blame to the Finley 
brothers for the explosion. 
Unconvinced by the Bureau and Labor Subcommittee’s overall assessment of the 
disaster, the Coal Miners’ Legal Defense Fund released its own report, pointedly titled 
“The Hurricane Creek Massacre.” The Fund explicitly blamed both the Finley Brothers 
and the Bureau of Mines for the events at Hurricane Creek. In the conclusion, the authors 
stated, “Since the explosives were purchased by the mine operator, and since the 
operators made no attempt to keep them under lock and key, he is responsible for the fact 
that they were used, and must be imprisoned under Section 109 (b) of the Federal Coal 
Mine Health and Safety Act…”55 They also listed several other violations committed by 
the Finley brothers that endangered their employees’ health and safety. The report 
condemned the inspection practices of the Bureau of Mines. It surmised that, if the 
Bureau had fully inspected the Finley mines in 1970, it would have uncovered the illegal 
blasting practices.56 It also criticized the Bureau’s hearing in Hyden on January 6: 
“Despite the presence of Bureau of Mines director Osborn and a supporting staff of 
Interior Department attorneys, the January 6 hearing constituted an astonishing display of 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
 
55 Coal Miners Legal Defense Fund, “The Hurricane Creek Massacre: A Report on the 
Circumstances Surrounding the Deaths of 38 Men in a Coal Mine Explosion in Eastern 
Kentucky, December 30, 1970,” (Charleston, West Virginia: Coal Miners Legal Defense 
Fund, 1971), 47. This report is located in Folder 15 (entitled ‘Hyden Disaster’), Box 46, 
Miners for Democracy Collection, Walter Reuther Library of Labor and Urban Affairs, 
Wayne State University, Detroit. 
 
56 Ibid., 49. 
 
  
229
downright incompetence that casts doubt on the ability of the Bureau to investigate any 
matter relating to mine safety.”57  
The Hyden mine disaster reflected the dangers faced by coal miners, particularly 
those working in small, non-unionized operations. In the absence of a union presence at 
the mine, the Finley brothers committed serious health and safety violations to limit 
expenditure on labor and increase their profits. They bore a large degree of responsibility 
for the explosion that killed 38 miners. However, the behavior of the Finley brothers was 
consistent with that of many other coal mine operators over the past several decades. 
More significantly, the Hyden disaster reflected the complete failure of the Bureau of 
Mines to enforce the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. 
 
Politics Before Partisanship 
Beyond the controversy surrounding the Bureau’s role in the Hyden disaster, by 
late January 1971 the Nixon administration had moved toward the appointment of a new 
Secretary of the Interior. The administration announced it was considering Rogers C. B. 
Morton for the position. On January 25, Morton testified at a Senate hearing on his 
impending appointment as Interior Secretary. He stated that he would make 
environmental issues a top priority, but stressed he would not allow them to jeopardize 
economic and defense policies. Environmental groups were skeptical of Morton’s 
concern for the environment, particularly in light of his voting record in the House and 
his solicitation of corporate donations while he was head of the Republican National 
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Committee.58 In the recent past, the Sierra Club had accused him of “a dismal, lackluster 
performance” on environmental policy and of representing oil interests in Congress. The 
president of the Sierra Club, Phillip Berry, said, “The list of his votes against the 
environment is a very long one. We believe we should have a man in this job who has 
shown himself to be a committed and dedicated conservationist. The record of Rogers 
Morton does not show he is this man.”59 If appointed, the position of Interior Secretary 
would give Morton a unique voice, not to mention significant authority, in the Nixon 
administration’s environmental policies, which was precisely why environmental groups 
opposed him. 
 On January 26, after the conclusion of the hearing, the Senate Interior Committee 
gave unanimous consent to Morton’s appointment. The committee members scrutinized 
Morton’s financial records before granting their approval. While Morton had limited 
shares in the oil industry, he already had informed the committee of his intent to sell 
them, as they might be a conflict of interest. The Department of the Interior, for example, 
controlled offshore oil leases and the Alaska pipeline.60 Two days later, the full Senate 
confirmed Morton’s appointment. Despite his optimistic rhetoric, Morton’s appointment 
reinforced the Nixon administration’s conservative stance on coal mine health and safety. 
Morton’s rejection of the Federal Coal Mine Act in the final congressional vote, 
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combined with his history of voting against progressive environmental policies, meant 
that any improvement in the Bureau of Mines was unlikely.61  
In late January 1971, Edward D. Failor, appointed by the Bureau of Mines to 
oversee enforcement procedures, imposed fines totaling $5,000 on 200 mine operators for 
400 violations of the Federal Mine Act. Failor announced that the Bureau planned to 
issue fines for an additional 30,000 violations that had occurred since April 1970.62 This 
was the Bureau’s third attempt in the past ten months to impose penalties for violations of 
the law. The federal injunction against the Bureau in April 1970 had thwarted its first 
effort to collect fines. The Bureau tried again to collect fines from operators once the 
injunction expired, using a new fee schedule drafted by Undersecretary of the Interior 
Fred J. Russell. Inspectors, however, failed to adhere to the new schedule and told 
operators guilty of infractions that the Bureau would impose fines later. Even Failor’s 
limited third attempt to collect fines did not represent significant progress. The Bureau’s 
paltry fines for only a small fraction of violations emphasized the Bureau was not 
upholding its mandate for tough health and safety enforcement.63  
 While the new penalty schedule gave the Bureau the authority to impose fines of 
between $5,000 and $10,000 for serious violations, it also exempted operators from 
financial sanctions when “[a violation] clearly could not have been avoided at the time 
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the violation was cited.”64 Bureau officials defended this strategy, claiming that the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 contained a similar clause and reflected 
Congressional thinking on workplace safety. UMW Safety Director Lewis Evans 
complained that the “absence of fault” clause rested on the discretion of individual 
inspectors. He said the UMW only agreed with exempting operators from violation 
notices when the unavailability of equipment, personnel, or technology prevented them 
from adhering to the law. The union, he emphasized, opposed exemptions for operators 
who were simply unaware of violations in their mine.65 
 By questioning inspectors’ freedom to interpret the law, Evans was touching on a 
fundamental problem within the Bureau of Mines. In many cases, the decisions of 
individual staff members, particularly at the management level, prevented it from 
uniformly enforcing the Federal Mine Act. Bureau managers frequently decided not to 
act on the violation notices issued by coal mine inspectors. They could avoid acting on a 
violation by classifying it either as “vacated” or “void.”66 By labeling a citation notice as 
“vacated,” managers were stipulating that it had been wrongfully issued, even if the 
inspector was able to provide compelling evidence to the contrary. “Vacated” citations, 
however, remained part of the Bureau’s official record. “Void” citations were those 
deemed by managers to have been issued in error, or on reassessment had been addressed 
by mine owners. While the Bureau filed “void” citations, they did not remain part of the 
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official record. Managers frequently overturned the citations issued by mine inspectors 
using one of those classifications.67 They also exercised their autonomy in other ways. 
Some employed family members and friends as inspectors, even when they had no 
mining experience and lacked the appropriate qualifications.68 
 The significant influence of the Bureau’s management over safety enforcement 
had been revealed previously in the responses to a 1970 inspector questionnaire devised 
by W. R. Park, a district Bureau manager in West Virginia. In the responses, the majority 
of inspectors claimed that the upper levels of Bureau management hindered their 
effectiveness by limiting their authority. They cited the provisions of the 1969 legislation 
as a key factor impeding their performance. The inspectors specifically cited the Bureau’s 
“middle managers” as the main obstacle to their work. One commented, “It’s not Park or 
O’Leary [Bureau director]; it’s someplace in between them. Those fellows in between 
have lost track of what is going on out there.” 69 Inspectors who performed their job too 
effectively were often subject to an “incompatibility transfer.” In many cases, coal 
operators who felt a particular inspector was being too strict about the enforcement of the 
law contacted the Bureau District office and requested the inspector be transferred 
elsewhere. Park contended he only transferred inspectors if he could find evidence of 
misconduct. Many of the inspectors subject to this measure, however, claimed they were 
not allowed to testify on their own behalf.70  
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 Even decisions by inspectors on the ground prevented the Bureau from 
consistently enforcing the Federal Mine Act. According to former mine inspector Richard 
McDorman, well-qualified inspectors did not always understand the mandatory standards 
of the Act, which were often complex and ambiguous. The inspectors often had to make 
their own interpretations of the Bureau’s annual inspection manual, which contained too 
many generalizations and not enough specific guidelines. In addition, many inspectors 
lacked the requisite knowledge to interpret the guidelines for themselves. The Bureau’s 
inspector training program course provided only rudimentary education, particularly from 
1970 to mid-1971, when the Bureau was more concerned with addressing the shortage of 
mine inspectors.71 
 The Bureau’s ongoing shortage of inspectors further impeded its enforcement of 
health and safety. Despite the shortfall in its inspection force, the Bureau was rigid in the 
qualifications and physical requirements it demanded of inspectors. On March 26, 1971, 
Michael F. Widman, a national leader in the United Mine Workers of America, wrote to 
Senator Richard S. Schweiker (R-PA) regarding Norman Rumburg, whose application to 
become a Bureau inspector had been rejected. Widman complained that the Bureau had 
denied Rumburg the opportunity of becoming an inspector because he was slightly 
overweight. He emphasized the Bureau’s urgent need for inspectors and Rumburg’s ten 
years of previous experience as a federal mine inspector from 1953 to 1963, and urged 
Schweiker to intervene on Rumburg’s behalf.72 Widman also wrote to Representative 
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John P. Saylor (R-PA), who addressed the matter by writing to Bureau director Elburt F. 
Osborn. On April 15, 1971, Osborn responded to Saylor, informing him that Rumburg 
had failed to meet the stringent physical criteria required for underground inspection 
work. He wrote, “Mr. Rumburg has been unable to meet the physical requirements for 
appointment as a Federal Mine Inspector… Because of the arduous nature of our 
inspector positions, the stamina and other physical requirements are necessarily rigid to 
help make certain that the one appointed can perform his duties adequately without 
hazard to himself or others.”73 In all likelihood, the Bureau’s rigorous physical 
requirements for inspectors were not solely connected to the strenuous demands of 
inspection work. The Bureau may have adopted these requirements to ensure a pliable 
labor force. By rejecting skilled, well-qualified applicants for minor physical reasons, the 
Bureau avoided employing inspectors who sought to issue tough sanctions for health and 
safety violations. In turn, the Bureau avoided alienating itself from the coal operators.  
 Widman also engaged in correspondence with Osborn. He informed Osborn that 
he had reviewed Rumburg’s qualifications and perceived him to be well qualified for the 
position of federal inspector. He asked Osborn to hold a meeting with Rumburg and 
union representatives, but Osborn’s response precluded such a measure.74 In his reply to 
Widman, he stated that such a meeting would have no utility, particularly given 
Rumburg’s employment record with the Bureau. Osborn went on to reveal that from 
April 1 1960 to March 31, 1961, Rumburg, while employed as a Bureau inspector, had 
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been rated deficient in quality of work, work habits, and work attitude, despite receiving 
an overall rating of satisfactory. Osborn continued, “On April, 1961, he was officially 
reprimanded by the Director, Bureau of Mines. On November 28, 1962, Mr. Rumburg 
was separated for cause from the Bureau.”75 Despite this, the Bureau had given Rumburg 
another opportunity to qualify as an inspector, on the condition that he passed the 
physical examination. According to Osborn, Rumburg’s past employment record, 
combined with his failure of the physical examination, had prevented him from obtaining 
employment with the Bureau.76 
 Rumburg’s case was by no means unique, as a significant number of applicants 
for the Bureau’s inspection team failed to gain employment. An examination of 
correspondence in the United Mine Workers Safety Division Office Files reveals that 
many candidates, such as James DeFail of Loyalhanna, Pennsylvania, were turned down 
because they did not meet the required standards of physical fitness.77 However, the 
Bureau turned down other candidates for more abstract reasons. John Chiesa, for 
example, an experienced miner from Blairsville, Pennsylvania, passed the qualifying 
requirements but did not receive an offer of employment. The Bureau determined that 
“other applicants were better suited.”78  
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 At first glance, it might be argued that the Bureau had stringent criteria for 
applicants who wished to qualify as an inspector and sought to conduct its mine 
inspections by the highest standards. A closer examination shows this was not the case. 
The Bureau’s rejection of applicants for minor technicalities, including slight 
discrepancies in weight and physical fitness, makes little sense, given that it did not 
provide comprehensive training to new inspectors. It also relied on “Partial But 
Representative” inspections, which did not require inspectors to undertake a full 
examination of the mine. Moreover, the Bureau should have accounted for unqualified 
candidates in its hiring procedures by interviewing more people. Ultimately, the Bureau’s 
rejection of a large number of candidates accounted for its ongoing shortage of inspectors 
and in turn its failure to enforce federal mine legislation.  
In the spring of 1971, the Bureau embarked on a program of extensive 
reorganization, creating new inspection districts and redrawing the boundaries of existing 
ones. The purpose of this reorganization, according to Elburt Osborn, was “to provide for 
closer supervision, lend better technical assistance, and to make all districts more 
manageable.”79 By late March, local unions in western Kentucky were concerned by the 
Bureau’s plan to transfer its jurisdiction for the region from its Madisonville office, run 
by William Craft, to new offices in Morganfield and Beaver Dam, overseen by Donald 
Martin. They were particularly worried that William Craft would no longer be in charge 
of enforcing safety at their mine. When the Bureau proceeded with the opening of the 
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Madisonville office, miners were outraged. Several local unions wrote letters to Elburt 
Osborn to convey their opposition to the new office.80  
Local 1071 leader James Smith, writing to Osborn on behalf of his fellow miners 
at the Uniontown mine, asserted, “During the time that Mr. Craft was in charge of the 
Madisonville office we made more progress safety wise, than we ever made in a like 
period of time. Mr. Craft knew the federal code, and made strong effort to see that the 
coal company complied with it.”81 According to Smith, safety conditions had been 
deteriorating ever since the Morganfield office opened under Donald Martin’s control. He 
contended that the Bureau’s lax enforcement policies made it easier for the mine’s 
owners to evade the law. Smith believed that “the company knows who is coming, when 
he will be there, and what section of the mine he will visit.” Articulating his frustration 
about the situation, Smith wrote: 
Somebody in the Bureau of Mines is playing politics and they are doing it at the 
expense of our safety. We resent it. We don’t feel that we have to tolerate this and 
we don’t intend to. We cannot believe that you would condone such action and 
we don’t believe the Secretary of the Interior, Roger Morton [sic], knows of what 
is going on. If he did, we believe that the Madisonville office of the Bureau of 
Mines would again assume jurisdiction over our mines and all other mines in 
western Kentucky and restore the degree of safety and confidence which Bill 
Craft built up in Western Kentucky.82 
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Smith’s letter shows his conviction that low-level Bureau officials were carrying out the 
reorganization without the knowledge of Elburt Osborn and Rogers C. B. Morton. 
Further, by stating that the miners did not intend to tolerate the Bureau’s political 
maneuvering, Smith hinted at the possibility of future strike action. He also conveyed an 
implicit assumption that Morton would place the western Kentucky mines back under the 
control of the Madisonville office.    
Like James Smith, President James Jones Jr. and the Safety Committeemen of 
Local No. 1636 framed the institutional reorganization in political terms. In an agitated 
letter, they wrote, “The Bureau of Mines is now playing politics instead of promoting 
safety. We have a good director of the Bureau of Mines in the Madisonville KY office 
[Craft], but it looks as though that doesn’t make any difference to the powers that be; 
they want to create a new office in Beaver Dam, Kentucky to make a job for someone 
who may have some influence either in the Bureau or politically. We don’t like it.”83 
Similarly, miners of local union 1740, based at the Hamilton No. 2 mine in Union 
County, complained about the deterioration of conditions at their mine and the nearby 
Uniontown mine, both operated by the Island Creek Coal Company. They felt that the 
opening of the Morganfield office had restricted the Bureau’s enforcement of the 1969 
Federal Mine Act. The authors of the letter, local president Raymond Tate and safety 
committeeman Walter Adams, wrote, “We have confidence in Mr. Craft and we say to 
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you, if you are sincerely interested in safety, you will put Mr. Craft back in charge of all 
the mines in western Kentucky.84 
In late April, miners wrote to Osborn in an effort to prevent the opening of the 
new Beaver Dam office. President James Dukes and safety committeemen Walter Swain 
and Luther Grayson of local union 9925 pleaded, “Bill Craft who is in charge of the 
Madisonville office of the Bureau of Mines has proven himself and we assure you that he 
has our cooperation and the last thing we would want would be to see a change made in 
the present arrangements in regard to the Bureau of Mines Safety Division.”85 
Meanwhile, the representatives of local union 1178 contended, “This report [about the 
opening of the Beaver Dam office] seems to have received considerable enthusiasm 
among the coal companies in this area and we can see that well it might have the support 
of the coal companies. Under the present director, Bill Craft, the Federal law is 
enforced.”86  
Even in the light of the Bureau’s reorganization and the expansion of its 
inspection force, Department of the Interior representatives still tried to minimize the 
Bureau’s responsibility for health and safety enforcement. At a department meeting on 
July 1, Interior Secretary Rogers C. B. Morton argued that most accidents were the result 
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of miners’ carelessness or operators’ failure to implement safe working practices. Morton 
stressed that educating miners was of the utmost importance, particularly in small mines 
where companies did not have the resources to provide such educational programs. 
Senator John Sherman Cooper (R-KY) defended Morton’s initiative in Congress, arguing 
that while the Bureau had failed in many of its obligations, much of the criticism against 
it was unjustified. He launched a scathing attack on former Bureau director John F. 
O’Leary for imposing fines on operators that did not have the necessary safety equipment 
required by the new regulations. According to Cooper, the strict regulations had forced 
many small mines in Kentucky to close, in turn leading to an increase in surface mining 
and related environmental problems. 87   
The Department’s lack of support for the Bureau’s enforcement role also was 
emphasized by its budget from 1970 to 1971. In 1970, the Department spent a total of 
$23 million on health and safety, including $12 million for inspections, investigations, 
and rescue work, and $11 million for health and safety research. The following year, it 
almost doubled its expenditure for health and safety, allocating a total of $42 million for 
that purpose. That same year, however, it spent $47,698,000 on mineral and resource 
production, the other component of its dual function.88 Moreover, according to McAteer, 
the Bureau’s Conservation and Development Division, which focused on the business 
and production aspects of the mining industry, employed more people than its Health and 
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Safety Division. In 1971, the former employed 2,564 people, compared to the Health and 
Safety Division’s employment of 2,242 people, of which 618 were field inspectors.89 
An article in Coal Patrol, a bi-weekly newsletter that reported on coal industry 
developments, further emphasized the Department of the Interior’s efforts to downplay its 
role in the coal industry’s fatality record and to blame miners for accidents. The article 
reported that Rogers C. B. Morton was considering a proposal by Harry Treleaven, an 
advertising magnate from New York who ran Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign, to 
enhance the Interior Department’s public image. The proposal’s central premise was that 
Treleaven’s company should undertake an expensive publicity campaign with the 
message that miners would not get killed or injured if they were more careful. 
Treleaven’s proposal was based on a “fact-finding” study of the department’s information 
programs he had undertaken shortly after Morton’s appointment in January. The article 
noted that Treleaven’s business partner, Harry Allison, had worked with Morton on the 
Republican National Committee.90  
Coal Patrol went on to provide a starkly critical assessment of the proposal. It 
noted that just months earlier, President Nixon had sent a memorandum to government 
agencies ordering the termination of “self-serving and wasteful public relations efforts,” 
and the end of “inappropriate promotional activities.” Therefore, Morton’s consideration 
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of Treleaven’s proposal directly violated Nixon’s instructions. More significantly, the 
article contended that the biggest impediment to safe working conditions was the 
bureau’s failure to make operators comply with the 1969 Coal Mine Act, not recklessness 
on the part of miners. The newsletter attacked the proposed move as a conflict of 
interests, noting that Morton was considering a proposal by a man who was not only in 
partnership with one of his former colleagues, but who had also run the 1968 presidential 
campaign.91 
In a public address in Lexington, Kentucky, on September 16, 1971, Bureau of 
Mines Director Elburt Osborn outlined some of the problems the Bureau had encountered 
over the previous eighteen months. He opened his address by quoting Assistant Secretary 
of the Interior Hollis M. Dole’s statement at the Senate hearing on mine health and safety 
in August 1970. Dole had emphasized to the hearing that the health and safety act 
required “a safety revolution in the coal mines within 90 days and a health revolution to 
follow within 90 days.”92 In Osborn’s view, the significant lack of inspectors hindered 
the Bureau’s initial efforts to enforce the new federal mine act. He explained, “Our 
principal asset was the inspection force, which at that time consisted of 210 inspectors, 30 
inspector trainees, and 60 specialists in such technical areas as roof control, ventilation, 
electricity, and other areas of mining technology. We had a force of 300 all told, less than 
a third of the number needed to meet the minimum requirements of the law.” Osborn was 
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convinced, however, that the Bureau had made significant progress in rectifying the 
shortage of inspectors, by reducing the length of the training program and opening a new 
academy in temporary headquarters in Beckley, West Virginia. 93  
Furthermore, Osborn claimed that since the beginning of 1971, the number of 
Bureau inspections in all types of mines had markedly increased. He asserted: “The 
Bureau, to the limit of its resources, has enforced the Federal Coal Mine Health and 
Safety Act rigorously and fairly. As of the beginning of September, 48,346 penalties, 
totaling more than $6.3 million, had been proposed for violations of the Act, and over 
$800,000 of that amount has been paid.”94 While Osborn highlighted recent 
improvements in the Bureau’s performance, he glossed over its many failures, which he 
attributed to intrinsic weaknesses in its bureaucratic and political structure.  
By late October 1971, however, there were signs that the Bureau’s performance 
was improving. During the summer, it had expanded its qualified inspection staff to over 
1,000 people, a significant increase on the 250 inspectors employed the previous year. It 
had also started construction on the new National Mine Academy in Beckley, which 
would provide more comprehensive training for inspectors.95 Harrison Combs argued that 
the new inspection districts were more efficiently organized than their predecessors, with 
improved management of personnel and faster approval of operators’ roof support and 
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electrical plans.96 In conjunction with the Department of the Interior, the Bureau also had 
created a team of mining engineers for touring the coalfields, with the purpose of 
ensuring that inspectors were uniformly implementing the Federal Mine Act.97 The 
Bureau was also in the process of replacing several of the managerial staff at its 
Washington, D.C. office. Its main goal, wrote Elburt Osborn in a memorandum to the 
Assistant Secretary of Mineral Resources, was to “professionalize top level management 
in the Washington office of Coal Mine Health and Safety as well as in the field.”98 
By the end of the year, there was further evidence that the Bureau’s performance 
was gradually improving. Throughout 1971, there were 180 deaths in the coal industry, 
equivalent to a rate of 0.71 fatalities per million man-hours worked and 0.12 fatalities per 
million tons of coal extracted in the bituminous and anthracite sectors combined.99 It was 
a marked decrease in the fatality rate for 1970, when there were 260 deaths in the coal 
industry. The 1970 frequency rate was 1.02 deaths per million man-hours worked, and 
1.26 deaths per million tons of coal mined.100 There had been a significant improvement 
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in coal mine health and safety in 1971. As with previous years, falls of roof, face, and 
ribs in underground mines were the primary cause of death, rather than explosions, major 
disasters, or other accidents. Of the 180 deaths in 1971, 60 were attributable to this cause. 
Fatalities from the collapse of the internal mine structure occurred in three percent of all 
coal mines inspected by the Bureau that year.101  
 
Conclusion 
Despite the notable reduction in coal mine fatalities by the close of 1971, the 
Federal Coal Mine Act still did not afford miners the safer conditions it had promised 
when Nixon signed it into law in December 1969. Miners faced the constant danger of 
being crushed to death by a falling roof or collapsing ribs, or perishing in a disaster such 
as the Hurricane Creek explosion. Much of the responsibility for the continuing hazards 
in underground mines was attributable to the Bureau of Mines. The Bureau was lax in its 
inspections and, as the Hurricane Creek disaster showed, frequently neglected to follow 
up on health and safety violations. The Bureau’s performance was attributable to a 
shortage of inspectors and poor training for the inspectors who qualified. Moreover, ill-
informed decisions by middle-level managers detracted from the Bureau’s health and 
safety policies. While the Bureau sought to improve its performance through an extensive 
program of reorganization, this program had a negligible impact. Although it had 
addressed the shortage of inspectors and contributed to a decline in the fatality rate by the 
end of 1971, many believed that the Bureau was a major impediment to safer conditions  
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in the mines. 
  The Bureau’s dismal performance was, in many ways, a reflection of the Nixon 
administration’s labor policies and its conservative stance on coal mine health and safety. 
The administration’s appointment of Elburt F. Osborn as the head of the Bureau of Mines 
and Rogers C. B. Morton as Interior Secretary limited the Bureau’s ability to engage in 
significant reform. Osborn and Morton both lacked real mining experience and were 
more supportive of the coal industry than miners. In fact, from October 1970 to 
December 1971, the Bureau of Mines actively undermined many of the legislative gains 
that miners and their supporters had fought so hard to achieve. 
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Chapter 6 
Making Amends: 
The Black Lung Benefits Act, New Union Leadership, and the Mine Enforcement 
and Safety Administration  
 
Introduction 
By early 1971, the Black Lung Association consisted of fourteen chapters across 
Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, and West Virginia. The BLA chapters continued to 
protest the Social Security Administration’s management of the federal black lung 
compensation program, particularly its denial of benefits to tens of thousands of black 
lung victims and widows. On January 11, 1971, around 50 miners marched to the SSA 
office in Logan County, West Virginia, to present a list of demands by the Logan County 
and Mingo County chapters of the BLA. The director of the office sent the list to the 
central SSA office in Baltimore. Later that month, SSA officials from Baltimore and 
Washington, D.C. met with representatives from the Logan County and Mingo County 
chapters to discuss their grievances. While the officials promised to investigate the 
miners’ concerns, the meeting did not result in direct changes to the Social Security 
Administration’s management of the compensation program.1  In their quest to achieve a 
more equitable compensation system, the local BLA chapters believed that persistence 
was the most effective tactic. Their main priority was to get the SSA to legitimize 
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applicants’ claims for compensation.2 To that end, local chapters of the BLA continued to 
engage in protests, which although organized locally, were targeted at high-level officials 
of the Social Security Administration. Such protests, however, did not yield tangible 
results.  
The same day as the march in Logan County, Dr. Buff publicly attacked a new 
breathing test recently introduced by the Social Security Administration. Buff argued that 
the test, administered for claimants who exhibited positive X-ray evidence of black lung 
disease, was “at its best very inaccurate.” Complaining that the breathing test often 
showed normal results for miners with severe black lung, Buff argued it was created to 
deny benefits to miners. His charges reinforced the Black Lung Association’s conviction 
that the SSA was making arbitrary decisions about compensation payments based on 
flawed evidence.3  
For the Black Lung Association and its supporters, the Social Security 
Administration was a significant obstacle to miners’ receipt of federal black lung 
benefits. The large number of miners who were denied compensation was not only 
attributable to the individual decisions of the SSA. It also stemmed from inherent 
weaknesses in the black lung compensation legislation in the Federal Mine Act of 1969. 
This chapter focuses on the Black Lung Association’s campaign to amend the federal 
black lung benefits program. It shows that the association’s sustained grassroots activism 
was instrumental in the passage of the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, which provided 
a more liberal compensation system. In addition, the chapter examines how Miners for 
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Democracy won control of the United Mine Workers in the presidential election of 1972. 
The new UMW president, Arnold Miller, was more attentive than Tony Boyle to miners’ 
working conditions and issues such as compensation. Furthermore, this chapter discusses 
how the Nixon administration, conscious of the failures of the Bureau of Mines, created a 
new health and safety enforcement agency called the Mine Enforcement and Safety 
Administration.  
 The passage of new federal black lung legislation, the ascension of Miners for 
Democracy to the UMW national leadership, and the Nixon administration’s creation of 
MESA were significant advances in coal mine health and safety. Yet, as this chapter also 
shows, there were limitations to those advances that had negative consequences for the 
nation’s rank and file coal miners. 
 
Grassroots Resurgence: Challenging the Black Lung Benefits Program 
In the realization that the Black Lung Association’s local demonstrations were not 
working, Don Bryant, the president of the Logan Country chapter, began to plan a march 
on Washington. He complained, “We have waited two months for social security to move 
on their promises but we see no evidence of changes… Thousands of disabled miners and 
widows are being treated like dirt… We have tried to work things out but all we get is 
unkept promises and no action. We want what is right and we will get it even if it takes a 
trip to Washington.”4 The activists were particularly frustrated by senior officials’ refusal 
to meet with them. Commissioner Robert M. Ball, head of the Social Security 
Administration, Bernard Popick, chief of the Bureau of Disability Insurance, and Elliot 
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Richardson, head of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, all denied the 
activists’ requests for meetings. Bernard Popick eventually agreed to meet with BLA 
representatives in April, but he failed to attend the meeting. The activists’ decision to take 
their campaign to the nation’s capital was, in large part, driven by the refusal of SSA 
officials to acknowledge them. One black lung activist remembered: 
On April 29, leaders from 10 BLA chapters were supposed to meet with Popick, 
the head of the Bureau of Disability Insurance, which handles the Black Lung 
Program. This meeting was originally set for March 15, but the Social Security 
pencil pushers kept stalling. April 29 came – but Popick did not show up. Instead 
he sent his assistant Bill Rivers and some other flunkies. Some men thought we 
should walk out, but we decided to give the messenger boys the word to take back 
to their boss.5 
 
The BLA members wrote down a list of demands for Rivers and his associates to 
give to Popick, with a deadline of two weeks to implement them. Popick’s failure to 
address their demands was one of the key factors that convinced the activists of the need 
to widen their campaign. The Black Lung Association’s main priority was the reform of 
the federal black lung compensation program.6 Representatives from the BLA central 
office in Charleston planned to visit Congress and establish pickets at the UMW-owned 
National Bank of Washington, the United Mine Workers headquarters, and the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. While the central office provided 
instructions, much of the organization of the demonstration fell to local chapters. Leaders 
of the local BLA chapters distributed forms to obtain more information on who planned 
to attend the demonstration, and what they wanted to achieve on the trip.7  
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As the BLA organized its march, Congress began to address the weaknesses in the 
federal black lung compensation program. On May 10, the General Labor Subcommittee 
in the House of Representatives opened a hearing to consider legislative amendments to 
Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Act. The subcommittee had introduced a number of 
Democrat-sponsored bills, which, among other things, prohibited the denial of claims 
solely on the basis of X-ray evidence, prevented the deduction of black lung benefits 
from other compensation payments, and mandated benefits for double orphans.8  The 
Subcommittee acknowledged, therefore, that X-rays did not provide definitive proof of 
black lung and that miners should receive black lung benefits without having other 
benefits reduced. Furthermore, it recognized that several of the miners who died from 
black lung were the only surviving parent of their children or had been raising their 
children alone. The subcommittee felt it was necessary to provide financial assistance to 
children who became ‘double orphans’ as a result of black lung disease. 
Testifying before the subcommittee, Ken Hechler explained why miners in 
Kentucky and West Virginia experienced the highest rate of denials by the Social 
Security Administration. In his testimony, he emphasized the lack of medical facilities in 
those states and the administration’s reliance on X-ray exams as evidence of 
pneumoconiosis: “Many doctors examining these X-rays have historically down through 
the years been individuals who have denied that pneumoconiosis as a disease actually 
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exists. There has been disagreement between doctors and radiologists reading the same 
X-rays.”9  
In addition, Hechler charged that the Nixon administration had ordered the SSA 
to adopt a conservative approach in its implementation of the 1969 Federal Mine Act, in 
order to limit the amount of successful compensation applications.10 Hechler contended, 
“I have never seen this order in writing, but it seems to me that when you have this kind 
of repeated denial of applicants who are short of breath, and obviously disabled, who 
cannot qualify, that such an order must have been handed down, because otherwise we 
would have had the provisions of the act carried out with the intent of Congress.”11 Given 
that President Nixon had almost vetoed the Federal Mine Act for its black lung benefits 
provision, Hechler’s claim made sense. Hechler’s statement emphasized his ongoing 
mistrust in the Nixon administration’s commitment to coal mine health and safety. More 
importantly, his testimony highlighted one of the most contentious issues of debate 
surrounding the program, the validity of X-rays as a source of medical evidence. 
Bernard Popick, the head of the Bureau of Disability, defended the record of the 
Social Security Administration. He commented, “With the limited knowledge available in 
the early months concerning the specific criteria for eligibility, it was to be expected that 
this all-out effort on our part to protect individual benefit rights would result in 
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applications from a very substantial number who were eventually found not to meet the 
requirements of the law.”12 According to Popick, there had been 290,000 applications for 
compensation since the program began, and 190,000 of those had been successful.13 Yet, 
he also argued that the SSA needed to acquire more knowledge about the scientific and 
medical properties of pneumoconiosis so it could improve its procedures for identifying 
the disease.14 Like Hechler, Popick highlighted the divisions over the definition of black 
lung disease and the most effective means of identifying it. Additionally, he criticized the 
Federal Coal Mine Act for its failure to award compensation to double orphans. To that 
end, he voiced his support for legislative bill H.R. 42.15  
 Representing the Black Lung Association, Arnold Miller testified at the hearing 
with a delegation of six witnesses. Miller complained that the SSA was undermining the 
compensation program by defining pneumoconiosis more narrowly than Congress had 
intended. One of the witnesses, Verlan Golden of the Economic Opportunity Council in 
Knox County, Kentucky, was far more scathing in his attack of the SSA, protesting,  “We 
people that go down to the Social Security Office are misled, abused, lied to, and you 
name it we can furnish it.”16 Golden further stated that the hearing should have taken 
place in southern Kentucky or West Virginia, as the people most severely affected by 
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pneumoconiosis were too sick to travel to Washington.17 He claimed that the SSA clinics 
were not equipped with the necessary medical equipment and that they rushed the 
medical examinations of coal miners. To exemplify his point, he related a story about a 
miner who had been denied black lung benefits: 
And I have a man that told me that he went and was X-rayed and turned down. 
The doctor told him he had two perfect lungs. He said, “Doc, did you see the 18-
inch scar on my back that I had one of my lungs removed?” This is the type of 
thing that you have got going on in the black lung services and this has come from 
the Social Security Administration.18 
 
Golden implied that the doctors working on behalf of the SSA were willfully denying 
miners the opportunity to collect black lung benefits. His testimony provided support for 
Hechler’s claim that the Nixon administration had issued the SSA with instructions to 
limit the number of miners who received compensation.  
Miller submitted anonymous written testimonies for the official record of the 
hearing. Written by disabled miners and widows who were unable to attend, the 
testimonies encapsulated the true human cost of pneumoconiosis, as well as applicants’ 
negative experience of the federal compensation program. One widow who had written to 
Miller described the effects of black lung disease on her husband. She wrote, “He had 
shortness of breath his last month of life he lived in the hospital under oxygen he coughed 
large blackish clots of blood, had chest pains, weakness and could not work, he 
developed a viral pneumonia, had 3 blood clots go into his heart and died of a 
Myocardical Infarction [sic].”19 She also stated that an autopsy of her husband had 
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revealed black scarring on his lungs. Doctors were unable to determine, however, if this 
caused his health problems. The widow conveyed to Miller her fear that she would not be 
able to obtain compensation because her husband worked in the mine for less than six 
years. She hoped, however, that her testimony might help another widow in her position 
to obtain benefits.20 Her letter confirmed that even clear evidence of black lung from an 
autopsy was no guarantee that the SSA would award compensation to miners’ widows. 
Moreover, it conveyed the immense physical suffering caused by pneumoconiosis. 
A 52-year old miner, who had spent twenty-five years underground, wrote to 
Miller after being denied benefits. Despite exhibiting clear signs of black lung disease, 
the Social Security Administration did not award him compensation. He explained that 
Dr. Donald Rasmussen had examined him twice, in 1966 and 1969, and found evidence 
of the disease on both occasions; in fact, the disease had worsened by the second 
examination. The miner wrote, “I had to hire a lawyer to get on disabled social security 
even though I had black lung, a heart murmer and arthritis of the neck and spine that was 
caused by a mine injury.”21 His application for black lung benefits was denied because 
the SSA determined that he was not ‘totally’ disabled. Yet, in making this assessment, the 
Social Security Administration had failed to obtain his medical records from Donald 
Rasmussen. The miner commented, “I believe a big factor in the failure of some miners 
to get their rightful benefits is caused by the Social Security office not getting their 
records.” At the time of writing to Arnold Miller, the unnamed miner was in the process 
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of making an appeal.22 The Social Security Administration’s failure to obtain the miner’s 
medical records was as much attributable to its bureaucratic disorganization as its 
conscious effort to evade paying compensation.  
Another miner wrote to Miller to complain about the Social Security 
Administration’s system for determining eligibility for black lung benefits. In his letter, 
the miner stated: 
… So one more thing that I want to call your Attention to is this, there is some of 
the Miners all around me Here that they filed thay Claims the same date of the 
same month that I did and Thay was payed for thay Claims and diden have to go 
no where to Get no Proof of Eligibelty for to get it comeing to them So I’M 
saying right here that this Mr. Robert M. Ball Knows All About these Matters as 
he has the records right There at his Finger tips for to check so this makes Me feel 
like that I’M being given Some Discrimination on getting my Claim 
Settled…[sic]23 
 
The letter conveyed the miner’s belief that the SSA was making arbitrary decisions about 
compensation payouts. Moreover, it conveyed the suspicion of many coal miners that the 
administration was awarding benefits to some applicants without full medical evidence. 
The letters that Miller submitted for the record depicted the disarray in the federal 
black lung compensation program. Moreover, they showed the important contribution of 
miners and their families to the national debate on the compensation program. The letters 
also emphasized the applicants’ belief that the central black lung office in Charleston, 
particularly its leader Arnold Miller, could resolve their individual disputes with the 
Social Security Administration. Conversely, the letters also showed that the applicants 
were becoming disillusioned with local protest as a means of resolving their grievances. 
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By writing to Miller, they were bypassing their local Black Lung Association chapter and 
seeking action from the centralized main office. The letters emphasize the short-term 
failure of local black lung chapters to address the failures of the compensation program. 
  In his testimony at the subcommittee hearing, Dr. Donald Rasmussen criticized 
X-rays as a method of detecting pneumoconiosis. He described how his medical team 
frequently encountered miners with severe breathing difficulties that rendered them 
almost inactive. Yet the X-rays of those miners either displayed simple pneumoconiosis 
or did not show evidence of pneumoconiosis at all. Rasmussen also dismissed the Social 
Security Administration’s breathing test, previously criticized by Buff, as an effective 
method of determining black lung disease.24 “In our opinion, then,” said Rasmussen, “the 
use of these tests alone is inadequate. Our experience with the chest X-ray leaves us to 
conclude, again, that pneumoconiosis of coal workers is difficult to identify.” According 
to Rasmussen, slight differences in X-ray technique, including the voltage used to take 
pictures, had a significant impact on the detection of pneumoconiosis, and thus in 
calculating disability and compensation.25 
 The House Labor Subcommittee hearing clearly showed the failure of the black 
lung compensation program, but also demonstrated the emerging movement for reform at 
the national level. A hearing before the full House Committee on Labor on May 19 
revealed many of the same tensions. Carl D. Perkins, the chairman of the Labor 
Committee, highlighted the disparity between states, claiming that 72 percent of 
applicants in his state of Kentucky were denied benefits, compared to 52 percent in West 
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Virginia and 31 percent in Pennsylvania. He identified the X-ray examination as the 
cause of this injustice. “I hate to see disabled people robbed this way, in one sense of the 
word. To undertake to deny black lung benefits solely on X-ray evidence as they are 
doing was never intended by the Congress and it is a disgraceful situation.” He further 
condemned the way that miners were “lined up like sheep” for X-ray examinations.26 
 The hearings in the House of Representatives brought national attention to the 
black lung benefits program, creating a favorable climate for the Black Lung 
Association’s planned demonstration. On June 7, 1971, after almost two months of 
preparation, the association undertook an extensive lobbying campaign in Washington, 
D.C. Around 150 people, consisting mostly of retired and disabled miners and widows, 
participated. The majority of the protestors were from West Virginia, although the group 
also included people from Virginia, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania. The group visited 
several Congressmen, emphasizing the risk of disease that miners faced and the problems 
that applicants, particularly widows and orphans, encountered in their pursuit of 
benefits.27 Christine Warwick of Red Star, West Virginia, led a delegation of 30 people to 
see Ken Hechler, who told them that their failure to obtain compensation stemmed from 
President Nixon’s dislike of the program. Hechler repeated the claim he had made at the 
hearing on May 10, that Nixon had ordered the SSA to apply the law as selectively as 
possible, “with the result that you and others are being denied your rights under the law 
that we in Congress passed.”28  
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 Another group of activists visited Senator Robert C. Byrd in the U.S. Capitol 
Building. The activists emerged confident that he planned to advance the federal 
compensation laws. Also present at the meeting were Hugh Johnson, Assistant to the 
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, and Bernard Popick, Director of the 
Bureau of Disability Insurance. They explained the compensation law to the ten delegates 
permitted to enter Byrd’s office and promised to evaluate their individual situations.29 
Senator Jennings Randolph, meanwhile, was back in his home state of West Virginia, but 
his staff assured the black lung activists that he fully supported amending Title IV of the 
1969 Federal Mine Act.  The activists informed Randolph’s staff that they supported an 
amendment to provide compensation to the orphans of coal miners. They highlighted two 
children in Mingo County, aged 10 and 13, whose father was certified to have died from 
black lung, but who were receiving no benefits, because their mother had abandoned 
them. 
 At a news conference later that day, John Mendez, an activist from Chapmanville, 
West Virginia, criticized the Social Security Administration for denying claims on the 
basis of a single X-ray test.30  The BLA delegation threatened to disrupt the provision of 
America’s coal-generated electricity by going on strike unless Congress acted on their 
complaints. The activists displayed a number of posters at the conference, including one 
that stated: “President Nixon: We aint got much, but we sure got electric power. Give us 
our black lung pay.”31 This threat was particularly resonant given the impending energy 
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crisis in the United States. That summer, a number of East Coast cities were facing the 
threat of power “brown outs.” Disruption to coal supplies would further jeopardize the 
provision of electricity. Existing supplies of coal, oil, and natural gas were barely meeting 
Americans’ demand for energy.32   
 Although the Black Lung Association had invested considerable planning in the 
lobbying campaign for June 7, the relatively small attendance called into question its 
ability to persuade Congress of the need for legislative change. This was confirmed the 
following day, when the House Labor Subcommittee failed to pass a bill granting black 
lung benefits to orphans. Yet the activists increased the national focus on their cause and 
consolidated alliances with powerful Congressman. The demonstration might not have 
brought immediate results, but the activists laid an important foundation for future action. 
The events of June 7 also showed that criticism of the program was, increasingly, 
specifically targeted at President Nixon.33 
 
Clearing the Air: The Black Lung Amendments Act of 1972 
The House Labor Subcommittee’s rejection of the bill that provided compensation 
to black lung orphans did not stall the process of reform in the House of Representatives. 
The following week, on June 16, 1971, Carl Perkins introduced bill H.R. 9212 to the 
Committee on Education and Labor, which contained a number of legislative measures to 
amend the compensation program in Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Act. Specifically, 
it advocated benefits for double orphans, extended federal management of the 
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compensation program until January 1975, and clarified that black lung benefits did not 
constitute state workmen’s compensation.34 The latter provision was important, because 
the Social Security Administration erroneously classified federal black lung benefits as 
workmen’s compensation. Under its guidelines, the SSA reduced injury disability 
payments to miners if they also received state workmen’s compensation payments, 
especially if the combined benefits exceeded 80 percent of a worker’s total earnings. 
Thus, miners receiving both disability insurance and black lung benefits often found their 
disability payments reduced.35  
The bill also included a ‘presumptive’ clause, which stipulated that miners with 
fifteen years of underground experience and outward signs of a “totally disabling 
respiratory disease” had work-related pneumoconiosis, even if X-rays did not confirm 
this diagnosis. Furthermore, the bill expanded the range of evidence for detecting black 
lung to include blood gas studies, electrocardiograms, and other diagnostic tests. The bill 
even stipulated that lay testimony was an acceptable form of evidence.36 Whereas Title 
IV of the Federal Mine Act stipulated that miners were not disabled if they could perform 
light work, Perkins’ bill included an amendment that tied the definition of disability to a 
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miner’s ability to perform his regular job. Finally, the bill called for a review of all 
previously denied claims for black lung benefits.37 
 The Black Lung Association viewed Perkins’ bill as the key to the liberalization 
of Title IV of the Federal Mine Act and campaigned for its passage. One activist 
commented that the campaign was “the most effective grassroots lobbying he had ever 
seen.” The activists regularly organized carpools to Washington D.C., where they lobbied 
congressmen and picketed the offices of the Social Security Administration.38 Helen 
Powell, one of the most prominent leaders, later recalled, “We would go around to 
different Congressmen and Senators’ offices. They didn’t know us from Adam, we would 
make them believe we were from our home state and… we would put demands on them, 
because they had no way of knowing who we were. So we got a lot of help that way.”39 
Powell also recalled that it was not always easy to sustain the momentum behind the 
campaign. She stated, “We would plan trips to D.C., sometimes without a dime in our 
pockets, and [when we got there] we lived off baloney, peanut butter and jelly, the 
churches would take us in and they’d fix meals for us.”40 Despite the obstacles they 
faced, the network of BLA chapters persisted with their lobbying efforts, determined to 
persuade Congress to pass Perkins’ legislative bill. They engaged in more planning and 
organization than the 1969 black lung protest movement in West Virginia, in the hope of 
finally winning the passage of an adequate compensation bill. 
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The lay advocates in the Black Lung Association were key participants in the 
lobbying campaign for the amendments. Their experience of assisting coal miners and 
widows with benefit claims enabled them to merge complex legal and technical 
arguments with a humanitarian approach.41 The Appalachian Research and Defense Fund 
provided limited financial support for the advocates, while Designs for Rural Action 
helped them to coordinate their lobbying efforts.42 Even the coal operators supported the 
activists’ campaign for Perkins’ bill, because it would absolve them from having to pay 
towards black lung compensation. Under state compensation laws, employers were liable 
for a substantial part of the cost. The coal operators sought to evade responsibility for 
black lung benefits payments.43 Some politicians opposed the amendments because they 
would delay the transfer of the compensation program to the coal industry.   
  The House of Representatives began deliberations on the Perkins bill on October 
18, 1971.44 Perkins took the unusual step of announcing that members would be voting 
on the bill as written, without being given the opportunity to propose amendments. The 
bill needed to gain a two-thirds majority, however, to pass the House in this manner, or it 
would be subject to debate under the normal congressional regulations.  
Much of the opening debate centered on the amendment that prohibited the denial 
of claims solely on the basis of X-ray results. The validity of the X-ray as a form of 
medical evidence was one of the most contested issues in the struggle over black lung 
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compensation. Representative John N. Erlenborn (R-IL) led the Republican criticism of 
the amendments. Erlenborn had fronted the Republican opposition to the compensation 
plan (Title IV) in the original Federal Coal Mine Act. While he supported benefits for 
orphans, Erlenborn was adamant that X-rays were the only reliable method to distinguish 
victims of pneumoconiosis from miners with conditions such as emphysema and 
bronchitis. The amendment on medical evidence, he insisted, would enable miners 
without black lung to collect benefits. “That is not the real purpose of this bill,” he 
maintained. “It is not a matter of simple justice. It is a matter of extending benefits and 
giving them to people who are disabled for reasons other than the fact they have coal 
workers pneumoconiosis. There is no social justification for doing that. There is no 
medical justification.”45 He also cited findings by the British Medical Society that it was 
possible to determine conclusively from an X-ray if a miner was suffering from 
pneumoconiosis.  
Erlenborn was unable to respond, however, to a comment by Representative 
Frank Evans (D-CO) that some miners with negative X-rays exhibited substantial 
evidence of pneumoconiosis when autopsied after their death. He merely responded that a 
miner could simultaneously have black lung disease and other ailments.46 Responding to 
Erlenborn’s comments that the extension of federal benefits was a “windfall” for coal 
operators, Phil Burton argued that virtually none of the states had implemented the 
necessary measures to update their worker compensation programs. In fact, only three 
small states, none of them coal producers, had taken the necessary measures. He argued 
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that two years was a reasonable time extension for the states to update their programs and 
implement the appropriate legislation.47 
Representative Tom Bevill (D-AL) said the amendments were “one more step 
towards the resolution of an enormous debt which the people of this Nation owe to coal 
miners.” Drawing a stark connection between the nations’ growing energy consumption 
and the suffering of its coal miners, Bevill stated, “We have involved a number of our 
citizens in the hazardous task of extracting coal under conditions which we now consider 
unacceptable in order to use this coal for the production of energy to benefit us all.” 
Noting the failure of Congress and the coal industry to protect the miners who created 
such benefits, he continued, “The conditions of coal mining were so hazardous that many 
of these miners became disabled or died as a result of preventable accidents or 
diseases.”48  
Bevill argued that the federal government should not view coal miners’ lives as an 
expendable resource in the production of energy. He felt the miners were entitled to a 
more equitable compensation program because of the significant risks they faced in their 
work. Moreover, his statement highlighted the importance of coal miners to the nation’s 
energy supply. Bevill also argued that a negative X-ray should not be used to deny 
compensation to miners. He opposed Title IV’s stipulation of uniform testing criteria on 
all miners, as “individuals respond in different ways to an attack by a disease and the dust 
of a mine affects individuals in different ways.”49 
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In support of Bevill’s claim, Ogden Reid (D-NY) explained that other testing 
methods for black lung disease were readily available, such as the pulmonary function 
test or the blood gas test developed by Dr. Donald Rasmussen. Such testing, he argued, 
could detect black lung where previously there was no evidence of it. Reid disapproved 
of miners not receiving compensation solely “because medical facilities and detailed 
records are unavailable. I say that coal miners, who risk their lives almost daily, are 
entitled to the best medical tests, not the cheapest or the easiest.” Reid acknowledged that 
he supported the bill as written; he did not adhere to Erlenborn’s suggestion of debating it 
under normal regulations.50 
 Representative Robert Michel (R-IL) expressed his concern about widening the 
black lung benefits program without adequate protective mechanisms against increased 
costs. He proposed debating the bill under regular Congressional procedure to allow for 
the addition of such mechanisms. More significantly, however, Michel proposed an 
amendment not included in H.R. 9212, the extension of Title IV to all coal miners, 
including surface coal workers and strip miners. He argued that strip miners were entitled 
to benefits because they inhaled the same coal dust as underground miners. He noted 
there some strip miners in his district had been inhaling coal dust for years at the coal 
tipple or crusher.51 With his proposed amendment, Michel brought into focus a segment 
of coal miners that had been neglected by the 1969 legislation. Although strip miners did 
not work in the confined environment of underground mines, they were still exposed to 
significant quantities of coal dust, particularly if they worked at the tipple, where the 
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loading of coal into railroad cars generated large clouds of dust. Michel recognized that 
all coal workers, not just those working underground, were susceptible to 
pneumoconiosis. 
 John Dent rejected the cost arguments against bill H.R. 9212, asserting that the 
profits from coal production in the following six years would far outweigh the cost of 
implementing the bill. Similarly, Kenneth Gray (D-IL) condemned the members of the 
Republican Party who opposed the bill for its financial cost. He argued they would 
support the bill if they worked underground for thirty or forty dollars a day, while facing 
the constant threat of disaster. Gray advised them to talk with families affected by black 
lung disease, which would convince them of the need for more equitable black lung 
compensation.52 The testimonies of Dent and Gray emphasized that most of the 
Republican opposition to the black lung bill was attributable to its financial cost. In that 
regard, the hearing echoed the legislative debate over the original black lung benefits 
program, embodied in the Federal Mine Act of 1969. Many Republicans argued the 
program would be too expensive, while President Nixon nearly vetoed the Federal Mine 
Act for the cost of the black lung program. 
Commenting on his own state of West Virginia, James Kee (D-WV), said, “A 
third of the black lung benefits claims which have been turned down to date have been 
disallowed because the miner was not totally disabled. In fact, what the Federal 
Government is saying to these miners is that they do not qualify because they are not 
totally dead. I have contended from the very beginning that the requirement for 
determining ‘total disability’ should be made more realistic. To that end, Kee indicated 
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that he was fully supportive of the bill and its improvements to the original 1969 Act.” In 
his argument for a more realistic definition of ‘total disability,’ Kee advocated the 
payment of benefits to miners who had stopped working as a result of black lung disease, 
not just those who were completely incapacitated by it. He recognized that miners were 
not only affected by the physical discomfort of black lung, but also by the loss of income 
that came with unemployment. 53 
 When the members of the House voted on the bill, it did not gain the two-thirds 
majority necessary to pass. The deliberations on October 18 stressed a clear line of 
division in the House, between the largely Republican faction that opposed liberalizing 
the benefits program and the Democrats who sought to compensate miners for the 
dangers of their labors. The House agreed to deliberate the bill again in November under 
the standard rules, which meant that there would be an opportunity to propose 
amendments.54  
The House reopened debate on the bill on November 10, 1971. Perkins reaffirmed 
his main complaint with the existing legislation. He argued that the Social Security 
Administration was “setting off black lung benefits against social disability payments, 
even though the law states that the payments are not to be treated as workmen’s 
compensation.” He maintained that some miners received less benefits after filing black 
lung claims if they were already receiving social security disability.55 
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John Erlenborn criticized the bill’s amendment that prevented the classification of 
black lung benefits as state workmen’s compensation. He argued the federal black lung 
program should only be a stop-gap measure to allow the federal government to make 
payments to miners not covered by other compensation programs. A number of state 
governments, he explained, failed to recognize how coal dust affected miners’ lungs and 
consequently did not have adequate compensation measures. Erlenborn also renewed his 
opposition to the expansion of medical evidence beyond the X-ray exam. He argued that 
this would allow miners with other breathing disorders such as emphysema and asthma to 
claim benefits.56  
John Dent retorted that Erlenborn’s objection to the bill was merely about its 
financial implications and that it was impossible to place a cost on human lives. He 
believed that medical evidence had clearly shown the need to go beyond X-rays when 
determining the existence of pneumoconiosis. Furthermore, he replied to Erlenborn, “If 
the X-ray is all that you say it is, then the additional testing will also correlate with the X-
ray findings. We are not proposing to pay benefits to ineligible miners. We just want 
them to have the benefit of the doubt, and the benefit of the division of medical opinion 
on the subject.” In contrast, Representative Albert Quie (R-MN) agreed with many of 
Erlenborn’s objections, particularly the extension of federal control of the program. He 
argued that the states had been given ample time to prepare for the transfer of the 
program. 57  
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Towards the end of the day’s proceedings, both Hechler and Erlenborn proposed 
amendments to bill H.R. 9212. Hechler’s amendment focused on protecting the rights of 
minor children to collect benefits, while Erlenborn’s amendment was designed to provide 
further clarification on benefits for double orphans. The House passed both amendments. 
More significantly, it passed Robert Michel’s earlier amendment to extend Title IV of the 
Federal Mine Act to strip miners. The members rejected an additional proposal by 
Erlenborn to remove the X-ray provision from the bill. The House then voted to pass the 
amended bill by a majority of 311 to 79.58 
Having passed the bill, the House submitted it to the Senate Committee for further 
deliberation. During six days of public hearings, in December 1971, the Senate 
Subcommittee on Labor deliberated several different bills, including S. 26875, introduced 
by Jennings Randolph, S. 2289, introduced by Senator Hartke, and a compromise version 
of H.R. 9212. The latter included many of the original measures from the House version, 
as well as several amendments. As in the House version, it provided black lung benefits 
for double orphans, prohibited the denial of compensation claims on the basis of a 
negative X-ray, included a ‘presumptive clause,’ and mandated the extension of benefits 
to all coal miners. The bill only extended federal management of the black lung benefits 
program for one year, in contrast to the two-year extension in the House bill. While it 
stipulated that federal black lung benefits should not be classified as workmen’s 
compensation, it limited the benefits miners could receive to 100 percent of their total 
earned income.59  
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Lorin E. Kerr, the Safety Director of the United Mine Workers, made a statement 
before the Senate Labor Subcommittee on December 1, 1971 that reflected the distance 
between the UMW and the Black Lung Association. He stated, “We have been impressed 
with Congressional wisdom in assigning the administrative responsibilities for title IV to 
the Social Security Administration… The concern manifested for people by the Social 
Security Administration has been a refreshing contrast to the usual adversary attitude 
encountered in most state workmen’s compensation agencies.”60 Kerr announced the 
union’s support for bill S. 2675. He further announced that the union favored a ten-year 
presumptive clause for miners with serious pulmonary impairment.61 While he indicated 
that the union supported the prompt implementation of state compensation programs, he 
also urged Senator Williams to establish Title IV “as a permanent federal program.”62 
With regard to the management of the compensation program, the union was, at least, on 
the same page as the BLA activists. Kerr stated, “Seventy years of experience has clearly 
indicated that with rare exception the employers’ costs of compensation, as with all other 
production costs, are ultimately paid by the consumer. This is not new or startling, but it 
was initially envisioned that increased compensation costs would hasten the elimination 
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of all occupational health and safety hazards.”63 Kerr also proposed the incorporation of 
the strip miners’ provision in H.R. 9212 to the Senate bill. 
Black lung activists continued the momentum of their campaign by testifying at 
the hearing. BLA President Arnold Miller used his appearance before the subcommittee 
to repeat many of his grievances with the SSA. He condemned its lack of medical testing 
facilities in the coalfields and denial of claims based on X-ray evidence. He urged, “We 
must solve this problem among our coal miners in the near future or we won’t have any 
coal miners to mine coal that is vital to the economy of this country.”64 Representatives 
from the Association of Disabled Mines and Widows, Inc., also gave testimony at the 
hearing. Claims advocate Willa Omechinski, whose husband was disabled by 
pneumoconiosis, explained how the Social Security Administration’s medical evaluations 
did not match coal miners’ physical experience of black lung disease:  
The men that I work with, and the widows of the deceased miners, are not the best 
educated people in the world, because they had to go to work in the mines early, 
and this is the only work they have ever known, and now when they go for their 
X-rays, when they go for their medical examinations, they are denied their black 
lung disabilities… We only ask for what we feel this man is entitled. With his 
breathing gone, he cannot work, but he still has to live. I feel this man has done 
the hardest work there is, and he should be able to live as a person as he is.65 
 
Omechinski’s testimony cemented support for the black lung amendments and, in the 
formal setting of Congress, gave credence to the black lung activists’ campaign.  
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In late February 1972, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, after 
making further amendments, passed the bill unanimously and sent it to the Senate floor. 
In a report published in April 1972, the Senate stressed the importance of amending the 
original provisions of Title IV of the Federal Mine Act of 1969. According to the report, 
356,857 claims had been filed for benefits between December 30, 1969 and March 1972, 
and only 166,593 of those claims had been approved. Of that number, 91,784 claimants 
were disabled miners and 74,809 were widows. The Senate deduced from the statistics 
that problem of pneumoconiosis was much wider than Congress initially believed and 
that the black lung compensation program was not as broad as originally intended under 
Title IV.  
The Senate approved H.R. 9212 by voice vote on May 4 and sent it to the House 
of Representatives for further approval and final passage. The House and Senate reached 
a compromise by extending federal control of the black lung program for 18 months. The 
bill obligated the Social Security Administration to continue paying compensation until 
June 30, 1973, at which point the Department of Labor would temporarily assume 
responsibility for claims. The states and coal operators would assume control of the 
program on January 1, 1974. In addition, the final version of the bill mandated black lung 
benefits for double orphans and stipulated that miners with fifteen years of experience 
and a ‘totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment’ had pneumoconiosis.66 
Both the Senate and the House argued for the importance of the president signing the new 
bill, even though President Nixon vehemently opposed extending federal coverage of 
black lung compensation. His administration estimated that the new black lung bill would 
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cost the government an additional $4 billion per year, and coal operators $2 billion per 
year.67  
On May 10, the House passed the legislation by 275 to 122. Opponents 
immediately announced their opposition, arguing that compensation for disabled miners 
and their dependents should be the responsibility of state governments and operators. 
They also argued that the legislation would provide the foundation for broad 
compensation measures for other industries. There was speculation among the media that 
President Nixon would veto the bill. The Black Lung Association sought the immediate 
enforcement of the bill, so when President Nixon delayed signing the bill it took 
immediate action. On May 19, it shut down two large coal mines in Mingo County, West 
Virginia, and established picket lines.68  
Nixon signed the Black Lung Benefits Act into the law the following day, May 
20, despite his objection to it. In justifying his signing of the bill, Nixon claimed that 
pneumoconiosis was too large a problem for him to ignore, particularly given that so 
many miners and their families were in need of financial support.69 It was also a 
presidential election year. By refusing to sign the Black Lung Benefits Act, Nixon risked 
losing a sizeable portion of blue-collar support. The president advised all states to ensure 
their worker compensation programs covered pneumoconiosis before they assumed 
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control of black lung compensation in January 1974. Nixon explained that he had 
misgivings about the bill not because it provided support for miners and widows, but 
because it placed the onus for compensation on the federal government. He commented, 
“This legislation departs from the U.S. tradition that compensation for work-related 
accidents and diseases should be provided by State workmen’s compensation laws, 
financed by the industries containing the hazards. Responsibility for black lung 
compensation clearly should lie with the owners and operators of the mines.”70 Despite 
Nixon’s conviction that the federal government should not be responsible for federal 
black lung benefits, his signing of the bill marked a significant victory for the Black Lung 
Association. The association’s long campaign for the improvement of the black lung 
compensation program had succeeded.  
The amendments to the Title IV of the Federal Mine Act did not occur in 
isolation. Rather, they were part of a broad expansion of the social security program. In 
1972, Congress implemented the largest increase in benefits in the program’s history.71 In 
“The Politics of Social Security Expansion,” Edward Berkowitz and Daniel Fox argue 
that there was a consensus in Congress in the 1960s and 70s over the need to expand 
social security disability benefits across the board. Subsequently, Congress began to 
focus its energies on constituents who were previously denied benefits, including 
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dependents and young workers.72 Congress, therefore, enacted a broad legislative 
program in 1972 to provide benefits to injured and disabled workers. In doing so, it 
sought to improve the lives of people who were suffering from occupational injury and 
disease.  
The positive impact of the black lung benefits program was evident by late 1972. 
By December 1972, 88,100 retired miners and 169,100 widows and dependents were 
receiving benefits, a significant increase from the previous year.73 Ed Jewell, a retired 
coal miner, commented, “Before black lung (benefits) we just couldn’t make it without 
help from the children. Now we can really enjoy our family. I had four sons and I never 
told them what to do with their lives, but I’m glad none of them went into the mines.”74 
Activist Helen Powell witnessed directly how the Black Lung Amendments Act 
improved the lives of coal miners and their families. She remembered, “It was kind of a 
horrendous time, but in the end, it all paid off, and that made you feel good. When I could 
go into a store or walk down the street and somebody said, “Oh, Ms. Powell, thank you 
for helping us to get benefits, I was able to buy this, that and the other, and we plan to 
buy us a little house.” 75 Powell felt her efforts on behalf of the Black Lung Association 
had been worthwhile, as compensation had a positive impact on the lives of black lung 
victims and widows. She further commented, “Just small thank yous, for me that was just 
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like saying, “Here’s a million dollars for you,” because it helped you feel that you had 
done something good for somebody else.”76 
Congress continued to search for ways of improving the federal black lung 
compensation program.  In July 1973, the House General Labor Subcommittee convened 
to discuss four separate bills designed to amend further Title IV of the Federal Mine Act 
of 1969. Bill H.R. 3476 mandated the continuation of federal responsibility for black lung 
benefits for an additional two years, effectively delaying the transferal of the 
compensation program to state governments and the coal operators from its scheduled 
date of January 1974. The rationale behind this bill was that most states still did not have 
effective apparatus in place to distribute black lung compensation. Operators, determined 
to avoid responsibility for black lung compensation, testified in favor of this measure. 
Bill H.R. 8834 was designed to prevent the duplication of black lung benefits to 
individual widows. The two other legislative bills, H.R. 8835 and H.R. 8838, respectively 
eliminated and restricted the fees that lawyers were eligible to collect for assisting black 
lung claimants. Legal fees were a burgeoning problem in the coalfields, with attorneys 
collecting sizeable government payments as reimbursement for their work with black 
lung victims. 77  
The hearing revealed further weaknesses in the black lung benefits program. It 
showed the subcommittee was convinced that the state legislatures were unprepared to 
administer compensation for pneumoconiosis victims, and that a large proportion of 
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lawyers had clearly exploiting the program for their personal financial gain. Bills 8834, 
8835, and 8838 did not advance beyond the subcommittee. Bill 3476, however, became 
the foundation for the extension of the federal government’s management of the black 
lung benefits program.  
Despite the ongoing weaknesses in the federal compensation program, the Black 
Lung Benefits Act of 1972 significantly improved the ability of coal miners and widows 
to obtain federal compensation for pneumoconiosis. The Act passed as a result of a 
sustained campaign by the Black Lung Association, which engaged in protests and 
lobbying to convince Congress of the importance of stronger legislation. As with the 
passage of the West Virginia black lung law and the Federal Mine Act of 1969, 
grassroots, community-based protest played a significant role in legislative change. There 
were still obstacles, however, to effective health and safety enforcement in the coalfields, 
not least UMW President Tony Boyle. Miners for Democracy (MFD) actively 
campaigned for control of the union, not only to reform its approach to health and safety, 
but also to reinstate democratic practices and procedures. 
 
Miners for Democracy: Challenging the Union, Reforming Health and Safety 
With regard to health and safety issues, the UMW rank and file challenged the 
union hierarchy in a number of ways. First, they contested the union’s management of the 
Welfare and Retirement Fund through a major legal case. The UMW Welfare and 
Retirement Fund had been denying health benefits and pensions to a significant 
proportion of its members, even if they had actively been paying union dues. In response, 
over 5,000 miners formed an “organization of living dead men trying to help each 
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other.”78 In 1969, the Disabled Miners and Widows Association, Inc. (DMWA) brought a 
suit against the UMW known as the Blakenship case, after retired miner Willie Ray 
Blakenship. The DMWA planned to use the case to obtain benefits for those the WRF 
had deemed ‘ineligible.’ Under the direction of lawyer Harry Huge, the DMWA argued 
that the Fund’s regulations were “unjust,” and prevented 70,000 miners, widows, and 
dependents from claiming benefits to which they were entitled. The association filed for 
breach of trust in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia before Judge 
Gerhard Gessel.79  
Blakenship, who had worked for more than 20 years in the coal industry, applied 
for a pension. He was denied. The union argued he had been a self-employed partner at 
several mining operations, which meant not all of his working time could be accepted. 
Similarly, 60-year old Robert White of Gordon, West Virginia, failed to receive his 
pension from the WRF because he had not paid his dues for 90 days after he retired. 
Despite the fact he had worked in the mines for 23 years and had to quit because of black 
lung disease, he was still subject to inflexible rules.80 Originally, miners had one year to 
pay the extra dues after leaving, and White claimed he was not aware of the switch to the 
new deadline of 90 days. The Blakenship vs. Boyle law suit charged that the Fund, jointly 
administered by the coal industry and the UMW, had been improperly administered. P. 
                                                 
78 Chicago Tribune, March 26, 1971, 2. 
 
79 Richard P. Mulcahy, A Social Contract for the Coalfields: The Rise and Fall of the 
United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund (Knoxville: The 
University of Tennessee Press, 2000), 157. 
 
80 Chicago Tribune, March 26, 1971, 2. 
 
  
 
281
W. Hendricks of the Disabled Miners and Widows Associaiton claimed the union had 
denied pensions to around 70,000 retired miners.81 
Attorney Harry Huge wanted to determine if the WRF trustees had managed the 
fund in the best interests of the beneficiaries. He found that, in many cases, they had not. 
For instance, the trustees had placed funds in non-interest bearing accounts, had failed to 
pursue delinquent royalty payments by operators, and had implemented President Boyle’s 
unauthorized pension increase in 1969. After gaining access to the files of the Welfare 
and Retirement Fund, Huge made the Fund’s “liquidity” the central issue in the case.82 At 
the legal hearing for Blakenship vs. Boyle, Josephine Roche, one of the Fund’s managers, 
admitted that the Fund’s income was significantly higher than its expenditure. Judge 
Gerhard Gessell, presiding over the hearing in the U.S. Court of Appeals, concluded that 
a breach of trust had taken place. He argued that the UMW had mismanaged the Fund by 
using it to limit the union’s tax payments.83 Money added to the Welfare and Retirement 
Fund was not classified as taxable income. While Judge Gessel argued there was no 
evidence of a conspiracy, he believed that the practices introduced and maintained by 
former UMW President John L. Lewis had been detrimental to the miners’ best interests. 
Gessel ordered a change in the Fund’s administration.84  
 The outcome of the Blakenship vs Boyle legal case further undermined Tony 
Boyle’s leadership of the UMW and offered hope to sick and disabled miners who had 
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been denied benefits by the Welfare and Retirement Fund. The victory was indicative of 
the activism occurring in the Appalachian coalfields. Like the Black Lung Association, 
which employed the services of legal advocates to challenge the Social Security 
Administration’s compensation policies, the Association of Disabled Miners and Widows 
engaged in legal action to challenge the union’s management of its health and pension 
benefits for members. In the early 1970s, legal action, more than strikes and spontaneous 
demonstrations, was the key to improving compensation and benefits for miners and 
widows.  
 Boyle’s leadership of the UMW was beginning to unravel. On March 31, 1972, a 
federal jury convicted Boyle on thirteen charges of conspiracy and making illegal 
political contributions with union funds. Specifically, he was convicted of one conspiracy 
charge, eleven charges of violating the Corrupt Practices Act, and a further charge of 
violating the Landrum Griffin Act by converting union funds into political campaign 
contributions. Boyle faced thirty-two years in prison and $120,000 in fines. Under the 
terms of the Landrum Griffin Act, he risked losing his position as union president and the 
right to hold office for five years. A union associate said that the union would launch an 
appeal once Boyle was sentenced. Boyle was freed on personal bond until the sentence 
was issued. One of his colleagues told reporters, “We’re all shocked they threw the book 
at him.”85  
 Boyle’s convictions were a direct result of the investigation the Department of 
Labor had started in January 1970, shortly after the Yablonski murders. They also 
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followed the order the previous year by the U.S. District Court for Boyle to stand down 
from his position as the head of the union’s Welfare and Retirement Fund. In contrast, the 
jury acquitted John Owens, the union’s secretary-treasurer, and James Kmetz, its chief 
lobbyist.86 Just weeks later, on May 1 1972, the Department of Labor overturned the 
results of the December 1969 election of the United Mine Workers. Stating that there had 
been massive irregularities in the voting procedures, the Department scheduled a new 
election with full government supervision for December of that year.87 
Miners for Democracy immediately began preparing for the new election. On 
May 27, 1972, the organization held a nomination convention at Wheeling Jesuit 
University in West Virginia. J. Davitt McAteer, a former student of the university, had 
gained permission from the priest in charge of the university to use the campus for the 
convention. He later recalled, “We couldn’t get anybody to host the convention because 
they were afraid that the union and coal companies would be displeased because they 
hosted a dissident union movement convention.”88 Five hundred people attended the 
convention to vote for a candidate to oppose Boyle in the forthcoming election. There 
were delegates from Illinois, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Virginia, and Alabama. Mike 
Trbovich, the leader of the Miners for Democracy and a close friend of the late Jock 
Yablonski, entered the convention as favorite for the presidential nomination. However, 
the delegates voted for Arnold Miller as presidential candidate, with Trbovich as vice-
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presidential candidate and Harry Patrick as the nominee for Secretary-Treasurer. 
McAteer, who attended the convention, witnessed how the delegates made the decision 
regarding the slate: 
Mike Trbovich obviously held the mantle because he had been very close to 
Yablonski. But Mike was of Polish descent and it was feared that the name alone 
and the ethnic background would not fly in places like Kentucky, Alabama, and 
southern West Virginia. And so we were in a kind of deadlock, and Harry Patrick 
was there, but he was considered too young. It came down to the day of the vote 
and Miller’s name was put up as the compromise candidate, someone who was 
not objectionable. Since he had not much of a track record he had not made 
enemies.89 
 
As McAteer explains, the MFD delegates chose Miller not because he was more qualified 
than Trbovich, but to ensure the widest possible support for their candidate in the 
forthcoming election. In The Miners’ Fight For Democracy, Paul Clark explains that 
Miller’s position as head of the Black Lung Association facilitated his nomination, as he 
was able to use the BLA as a political base. Furthermore, prior to the convention Miller 
had enhanced his reputation in Miners For Democracy and among the rank and file by 
campaigning on behalf of the MFD cause.90  
 Having nominated its election slate, Miners for Democracy ran on a reform 
platform. The organization proposed district autonomy, including the right of districts to 
elect their own officials and representatives. It also advocated the overhaul of the union’s 
administration, including the reduction of leaders’ salaries and the end of nepotism, as 
practiced by Boyle and other high-level officials. More importantly, however, MFD 
emphasized the importance of dealing with membership priorities such as organizing and 
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health and safety. According to Paul Clark, the Miners for Democracy had three 
advantages over the previous insurgent campaign led by Yablonski. First, the election 
was to be organized and monitored by the Department of Labor. In the December 
election, voting was to take place over an eight-day period, to allow the Department to 
monitor voting at every local union. The Department ordered the UMW to publish MFD 
campaign material in the United Mine Workers Journal, and instructed candidates to file 
reports of their expenditure.91 Second, among the rank and file there was much stronger 
support for reform than in mid-1969. Paul John Nyden estimates that the MFD campaign 
gained the support of an additional 37,214 young, reform-orientated miners over the 
Yablonski campaign. Third, the increasing litigation against Boyle, including the April 
1971 ruling by the U.S. District Court that he was guilty of embezzling union funds, and 
the Department of Labor’s voiding of the 1969 election, gave the MFD an advantage over 
their opponents.92  
 Boyle’s legal troubles and the intervention of the Department of Labor gave 
renewed confidence to the rank and file who desired a change in the union’s leadership. 
At a campaign meeting in late July 1972, retired miner Casimir Shuck told reporters, 
“We’re not afraid now. We used to have to whisper it to friends. But now we talk up. 
Boyle didn’t run the union right.”93 Shuck’s comments emphasized that much of Boyle’s 
support was attributable to his use of intimidation. With Boyle now under scrutiny from 
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the Department of Labor, the rank and file members of the UMW were increasingly 
speaking out against him. 
 The MFD candidates started the election with a slight lead over Boyle. The ballots 
opened on December 1, and voting extended over the following eight days. On December 
15, the Department of Labor announced that Arnold Miller had won the election, 
obtaining 56 percent of the ballot to the 44 percent obtained by Boyle. In his victory 
speech, Miller reaffirmed his campaign pledges to move the union headquarters back to 
the coalfields and to attend to key issues such as health and safety.94 The victory of 
Miners for Democracy was a significant development, particularly for the rank and file 
miners in the coalfields. It showed that democracy had returned to the coalfields, after 
several years of corruption under President Boyle. The victory was the direct result of the 
Department of Labor’s monitoring of the election, which prevented Boyle from rigging 
the ballot and, more importantly, enabled miners to vote freely. In addition, it meant the 
UMW would now be more attentive to miners’ working conditions and issues such as 
compensation. Miller’s victory promised to improve health and safety in the Appalachian 
coalfields. 
The victory of the Miners of Democracy, however, did not bring immediate 
changes to working conditions in the coalfields. After the MFD election victory, the 
Department of Labor was responsible for orchestrating the transfer of power within the 
United Mine Workers headquarters. According to McAteer, the process of installing the 
new leadership was “very acrimonious, there was a great deal of weeping and gnashing 
of teeth and anger and mean-spiritedness on both sides. There was a very contentious and 
                                                 
94 New York Times, November 27, 1972, 40; Washington Post, December 16, 1972, A1. 
 
  
 
287
cantankerous transfer of power that meant the other side was left out, angered, mean, and 
unhappy.”95 Once the MFD had assumed control of the union, it encountered several 
other problems.  
 First, Arnold Miller lacked the experience for his position and faced an enormous 
workload. His only previous leadership roles were head of UMW local 2093 and 
president of the Black Lung Association. He did not possess the administrative skills 
necessary to manage the national leadership of a major union. Second, the new union 
leadership dismantled Miners for Democracy as an insurgent organization. Miller and his 
colleagues believed that MFD had become the institutional union and that it was 
unnecessary to maintain it as a separate organization. The new union leaders were 
worried that, if allowed to continue, Miners for Democracy might pose a threat to the 
stability of the United Mine Workers by creating a power struggle. To keep the MFD 
alive would have required a concerted effort, as it had always been a small network of 
committed activists. In addition, most of the original activists from the Miners for 
Democracy were now too preoccupied with running for office in the UMW districts to 
keep the organization alive. By abandoning the framework that had enabled them to take 
over the UMW, however, the new leaders created a significant problem. They effectively 
removed the mechanism by which the rank and file could have held their leaders 
accountable for their policies and decisions.96 
 Another problem was that Miners for Democracy had to divert its attention from 
its platform issues such as health and safety to tackle the deeply entrenched corruption in 
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the union. Thus, the new leaders could not immediately focus on the real issues that 
affected the rank and file miners. Because corruption and mismanagement were so 
endemic in the United Mine Workers, the leadership had to reconstruct the entire union 
from the ground up. Miller even acknowledged that the entire union apparatus had 
stopped working. Furthermore, the new leaders were divided over how to tackle this 
problem. They could not agree if they should redefine the union’s relationship with the 
coal operators, rewrite the union constitution, or remove all traces of Boyle’s 
leadership.97 
 Once Miller and his colleagues had taken measures to address the institutional 
problems in the United Mine Workers, they started to implement the key measures in 
their reform platform. Health and safety was a key priority, but the union’s stringent 
approach to this matter caused concern for operators. In a letter to Arnold Miller, Guy 
Farmer, the President of the Bituminous Coal Operators’ Association, said many coal 
operators were concerned about the union’s health and safety policies as reported in the 
local and national press. He wrote, “They are especially apprehensive and somewhat 
alarmed at some of the published reports which seem to imply a unilateral program of 
enforcement [by the union] which goes so far as to preempt the government agencies and 
the mine operators’ responsibility for health and safety.”98 Farmer’s letter reiterated the 
close relationship that had existed between the coal operators and Tony Boyle. With a 
new president leading the UMW, the operators feared the union’s tougher stance on 
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health and safety. Farmer’s letter further implied that some operators were spreading 
propaganda about the union’s new health and safety policies. It was completely untrue, 
not to mention unrealistic, for the union to supersede the federal government in health 
and safety enforcement.  
 
The Mine Safety and Enforcement Administration (MESA) 
 In May 1973, the Nixon administration tackled the poor enforcement record of the 
Bureau of Mines by creating a new agency, the Mine Safety and Health Administration 
(MESA). Located in the Department of the Interior, MESA was solely responsible for 
enforcing health and safety in all coal, metal, and non-metal coal mines. Unlike the 
Bureau of Mines, it did not conduct research on mineral production or promote the 
interests of mining industries. Although the coal mine fatality rate had improved in the 
past two years, the Nixon administration acknowledged that the Bureau was ineffective at 
enforcing health and safety.  
James Day, a 42-year old Korean War veteran, became head of the Mine 
Enforcement and Safety Administration. Day graduated from Piedmont College in the 
early 1950s with a degree in Business Administration and Accounting, and he was a 
former employee of the C.I.A. He had a law degree and had spent time in private practice 
as a specialist in international law. Since March 1970, he had been director of the Interior 
Department’s Office of Hearings and Appeals, which had been created specifically to 
oversee the management of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. On 
accepting that position, he later commented, “I took the job because it sounded highly 
challenging. The office had just been created to meet the requirements of the 1969 Act, 
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and the job called for organizing the office, assembling different groups that had been in 
other Interior Department offices, such as in the Bureau of Land Management and the 
Solicitor’s Office, and setting up procedures and standards.” 99 Day planned to improve 
health and safety enforcement by giving more support to federal mine inspectors and 
encouraging them to make swift decisions about penalties for violations. Under the 
Bureau of Mines, inspectors were over-worked and frequently under-qualified. 
Furthermore, their decisions about penalties were often over-ruled by Bureau managers. 
Day, therefore, planned to enhance inspectors’ ability to enforce the Federal Mine Act. 
Yet, coal mine inspectors’ work was complicated by the fact that they were now 
responsible for inspecting both coal and non-coal mines. In fact, Day sought to introduce 
similar inspection standards for all types of mine. 
The creation of MESA was accompanied by the reorganization of the federal 
inspection system. Under the Bureau of Mines, there were nine inspection districts for 
coal mines and six inspection districts for metal and non-metal mines. The new system in 
the Mine Safety and Health Administration contained six autonomous regions that were 
each responsible for all types of mining. Each region had its own administrator who was 
responsible for reporting to the MESA associate administrator in Washington, D.C. The 
reorganization of the federal inspection system was accompanied by a significant 
increase in the mine inspection force.100 Although the Mine Enforcement and Safety 
Administration was not responsible for mining research or upholding corporate interests, 
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100 Chironis, “Jim Day’s MESA,” Coal Age, November 1974, 75; Daniel Curran, Dead 
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from the outset its structure limited its ability to enforce health and safety in the coal 
industry. Like the Bureau of Mines, it was located in the Department of the Interior, 
which did not convey a strong commitment to mine health and safety. Moreover, the 
agency’s responsibility for mines in all mineral industries prevented it from focusing on 
hazards specific to the coal industry.  
 During 1973, the Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration levied 76,000 
violation notices against coal operators. The operators argued that the law was applied 
too stringently and complained that inspectors did not make assessments based on the 
circumstances of individual operations. By the end of 1973, operators across the country 
had already lodged 15,000 appeals before the courts. Day contended that MESA would 
not be able to enforce health and safety if operators kept filing appeals. Although Day 
was employing several attorneys to pursue unpaid fines, lawyers for the National 
Association of Coal Operators advised operators not to pay and to file legal complaints 
instead. The effectiveness of MESA as an enforcement agency only stretched so far. In 
1974, the number of mine closures was fifty percent higher than the previous year. 
Moreover, there was a fifteen percent increase in the number of citations issues by the 
federal government, while the number of extensions granted to operators for the payment 
of fines declined by approximately thirty percent. Yet, the overall number of inspections 
conducted by the federal government actually declined. There were fewer inspections in 
1974 than there were in 1973. 101 
 In late 1974, James Day proposed a number of amendments to the Federal Mine 
Act. The United Mine Workers especially objected to his proposal of modifying the 
                                                 
101 Chironis, “Jim Day’s MESA,” Coal Age, November 1974, 74-75; Curran, Dead Laws 
for Dead Men, 121. 
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system of mandatory fines. Day argued that operators who committed only minor 
violations should be issued a warning ticket, and then fined substantially if they did not 
permanently rectify the violation. He further proposed that operators should have the 
right to appeal only through the U.S. Court of Appeals, and not district courts. In 
retaliation, the UMW argued that MESA was ineffective at collecting fines. The union 
alleged that the agency settled for thirty-five to forty percent of the original amount 
assessed for violations. Day replied that this measure only applied to old violations issued 
prior to May 1973. He claimed that, for new citations, MESA typically collected eighty 
to ninety percent of the assessed amount.  Moreover, he claimed that operators’ lawyers 
typically used delaying tactics to prevent collection of the fine.102 Despite his claims, Day 
pursued a weak enforcement strategy.  
The union’s frustration with the policies of the Mine Enforcement and Safety 
Administration prompted it to adopt its own health and safety measures, with the goal of 
reducing mine casualties and fatalities. The UMW gave additional support to local safety 
committees by providing safety seminars and affirming the right of these committees to 
remove workers from hazardous conditions. The safety division also began to take more 
decisive action over the issue of dust control. After the passage of the Mine Act in 1969, 
a federal organization called the Interim Compliance Panel had issued permits to some 
coal companies that temporarily exempted them from fulfilling the minimum dust 
requirements. The companies who held permits now sought an extension. The safety 
division, along with the union’s legal department, made their objections about an 
extension known before the Interim Compliance Panel. The safety division pursued other 
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measures, such as providing all its members with a safety manual and monitoring the 
performance of the Bureau of Mines and MESA.103 
The action taken by the United Mine Workers underscored the limits of the 
federal government’s health and safety enforcement efforts. Despite the Nixon 
administration’s creation of the Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration, the UMW 
leadership was convinced that it was continuing to evade strong enforcement measures,. 
While the decline in coal mine fatalities from 1973 to 1975 suggests otherwise, the 
federal government’s enforcement policies were still flawed. MESA frequently did not 
order closure notices for particularly dangerous mines and failed to enforce the strict 
regulations for dust control.   
It was not only the UMW leadership that protested the federal government’s 
approach to mine health and safety in the mid-1970s. Only three years after the passage 
of the Black Lung Benefits Act, rank and file miners were questioning the federal 
government’s management of the black lung compensation program. The transfer of the 
program from the federal government to the states had not taken place in 1974 as 
originally planned, because the Nixon administration realized that too many state 
legislatures were unprepared to administer black lung benefits. Despite the liberal terms 
of the Black Lung Benefits Act, many coal miners still were not receiving compensation. 
On September 16, 1975, around three hundred miners demonstrated in McPherson 
Square in Washington, D.C.104 The following day, nearly 1,500 miners protested on 
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Capitol Hill, adamant that the benefits distribution system was unfair. They demanded the 
passage of an amended black lung benefits act, written by Representative Carl Perkins 
(D-KY). Perkins’ bill automatically awarded benefits to miners with at least fifteen years 
experience. Otho Sisk, aged sixty-three, was among the demonstrators. Sisk’s father had 
worked as a miner and died of lung disease in 1953. Now Sisk himself was suffering 
from pneumoconiosis, having labored as a miner since the age of sixteen. Despite the fact 
that four doctors had verified his illness, he had not been granted compensation.105  
Developments in the House of Representatives in 1976 demonstrated that the 
miners’ goal of more equitable black lung compensation was still far from a reality. 
While the House was not averse to Perkins’ proposal of automatic compensation, it 
abandoned Perkins’ original bill in favor of a more restrictive bill. The bill stipulated that 
only coal miners with thirty years underground experience should automatically qualify 
for some benefits. A number of Congressmen argued that the bill should be modified to 
include only miners who had worked for this amount of time before the 1969 legislation 
came into force. The bill did not advance through the House. 106 
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Conclusion   
From early 1971 to May 1972, the Black Lung Association demonstrated the 
power of collective protest and community-based activism to generate legislative change. 
Although the BLA had expanded into a national organization, it continued to operate at 
the grassroots level: local chapters, composed of lay advocates, disabled miners, and 
widows were crucial to its activism. In contrast to its spontaneous campaign in West 
Virginia in early 1969, the Black Lung Association’s lobbying campaign against the 
federal government in 1972 was planned and organized in advance. The efforts of the 
BLA directly contributed to the Nixon administration’s passage of the landmark Black 
Lung Benefits Act of 1972. 
  The significance of collective activism in the coalfields was further exemplified 
by the victory of Miners for Democracy in the 1972 United Mine Workers election. The 
candidates on the MFD election ticket – Arnold Miller, Mike Trbovich, and Harry Patrick 
– orchestrated an effective campaign across the coalfields, aided considerably by Tony 
Boyle’s conviction of fraud under the Landrum Griffin Act. A large number of coal 
miners, no longer intimidated by the national leadership of the UMW, supported the 
MFD in the election. The Association of Disabled Miners and Widows’ successful 
lawsuit against the UMW Welfare and Retirement Fund further demonstrated the 
growing momentum of reform elements in the coalfields. Yet, the flaws of coalfield 
activism were also evident. The Miners for Democracy developed a platform on health 
safety that, once in power, they were unable to implement because of the endemic 
corruption at every level of the UMW national leadership. In addition, the Black Lung 
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Benefits Act did not fulfill its original promises. By 1975, the federal government was 
still denying benefits to many black lung victims and widows. 
 During this period, the Nixon administration, as well as passing the Black Lung 
Benefits Act, created the Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration for the 
enforcement of mine health and safety. The creation of MESA emphasized the poor 
enforcement record of the U.S. Bureau of Mines. As a result of its dual responsibility for 
enforcing health and safety and promoting corporate interests, the Bureau had failed to 
uphold the terms of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. Although 
MESA adopted a tougher approach to enforcement than the Bureau, there were still flaws 
in its policies. For instance, typically it failed to collect the entire amount of fines 
assessed for health and safety violations. The new leadership of the United Mine Workers 
was particularly critical of the Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration’s policies. 
 From 1971 to 1975, there were significant developments in coal mine health and 
safety in the United States. Responding to activism by the Black Lung Association, the 
federal government passed major legislation in the form of the Black Lung Benefits Act.  
Further, it created the Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration as a result of the 
failures of the Bureau of Mines. Miners for Democracy gained control of the United 
Mine Workers and, with their ascension to power, reformed the union’s approach to the 
working conditions of the rank and file. Yet, as shown in this chapter, such developments 
did not solve the health and safety crisis for rank and file coal miners. They still labored 
in dangerous conditions, and many who were afflicted by pneumoconiosis were unable to 
obtain black lung benefits. 
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Chapter Seven 
Progress and Decline: 
The Energy Crisis, Legislative Reform, and Deregulation 
 
Introduction 
Early on the morning of February 26, 1972, after several days of heavy snow and 
rain, a coal slag dam high above Buffalo Creek in the Appalachian region collapsed, 
sending millions of gallons of thick, black sludge crashing through the valley. Owned by 
the Pittston Coal Company, the 200-feet long dam was designed to hold waste products 
removed from coal after its extraction. Bituminous coal companies removed impurities 
from coal to turn it into a commercially viable product. The collapse of the dam was 
triggered by twenty inches of snow and three inches of rain. The torrent of coal sludge 
carried away cars and houses with its force. Within a few hours, 37 people had officially 
died, either drowned or buried by landslides. There was some confusion, however, over 
the exact death toll. The time of the disaster, combined with the lack of warning about the 
oncoming water, meant residents had little time to escape. Lieutenant Ellis of the Beckley 
police said the presumed death toll was 90 people, a figure that Governor Archer Moore 
described as “a catastrophic loss of life.” In light of these events, Moore declared Buffalo 
Creek a disaster area.1  
As the water surged through the valley, over 400 people had fled their homes. 
Lorado, a small community closest to the disaster site, was wiped out. The black, sludge-
                                                 
1 Raleigh Register (Beckley, WV), February 27, 1972, 1 and 2; Sunday Gazette-Mail 
(Charleston, WV), February 27, 1972, 1A and 10A; Herald-Dispatch (Huntington, WV), 
February 27, 1972, 1. 
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filled water, which some eyewitnesses claimed was twenty feet high, destroyed roads and 
demolished bridges in its path. As refugees fled to emergency shelters further down the 
valley, high winds and heavy rain thwarted rescuers’ efforts to gain access to Lorado. 
Three private helicopters eventually brought the most seriously injured people out of the 
settlement.2 One survivor at Lorado, Henry Kilgore, reported that he and his family fled 
to the hills when they saw the water rushing past the house. When they turned back, “the 
house was floating down through the coal camp.” Other survivors fleeing from the water 
told a state trooper they had counted 52 bodies in the hollow. The water cut a seventeen-
mile path through the valley, causing devastation to several other communities. State 
officials evacuated people living near the Guyandotte River when its level became 
dangerously high. The water lost much of its force when it reached Accoville, a 
settlement twelve miles from the slag dam where the valley widened.3  
By the following day, February 27, at least 60 people were confirmed dead, and 
more than 4,000 of the 7,000 people living in the Buffalo Creek area were homeless. 
After touring the area, Governor Moore announced that 80 percent of the homes in a 
dozen mining communities had been destroyed. He announced his intention to ask the 
state legislature for $1 million in relief. Later, after meeting with representatives from the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the governor announced the state would 
transport mobile homes for the victims. Over 400 people were still missing, but it was 
unclear if they were dead or had gone in search of family members and relatives. South 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
 
3 Raleigh Register (Beckley, WV), February 27, 1972, 1 and 2; Sunday Gazette-Mail 
(Charleston, WV), February 27, 1972, 1A and 10A; Herald-Dispatch (Huntington, WV), 
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Man Elementary School had become a temporary morgue, although only ten bodies had 
been positively identified. Amid the confusion, it became apparent that the people living 
along the Creek had been given virtually no warning about the impending disaster. Otto 
Mutters, the Logan Country Deputy Sheriff, said an official of the Pittston Coal Company 
had assured him at 6:30 a.m. that “everything was okay” with the dam.4  
 The lack of stable roads and bridges hindered efforts to rescue survivors and 
recover bodies. Members of the National Guard used bulldozers and earth-moving 
equipment to hunt for bodies buried in the wreckage, while the homeless sought refuge in 
schools and churches. A group of more than hundred survivors arrived in Wharton, 
Boone County, after walking over the hills to safety. Volunteers and relief organizations, 
including the Red Cross and the Salvation Army, helped to provide relief and to 
administer vaccines and medical treatment.5  
There was conflict over the exact cause of the disaster. Some people claimed that 
the earthen dam collapsed from the pressure of heavy snows and rain, while others said 
that Elk Lick, a Buffalo Creek tributary, broke through the slag dam, causing it to break. 
Ben Tudor, the general superintendent of the Buffalo Mining Company, a subsidiary of 
the Pittston Coal Company, claimed that the West Virginia government had contributed 
to the disaster. He argued that it had prohibited the company from dumping excess coal 
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sludge in the valley, resulting in increased pressure on the dam. Tudor did not mention, 
however, that the Pittston Company had failed to maintain the dam properly.6  
Several weeks passed before the full scale of the devastation became apparent. Of 
the 5,000 people living in the valley, 125 were killed, 1,121 were injured, and 4,000 were 
left homeless.7 The Buffalo Creek disaster was significant for several reasons. First, it 
showed that the coal industry threatened the welfare of entire mining communities, not 
just the miners who labored underground. Throughout Appalachia, similar impoundment 
dams jeopardized the property, safety, and lives of people living in mining camps. 
Second, the disaster emphasized that the coal industry posed a threat to the natural 
environment. The collapse of the Pittston dam not only caused significant loss of life and 
widespread homelessness, it also damaged the landscape by polluting water supplies, 
destroying trees and vegetation, and contaminating valley streams. Third, the events at 
Buffalo Creek highlighted the failure of the federal government to regulate the 
environmental hazards of the coal industry. Despite the fact that the U.S. Geological 
Survey had compiled substantial evidence that coal dams were a significant human and 
                                                 
6 Charleston Daily Mail, February 28, 1972, 1 and 2; Charleston Gazette, February 28, 
1972, 1A and 2A; Post-Herald, February 28, 1972, 6. 
 
7 For full details of the disaster, see various reports in the Historical Collection at the 
National Mine Safety Academy, Mine Safety and Health Administration, Beckley, West 
Virginia:  The Buffalo Creek Flood and Disaster: Official Report from the Governor’s Ad 
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environmental hazard, the influence of the coal industry in state politics was an obstacle 
to legislative action.8 
The Buffalo Creek disaster reflected the broader human and environmental 
hazards of coal mining in the early 1970s. Mining communities and the environment 
were under threat from the widespread practice of surface mining. This form of mining, 
which involved extracting coal directly from the ground with machinery, threatened the 
health and safety of miners and their families and caused widespread pollution and 
devastation to the natural landscape. Surface mining was by no means new. As Chad 
Montrie shows in his book To Save the Land and People, the practice of surface mining 
in Appalachia pre-dated World War I. 9 In the early 1970s, however, the practice became 
more widespread not just in Appalachia, but in western states.  
The expansion of surface mining in the United States was driven primarily by the 
energy crisis. As domestic oil reserves began to decline and the price of imported oil 
continued to rise, the country renewed its emphasis on coal as a source of electrical 
power. The federal government, scientists, and the United Mine Workers stressed the 
versatility of coal, not just as an energy source in its own right, but also as a substance 
that was easily converted into oil, petroleum, and other fuels. Coal operators increasingly 
turned to surface mining to extract the coal as cheaply and efficiently as possible.  
 This chapter will examine the complex relationship between the energy crisis, 
miners’ health and safety, and the environment in the coal industry during the 1970s. It 
                                                 
8 Charleston Daily Mail, February 28, 1972, 2A. 
 
9 For further information, see Chad Montrie, To Save The Land And People: A History of 
Opposition to Surface Coal Mining in Appalachia (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2003), particularly chapter two. 
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will argue that the federal government and the coal companies focused on increased coal 
production as an immediate solution to the energy crisis, while giving little regard to its 
long-term effects on coal miners, their communities, and the natural environment. In 
addition, the chapter will focus on coal mine health and safety during the Jimmy Carter 
and Ronald Reagan administrations, from 1977 to 1988. It will show that President Carter 
addressed many of the environmental and health and safety hazards of the coal industry 
by signing the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 and the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. The chapter will further demonstrate, however, 
that his legislative achievements were undermined by the Reagan administration’s 
policies of deregulation. 
From 1972 to 1988, there were notable advances in coal mine health and safety. 
The fatality rate declined in this period, while President Carter strengthened legislative 
measures designed to protect coal miners and the environment. Yet, other factors 
undermined the improvements in coal miners’ working conditions. The energy crisis 
prompted operators to prioritize coal production ahead of health and safety, while 
President Reagan’s deregulatory philosophy led him to make significant cuts in federal 
enforcement and the black lung benefits program. The sixteen-year period from 1972 to 
1988, therefore, was marked by both progress and decline. 
 
Coal Mining and the Energy Crisis 
As early as the summer of 1971, President Richard Nixon warned the United 
States that an energy crisis was imminent. In an address to Congress, he explained that 
the country was experiencing energy shortages because of a sharp increase in demand 
  
 
303
over the previous four years. He announced that the nation could avert the crisis by 
limiting the importation of foreign oil, developing nuclear power, and increasing coal 
production. He emphasized the importance of excavating coal located under federal 
lands. Nixon believed that coal would not only fuel the nation’s power plants, but that it 
would provide an important source of home heating and could be converted into natural 
gas. 10 In the early 1970s, coal accounted for a growing share of the electrical energy 
market, while the place of oil in the market declined. In 1969, coal generated 706 billion 
Kilowatt-hours of electricity, while petroleum accounted for 138 billion Kilowatt-hours. 
In 1973, coal generated 848 billion Kilowatt-hours, while petroleum accounted for 314 
billion Kilowatt-hours. To compensate for the decline in imports of oil, the United States 
turned to coal as a viable alternative.11   
The administration’s plan for increased coal production was dependent on the 
growing sector of surface mining. Many of the country’s new surface mines were located 
in western states such as Colorado, South Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana. In the early 
1970s, surface mining became more widespread in the United States than traditional 
underground mining. In 1968, underground coal mining accounted for 346.6 million short 
tons of coal production, while surface mining accounted for 210.1 million short tons.12 
Just four years later, in 1973, surface mining represented almost half of the nation’s coal 
                                                 
10 New York Times, July 7, 1971, pg. 1; “Special Message to Congress on Energy 
Resources, June 4, 1971,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard 
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(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1972), 704-714.  
 
11 Franklin Tugwell, The Energy Crisis and the American Political Economy: Politics 
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production. That year, underground mining accounted for 300.1 million short tons of 
production, while production at surface mines amounted to 298.5 million short tons.13 
Surface mining was more cost effective and required less manpower than underground 
mining. Supporters also emphasized that surface mining was twice as productive per man 
as underground mining and much safer.14 Statistically, surface mining resulted in fewer 
injuries and fatalities than underground mining, but that was largely because it required a 
much smaller workforce. In the Eastern and Appalachian coalfields, 200 men were 
typically required to produce one million tons of coal per year. In the surface mining 
industry, the same amount of coal could be produced with just ten miners.15  
The growth of surface mining was partly attributable to the stringent terms of the 
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. According to Daniel Curran, from 
1969 to 1974, the Federal Mine Act caused a twenty-two percent decrease in the number 
of underground mines in the United States and an eighteen percent increase in the number 
of surface mines. Small underground mine operators could not afford the cost of 
installing new equipment and of paying penalties for health and safety violations. During 
this period, 588 underground mines closed, 70.7 percent of which were located in 
Kentucky and West Virginia. The majority of the underground coal mines in those states 
were small marginal mines, which, prior to the passage of the 1969 act, were typically 
                                                 
13 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Coal Production in the United States: An 
Historical Overview (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 3. 
 
14 New York Times, July 17, 1971, pg. 24; “The Price of Strip Mining,” Time, March 22, 
1971, 47. 
 
15 New York Times, August 22, 1971, 1 and 49; Miller, “The Energy Crisis As A Coal 
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classified as ‘non-gassy.’ 16 James Day, the head of the Mine Enforcement and Safety 
Administration, claimed that more than half of the remaining mines formerly defined as 
“non-gassy” were still not in compliance with the legislation regarding methane levels 
and, therefore, faced the risk of closure.17 
The accessibility of western coal enabled large energy conglomerates to lease 
enormous reserves. Peabody Coal had leased more than 8.7 billion tons of coal, while 
Continental Oil had leased 8.1 billion tons, and Union Pacific had leased more than 10 
billion tons. UMW President Arnold Miller predicted that this represented only a tiny 
fraction of future coal production if the energy cartel was allowed to continue leasing 
coal without regulatory controls. The industry, claimed Miller, was waiting until oil 
supplies were exhausted before selling its coal. He wrote, “The biggest oil-coal combines 
are sitting on vast reserves of readily recoverable coal. But that coal will come out of the 
ground only when the men who own it can be sure of the price they will get for it.”18 
With demand for coal at a premium, as a result of the country’s increasing energy 
requirements, there was little incentive for the major corporations to focus on health and 
safety. 
Like underground mining, surface mining presented a number of health and safety 
hazards to the labor force. In particular, miners risked being crushed, maimed, or 
                                                 
16 Daniel Curran, Dead Laws for Dead Men: The Politics of Federal Coal Mine Health 
and Safety Legislation (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), 120. 
 
17 Ibid. 
 
18 Ibid., 39. 
 
  
 
306
electrocuted by machinery.19 Despite the open-air environment of surface mines, miners 
also risked developing black lung disease. The large mechanical shovels and draglines 
used to excavate the coal from the ground created a permanent cloud of coal dust over 
surface mine operations. Congress included surface miners in the Black Lung Benefits 
Act of 1972, recognizing that the disease had a significant impact on them. Organized 
labor, however, did little to address the health and safety hazards of surface mining. In 
fact, the growth of surface mining undermined the position of labor unions in the 
coalfields.20 
Historically, the Western Federation of Miners (WFM) was the main organizing 
force in the western coalfields. Founded in 1893 by miners from several states in the 
Rocky Mountain region, the WFM achieved significant gains in wages and hours, 
particularly in Colorado after the Cripple Creek strike of 1894. The union’s affiliation 
with the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1911 further augmented its bargaining 
power, and enabled it to establish a strong presence in the Lake Super copper region, 
which it had previously struggled to organize. In 1918, the WFM changed its name to the 
International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers. Its declining power in the 
ensuing decades prompted it to merge with the United Steel Workers in 1967. By the 
                                                 
19 For individual reports on accidents at strip mines, see Mining Enforcement and Safety 
Administration (MESA) and Homes Safety Association, “Abstract From Fatal Accident, 
August 1973,” Folder 19, Box 1, United Mine Workers Safety Division Office Files, 
Special Collections Library, Pennsylvania State University, State College, Pennsylvania; 
Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA) and Homes Safety Association, 
“Abstract from Fatal Accident, May 1974,” Folder 21, Box 1, UMW Safety Division 
Office Files, PSU Special Collections. 
 
20 John Laslett, “A Model of Industrial Solidarity.” In The United Mine Workers of 
America: A Model of Industrial Solidarity?, edited by John Laslett (University Park: The 
Pennsylvania State University, 1996), 2. 
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zenith of surface mining in the early 1970s, the union lacked the political and economic 
capital to organize western miners on a substantial level.21 
The United Mine Workers scarcely had more success in organizing western 
surface mines. Although originally founded in Montana, much of the union’s power was 
located in Appalachia and its headquarters in Washington D.C., far from the western 
coalfields. Geography was not the only factor that limited its organizing efforts in surface 
mining operations. By the 1970s, the UMW was averse to expending its resources on 
such organization. Since World War II, district leaders had pleaded with the national 
leadership to become more active in strip mines, but to no avail. Part of the union’s 
aversion to organizing surface mines stemmed from John L. Lewis’s 1946 agreement 
with the coal operators not to protest mechanization, in return for their support of the 
Welfare and Retirement Fund.22 Because surface mines were dependent on machinery, 
the union was not in a strong bargaining position. Surface miners, therefore, found little 
union support in health and safety issues. 
                                                 
21 For a detailed history of the Western Federation of Miners, see, Alan Derickson, 
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(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1988); Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All: 
A History of the Industrial Workers of the World (Urbana-Champaign: University of 
Illinois Press, 2000); Charles K. Hyde, Copper for America: The United States Copper 
Industry from Colonial Times to the 1990s (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 
1998); Elizabeth Jameson, All That Glitters: Class, Conflict, and Community in Cripple 
Creek (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1998); Larry Lankton, Cradle to 
Grave: Life, Work, and Death at the Lake Superior Copper Mines (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991); Philip J. Mellinger, Race and Labor in Western Copper: The 
Fight for Equality, 1896-1918 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995); Arthur W. 
Thurner, Rebels on the Range: The Michigan Copper Miners’ Strike of 1913-1914 (Lake 
Linden, Michigan: John Forster Press, 1984). See also Daniel Curran, Dead Laws for 
Dead Men, 140-141. 
 
22 Joseph Finley, The Corrupt Kingdom: The Rise and Fall of the United Mine Workers 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), 178-204. 
  
 
308
President Nixon’s emphasis of coal as a solution to the energy crisis also had 
negative environmental implications. Environmentalists argued that the practice of 
surface mining was ecologically harmful. Brock Evans of the Sierra Club fumed, 
“[Nixon] is really calling for massive strip mining for coal, massive destruction of the 
land, and pollution of the land and water.” Similarly, Rod Cameron of the Environmental 
Defense Fund contended that Nixon’s plan allowed for the wanton destruction of the 
natural landscape.23 The environmentalists were outraged by the administration’s plan to 
increase coal production. They argued that surface coal mining left deep scars on the 
sides of mountains and destroyed tens of thousands of acres of streams and forests. The 
dumping of ground waste from surface operations caused landslides, the silting of 
streams, and the pollution of domestic water supplies, as well as widespread damage to 
property. Furthermore, the exposure of waste substances containing sulfur to the air 
caused acid mine drainage, which contaminated water supplies and streams.24 A 
Department of the Interior report published in 1971 revealed that 1.8 million acres of land 
across the country had been strip-mined. Only 58,000 acres had been “restored” to their 
approximate original condition. At this time, federal law did not mandate the restoration 
of strip-mined land to its original condition.25 
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Critics of surface mining, led by Ken Hechler, emphasized the damage it caused 
to the natural environment.26 Hechler rejected the coal industry’s claims that strip mines 
could be converted into golf course or camping grounds. Writing for the Los Angeles 
Times, he stressed, “such projects become prohibitively expensive when undertaken on a 
broad scale.” To further support his argument, he asserted that “…even on ‘reclaimed’ 
sites, shallow grasses are scarcely acceptable replacements for hardwood forests – and 
acid pollutants will often show up several years later as far away as 30 miles from a 
stripped area.”27 Hechler also criticized the supporters of strip mining who argued it made 
good economic sense. He cited the Bureau of Mines’ estimation that only 45 billion tons 
of coal could be recovered economically through strip mining, as opposed to 356 billion 
tons through underground mining.28 For local citizens, challenging the coal industry’s 
environmental injustices was difficult, not least because the coal companies were 
typically from outside the region and colluded with local politicians. One group in 
Tennessee charged that the state government was failing to levy local taxes on outside 
companies, causing huge losses in state revenue.29  
President Nixon’s main priority was to avert the impending energy crisis, rather 
than to address the human and environmental hazards of surface mining. On April 18, 
1973, he informed Congress that he planned to give priority to the development of coal as 
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fuel source. He described coal as “our most abundant and least costly source of energy.” 
Nixon explained that coal provided less than twenty percent of the country’s energy and 
that its use was continuing to decline. He stressed the importance of placing coal at the 
center of the country’s energy strategy to avoid dependence on foreign oil. 30  
President Nixon was aware, however, that recent federal mining regulations and 
escalating public concern about the environment were obstacles to increased coal 
production. He stressed that mine operators would have to adhere to strict environmental 
standards and that it was important to achieve a balance between protecting the 
environment and fulfilling America’s economic and national security interests. While the 
president acknowledged that the Clean Air Act of 1970 would limit the burning of coal as 
a source of energy, he advocated placing less emphasis on the less important standards in 
the act. In addition, Nixon supported the Environmental Protection Agency’s policy of 
granting states the right to burn more coal during energy shortages.31  
Nixon did not mention coal mine health and safety during his address. This 
omission cast doubt on the sincerity of his commitment to miners’ working conditions. It 
again suggested that Nixon had supported the Federal Mine Act of 1969 and the Black 
Lung Benefits Act of 1972 primarily to obtain blue-collar support for the 1972 election 
and the Democrat’s backing for his defense and foreign policies. Yet, Nixon’s emphasis 
on coal as an energy source was prescient. In October 1973, an oil embargo by the 
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Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) resulted in the energy crisis that 
he had been trying to avoid.  
Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton shared Nixon’s faith in coal as a 
viable solution to the energy crisis. In an article entitled “Coal: Our Ace in the Hole to 
Meet the Energy Crisis,” Morton cautioned, “The mighty American economy, strongest 
in the world, is quite literally running out of gas.” He highlighted the country’s 
dependence on oil and natural gas, claiming that those fuels accounted for 77 percent of 
the national energy supply. In contrast, only eighteen percent of the country’s energy 
came from coal, four percent from hydroelectric power, and one percent from nuclear 
power. Morton cautioned against continued dependence on foreign oil imports. He 
argued that that if the United States was unable to import oil in sufficient quantities then 
“we would, as a nation and a world power, trail off into impotence.”32 Morton was 
dismissive of alternative energy sources, such as solar energy, geothermal energy and 
atomic fission. He also believed that, in the short-term, domestic oil was not a viable 
solution, although he noted that, in the near future, oil would be available through the 
Trans-Alaska pipeline. For Morton, coal was the key to resolving the energy crisis: 
... I believe that our best path to self-sufficiency by 1980 lies underground – in 
coal. Coal – three trillion tons of it, composing 89 percent of all our fossil-fuel 
resources – is literally our “ace in the hole.” In fact, we have enough coal in the 
ground to supply all our energy requirements until well into the second quarter of 
the 21st century.33  
 
Morton recognized that coal was more costly to produce and distribute than oil 
and natural gas, caused air pollution when burned, devastated the natural environment 
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through the practice of surface mining, and “[remained] one of the most hazardous 
occupations in the nation.” He explained, however, that coal could be converted into both 
gas and synthetic oil. Moreover, he claimed that America had enough coal reserves for 
conversion into four trillion barrels of oil, ten times the world’s total oil supplies.34 
Establishing a program for converting coal into gas and oil, Morton argued, was 
imperative if the country was to become self-sufficient.35 He revealed that the Bureau of 
Mines and the Office of Coal Research both were researching economically feasible 
conversion processes. Technological advances of this nature, argued Morton, depended 
on changes in existing labor practices.36  
Emphasizing the dangerous nature of underground work, Morton argued that, by 
the year 2000, underground coal mines should be completely automated, with machines 
doing the most dangerous work. Men’s duties, he cautioned, should be limited to 
maintenance and control.37  In the short term, further strip mining was necessary, but it 
would require tough legislation from Congress to protect the land. On paper, Morton’s 
proposals accounted for the protection of both workers and the land. They were little 
more than political rhetoric, however, not a framework for substantial policy. Morton’s 
past record did not reveal a genuine concern for coal mine health and safety or 
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environmental conservation. Prior to becoming Secretary of the Interior, his policies 
typically favored industry and business.38  
 A similar article in the Saturday Evening Post promoted the benefits of coal as a 
long-term solution to the energy crisis.  In “Coal: An Answer to the Energy Crisis,” Jep 
Cadou argued that the United States had enough coal to last for the next 800 years under 
the current rate of consumption. Like Morton, he stressed that coal was “enormously 
versatile.” It could provide the basis for many other energy supplies, he argued, including 
petroleum, natural gas, and electricity. Cadou asserted that the United States could use 
coal to eliminate its energy shortfall in the next two or three years. In contrast to Morton, 
who proposed replacing miners with technology, Cadou advocated the rapid expansion of 
the coal mine labor force, through a program designed to train an additional 100,000 
additional miners. According to Cadou, this effort would require a substantial publicity 
campaign to make mining a more attractive career option to American youth. He argued 
that the image of a miner hacking coal out of the ground with a pick shovel was outdated. 
He wrote, “You are likely to find today’s miner pressing buttons or pushing levers to 
operate expensive equipment which removes the coal from the earth, cleans and sizes it 
and ships it to the user.”39 Cadou’s article emphasized the prevalence of surface mining, 
with its reliance on large mechanical draglines to scoop the coal from the earth. 
 In his urgency to make coal the foundation of national energy policy, Cadou 
completely ignored the risks of mining to labor and the environment. He stated, “Mining 
is still a hazardous occupation, but it is growing safer all the time. The miners say so. 
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And so do the cold statistics. There were 325 fatal injuries in coal mining in the United 
States in 1960, according to the Bureau of Mines of the Department of the Interior. There 
were 260 such deaths in 1970, and 180 in 1971, the last year for which statistics have 
been reported.” 40 Cadou did not mention that the number of fatalities had increased from 
1969 to 1970, nor did he frame the statistics in terms of man-hours worked or the 
quantity of coal produced. Further, despite highlighting the new dust regulations to 
prevent black lung disease, Cadou ignored the fact that many employers were still failing 
to implement them. Finally, he wrongly credited the UMW with the recent major 
advances in health and safety. He further dismissed the environmental impact of strip 
mining. He cited the AMAX Coal Company, based in Indiana, as a leader in the 
restoration of strip-mined land. One of its subsidiaries, Meadowlark, had generated 
enormous profits from the sale of livestock and crops developed on reclaimed land.41 
Cadou’s assessment ignored millions of acres of land were simply abandoned by mining 
operators or not properly restored. 
Despite the aspirations of the Nixon administration and the media to resolve the 
energy crisis through coal, the militant attitude of the nation’s coal miners complicated 
matters. By early March 1974, a wildcat strike was spreading rapidly among the miners 
of West Virginia. The strike was directly related to the energy crisis, as the miners had 
walked off the job in response to the gas allocation policies of the federal and state 
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governments.42 The industrial walkout not only hindered production of 75 percent of the 
country’s metallurgical coal, but also forced steel companies who used such coal in their 
production to lay off workers. In just a few days, the strike caused the loss of production 
of 2.5 million tons of coal. The Bituminous Coal Operators’ Association and the major 
steel companies, many of which owned coal mines, accused the United Mine Workers of 
staging the strike for its own political reasons, a claim the union denied. The federal 
government and the operators were concerned that UMW President Arnold Miller had 
made promises to rank and file miners that he could not deliver, including an increase in 
wages and pensions and significant improvements in mine safety. Miller’s promises 
exceeded what he could reasonably expect to obtain during the bargaining process. 43   
The government and mine owners were particularly concerned about the 
impending contract negotiations between the UMW and the coal industry. They worried 
that another strike during the negotiating process would further jeopardize the nation’s 
coal supply. In the hope of limiting coal shortages, Secretary of Labor George Schultz 
established an intergovernmental group under the control of the Cost of Living Council to 
develop a national coal policy for the rest of 1974. According to Business Week, the 
federal government advised operators to make a substantial wage offer to the miners to 
avoid unrest.44 The Nixon administration also sought to alleviate potential coal shortages 
through improved productivity among the miners, particularly by reducing absenteeism.45 
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Rank and file coal miners were concerned about the impact of the energy crisis on 
their economic position and their working conditions. They were less concerned, 
however, with its impact on the environment. In article entitled, “The Energy Crisis As A 
Coal Miner Sees It,” published in Center Magazine, UMW President Arnold Miller 
claimed that the several thousand strip miners that belonged to the union did not like to 
hear him “talking like an environmentalist.” He warned, however, that complacency was 
fatal, in both health and safety and environmental matters: 
…There is a tradition of speaking out in my union, and the westward trend of coal 
mining creates an issue we all have to confront. In West Virginia and Kentucky, 
all over Appalachia, we found out, as our fathers found out before us, that when 
the companies no longer need you or want you, all you have left are the scars and 
the dust in your lungs. And in our hills, what we have left are the scars and the 
mud slides and the streams choked with silt where we used to fish.”46 
 
Miller recognized the threat that the coal industry posed to both the health and safety of 
miners and to the fabric of the natural environment. He argued that it was important to be 
wary about the expansion of surface mining into western states. 
Miller also mentioned the Farmington and Buffalo Creek disasters, noting that 
fifty years earlier, the coal operators had promised to develop Appalachia and had instead 
left it in ruins through by exploiting its coal for profit. Moreover, Miller contended, it was 
necessary to find a common ground between western miners who wanted to protect their 
jobs and the “eagle freaks,” or conservationists, who sought to protect their land and 
property. For Miller, the expansion of coal mining in the West thus presented a 
significant dilemma.47 
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Supporters of strip mining argued that tough environmental policies would 
destroy the benefits it created, both in Appalachia and the West. Operators and 
community organizations, including “Save Our Jobs,” an Appalachian advocacy group, 
contended that surface mining was a vital source of employment in Appalachian 
communities.48 They neglected to mention that surface mining eliminated underground 
mining jobs and relied on minimal labor. Miller was wary of the argument that 
environmental protective measures would threaten jobs. He feared that rapid 
development of western mining would result in the loss of between 25,000 and 40,000 
mining jobs in the eastern part of the country. Yet, he also recognized the importance of 
protecting miners’ jobs in the west. To maintain a balance in employment between the 
eastern and western mining regions, he advocated a National Energy Policy that cut back 
the power of the large corporations.49  
The rapid growth of surface mining in the 1970s was a viable to solution to the 
energy crisis in the United States, providing the country with a cheap and reliable source 
of fuel. Surface mining had negative consequences, however, for the coal mine labor 
force and for the environment. Although in decline at this time, underground mining was 
still a prominent method of coal production. The renewed emphasis on coal production 
also jeopardized the safety and lives of miners who worked in underground mines, 
particularly marginal and non-union mines. 
The strict measures of the Federal Coal Mine Act meant that underground mines 
played a less significant role in the energy crisis than surface mines. In 1973, an industry 
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representative claimed that in some underground mines, production had declined from 
twenty tons per day to eight tons per day as a result of the legislation, while one 
government official argued that operators faced the dilemma of increasing production 
while adhering to health and safety standards. Arnold Miller argued that the federal 
government should offer the smaller companies short-term loans for implementing safety 
and training measures, which would enable them to continue operating without 
significant financial losses. Many small operators were unable to afford the cost of 
installing the safety equipment mandated by the Federal Mine Act.50  
Despite the obstacles they faced, small marginal coal mines continued to thrive. 
Moreover, their operators continued to violate the law, despite the enforcement 
procedures of the Bureau of Mines. Rising demand for coal placed increased pressure on 
such mines to increase their production. Moreover, several independent operators with 
little experience or background in mining saw a chance to profit from the energy crisis. 
Their lack of knowledge about operating a coal mine had significant implications for the 
health and safety of miners. J. Davitt McAteer, who carried out extensive research on 
coal mine health and safety in the 1970s before becoming a safety adviser for the United 
Mine Workers, explained that many new mine operators were simply concerned with 
profiting from the immediate demand for coal in the United States and that safety was not 
a top priority for them.51  Similarly, large underground mining operations, which were 
mostly owned by corporations and oil interests, continued to endanger their workers 
through neglect. UMW Arnold Miller drew a close relationship between the large mining 
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corporations and the federal government. He wrote, “I would not claim that industry and 
government are one and the same, because my experience with the federal bureaucracy is 
that it is a world all to itself. But I do believe that industry and government are much 
closer together and much less distinguishable than they have a right to be.”52  
The dangers of underground coal mines were exemplified by a massive explosion 
at the Scotia mine in Kentucky on March 9, 1976. Fifteen miners perished in the disaster. 
The mine, located near the small community of Oven Fork in Letcher County, Kentucky, 
was owned by the Scotia Coal Company, a subsidiary of the Blue Diamond Coal 
Company based in Tennessee. A further eleven men, mostly MESA representatives and 
rescue workers, lost their lives during a second explosion on March 11, as they searched 
for possible survivors.53 The Scotia mine produced high-quality metallurgical coal, which 
was used in the production of steel and electrical power. According to records maintained 
by the coal industry, production at the mine had been increasing over the past five years. 
The rise in production was arguably connected to a decline in health and safety standards 
at the mine. The Keystone blue book, the formal industry record of production, showed 
that the mine produced 936,384 tons of coal in 1974. By early 1976, the blue book 
recorded that production at the mine was roughly 6,000 tons per day, equating to 2.19 
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million tons annually. The Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA) gave a 
more conservative estimate of production, citing daily production at the mine in 1975 as 
2,500 tons per day.54  
From 1974 to 1976, MESA repeatedly cited the mine for violations of health and 
safety legislation. From the beginning of 1974 until the date of the disaster, MESA 
inspectors discovered sixty-two violations of the ventilation standards in the Federal 
Mine Act. The penalties that MESA levied against the Scotia Company, however, 
consistently declined while the number of violations increased.55 In its report on the 
disaster, the federal government concluded that inadequate ventilation caused the 
explosion. It also cited the secondary cause of faulty electrical equipment sparking the 
methane gas inside the mine.56 MESA criticized the mine owners for not conducting pre-
shift examinations of equipment and methane levels. The report stated, “MESA 
investigators conclude that the explosion of March 11, 1976, resulted from a lack of 
sufficient air to ventilate the area in 2 Southeast Main inby No. 22 crosscut, including the 
2 Left Section, and remove from the mine the know methane accumulations. The lack of 
air prohibited safe and timely completion of the recovery operations.”57 
The Scotia disaster was a clear example of how underground operators’ quest for 
increased production conflicted with effective health and safety enforcement. As the 
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Scotia Company’s production steadily increased, safety standards in the mine declined, 
resulting in the loss of 26 lives. The underground coal mines that managed to survive 
throughout the 1970s perpetuated unsafe working standards, despite the existence of 
legislation to protect workers. When President Jimmy Carter entered the White House in 
January 1977, however, he responded immediately to the labor and environmental 
injustices of the coal industry. During his single term in office, he signed legislation to 
strengthen the Federal Mine Act of 1969 and to regulate surface mining. 
 
Legislative Solutions: The Policies of President Jimmy Carter  
 
 After winning the 1976 presidential election, President Carter entered the White 
House with a reform-orientated perspective. According to Charles O. Jones, author of 
The Trusteeship Presidency, Carter viewed his role as that of a trustee, that is, “an official 
entrusted to represent the public or national interest, [who downplayed] short-term 
electoral considerations.” Carter favored national over local issues, but he adopted a 
micro-management approach to his presidency, handling key issues in a comprehensive 
manner.58 In addition, he appointed staff members who were sympathetic to labor and 
environmental issues. The environmental movement supported Carter’s decision to 
appoint Cecil D. Andrus, formerly a two-term governor of Idaho, as Secretary of the 
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Interior. Carter selected 48-year old F. Ray Marshall, a professor of law at the University 
of Texas, for the position of Secretary of Labor.59 
Carter’s policy goals included the reform of energy, employment, and tax 
legislation. Several factors jeopardized the acceptance of his legislative agenda by 
Congress. During his presidential campaign, Carter had criticized both the Republican 
Party and the Washington political establishment. Therefore, many Congressional 
representatives, particularly those who were newly elected, felt little obligation toward 
Carter. Furthermore, many lawmakers were entering political office as a result of 
professional experience, not political affiliation, which made their loyalty to Carter 
questionable. 60 Yet, Carter believed his role in setting the legislative agenda was to act 
independently from Congress. His ‘trusteeship’ approach excluded Congress from the 
early stages of policy development. Carter believed that by relying on members of 
Congress to formulate policy, he would be violating the public trust. He sought to enact 
his original campaign promises with as little compromise as possible. His detached style 
caused suspicion in Congress, which relied on personal communication to function 
effectively.61 
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 In his first legislative session, President Carter introduced a number of legislative 
bills to Congress. 62 Notably, he introduced bills to regulate surface mining, strengthen 
mine health and safety, reform the federal black lung program, and address the energy 
crisis. There was a strong connection between those issues, even though Carter addressed 
each issue in a separate bill. He planned to achieve energy independence through coal 
production, while limiting the human fatalities and environmental devastation caused by 
the mining of the coal.  
Carter’s focus on coal production extended the energy policies of his 
predecessors, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. In the previous five years, coal production 
in the United States had significantly expanded. Production increased from 598.6 million 
short tons in 1973 to 670.2 million short tons in 1978. Surface mining accounted for 
almost two thirds of all coal production in 1978. For Carter, developing energy 
independence was not enough. He also believed that the United States needed to become 
more energy efficient. In an address to the nation in April 1977, he cautioned, “We 
simply must balance our demand for energy with our rapidly shrinking resources. By 
acting now we can control our future instead of letting the future control us.” 63 He sought 
to limit energy consumption, therefore, to ensure adequate coal reserves for the long-term 
future.64 
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To combat the environmental destruction caused by coal mining, Carter signed 
the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act on August 3, 1977. The Surface Mine Act 
depended on the cooperation of state governments and the federal government to prevent 
the environmental abuses of surface mining, especially the pollution of soil and water and 
operators’ abandonment of the land without adequate restoration. For Carter, the law 
required balancing environmental protection with the country’s energy requirements. The 
passage of the Surface Mine Act followed many attempts by previous administrations to 
regulate strip mining.65 
Most importantly, in 1977, the Carter administration reinvigorated the issue of 
mine health and safety. Carter sought to strengthen legislation for mines in all mineral 
industries, including the various metal industries. He particularly wanted to improve the 
federal government’s enforcement of health and safety. The Mine Enforcement and 
Safety Administration (MESA) had, in the past four years, provided more effective 
enforcement than the Bureau of Mines, but its location in the Department of the Interior 
limited its ability to reduce injuries and fatalities. Mine health and safety advocates, 
particularly Ken Hechler (who was now Secretary of State in West Virginia), had long 
proposed the transfer of health and safety enforcement to the Department of Labor. The 
Department of the Interior’s original mandate included mineral production, but not the 
protection of miners and mineral workers.  In the summer of 1977, therefore, Congress 
considered draft legislation to amend the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969. The focus of the Senate deliberations was bill S. 717, which brought all mines, 
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including metal and non-metal mines, under uniform health and safety legislation. It also 
mandated the transfer of health and safety enforcement from the Department of the 
Interior to the Department of Labor, a measure that Hechler had advocated during the 
legislative hearings on the Federal Mine Act of 1969. Further, it strengthened inspection 
procedures, increased the penalties for violations, and proposed the creation of a Federal 
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission to oversee adjudicative matters connected 
to violations of the law.66 
Senator Orrin Grant Hatch (R-UT) led the opposition to the bill, arguing that coal 
mines and non-coal mines could not be effectively consolidated under a single law. He 
introduced a separate amendment to strengthen the health and safety provisions for metal 
and non-metal mines, embodied in the Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Act of 1966. 
He commented, “It has for many years been recognized that although coal and non-coal 
mining have one basic similarity, that is, extraction of minerals from the earth, the 
similarity just about ends there.”67 Senator Harrison Williams (D-NJ) strongly criticized 
Hatch’s amendment because it did not provide equal protection for all miners. He argued 
that the original version of S. 717 “[corrected] the inadequacies and the injustice 
currently suffered by our Nation’s hard rock miners, by establishing a single mine safety 
and health law, with a single structure for enforcement and administration.”68 
Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) presented an amendment that permitted state 
governments to develop their own health and safety standards in conjunction with the 
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Department of the Interior. The amendment enforced a key provision of the 1966 Mine 
Act, namely the freedom of the states to set their own laws for metal and non-metal 
mining. Again, Williams condemned the amendment, complaining that it would result in 
major discrepancies in federal enforcement.69 The Senate ultimately rejected both bills 
along with several others. It did, however, incorporate an additional amendment to bill S. 
717, proposed by Senator Hatch, that allowed interested parties to participate in appeals 
hearings.70 On June 21, the Senate passed the bill by a clear majority of 78 to 18.71 
The House of Representatives deliberated a similar bill, H.R. 4287. As with the 
Senate negotiations, the key point of opposition was the bill’s incorporation of all types 
of mine. Representative Ronald Sarasin (R-CT) was particularly vocal in his criticism, 
arguing that placing coal mines and non-coal mines under the same legislation was not 
only illogical, but also unsafe. He said, “All H.R. 4287 really does is to add additional 
workers to a law that is in rather sorry shape, irrespective of their needs and interests. The 
real tragedy is that metal and non-metal miners will now be included in a law that has a 
lower success rate of preventing fatalities and injuries.”72 Referring to the 1966 Act, 
Sarasin predicted, “They will be losing a law that has resulted in constant improvements 
for them and that, with improvements, could rapidly enhance their chances to leave their 
jobs each day safe and healthy.” He announced his intention to offer a substitute bill, 
H.R. 7979, which focused solely on amending the Metal and Non-Metallic Mine Act.  
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Notably, Sarasin’s bill retained enforcement powers in the Department of the Interior, 
rather in the Department of Labor as specified by the original bill.73  Representative 
Vonno Lamar Gudger (D-NC) presented a modified version of Sarasin’s bill that 
transferred responsibility for enforcement to the Department of Labor.74 Both Sarasin’s 
bill and Gudger’s modification of it failed to pass the House. The House, however, 
approved amendments by John Murtha (D-PA) and Michael Myers (D-PA) to increase 
the allocation of funding for enforcement of H.R. 4287. It also passed a further 
amendment by Sarasin, which allowed operators to modify safety standards in 
accordance with shifting underground conditions. The House passed H.R. 4287 in its 
amended form by 244 votes to 88.75 
In the autumn, the joint conference committee studied the discrepancies between 
S. 717 and H.R. 4287 before producing a single legislative bill. The final draft 
incorporated the Senate’s original proposal of creating a Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Review Commission to manage adjudicative issues, such as operators’ appeals against 
penalty notices, while rejecting the House’s recommendation of retaining this function 
with the Department of the Interior. The final bill also included many of the Senate’s 
more stringent measures on standards setting, enforcement and inspection procedures, 
and the review and appeals process. Many of the common elements of S. 717 and H.R. 
4287 remained in the final conference bill, including their applicability to all types of 
                                                 
73 Ibid: 23175-23177. 
 
74 Ibid., 23181. 
 
75 Ibid., 23190. 
 
  
 
328
mine and the transfer of health and safety enforcement from the Department of the 
Interior to the Department of Labor.  
The Senate voted on and approved the conference bill on October 6, 1977, while 
the House passed it three weeks later, on October 27.76 On November 9, President Carter 
signed into law the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. Before the waiting 
members of Congress, he reflected on the importance of the act. Carter said, “I think that 
every American knows that a major contributing factor to our own economy is the 
courageous and sometimes dangerous miners who go deep beneath the earth to bring to 
the surface, for our use, coals and other minerals.” He argued that one of the bill’s most 
important aspects was its transferal of health and safety enforcement from the 
Department of the Interior to the Department of Labor.77 The 1977 Mine Act formally 
relocated the Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA) in the Department of 
Labor, where it was renamed the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). The 
Bureau of Mines, which was still located in the Department of the Interior, continued to 
conduct research on coal production and technology at this time. 
Four months later, on March 1, 1978, President Carter signed into law the Black 
Lung Disability Trust Act. The new legislation was designed to improve significantly the 
ability of miners and their dependents to obtain benefits and to reduce the processing time 
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for claims. The act mandated a new tax on the coal industry, which would provide an 
additional $100 million per year to fund the federal black lung compensation program.78 
Carter’s approval of the act revealed that Richard Nixon’s original goal of moving 
responsibility for black lung benefits to the states by 1975 had failed. Most state 
legislatures, however, still did not have adequate mechanisms in their worker 
compensation programs to provide black lung compensation. Emphasizing the link 
between energy production and mine health and safety, Carter commented that the law 
represented “a comprehensive federal effort to reduce the human and social cost of our 
growing dependence on coal.” Under the terms of the new law, Carter continued, “more 
miners and their families will receive the benefits they deserve.”79  The president 
recognized both the significant impact that black lung disease had on coal miners and 
their families and the failure of state workers’ compensation programs to provide 
benefits. With the Black Lung Disability Trust Act, Carter extended the federal 
government’s responsibility for providing black lung compensation. 
The passage of the 1977 Mine Act and the Black Lung Act of 1978 coincided 
with significant increases in coal production and the coal mine labor force. Coal 
production in the United States had been steadily increasing over the previous eight 
years. In 1969, total production was 569 million short tons, increasing to 660 million 
short tons in 1977. In fact, production in 1977 was at its highest level since 1948, 
primarily because of the prevailing energy crisis and increased production at surface 
mines. The high level of production in 1977 occurred despite a prolonged miners’ strike 
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that took place in the winter of 1977-78. Similarly, in the same eight-year period, there 
was a notable increase in the coal mine labor force, from 95,000 miners in 1969 to 
140,000 miners in 1977. The additional workers were necessary to meet the surging 
demand for coal.80 Although there was a decline in underground production during this 
eight-year period, 35,000 of the additional miners worked in underground mines. The 
increased job security for miners led to additional strikes for better pay and working 
conditions.  
The Carter administration focused more on enforcement of federal legislation than 
the Nixon administration. From 1978 to 1980, the Mine Safety and Health Administration 
found ongoing support from the Carter administration, which increased its budget by six 
percent. It also expanded its inspection force from 1,228 inspectors to 1,367 inspectors. 
During the same period, the number of inspections of all types of mine increased, while 
the number of violations recorded by inspectors declined. The number of citations issued 
for recorded violations increased, as did the average penalty. In 1977, the average penalty 
assessed was $122, while in 1978 it had risen to $177. By 1979, the average penalty for 
violations was $207.81  
Despite more rigorous enforcement, there were still weaknesses in the federal 
mine health and safety program. The 1977 Mine Act did not result in immediate 
improvements to miners’ health and safety. Although MSHA was supposed to enact 
strong penalties against operators that repeatedly violated the law, it had the freedom and 
autonomy to interpret each case on its own merits. Consequently, the agency rarely 
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instructed operators to withdraw its workforce or cease operations entirely. Moreover, 
when levying fines against operators, it rarely applied the upper limit of $10,000.82 
During the tenure of the Carter administration, there was a fluctuation in the mine fatality 
rate. In 1977, the fatality rate was 0.069 per 200,00 man-hours worked, the equivalent of 
0.345 per one million man-hours. The following year, the fatality rate declined slightly to 
0.055 per 200,000 man-hours, the equivalent of 0.275 fatalities per million man-hours. In 
1979, there was a visible increase in the mine fatality rate, which rose to 0.066 fatalities 
per 200,000 employee hours, the equivalent of 0.33 fatalities per million-man hours 
worked. In 1980, the final year of the Carter administration, the fatality rate was 0.064 
per 200,000 employees, the equivalent of 0.32 fatalities per million man-hours worked. 
Overall, there was a slight drop in the fatality rate during the four years Carter was in 
office. More importantly, there was a general improvement in mine health and safety.83   
Overall in 1979, there were 144 coal mine deaths, a significant increase from the 106 
deaths in 1978. While the number of men employed in the coal industry had increased 
significantly over the previous two years, this hardly justified such a sharp acceleration in 
the fatality rate.84 
On July 15, 1979, Carter addressed the American public on the nation’s energy 
crisis, the most significant domestic policy dilemma he had faced during his time in 
office. As he had done in previous speeches, Carter framed the energy crisis in moral 
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terms. He told his audience, “In a nation that was proud of hard work, strong families, 
close-knit communities, and our faith in God, too many of us now tend to worship self-
indulgence and consumption… We’ve learned that piling up material goods cannot fill 
the emptiness of lives that have no confidence or purpose.”85 Carter further developed the 
theme of morality, in particular emphasizing the country’s unbridled consumption of 
energy over the past twenty years. “In little more than two decades,” he proclaimed, 
“we’ve gone from a position of energy independence to one in which almost half the oil 
we use comes from foreign countries, at prices that are going through the roof. Our 
excessive dependence on OPEC has already taken a tremendous toll on our economy and 
our people.”86 Carter assured citizens that he planned to resolve the energy crisis, by 
preventing further increases in foreign oil imports and by allocating funds for developing 
domestic energy sources such as oil shale and coal.87 Yet the safety of miners who 
produced the coal, and the protection of the natural environment, did not factor into 
Carter’s moral analysis in the speech. 
 For the most part, Carter improved health and safety and environmental 
conservation in the coal industry. In 1980, however, Ronald Reagan was elected 
president, marking the beginning of an extensive period of deregulation that would have 
significant implications for the nation’s miners. The Reagan administration not only 
significantly weakened federal regulation of health and safety, but also amended the 
black lung benefits program to make it harder for miners and their dependents to obtain 
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benefits. In short, the administration eroded many of the gains that miners and their 
supporters had achieved in the 1970s through sustained protest and grassroots activism. 
 
Coal Mine Health and Safety in Decline: Ronald Reagan and Deregulation 
During the 1980s, many of the improvements to coal mine health and safety 
achieved by the Carter administration were eroded by President Ronald Reagan. In 
November 1980, Reagan won the presidential election by a landslide majority, defeating 
Jimmy Carter and independent candidate John Anderson. Reagan’s political values were 
entirely incompatible with maintaining strong federal enforcement of health and safety. 
He believed that regulation was economically destructive, linking it with reduced 
productivity and economic decline.88 In accordance with that belief, his administration 
brought deregulation into every sphere of government. In many cases, it did not actively 
pursue legislative means to deregulation, but rather it ordered government agencies to 
stop enforcing existing regulations. It also filled high-level positions with politicians 
unlikely to interfere with the private sector.89 William Kleinknecht argues, “Reagan 
changed the role of government from that of watchdog to lapdog without even bothering 
to consult Congress… The Reaganites went after regulatory agencies with relish, starving 
them of resources and staffing with officials committed to their destruction.”90 
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Reagan targeted agencies such as the Mine Safety and Health Administration 
(MSHA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
for budgetary and staff cuts, with the intention of reducing government oversight of 
private business.91 Reagan had targeted OSHA for cutbacks even before entering office, 
supporting a legislative bill in 1979 that called for the agency’s abolition. During his 
presidency, he did not succeed in abolishing it, but he did significantly reduce its power. 
He appointed Thorne Auchter, the head of a Florida construction company, as director of 
OSHA, despite the fact he had received numerous citations from OSHA for unsafe 
working practices. From 1980 to 1986, there was a thirty percent drop in the number of 
inspections of manufacturing plants by OSHA, and a drop in fines from $26 million per 
year to $13 million per year.92  
The Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief was responsible for the 
administration’s deregulation program. Although Vice-President George H. W. Bush was 
head of the agency, James C. Miller III, formerly administrator of regulatory affairs in the 
Office of Management and Budget, assumed the key leadership role in the program. 
Richard Williamson, assistant to the president for intergovernmental and regulatory 
affairs, and C. Boyden Gray, the counsel to the Task Force, also made important 
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contributions. They encouraged business and civic leaders to inform the task force of 
their worst reform “horror” stories and even encouraged them to circumvent regulatory 
agencies by taking complaints straight to the White House. The Task Force also made it 
easier to enact changes to federal legislation. In some instances, regulations were 
abolished immediately after meetings between industry officials and representatives from 
the Office of Management and Budget, but Miller and Gary did not admit this explicitly. 
The Task Force did not, however, afford the media and Congressional investigators the 
same freedoms as private business. It carefully guarded information regarding the Reagan 
administration’s implementation of its deregulatory program.93  
The Reagan administration’s program of deregulation had significant and far-
reaching implications for the nation’s miners. Reagan gave little priority to miners’ 
working conditions, and consequently the Mine Safety and Health Administration 
experienced significant reductions in its budget and staffing levels. The administration 
delayed the appointment of its assistant secretary of labor for mine safety for several 
months. In October 1981, the administration finally appointed Ford B. Ford to the 
position. Formerly an occupational health and safety administrator from California, 
Ford’s previous record further underlined Reagan’s commitment to deregulation.94   
The following month, as part of its budget strategy for 1982, the Reagan 
administration halted the power of the Mine Safety and Health Administration to inspect 
certain types of coal mine. Ford then embarked on a major reorganization of the agency. 
The MSHA was comprised of ten district offices, which were responsible for conducting 
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inspections, and nine assessment offices, which determined the penalty for each health 
and safety violation. If a conference between the MSHA and the operator was necessary, 
then it typically happened at one of the assessment offices. Inspectors rarely participated 
in these conferences, as they were designed to enable the operators to appeal fines and 
could result in a conflict of interest.95 Ford merged the different functions by abolishing 
the assessment offices and greatly expanding the role of the district offices. On May 30, 
1982, the nine assessment offices closed permanently. While Ford argued that this would 
enhance inspectors’ ability to improve miners’ lives, in reality inspectors now had to 
divert time from safety enforcement to managing conferences and providing education 
and training.96  
Ford’s restructuring of the MSHA increased the risk of confrontation between 
inspectors and coal operators. Under the previous system, managers at the assessment 
offices, not the inspectors, were not responsible for determining and issuing fines. In the 
restructured MSHA, inspectors who were active in the field became responsible for 
issuing fines. Consequently, Ford’s restructuring reduced the chance of prosecutions 
against serious health and safety violations. There were fewer prosecutions during 
Reagan’s first term than during the Carter administration’s tenure; the same applied for 
Reagan’s second term.97 In accordance with the administration’s stance on deregulation, 
Ford B. Ford also sought to limit confrontation with the coal industry. From 1981 to 
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1983, there was a decline in the number of citations issued by the MSHA, as well as in 
the average penalty for violations. 
Ford actively sought to limit confrontation between the Reagan administration 
and the coal industry. In fact, according to Daniel Curran, the administration believed it 
was important to cooperate with the coal operators. From 1981 to 1983, there was a 
decline in both the number of citations issued by the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration and the average fine for each violation. During this period, the number of 
citations dropped from 129,921 to 112,283, while the average penalty per violation fell 
from $136 to $58.98 Inspectors had more freedom to act independently and, following 
orders from Ford, typically ignored minor violations. The Reagan administration’s 
deregulation of health and safety enforcement thus led to an increase in the mine fatality 
rate. In 1981, there were 155 fatalities in the coal industry, twenty-two more than the 
previous year and the highest rate since 1975.99 
The administration made significant reductions in the budget allocated to MSHA. 
From 1978 to 1980, under President Jimmy Carter, the average annual budget was $166.3 
million, reaching a peak of $172.8 million in 1979. Throughout Reagan’s two terms in 
office, in contrast, the average annual budget declined sixteen percent, to $140 million by 
1988. More specifically, there was a nine percent decline in the funds allocated directly to 
coal mine health and safety. Under Carter, these averaged $73 million per year, whereas 
the Reagan administration provided an average of $67.6 million per year. Overall, budget 
allocations for MSHA in the early 1980s were less than those for MESA in the mid-
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1970s. The workforce at the Mine Safety and Health Administration also was affected by 
ongoing deregulation, particularly when Reagan ordered massive staff cuts at the agency. 
In 1978, there were 1,940 employees at MSHA. A decade later this number had fallen to 
1,519. Inspectors faced a larger workload, with responsibility for additional paperwork, 
assessing fines for violations, and inspecting more mines.  
At a Congressional hearing on February 19, 1982, Director Ford refuted 
accusations that cuts in MSHA staffing and funding had contributed to more deaths. 
Testifying before the Safety Subcommittee in the House of Representatives, he explained 
that, before the reorganization of MSHA, the central assessment offices and the district 
inspection offices had failed to communicate. While Ford claimed that operators violating 
the law would be subject to harsh sanctions, he downplayed the federal government’s 
responsibility for enforcement, stating his belief that health and safety should be the 
combined effort of industry, labor, and government.100 The mine inspectors who testified 
at the hearing spoke of their declining influence in the coalfields. Hugh Smith recounted 
an incident when a mine superintendent mocked him in front of a group of miners, telling 
them, “Gentleman, you’re looking at a third class citizen – he won’t be around much 
longer.” David Coleman revealed that one of his colleagues had been held hostage at 
gunpoint after issuing an operator with a citation. Representatives from the United Mine 
Workers, meanwhile, informed the committee that the Reagan administration was 
reversing years of progress. Safety director Joe Taylor, noting the increase in the fatality 
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rate, commented, “There is no other way of looking at it. There is a relationship between 
the fatalities and decline in inspections.101  
  On May 20, 1982, MSHA announced new rules for violation penalties. In 
addition to introducing a fixed penalty of $20 for less serious violations, it would give 
“good faith credit” to operators who rectified violations within the time frame set by the 
government. The agency also stated that it would impose fines of up to $10,000 for more 
serious violations, but its performance under Reagan suggested it was unlikely to levy 
substantial penalties against operators. The UMW voiced its concern that the new law 
would enable operators to avoid paying fines, rather than prompting them to correct 
violations. Two weeks earlier, the union’s new president, Sam Church, had announced 
the miners would strike if MSHA enacted the new rules. Despite support from the 
bargaining council, Church abandoned his plan for a walkout.  
Assistant Secretary Ford downplayed the significance of the changes, 
commenting, “Our aim in making these changes is to provide more incentives for mine 
operators to maintain safe and healthful conditions for their employees. We’re 
streamlining the assessments process by reducing time and resources associated with 
processing less serious violations. The rule is focused on the prevention and correction of 
all hazards to miners and operators will still face serious consequences for non-
compliance.” The changes significantly reduced the deterrent value of financial penalties. 
By the end of 1983, 73 percent of all assessed violations fell into the $20 category. 102   
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Miners and their families were most angered, however, by President Reagan’s 
plan to reduce funding for the federal black lung program. In a 1981 memorandum, the 
administration announced its plan to cut $2 billion from the program over the next five 
years. The Reagan administration attributed the insolvency of the black lung program to 
poor management by previous administrations, which, it argued, had led to an “automatic 
pension” for most coal miners. As the foundation for this contentious claim, the Reagan 
administration used a study by the General Accounting Office (GAO).103 According to 
James Brady, the White House press secretary, the study found “that an incredible 88 
percent of all claimants certified as eligible were either not disabled or else could not 
prove to have black lung disease.”104 The GAO study was based on a report in the 
Journal of the American Medical Association.. Bennett Judkins notes that, despite flawed 
research methods in the original American Medical Association report, the General 
Accounting Office study provided the administration with justification for making 
substantial cuts to the black lung program.105 
The Reagan administration refused to acknowledge that the problems with the 
black lung program were attributable mostly to the coal companies’ failure to make 
contributions as required by law.106 Under the 1972 Black Lung Amendments Act, the 
coal industry had been required to absorb the full cost of the program by 1976. When 
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they failed to meet this obligation, Congress, under Carter’s leadership, imposed a 
mandatory tax on the coal industry in the Black Lung Disability Trust Act of 1978. Yet, 
by the early 1980s, the federal government was still providing most of the funding for the 
program. President Reagan believed the federal government could no longer absorb the 
high costs of the program. Like Nixon before him, he believed that the federal 
government should not be responsible for compensating the victims of occupational 
disease. Reagan’s decision to reduce funding for the black lung benefits program 
highlighted the detrimental impact of federal bureaucracy on recent legislative gains in 
health and safety.107  
By the time Reagan entered office in January 1981, 77,500 miners were receiving 
federal black lung benefits. During the fiscal year that started in 1981, the federal black 
lung trust fund paid $824 in benefits, $549 million more than the $275 million it had 
received in contributions from the coal industry. Under federal law, the Department of 
the Treasury was compensating for the industry shortfall by providing additional money 
in the form of loans. The Reagan administration feared that, before 1995, the department 
would pay up to $9.5 billion that it could never reclaim. The president intended to end 
what is perceived as the “automatic pension” for miners, by rejecting questionable 
compensation claims and tightening the eligibility requirements for black lung benefits. 
Along with the budget cuts, the administration planned to increase taxes on the coal 
industry.108 
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 In late February 1981, the leadership of the United Mine Workers called on the 
union’s 170,000 members to hold a two-day strike on March 9 and 10 in protest of the 
Reagan’s proposed cuts to the federal black lung compensation program. Although 
operators and the union were in the process of negotiating a new contract, a walkout was 
permissible under the miners’ existing contract. The union had only used two of its ten 
“memorial days,” essentially days of unpaid leave granted to the miners for the express 
purpose of strike action. UMW President Church asserted that the Reagan administration 
had no understanding of black lung disease, accusing it of making statements that 
bordered on slander. He informed the media that the March strike was directly targeted at 
the administration, although indicated that it might bring the union more credibility in the 
ongoing contract negotiations. He commented, “We will call for all coal miners in this 
nation, union and non-union alike, to lay down their tools and walk away from the 
country’s coal mines if the administration attempts to gut this most humane and 
necessary program.”109 
 The United Mine Workers transported miners by bus from seventeen of the 
nation’s twenty-two mining states for the two-day strike in Washington. According to the 
Federal Park Police, 5,000 people participated in the strike. On the first day, both active 
and disabled miners expressed their contempt for Reagan. Winfield Maxwell, disabled by 
pneumoconiosis, said, “I wish I could give my black lung to Ronald Reagan.” His wife 
commented, “I’ll bet Reagan’s never seen anyone die of black lung, like I saw my father 
die. All he’d have to do is see that once or twice, and he’d think different.” Thousands of 
miners listened to anti-Reagan speeches at the United Mine Workers headquarters, before 
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marching past the White House. Lane Kirkland, the head of the AFL-CIO, was one of the 
featured speakers. He drew cheers by commenting, “Your brothers of the AFL-CIO are 
behind you all the way. This is an important one, but there will be other fights. Any man 
who would take black lung benefits from miners would stop at nothing.”110  
 The following day, March 10, as the strike continued, the Senate Committee on 
Labor and Human Resources approved an increase of $149 million for the black lung 
program in the next fiscal year. The Committee passed this measure largely through the 
influence of Senator Jennings Randolph (D-WV), who had tried to dilute the Senate’s 
mine health and safety bill in 1969. The committee made its decision as Reagan signed 
the budget proposals he was submitting to Congress for approval. The committee also 
rejected the president’s plans to cut low-income fuel assistance, legal assistance for the 
poor, and education programs for people with disabilities.111 The miners’ demonstration 
did not prevent Reagan from making changes to the black lung program. In December 
1981, he signed the Black Lung Benefits Review Act. The new legislation increased the 
excise tax on coal operators, with the intention of reducing the insolvency in the Black 
Lung Disability Trust Fund, and provided much stricter regulations and eligibility criteria 
for applicants. Reagan claimed the bill had been created with the cooperation of the 
United Mine Workers; but with its stricter eligibility requirements, it did not represent the 
interests of the rank and file.112 During the Reagan administration’s time in office, there 
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was a decline in the number of approvals for black lung compensation for miners and 
their dependents. Furthermore, although the number of coal mine fatalities declined, there 
was a significant increase in the number of serious and non-serious injuries.  
 At first glance, the conservatism of the Reagan era gives the impression of a 
significant departure from the legislative reform of the 1970s. As historian Jefferson 
Cowie argues, however, the political landscape of the 1980s did not mark a clear break 
from the 1970s; rather, it represented a logical transition. In his article, “Portrait of the 
Working Class in a Convex Mirror,” Cowie argues that the 1970s were a bridge between 
the 1960s and 1980s, marking an economic and cultural shift in American society. The 
shift not only exposed the limits of the progressive order, but created profound dilemmas 
for labor.113 For example, argues Cowie, President Jimmy Carter deviated from the blue-
collar policies that the Nixon administration had embraced, abandoning class coalitional 
politics and aligning himself with the middle class. Carter’s omission of the working 
class from the national political rhetoric occurred as economic inequality was on the rise. 
Furthermore, economics were becoming less influential in determining people’s voting 
choices and political affiliations, leading to the detachment of class and politics. In the 
early 1980s, the political Right gained working class support on cultural grounds, as 
unions became disorganized and business interests grew increasingly aggressive. Based 
on Cowie’s analysis, then, Carter’s approval of mine health and safety and black lung 
legislation was not, like Nixon, based on his goal of obtaining additional blue-collar 
votes. 
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 Cowie argues that the power of the working class had been declining long before 
Nixon entered the White House in the late 1960s. He notes that strikebreaking had been a 
common tactic used by employers since the 1930s. Carter contributed to the decline by 
abandoning blue-collar workers in his political agenda and presiding over the 
deregulation of the trucking industry, which led to lower pay and longer hours for truck 
drivers. When Reagan entered office, then, he was able to capitalize on a process already 
in motion. His extensive deregulatory policies were not new or a sharp break from those 
of his predecessors.114  
 
Conclusion 
During the 1970s and 1980s, coal mine health and safety was marked by both 
progress and decline. From the early to mid 1970s, operators focused more on increasing 
production to meet the demands of the energy crisis than adhering to health and safety 
and environmental legislation. The declining standards were illustrated in the Buffalo 
Creek disaster, which demonstrated that the hazards of coal mining were spreading 
beyond the confines of underground mines to local communities and the surrounding 
environment. The rapid growth of surface mining in the 1970s further jeopardized both 
miners and the natural environment.  
 From 1977 to 1978, President Jimmy Carter addressed the problems in the 
industry by signing several laws, including the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation 
Act, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, and the Black Lung Disability Trust Act. 
Those laws significantly improved miners’ conditions, and addressed many of the failures 
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of federal regulation earlier in the decade. From early 1981, however, miners’ conditions 
declined sharply, after Ronald Reagan entered the White House. Reagan’s extensive 
program of deregulation had a negative impact on both federal regulation and the 
distribution of black lung benefits. Regulatory agencies saw significant cuts in their 
budgets and, by the administration’s order, did not fully enforce rules governing health 
and safety. Despite their efforts to use strike action to defend their benefits, miners and 
their communities did not, as in the previous two decades, engage in extensive grassroots 
protest to challenge the decline. By the end of the decades, the injury rate in coal mining 
industry had increased significantly, while miners found it more difficult to obtain black 
lung benefits.  
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Chapter Eight 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Robert C. Byrd and Black Lung Benefits 
In early December 2009, members of the U.S. Senate were engaged in debate 
over a legislative bill (H.R. 3590) on health care reform. The bill represented the Barack 
Obama administration’s goal of making health insurance compulsory for all American 
citizens and legal residents. It included proposals to subsidize medical insurance for those 
unable to afford it and to prevent the health care industry from denying insurance to 
people with pre-existing medical conditions. The bill was a modified version of a 
legislative bill on health care reform passed by the House of Representatives in October 
2009.  
On December 3, 2009, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) added an amendment to the 
Senate bill to reform the federal black lung compensation program. Byrd’s amendment 
stipulated that coal miners with fifteen consecutive years of experience were eligible for 
benefits if they could provide medical evidence they were suffering from totally disabling 
lung disease. It also required mine owners to provide stronger evidence to contest 
compensation payments to individual miners and provided benefits for widows and 
dependents of miners who died from black lung disease. Byrd’s amendment restored to 
the federal black lung program many of the provisions that had been eradicated by the 
Ronald Reagan administration in the early 1980s. The terms of the amendment applied 
retroactively to 2005.1 On December 24, the Senate passed bill H.R. 3590, entitled the 
                                                 
1 U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd, “Byrd Promotes Black Lung Bill for Coal Miners,” 
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Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act, with Byrd’s amendment intact, 
paving the way for a conference committee debate with the House to establish the final 
terms of the legislation. The passage of the legislation was by no means assured, as the 
Republican Party had unanimously opposed both the House and Senate bills.2 
Byrd’s addition of the black lung amendment echoed his actions in the Senate 
forty years earlier. In 1969, he introduced a separate health bill to the Senate Labor 
Subcommittee on behalf of the United Mine Workers that provided federal compensation 
to the victims of black lung disease. At the time, the federal government did not provide 
such compensation, and few state legislatures included the disease in their worker 
compensation programs. The majority of black lung victims were unable to obtain 
financial relief, despite the chronic suffering they endured. While the Senate rejected the 
bill in favor of S. 2917, which did not include compensation measures, it added black 
lung compensation to S. 2917 in a separate amendment. In the House version of the coal 
mine bill, a black lung compensation provision by Representative Phil Burton (D-CA) 
                                                                                                                                                 
December 3, 2009, http://byrd.senate.gov/mediacenter/view_article.cfm?ID=561 
(accessed March 11, 2009); George Hohmann, “Black Lung Amendment Called a Job 
Killer,” AARP Bulletin, January 18, 2010, http://bulletin.aarp.org/states/wv/2010/3/ 
articles/black_lung_amendment_called_job_killer.html (accessed March 9, 2010). Article 
originally appeared in the Charleston Daily Mail on January 17, 2010. For more 
information on the Reagan administration’s cuts to the federal black lung program see 
chapter seven. 
 
2 Shailagh Murray and Lori Montgomery, “Senate passes health care bill, now must 
reconcile it with House,” Washington Post, December 25, 2009, http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/12/24/AR2009122400662.html 
(accessed March 12, 2010). For the full text of legislative bill H.R. 3590, see U.S. Senate, 
An Act, Entitled the Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 2010, http://democrats.senate.gov/reform/patient-protection-affordable-
care-act-as-passed.pdf (accessed April 7, 2010). Byrd’s black lung amendment is 
included in Section 1556 of the act, entitled “Equity for Certain Eligible Survivors.” 
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ensured that when Nixon signed the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, it 
contained strong measures to provide federal compensation for black lung victims.3 
Byrd’s amendment to the 2009 Senate health care reform bill emphasized the 
failure of the federal black lung compensation program. Furthermore, in an official press 
release to publicize his amendment, Byrd implied that the weak enforcement policies of 
the Bush administration had contributed to a recent increase in the prevalence of black 
lung. He recognized, however, that the disease was in long-term decline, largely as a 
result of the efforts of the Mine Safety and Health Administration during the Clinton 
administration. Senator Byrd commented: 
Equitable access to benefits is absolutely necessary -- but prevention must remain 
paramount. The incidence of black lung finally reached an all time low during the 
1990s, thanks to the longstanding leadership of the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration, many coal miners, physicians, and other advocates. Although the 
incidence of black lung disease has rebounded recently, I believe that, together 
with our continued commitment, we can reverse course. We can, and must, ‘end 
black lung,’ and move the vital work of coal mining to a brighter, healthier, 
future.’4 
 
Byrd’s main priority, therefore, was not just improving the federal black lung 
compensation program, but eradicating black lung disease from the coal mining industry. 
Despite Byrd’s emphasis on preventing black lung and making coal mining a 
healthier occupation, his amendment faced strong opposition. In mid-January 2010, Steve 
Roberts, the president of the West Virginia Chamber of Commerce, stated, “It’s a job 
killer. The cost of this could approach $1 billion.” According to Roberts, the bill would 
                                                 
3 Brit Hume, Death in the Mines: Murder and Rebellion in the UMW (New York: 
Grossman Publishers, 1971), 216; Washington Post, October 3, 1969, A8. 
 
4 Byrd, “Byrd Promotes Black Lung Bill for Coal Miners,” December 3, 2009, 
http://byrd.senate.gov/mediacenter/view_article.cfm?ID=561 (accessed on March 11, 
2009). 
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have negative financial implications for insurance companies and the coal industry. 
Under the terms of the Black Lung Disability Trust Act of 1978, both had a stake in 
funding the federal black lung program. Roberts argued, “[The amendment] could cost 
the very coal companies that are struggling to keep miners working multi-hundreds of 
millions of dollars, all to address a problem that no one has proved exists.”5 Roberts was 
referring to his conviction that there was no evidence that the federal government was 
wrongfully denying compensation to sick coal miners. He continued, “Medical science 
can determine who actually has black lung, and if a person has black lung we want them 
to get benefits. What we don’t want is a blanket presumption that if you worked in 
mining, you are entitled to a benefit for which you may not medically qualify.”6 Like 
many of the opponents of Byrd’s amendment, Roberts presented the mistruth that it 
provided automatic compensation to miners with fifteen years of experience. He 
neglected to mention that miners were still required to provide evidence of totally 
disabling lung disease. 
Roberts’ comments were reminiscent of the strong opposition to automatic 
compensation that had plagued the legislative debates on coal mine health and safety in 
the late 1960s and 1970s. Roberts represented a significant faction of interests, including 
mine owners, insurance companies, and Republican Party members, who sought to limit 
the provision of black lung benefits to miners. George Burton, the president of Brick 
Street Mutual Insurance, commented, “We have the utmost respect for Senator Byrd and 
                                                 
5  Hohmann, “Black Lung Amendment Called a Job Killer,” AARP Bulletin Today, 
January 18, 2010, http://bulletin.aarp.org/states/wv/2010/3/articles/black_lung_ 
amendment_called_job_killer.html (accessed on March 9, 2010). 
 
6 Ibid 
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all he has done for West Virginia but respectfully disagree with the ramifications of the 
retro piece of the legislation.”7 Byrd defended his proposals in another press release, in 
which he stated, “These black lung benefits have been promised to miners who come 
down with totally disabling black lung disease. But too often the coal companies and the 
insurers have chosen to elude their responsibility to these ailing miners by out-lawyering 
and literally out-lasting them.”8 
There were other obstacles to the implementation of Senator Byrd’s black lung 
compensation measures. In early January 2010, the House and the Senate were unable to 
reach an agreement on the final terms of the health care bill. The election of 
Massachusetts Republican Scott Brown to the Senate on January 19, 2010 further 
jeopardized the passage of a unified health care bill, by ending the Democrats’ 
supermajority in the Senate. Brown was strongly opposed to the health care reform.9  
In an effort to bring the House and the Senate to an agreement, the Barack Obama 
administration released its own legislative proposals on health care reform.10 The House 
of Representatives decided to resolve the dispute, however, by voting on the Senate’s 
health care bill (H.R. 3590) and devising a separate reconciliation bill that provided 
amendments to H.R. 3590. On March 21, 2010, the House passed H.R. 3590 by a 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
 
8 Ibid. 
 
9 Michael Cooper, “G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats,” New York Times, January 
20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/us/politics/21elect.html (accessed April 8, 
2010). 
 
10 For full details of the White House legislative proposals, see The White House, 
President Barack Obama, “Putting Americans in Control of Their Health Care,” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/health-care-meeting/proposal (accessed March 12, 2009). 
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majority of 219 to 212. The same day, it also passed H.R. 4872, known as the Health 
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, which modified certain provisions in 
H.R. 3590 and provided measures to reduce the cost of higher education.11 The Senate 
agreed to the amendments embodied in H.R. 4872, passing it by a narrow majority on 
March 25. President Barack Obama signed H.R. 3590 into law on March 23, 2010, and 
he signed H.R. 4872 into law on March 30, 2010.12 Crucially, Byrd’s black lung 
amendment remained intact when the House passed H.R. 3590, and it remained 
unaffected by the legislative amendments in H.R. 4872. With the passage of the health 
care legislation, coal miners and their dependents gained a more equitable, less 
discriminatory federal black lung program. Senator Byrd commented, “This bill is very 
welcome news for those who have been treated unjustly over the years, and should 
provide some comfort knowing that their benefits will be forthcoming in the future.”13 
As with the 1969 debate on health and safety, Byrd’s addition of the black lung 
amendment to the health care legislation affirmed the importance of Congressmen and 
senior legislators in effecting legislative change. More importantly, Byrd’s campaign for 
more equitable black lung benefits emphasized that, to some extent, miners were still 
                                                 
11 New York Times, March 22, 2010, 1. For the House of Representatives’ amendments to 
H.R. 3590, as embodied in bill H.R. 4872, see U.S. House, An act to provide for 
reconciliation pursuant to section 202 of the concurrent resolution on the budget for 
fiscal year 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., 2010, http://docs.house.gov/rules/ 
hr4872/111_hr4872_reported.pdf (accessed March 23, 2010). 
 
12 New York Times, March 24, 2010, 1; New York Times, March 31, 2010, 1; William 
Branigin, “Obama signs higher-education measure into law,” Washington Post, March 
30, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/03/obama-signs-higher-education-
m.html (accessed April 9, 2010). 
 
13 U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd, “Byrd Applauds Inclusion of Provisions to Help Victims 
of Black Lung in Health Care Bill,” March 22, 2010, http://byrd.senate.gov//mediacenter/ 
view_article.cfm?ID=615 
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experiencing the same health and safety issues as they had in the late 1960s, despite 
significant legislative advances. A series of coal mine disasters in 2006 and 2007 further 
emphasized that federal regulation had not eradicated the hazards of coal mine labor. In 
early January 2006, an explosion at the Sago mine in West Virginia resulted in the deaths 
of twelve miners. The miners died after inhaling toxic fumes released by the explosion.14  
The disaster prompted the George W. Bush administration to sign the Mine 
Improvement and New Emergency Response (MINER) Act in May 2006. The act was 
designed mostly to improve accident preparedness and the emergency response to coal 
mine disasters. It also contained a new penalty schedule for health and safety violations, 
and gave the Mine Safety and Health Administration the power to request an injunction 
against operators who refused to pay fines.15 The Bush administration’s implementation 
of the MINER Act reiterated one of the key trends in the evolution of coal mine health 
and safety laws. Typically, changes to legislation only occurred in the aftermath of major 
disasters. The same month as the Bush administration passed the MINER Act, five 
miners died in an explosion at the Darby mine in Kentucky. Investigators later 
                                                 
14 For a full account of the Sago mine disaster, see “How US Mine Tragedy Unfolded,” 
BBC News, May 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6640469.stm (accessed on 
March 9, 2010); New York Times, January 3, 2006, A1 and A14; New York Times, 
January 4, 2006, A1 and A13; New York Times, January 5, 2006, A1 and A20; New York 
Times, January 6, 2006, A1 and A19. 
 
15 For the full text of the MINER Act, see U.S Congress, Mine Improvement and New 
Emergency Response Act (MINER ACT), S. 2802 (Public Law 109-236), 109th Cong., 
2nd sess., 2006, http://www.msha.gov/mineract/mineractsinglesource.asp (accessed 
March 12, 2009). For a detailed account of mine health and safety during the Bush 
administration, see Christopher W. Shaw, Undermining Safety: A Report on Coal Mine 
Safety (Washington, D.C.: Center for Study of Responsive Law, 2008). 
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determined that an accumulation of methane gas in the mine caused the explosion.16 The 
futility of the MINER Act in preventing coal miner disasters was emphasized by a coal 
mine disaster in August 2007. Six miners died when a roof collapsed at the Crandall 
Canyon mine in Utah. During the rescue operation, three rescue workers were killed 
when another section of the roof collapsed.17  
In the past forty years, health and safety in the United States coal industry has 
improved. Recent disasters, however, combined with the ongoing problem of black lung 
disease and the recent decline in the federal black lung compensation program, 
demonstrate that today’s coal miners face the same health and safety problems that their 
predecessors fought so hard to eradicate. While coal miners and their supporters achieved 
significant legislative change through community activism in the late 1960s and 1970s, 
an inefficient and industry-orientated federal bureaucracy undermined their achievements 
by failing to provide adequate enforcement of the legislation. The same federal 
bureaucracy is responsible for many of the problems in the coal industry at present. 
Recent events, therefore, provide a foundation for summarizing the key issues of this 
dissertation. 
 
                                                 
16 “Mine blast kills five in Kentucky,” BBC News, May 20, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
hi/americas/5000984.stm (accessed March 15, 2010). 
 
17 For the complete story on the Crandall Canyon mine disaster, see “Six Trapped After 
Collapse in a Utah Coal Mine,” New York Times, August 7, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ 08/07/us/07mine.html?_r=1 (accessed March 12, 2010); 
“3 Killed and 6 Injured in Rescue Effort at Mine,” New York Times, August 17, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/17/us/17mine.html (accessed March 12, 2010); “Utah 
Disaster Was Preventable, Report Says,” New York Times, May 9, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/09/us/08cnd-mine.html (accessed March 12, 2010). 
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Grassroots Activism and State and Federal Legislative Reform 
The disaster at the Farmington mine in West Virginia in November 1968 was the 
turning point for coal mine health and safety in the United States. It sparked the outbreak 
of grassroots protest in the coalfields, as miners and their supporters engaged in 
community-based activism to campaign for stronger health and safety legislation and 
compensation for the victims of black lung disease.  The disaster also prompted the U.S. 
Congress to conduct hearings on the reform of coal mine health and safety legislation, 
and convinced President Richard Nixon of the need to strengthen coal mine legislation, 
although Nixon’s eventual approval of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act was 
more about his own political ambitions than it was about protecting and compensating 
coal miners. Coal miners continued to engage in grassroots protest even after Nixon 
signed the Federal Mine Act. The U.S. Bureau of Mines and the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) were encumbered by red tape and upheld the interests of the coal 
industry over those of the miners. Although community-based protest led to further 
legislative change, most notably the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, the federal 
bureaucracy continued to limit the improvement of health and safety. There was a 
particularly noticeable decline in federal enforcement of health and safety legislation 
during the Ronald Reagan administration. In particular, miners and their dependents 
found it increasingly difficult to obtain black lung benefits. 
 In the aftermath of the Farmington disaster, community activism was crucial for 
promoting and achieving legislative change. This was particularly true in the state of 
West Virginia. While the explosions at the Farmington mine highlighted the immediate 
safety risks that coal miners faced while laboring underground, Dr. Isidore Buff, Dr. 
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Donald Rasmussen, and Dr. Hawey Wells capitalized on the disaster to publicize the 
long-term health risks of coal mining. Buff exploited the presence of the national media 
at the Farmington mine to convey the impact of black lung disease on miners, particularly 
the acute suffering and shortness of breath. He highlighted the West Virginia legislature’s 
failure to provide workers’ compensation to the victims of the disease. In early January 
1969, the three doctors, who had become known collectively as the Committee of 
Physicians on Miners’ Safety, and a small group of rank and file miners formed the West 
Virginia Black Lung Association (BLA). The BLA led a campaign of intensive 
grassroots protest in pursuit of state compensation for black lung victims. The rapid 
growth of the organization was reflected by the black lung rally in Charleston in January 
26, Congressman Ken Hechler, the Committee of Physicians, and thousands of coal 
miners. The rally emphasized the Black Lung Association’s ability to mobilize coal 
miners’ frustration over the lack of an adequate compensation program. Furthermore, it 
emphasized miners’ rejection of the national leadership of the United Mine Workers, 
which they believed was unconcerned with the issue of health and safety. 
 In the weeks that followed, the black lung movement intensified its campaign for 
workers’ compensation for black lung victims. In mid-February, it instigated a strike in 
the West Virginia coalfields, which quickly expanded to become the largest strike in 
response to a health and safety issue in American history. By the beginning of March, 
over 40,000 miners across that state had walked off the job to protest the governor’s 
failure to add pneumoconiosis to the state’s list of compensable occupational diseases. 
During the strike, on February 26, hundreds of miners, joined by their families, miners’ 
widows, and activists, marched along Kanawha Boulevard to the state capitol building in 
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Charleston. The strike, which virtually halted coal production in West Virginia, 
compelled the state House of Delegates and Senate to pass legislation that granted 
benefits to black lung victims. Governor Arch J. Moore signed the legislation in mid-
March, less than three months after the formation of the Black Lung Association. The 
events in West Virginia in early 1969 provide clear evidence that community activism 
was instrumental in effecting legislative change in coal mine health and safety. 
 In early 1969, the United States Congress opened hearings on the reform of coal 
mine health and safety laws. The hearings confirmed that the federal government only 
made significant changes to legislation in the aftermath of major disasters, not in 
response to the many individual deaths that resulted from roof falls, minor explosions, 
and equipment failures. More importantly, however, the hearings emphasized the role of 
community activism in the improvement of the country’s coal mine health and safety 
laws. In the House of Representatives, Ken Hechler (D-WV) exerted influence on the 
Labor Subcommittee and the Committee on Education and Labor to produce a strong 
legislative health and safety bill that included a dust standard of three milligrams and 
many stringent safety provisions, such as the prohibition of smoking underground. 
Hechler’s representation of a coal mining district in West Virginia, combined with his 
key role in the Black Lung Association, meant he was well placed to represent the 
interests of coal miners and their families. The final draft of the Federal Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act of 1969 was, to a large extent, Hechler’s work. Representative Phil 
Burton (D-CA) also made a significant contribution to the act by devising its federal 
compensation program for black lung victims. The evolution of the Federal Mine Act was 
attributable to a few committed Senators and Congressmen who sought to improve both 
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coal miners’ working conditions and the federal government’s response to occupational 
disease in the coal industry. 
 The passage of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act was dependent on 
the support of the Nixon administration. President Nixon’s support of the act, however, 
was by no means assured, especially given its inclusion of an extensive compensation 
program for black lung disease. Nixon believed that compensation for workplace injuries 
and occupational disease was the responsibility of the states, not the federal government. 
Moreover, in accordance with his political philosophy, he supported the interests of 
business and private enterprise over those of labor and the environment. When Nixon 
signed the act on December 30, 1969, it was not through an altruistic desire to provide 
sick miners with benefits, but rather as a result of his own political ambitions and 
objectives. First, with only four dissenting votes across the House and Senate, he risked 
alienating Congress by rejecting the act. Nixon could not afford to do this, as he needed 
to obtain the support of the Democrats for his foreign policy and defense programs. 
Earlier in the year, he had delayed firing Bureau of Mines director John F. O’Leary to 
obtain Democratic backing for his Anti-Ballistic Missile program. 
 Second, Nixon sought to increase his blue-collar support for the next presidential 
election in 1972. Yet, by signing the Federal Mine Act (and the subsequent Black Lung 
Benefits Act of 1972), he went beyond the measures he planned to adopt in the pursuit of 
working class support. As historian Jefferson Cowie shows, Nixon centered his plan to 
obtain blue-collar votes by focusing on workers’ moral and political ideals, rather than 
providing funding for social and welfare programs. In fact, Nixon originally hoped to 
increase his working class support without additional federal programs. His goal was not 
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to improve the economic conditions of the working class, but to rely on this group to 
solve major issues such as crime, drugs, and defense. Nixon believed that blue-collar 
voters were the key to solving the nation’s moral crisis. He was convinced that, if 
workers felt respected, they would be more likely to support his administration.18 His 
reluctant support of the Federal Mine Act, then, went beyond his original policy 
aspirations with regard to the working class, especially given the compensation 
program’s projected annual cost of $140 million.19 
 To a lesser extent, community activism also influenced Nixon’s decision to sign 
the bill. In late December, Ken Hechler paid for several widows of the Farmington 
disaster to travel to Washington D.C. Although Nixon did not meet with them directly, 
their presence reminded him of the importance of signing more effective health and 
safety legislation into law. For Nixon, the immense human suffering and physical 
discomfort caused by black lung, not to mention the loss of earning capacity that miners 
experienced when they were too sick to work, was not a major factor in his signing of the 
legislation. He signed the Federal Mine Act for political reasons, rather than moral ones. 
Yet, he signed into law the most comprehensive and stringent coal mine health and safety 
law to date. 
 
 
                                                 
18 Jefferson Cowie, “Nixon’s Class Struggle: Romancing the New Right Worker, 1969-
1973,” Labor History 43 (2002), 257-261.  
 
19 For full details of Nixon’s blue-collar strategy and its effectiveness, see Cowie, 
“Nixon’s Class Struggle,” 257-283; Jefferson Cowie, “Vigorously Left, Right, and 
Center: The Crosscurrents of Working-Class America in the 1970s,” America in the 
Seventies, edited by Beth Bailey and David Farber (Lawrence: University of Kansas 
Press, 2004), 75-106. 
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Coal Miners and the Problems of Federal Enforcement 
As the story of Robert Byrd’s black lung compensation reform plans shows, an 
inefficient and industry-orientated federal bureaucracy undermined the legislative 
advances in the Federal Coal Mine Act of 1969. In the months after the passage of the 
legislation, at least half of the nation’s black lung victims were unable to obtain 
compensation, while there was an increase in coal mine fatalities. Miners and their 
supporters approached this problem by extending their campaign of community-based 
activism. Throughout 1970, rank and file miners, with the support of their families, 
widows, and retired and disabled miners, conducted demonstrations and work stoppages 
to protest the federal government’s weak enforcement of the Federal Mine Act. They 
were, to a large extent, also protesting against the United Mine Workers, which they 
believed was not doing enough to promote safe working conditions in the mines or to 
provide hospital care and pensions to retired or disabled miners. Coal miners and local 
and district union leaders expanded the grassroots campaign in the coalfields by writing 
letters to their Congressmen about the inefficiency of the Bureau of Mines, particularly 
its failure to inspect non-union coal mines. By late 1971, the Bureau’s enforcement of 
health and safety in the coal industry had started to improve. 
  From 1971, the Black Lung Association expanded into several other states and 
protested against the central office of the Social Security Administration, with the 
intention of improving its management of the black lung compensation program. The 
BLA also engaged in an extensive lobbying campaign in Washington D.C., in an effort to 
persuade legislators to strengthen the legislation governing the benefits program. Again, 
the BLA demonstrated the effectiveness of community activism in generating significant 
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legislative change. In May 1972, Congress passed the Black Lung Benefits Act, which 
Nixon signed into law the same month. Despite the liberal provisions of the act, which 
included less stringent eligibility criteria for miners and the provision of benefits to 
double orphans, thousands of claimants still failed to obtain compensation. By 1977, 
when President Jimmy Carter entered the White House, the federal government’s failure 
to provide an adequate compensation program for black lung disease was evident.  
 The Carter administration provided further confirmation that the federal 
government typically reformed health and safety legislation in response to major mining 
disasters, not the persistent hazards, such as roof collapses, that killed miners on a daily 
basis. In 1977, the administration used a major disaster at the Scotia mine in Kentucky in 
March 1976, which killed 26 miners, as the basis for strengthening the Federal Coal Mine 
Act. Congress passed the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, which provided 
comprehensive health and safety measures for all types of mine, including those in the 
metal and non-metal industries, in October 1977. Carter signed the act into law shortly 
afterwards. On this occasion, however, President Carter was not responding solely to the 
Scotia disaster. By signing the legislation, he was also acknowledging the declining 
health and safety standards in the nation’s mines during the energy crisis. In 1978, Carter 
also signed legislation that created the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. 
 Although designed to improve significantly conditions in the nation’s coal mines, 
the Federal Mine Act of 1977 did not fulfill its potential. When Ronald Reagan became 
president in 1981, he began an extensive program of deregulation. His massive staff and 
budgetary cuts to the Mine Safety and Health Administration, responsible for 
enforcement under the 1977 Act, led to an increase in black lung disease and injuries. 
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Furthermore, his administration’s overhaul of the black lung compensation program 
meant that miners and their dependents again struggled to obtain benefits. Reagan’s eight 
years in office provided clear evidence that federal bureaucracy restricted the scope of 
legislative change in coal mine health and safety. 
From 1968 to 1988, coal miners and their supporters engaged in community 
activism to obtain significant advances in coal mine health and safety legislation. 
Through grassroots protest, they pushed legislators to pass laws at the state and federal 
levels that improved working conditions and provided compensation for the victims of 
black lung. At the national level, they were assisted by President Nixon’s support of their 
cause, although Nixon was motivated more by his own political goals than the welfare of 
the country’s miners. Weak federal enforcement of the new legislation, however, 
undermined the achievements of the grassroots protest movement. Initially, miners and 
their supporters addressed the failures in the federal bureaucracy by extending their 
community activism. Ultimately, however, federal management of health and safety 
enforcement and the black lung compensation program went into decline.  
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ABSTRACT 
Fighting for Survival: Coal Miners and the Struggle Over Health and Safety in the 
United States, 1968-1988. 
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Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
My dissertation focuses on coal mining and occupational health and safety in the 
United States from 1968 to 1985. In the late 1960s, coal miners faced the constant risk of 
injury, occupational disease, and death. The dangerous conditions in the coal industry 
resulted in a massive explosion at the Farmington mine in West Virginia in 1968, which 
killed 78 miners. The Farmington disaster spurred miners to campaign for the reform of 
state and federal coal mine health and safety laws in the United States. They rejected the 
national leadership of their union, the United Mine Workers (UMW), which they 
perceived as corrupt and inattentive to their concerns. Instead, they engaged in activism 
at the local level, with the support of their families, activists, liberal politicians, and 
progressive physicians. They sought improved preventative legislation and compensation 
for the victims of pneumoconiosis, or ‘black lung,’ a debilitating, work-related 
respiratory disease. 
My study emphasizes the importance of community in the miners’ campaign for 
the political reform of coal mine health and safety laws. I argue that sustained community 
activism enabled miners to achieve legislative change, including improved protective 
  
 
383
laws and compensation programs, in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Coal miners and 
their communities played a significant role in the passage of a black lung compensation 
law in West Virginia in March 1969 and in the passage of the Federal Coal Mine Health 
and Safety Act of 1969. They continued to engage in grassroots protest when they 
realized that the agencies responsible for upholding the new federal legislation, the U.S. 
Bureau of Mines and the Social Security Administration (SSA), were not fulfilling their 
responsibilities. The Bureau of Mines failed to enforce the health and safety measures in 
the Federal Mine Act, while the SSA denied federal black lung benefits to tens of 
thousands of miners. The campaign of sustained activism by miners and their supporters 
led to the passage of the Black Lung Benefits Act in 1972. Furthermore, it enabled a 
reform organization called Miners for Democracy to win democratic control of the 
United Mine Workers in 1972. In the early 1970s, coal miners demonstrated that they 
were not passive actors, but rather determined, conscious protestors. Ultimately, 
however, an inefficient and industry-orientated federal bureaucracy undermined the 
activists’ achievements and led to a decline in coal mine health and safety.  
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